



# Amplifying Voices for the Protection of Civilians

**PAX PoC Program Annual Report 2021**

## PAX Protection of Civilians (PoC) Program

The PAX PoC programs seeks to increase the effectiveness of PoC interventions by facilitating that civilians can hold local and international security actors to account, and by enabling and motivating security actors to design and implement protection strategies that are civilian-centered.

PAX works together with committed citizens and partners to protect civilians against acts of war, to end armed violence, and to build a just peace.

For more information about this program please visit [www.protectionofcivilians.org](http://www.protectionofcivilians.org). You are also welcome to contact Hans Rouw, PoC Program Lead ([rouw@paxforpeace.nl](mailto:rouw@paxforpeace.nl)) or Carrie Huisman, PoC Partnership Coordinator ([huisman@paxforpeace.nl](mailto:huisman@paxforpeace.nl)).

**Cover photo:** Scott Peterson/Liaison ([Getty Images](#)), Italian Troops Retake Checkpoint in Mogadishu, Somalia on 9 July 1993

**Photo credits:** All other images and graphics presented in this report were taken by PAX PoC team staff, aside from photos from the annual PoC Conference, which were by [Lize Kraan](#).

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs

## PAX

PAX means peace. PAX works with people in conflict areas and concerned citizens worldwide to build just and peaceful societies. PAX brings together people who dare to stand for peace. Everyone who believes in peace can contribute. We believe that all these steps, whether small or large, inevitably lead to the greater sum of peace.

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# 1. PROGRAM SUMMARY

## Programmatic Theory of Change

PAX is the largest peace organization in the Netherlands. We work to protect civilians against acts of war, to end armed violence, and to build inclusive peace. We work in conflict areas worldwide, together with local partners and communities who – just like us – believe that everyone has a right to a dignified life in a peaceful society.

The following report reflects upon the period from January-December 2021 for PAX's Protection of Civilians (PoC) Program, *Amplifying Voices for the Protection of Civilians: Improving standards and accountability of PoC and military operations*. The ambitious initiative was developed by PAX in close consultation with our strategic partners within the Department of Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid (DSH) at the Dutch

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). **The PoC Program is designed to enable national and international PoC actors to develop and implement security interventions that are more inclusive, civilian-focused and relevant to local protection needs. It is also central to our purpose to help civilians hold these PoC actors accountable for fulfilling their responsibilities to ensure adequate human security.** The ultimate goal of the PoC Program is that to civilians living in conflict are safer and are able to live their lives free from fear. Our programmatic approach involves four core components:



Figure 1. The program's Theory of Change puts civilians at the center

### In-Depth Research

Through ongoing initiatives like the Human Security Survey (HSS), and detailed explorations of protection themes or case studies, PAX seeks to center the experiences and perspectives of civilians living in conflict. Working hand-in-hand with local experts and researchers, PAX interviews people about security risks they face, the enduring effects of violence on their communities, and prospects for further conflict or peace. This research informs our advocacy, training, and community engagement efforts.

### Dialogue

The findings of the HSS and other research efforts are used to elevate the voices of civilians in their engagements with relevant governments, armed groups, and international military missions. Using detailed and disaggregated data, local civil society can advocate for the interests of often marginalized communities and hold security providers accountable for fulfilling their protection duties in an inclusive way.

### Advice & Training

PAX develops and delivers tailored training and practical exercises for military personnel and missions, both pre-deployment and in the field. We aim to help militaries understand local dynamics, the expectations of civilians, and how to utilize threat-based approaches and community engagement to remain relevant and assess effectiveness. We also provide detailed advice regarding best practices in tracking, responding to, and mitigating civilian harm at the level of both field missions and headquarters.

### Influencing Policy

Using lessons learned in the field, we inform security-focused policy discussions at key international institutions like the UN, NATO, and the EU. We connect local security needs to policy makers at the international level to make protection strategies more relevant and inclusive. We do this through advocacy, convening expert roundtables, and organizing an annual PoC Conference.

PAX's PoC team includes thematic and process experts from around the world, and we implement all aspects of the program in close coordination with trusted international partner organizations, as well as our counterparts at the Dutch MFA. For a detailed version of the program's Results Framework, please refer to Annex 3.3.

## Overview of PoC Projects

The PoC Program includes four complementary projects that work from the grassroots to the international level, collectively addressing both the supply and demand sides of protection.

### Human Security Survey (HSS)

The [Human Security Survey](#) is a unique research and dialogue methodology developed by PAX's PoC



team to expand civilians' voice and agency on the key protection issues that affect them. Currently implemented as two separate projects in Iraq and South Sudan, PAX and its partners conduct large-scale quantitative research on a wide range of topics, including the nature of security threats facing civilians, the impact of these experiences on their daily lives, and civilians' expectations for the future. We bring the research findings back to local communities to facilitate dialogue about civilian security priorities with key authorities from local government, security forces, religious and social institutions, local armed groups, and civil society. At the international level, the HSS is used to influence the policymaking and strategies of diplomats and security institutions active in these environments by providing first-hand data about the realities facing conflict-affected populations. The HSS is increasingly complemented by other research endeavors, including longitudinal Expert Panel Surveys in South Sudan and detailed qualitative studies in Iraq.

### Engaging International Actors on PoC (EIA)

The commitment to protecting civilians in conflict is firmly on the international agenda, and key institutions like the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) possess defined policies around PoC. In practice, however, missions still struggle to effectively protect civilians living in situations of conflict. It is challenging to identify the population's various protection needs and then to match these to the often limited capabilities and resources available to a given mission. The [EIA project](#) addresses that challenge: PAX connects international PoC actors with communities living in conflict both directly and indirectly through policy debates, conferences, and advocacy exchanges. This serves to help policymakers develop more appropriate and strategic policies, and creates opportunities for local civil society to hold decision makers accountable. PAX also aims to generate and share actionable learning for the broader protection field with civilian perspectives at the center.

### Protection in Practice (PiP)

For a mission to succeed, military personnel must thoroughly understand both their own responsibilities and the operating context. To act in accordance with PoC policy and mitigate potential civilian harm, military personnel need to be adequately trained and equipped with the right technical capabilities. The [PiP project](#) seeks to meet the information needs of international military actors and institutions from a variety of different angles. PAX contributes to PoC-focused training and exercise modules that are grounded in field realities. PAX also advises missions and disseminates best practices regarding data-driven decision making and how to evaluate the effectiveness of military interventions from a civilian protection lens. Finally, this project facilitates greater transparency and accountability of military missions by promoting clear guidelines and methods for tracking, reporting, and responding to civilian casualties and other forms of civilian harm.

### Program Partners

PAX works with a number of trusted local and international partners in execution of the PoC Program. Many of the below organizations are longstanding partners of PAX, and others reflect newer relationships. Some work at the national or international levels, and others are very rooted in their local communities. Together the program benefits from the vast technical, operational, and geographically-grounded expertise of its implementation team. Below is an overview of each of the core partners engaged in this program:

#### Al-Ghad League for Woman & Child Care (Al-Ghad)

Al-Ghad is a national NGO based in Iraq. Their mission is to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people in several governorates across the country. They are actively engaged in projects promoting the wellbeing of women and children, including raising awareness about mines and

explosives, educational and recreational programs, financial aid, and protection assistance.

#### Assistance Mission for Africa (AMA)

AMA is a South Sudanese NGO working to promote human rights and communities to work towards their own development. They also work on peace and

community security, social justice, sustainability, livelihoods, and capacity development.

#### Intimacies of Remote Warfare (IRW)

The Intimacies of Remote warfare is an independent, evidence-based research program within the Utrecht University Centre for Global Challenges that aims to inform scholars, policymakers, and the public about the realities of today's remote wars.

#### Iraqi Al-Amal Association (Al-Amal)

Al-Amal is a non-political, non-sectarian NGO that builds capacity and raises awareness about social issues in Iraq. Its goal is to foster peace, sustainable development, gender equality, and respect for human rights, and has programs around income generation, advocacy on law reform, psycho-social support, legal assistance, and training courses.

#### Iraqi Al-Firdaws Society (Al-Firdaws)

Al-Firdaws is a local NGO based in Iraq that promotes women's rights and supports youth, particularly greater economic empowerment and political participation. They provide training and education on leadership skills and democracy, and engage diverse communities to work together for a better future. Al-Firdaws also works to demilitarize communities and support those who are affected by conflict.

#### Justice and Peace Commission-Catholic Diocese of Torit (JPC-CDoT)

JPC-CDoT is a faith-based organization working in South Sudan that actively engages with diverse communities to work for a better future for the members of the community and for more peace and security in their region as a whole.

#### The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

The Netherlands is committed to building a safe, stable and prosperous world. To contribute to this broader foreign policy goal, the Department of Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid (DSH) uses an integrated approach to humanitarian aid, reconstruction programs and improvement of security, rule of law, and governance, particularly in crisis and (post-)conflict settings. The PoC team partners with the Dutch MFA to develop training modules on PoC and provides policy advice based on research in conflict area

#### The Stimson Center (Stimson)

Stimson is a neutral policy research center working to promote international security, shared prosperity and justice through applied research and independent analysis, deep engagement, and policy innovation. Headquartered in Washington, DC, their award-winning research serves as a roadmap to address borderless threats through coordinated action. Stimson provides strategic guidance to NATO on PoC issues.

#### Wand Al-Khair Human Organization (WAHO)

WAHO is an Iraqi NGO on a mission to ensure a dignified life for people affected by displacement, including host communities. To achieve this, they organize a variety of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding activities to protect human rights, promote social justice, and battle discrimination. WAHO implements projects to advocate for women's empowerment, provide legal assistance, support emergency livelihoods, and enhance access to justice.

In addition to the formal partnerships described above, PAX also worked closely in 2021 with institutions like the **Finch Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT)** to develop and deliver PoC training modules; **InterAction** and members of the US-based Protection Working Group on joint advocacy; the **Cordillera Applications Group (CAG)** in designing and facilitating a military tabletop exercise for the **First German/Netherlands Corps (1GNC)**; an NGO Consortium made up of peer organizations, including **Open State Foundation**, **Airwars**, the **Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)**, **University of Utrecht**, **Amnesty International**, and occasionally the **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**, as part of the Roadmap Process; and CIVIC again as co-producers and co-hosts of the [Civilian Protection Podcast](#).

## Context Analysis

### PoC at the International Level

There are a number of positive developments in the thematic space relevant to this program, particularly within the policymaking arena at the UN, EU, and NATO, but also within key countries and member states.

The **United Nations** remained a key institution with which to engage in 2021. Towards the end of the year we noticed a growing appetite at the **UN headquarters** level to revisit institutional understanding of how protection of civilians and civilian harm are conceptualized throughout diverse UN entities. While world conditions impeded our ability to convene in-person events and advocacy meetings with

UN counterparts, we continued to provide input into policy debates and to [organize events](#) on the sidelines of key debates relevant to PoC themes, particularly around peacekeeping training, community engagement, and the environmental effects of conflict.

At **NATO**, the existing PoC Policy provides a very solid foundation from which the Alliance will build an implementation strategy for its partners to take forward into practice. In 2021 we noticed a new drive to progress the implementation of the policy with the publication of the PoC Handbook and several adaptations of PoC training modules. While the policy environment and ambitions embedded within NATO are strong, the Alliance will need to dedicate more focus and resources to the next phase of integrating these concepts into current and future field missions. The departure from Afghanistan in 2021 exemplified the need to have a thorough understanding of human security situations and how these are affected by the ever changing supply and demand for security. PAX and Stimson continue to engage very closely with NATO through a variety of research, advocacy, and training efforts. Notably, in 2021, PAX and Stimson ran a [military tabletop exercise](#) (TTX) focused around the PoC implications of high-intensity urban conflict, hosted by the First German/Netherlands Corps (1GNC). This was the first time that an NGO had facilitated such an exercise, and further helped to position this program as one of a handful of outside entities actively engaging with NATO on these themes.

The **European Union** emerged as a relevant stakeholder on PoC issues last year as well. In March 2021, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union established the European Peace Facility (EPF). The adoption of the EPF creates a new mechanism by which the EU will provide support – notably financial resources, training, and military equipment – to third-country armed forces and regional military operations. PAX and peer organizations continue to have [significant reservations](#) about the EPF and its potential implications for civilian security, and will remain engaged in monitoring and providing advice during its implementation phase to ensure efforts are taken to mitigate civilian harm and institute accountability in the case of abuses.

In **the Netherlands**, we witnessed a changing attitude towards transparency around civilian harm incidents, with new and meaningful interactions between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and civil society, as well as the establishment of the Sorgdrager Committee investigating the Dutch airstrike on Hawija, Iraq in 2015. PAX and peer institutions played an active role in facilitating these changes and anticipated policy changes – particularly by coordinating the “Roadmap Process” – and we look forward to actively collaborating with our counterparts at the MFA and MoD in advancing the Netherlands as a champion of PoC both domestically and on the international stage.

## Iraq

In October 2021, Iraq held parliamentary elections that were followed by significant violence in Baghdad and a failed assassination attempt on the Prime Minister. These events highlighted a number of prevailing conflict dynamics in the country. There remain deep political divisions in Iraq that impede the basic functioning of government institutions and breed mistrust among the public. A vast protest movement, underway since 2019, continues to call for the government to address rampant corruption, unemployment, and inadequate public services. Murders and kidnappings of high-profile activists persist, threatening public support for the security sector. In recent years there were a number of very public instances of Iraqi security forces (mainly the Federal Police) abusing their authority, including numerous documented cases of security forces harming peaceful protesters or exacting false confessions under torture. Additionally, armed militias – many of which are funded, trained, and equipped by neighboring Iran – operate as informal, unaccountable armed groups with disruptive political aims. **Iraq continues to experience a slow, burning crisis in the form of civic unrest, while still facing more acute and active threats from militias, ISIS, and other terrorist threats**, none of which national authorities seem capable of responding to effectively.

## South Sudan

The implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) peace accord, originally signed in September 2018, continues to lag behind schedule. It is hard to imagine that its provisions will be fulfilled in advance of elections scheduled to take place before the end of 2022, which could be another flashpoint for conflict. The international community continues to encourage South Sudanese to fully implement the peace agreement, although the government to date has been unwilling or unable to do. Both the government and opposition leaders have treated the agreement as a way to regroup and prepare for more struggle, rather than a means for addressing systemic governance issues. Simultaneously, climate-induced floods, displacement, and other contextual factors are fueling further conflict. **Many regions in the country are experiencing a worsening security situation and an upsurge in intra-communal tensions and violence.** The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is struggling to address these outbreaks of violence and implement a new PoC strategy following their withdrawal from the official PoC sites (aside from Malakal). The ongoing power vacuum at national and local levels in South Sudan, coupled with inadequate and ill-equipped security forces and growing effects of climate change, leave civilians extremely vulnerable to new cycles of conflict.

## COVID-19 Pandemic

COVID-19 continued to impact our work throughout 2021. Pandemic conditions required that we maintain a hybrid form of working, with limited access to our own offices and even more restricted opportunities to travel to convene or attend in-person events. The pandemic also affected the effective functioning of some UN and NATO operations and their ability to engage directly with the communities they support.

The pandemic forced us to remain flexible; for every activity we had to make contingency plans, sometimes postponing events or switching from physical to online settings. For the 2<sup>nd</sup> year in a row the most significant impact of the pandemic was that it impeded our plans to engage more actively with UN and other security-providing entities on the ground in target countries like Iraq and South Sudan. There was a window later in the year when travel became more possible (if costly and bureaucratic due to rigorous testing and documentation requirements), which PAX and its partners utilized to the best of our abilities. However, other ambitions to deepen relationships with field missions are again delayed until conditions allow.

Accessibility to the UN, EU, and NATO headquarters, as well as key member states around the world improved compared to 2020 as people and institutions adjusted to working remotely and engaging online. In response, PAX and its partners invested in producing high-quality [hybrid and virtual events](#), conducting more remote advocacy, and expanding our professional network (for instance, through increased social media engagement and expanding our [online newsletter](#) distribution). We also developed a [podcast series](#) in partnership with CIVIC in order to reach new audiences and bring civilian perspectives on PoC to the international level. **While remote virtual engagement remained far from ideal for the type of deep and sustained relationship building and institutional support we seek to achieve under this program, we are certain that these new ways of working enabled us to continue making progress towards our desired results in 2021.**



## Key Results Achieved

# PoC Program Level Dashboard - 2021

Below is a summary of key metrics regarding the impact, context, and visibility of the PoC Program in 2021, as well as an overview of budget utilization to date.

## DSH Standard Indicators

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of formal/informal institutions strengthened in the field of human security	6	10	23		39
# of people trained in the field of human security	0	97	187		284

## Context Indicators

### Fragile States Index (FSI)

The **Security Apparatus indicator** considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism; as well as serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security.

The **Group Grievance Indicator** focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process.

	2019	2020	2021	Ranking		2019	2020	2021	Ranking
Iraq	8,7	8,2	7,9	20 <sup>th</sup>	Iraq	8,8	8,5	8,2	20 <sup>th</sup>
South Sudan	9,7	9,4	9,7	4 <sup>th</sup>	South Sudan	9,4	9,1	8,8	4 <sup>th</sup>

\* Scores are from 1-10, with 10 the least positive. Rankings are by fragility score in 2021; 179 countries are analyzed for these years.

### Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

# of estimated fatalities resulting from political violence per year: **ACLED** defines events of violence against civilians as incidents where an organized armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants, and specifically includes sexual violence, attacks, and abduction/ forced disappearance.

	2019	2020	2021	Total	Note: PAX also includes those killed as a result of protests or riots from the same dataset given the likelihood that these are civilians. According to their codebook, ACLED excludes casualties associated with battles, explosions, or remote violence because they are presumed to be aimed at military targets. This is a potential data limitation in both contexts.
Iraq	702	418	355	1475	
South Sudan	976	665	946	2487	

## Program Visibility

Publications & Events	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of presentations or events by program staff or partners on general PoC or human security themes	0	3	8		11
# of attendees at annual PoC Conference	54	418	323		795
# of online views of HSS Iraq publications	327	841	932		2100
# of online views of HSS South Sudan publications	167	352	1310		1829

### Social Media & Podcast

# of recipients of PoC Newsletter	232	# of followers of PoC Twitter *	910
# of average monthly visitors to PoC website in 2021	709	# of members of PoC LinkedIn page *	1086
# of HSS followers on Facebook *	844	# of listeners to Civilian Protection podcast *	1939

\* As of April 2022

## Annual Partner Meeting

From 23-25 February 2021, PAX convened its annual PoC Program Annual Partner Meeting. Given pandemic conditions, the event was fully virtual and took place over Zoom. However, it still **provided a valuable moment for connection and collaboration across our many partners, projects, and contexts.**

In total, approximately 45 participants from across the program participated in some or all of the Partner Meeting. These included representatives from each of our partner organizations in Iraq, South Sudan, and the United States; colleagues from relevant country and thematic programs across PAX; policy experts from the Dutch MFA; and the entire PAX PoC team. Live interpretation between English and Arabic was available for all relevant sessions.

The agenda included a mix of plenary discussions, short pitches and presentations, as well as smaller-group breakout sessions. These provided program partners with the opportunity to share their biggest successes and challenges in 2020, as well as their core ambitions for their work in 2021. We also discussed opportunities for innovation and how to amplify our advocacy efforts both at the country level and collectively at the international level. We were pleased to have a dedicated moment to introduce new partners to the program, such as JPC-CDoT and WAHO, and also very happy to share the virtual stage with our counterparts from the Dutch MFA, who facilitated a conversation on what “people-centered security” means from our various different perspectives. Finally, we organized a couple of moments for social interaction, including an online trivia session and a “Fail Fair,” where people shared personal stories of learning from particularly unsuccessful moments in their work.




Figure 2. Virtual discussion during the Annual Partner Meeting

While everyone would have much preferred to convene together in person and devote more time and focus to this annual moment of engagement across the program, the feedback we received on how the event was organized (both in terms of content and logistics) was on the whole very positive.

## Midterm Program Evaluation

In Q4 2021, the PAX initiated an external midterm evaluation of its PoC Program. We developed and disseminated a detailed terms of reference to recruit qualified evaluation teams who could help us **to explore important questions about the effectiveness and sustainability of our program at a point when we can both learn from what is working well, but still make course corrections to shift our strategy or approaches to improve before the end of the current funding cycle.**

PAX identified a number of core evaluation questions at the outset of the process around the themes of effectiveness and sustainability; although, we decided that a core aspect of the Inception Phase (starting in Q1 2022) would be a participatory exercise with PAX and its partners to further refine, delineate, and contextualize the lines of inquiry to ensure their relevance and utility, and to secure buy-in from relevant programmatic stakeholders for the process.

In December, PAX selected a combined evaluation team made up of thematic and process experts from WINS Global Consult and Innovation Consulting & Solutions (ICS). The evaluation process is designed to include fieldwork in both Iraq and South Sudan, and remote interviews with international stakeholders from the UN, NATO, EU, and relevant member states, as well as our partners at the Dutch MFA. The process will conclude in June 2022.

## Learning Agenda

On 20-21 July 2021, the PoC team (with support from PAX's dedicated Learning Advisor) came together outside of our typical project siloes to engage in joint learning activities. The 2-day event included a mix of practical skill-building, facilitated discussions around one of our core program-level learning questions, and strategic conversations about joint activities in the second half of the year.

We began with a meta-level exploration of our own learning approaches as individuals and a team. Each team member filled out a "learning styles self-assessment" associated with David Kolb's typology of [experiential learning profiles](#). We had an interesting conversation about how team members trend towards different forms of learning (classified by Kolb as "accommodating," "diverging," "converging," or "assimilating"), and how this serves to facilitate or impede sharing lessons or putting them effectively into practice within our team.

In an effort to promote active learning, we also enlisted the help of an expert from the Pitch Academy to conduct 2 tailored trainings for PoC team staff on how to deliver concise and effective "pitches" in and about our work. One was held in person at the PAX office and the second was organized online for those based abroad. Together we learned how to identify, refine, and tailor core messages in order to better inform our target audiences, and we had extensive opportunities to practice and provide one other with feedback.

The rest of the learning event was focused primarily around practical and interactive discussions around one of our program's core learning questions: Are data and evidence enough? How do we go beyond generating interesting information towards fostering ownership for taking action rooted in local priorities? **Our goals were to consolidate some key lessons learned to date, to co-create plans for further investigation and implementation of these lessons in practice, and to generally maintain a culture of applied learning within our program.** Together we reflected on moments in our work when we had been confronted with this question or felt like we were falling short of our own ambitions to generate change as a result of our research or advocacy. We also came up with an action plan for how to adapt our approach to more effectively cultivate political will and local ownership for actions that are rooted in civilians' needs, specifically looking at our research, advocacy, and training efforts planned for 2021-2022. These included easy-to-implement actions, such as ensuring that all of our narrative analyses and policy briefs include clear and targeted recommendations, or to become active members of coalitions like the US-based PoC Working Group. We also identified some longer-term priorities, such as organizing crash courses in advocacy for local partners in Iraq and South Sudan, and incorporating more qualitative stories into our data-heavy research reports. Since this event, we have made progress towards each of these efforts and others.

## Lessons Learned at Program Level

PAX and its partners are committed to learning both in and from our work under this program. Below are each of the core learning questions that we identified at the program level during the first year of the program – each of which remain pressing and relevant to this day – followed by a few of the key lessons learned over the course of 2021.

### 1. What does meaningful accountability to civilians in conflict really look like in practice?

- How does it differ for different protection actors and institutions both nationally and internationally? What are the best interventions to build and foster this kind of accountability? How can we observe and assess our influence on these accountability dynamics?

PAX's approach to both exploring this question and trying to address the broader issue is to meaningfully connect civilians living in conflict to those actors at the national and international levels who are responsible for the so-called "supply side" of protection. While meaningful accountability is context-specific, in our experience it requires frequent, sustained engagement, as well as honest two-way dialogue about needs, capacities, priorities, and limitations.

In 2021, we leveraged our international network and platform to convene deep discussions around this question, including 4 sessions we organized during our PoC Conference focused on accountability themes, “*Hawija as told by residents*,” “*Accountability in practice: examples from ISAF and AFRICOM*,” “*Waiting for accountability: 6 years after Hawija*,” and “*Accountability and Afghanistan: what now?*”<sup>1</sup> PAX and CIVIC also produced a podcast episode entitled “*In search of answers*,” which featured experts from Somalia and Yemen talking about the challenges civilians face in trying to get recognition or seek amends. In these conversations, each of which featured local civilian experts, we heard about the civilian harm implications of modern forms of warfare and learned about the demand side of accountability – particularly the importance of recognition and offering formal apologies in addition to tangible forms of recompense, such as *ex gratia* payments or in-kind assistance.

The PiP team (in coordination with HSS Iraq) also explored this question through our work documenting the reverberating effects of conflict on civilians – both through the book *On Civilian Harm*, as well as through *research in Hawija, Iraq* about the experiences of civilians since the 2015 Dutch airstrike. We carried this research and accumulated expertise with us into a policy dialogue with the Dutch government through the Roadmap Process (described in more detail in the PiP chapter of this report), and we have been providing detailed recommendations to the MFA and MoD on how to improve their civilian harm tracking, mitigation, and response in both policy and practice. However, in addition to helping prevent “future Hawijas” through better policy, we still see it as our responsibility to convey upward Iraqis’ sincere desires for recognition and for investments to rebuild and recover in this specific community as well.

## **2. What does constructive community engagement by CSOs, NGOs, the UN, local and national security actors and international institutions look like, both currently and ideally?**

- **Is this both necessary and sufficient for bottom-up accountability?**

For the EIA project one of the key lessons learned bridges this question and the one above about accountability. In 2021, it became clear that a targeted mechanism to enable local civil society to meet directly with international policymakers would benefit the outcomes of our work. Utilizing some underspent resources from 2020, PAX is initiating a Civil Society Engagement Fund to bridge these gaps and build more direct mechanisms for community engagement between civil society in conflict-affected countries and decision makers at the headquarters of international institutions. This effort is intended to both facilitate that guiding policies are informed by local perspectives and priorities, as well as contribute to greater “bottom-up” accountability. Based on research in Brussels and the Sahel we will kickstart this initiative in 2022, most likely focused initially on the EPF.

Our HSS South Sudan team reflected on experiences in the states where we work and compared these to observations from Juba. What they observed is that community engagement done with communities where they live often leads to different outcomes and conclusions than engagement efforts that take place in capital, particularly if facilitated by more top-down oriented institutions. The latter is not necessarily wrong or ineffective, but requires more effort to connect and strengthen engagement at both levels.

## **3. Are data and evidence enough? How do we go beyond generating interesting information towards fostering ownership for taking action rooted in local priorities?**

- **Do we sufficiently understand the needs, interests, motivations, or challenges of those we are trying to influence? Are our analyses appropriate and research outputs sufficiently tailored to our key audiences?**

This learning question was the focus our PoC team learning day in 2021 and generated very rich discussions and proposed actions. For each of our main stakeholders (local and national security actors in Iraq and South Sudan; UN, NATO, and EU headquarters institutions; international military missions; key member states and T/PCCs; international civil society; and civilians living in conflict)

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<sup>1</sup> Note that recordings of each of these sessions are also available in Arabic in the full [YouTube playlist](#).

we worked to discuss their needs, interests, motivations, and challenges, as well as opportunities for filling knowledge gaps through our programming. While there were far too many points than can be shared succinctly here, the outcomes were rich and practical. In short, while we as a program seem to understand the circumstances of those we are trying to influence, we do not always have sustained interactions and could do a better job of tailoring our findings and recommendations to specific stakeholders, rather than only producing general outputs that can be shared with multiple institutions, but meet none of their specific needs.

We believe that we have made significant progress in putting these ideas into practice through our engagements with the Dutch government through the Roadmap Process and our advocacy around Hawija in particular.

#### 4. What are the best mechanisms for internal engagement that go beyond information sharing and facilitate both strategic and practical collaboration?

- How can we effectively transfer institutional knowledge within and outside of the program (e.g. in terms of content, technical skills, networks, history)?

Our program team identified three key learning points from 2021 relevant to this idea of strategic collaboration. First, when it comes to effectively leveraging peer organizations and diplomatic allies, active participation in networks and coalitions can be key. PAX remained engaged in entities like the Group of Friends on PoC and joined InterAction's PoC Working Group in 2021, which enabled to remain connected to peers working on relevant peacebuilding, human security, and PoC issues even during the pandemic. Staying available and trustworthy despite challenging circumstances is a key main success factor, and we need to expand that capacity, particularly in New York and Brussels in 2022.

Secondly, we learned that we need to coordinate better with our colleagues within PAX as well, including from the Iraq and South Sudan country teams, and across both headquarters and field offices. This has developed into more frequent communication about general programmatic updates, but also into joint advocacy around areas of mutual interest. We are also trying to make more strategic use of PAX's Learning Advisor and similar technical specialists.

Thirdly, we are learned about the need to continue deepening relationships with our own partners. After 2 long years of working more from a distance, we have renewed appreciation for the in-person contact we are more accustomed to having with our partners. We prioritized being able to travel or bring our partners to the Netherlands during the brief windows when this was possible in 2021, and look forward to this being more possible in 2022. Further, we are focused on engaging further down the chain beyond the Directors or program heads of our various partner organizations to work directly with more of the general staff. This can bring greater efficiency and improve understanding of each other's contexts and challenges. It also serves to encourage younger staff members from partner organizations to gain confidence and skills through undertaking new responsibilities.

## Budget and Spending

### Budget Notes

The PoC Program spent well with regards to its proposed budget for 2021, ramping up implementation after two years of pandemic-induced delays and adaptations. Travel picked up again between the Netherlands, South Sudan, Iraq, and other countries, though still remained lower than originally anticipated. A number of planned in-person events or trainings were postponed, particularly for the EIA and PiP projects, whereas others shifted to online settings, resulting in decreased spending on travel, venues, and other associated costs.

**To date the program has utilized 47% of the total budget, which is appropriate given this report corresponds with us being halfway through a four-year program (plus a short inception phase in 2019).**



We are pleased with spend rate, as we have proven to meaningfully contribute to our outcomes, even during a highly disruptive global pandemic and all of the associated consequences.

We did not deviate by more than 10% from the budget as approved by DSH in our 2021 workplan, aside from items such as partner audit costs, which were accounted for within their general operating budgets and therefore are not separately reported, and contingencies, which have not been utilized as a result of remaining underspending from 2019-2020. Additional explanatory notes are provided below.

### Spending Summary 2021

	Budget (2021)	Actuals (2021)	Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
<b>A. PAX Central</b>						
A.1 PAX Central Personnel	€ 194.503	€ 206.462	€ 456.356	€ 6.812	€ 863.394	53%
A.2 PAX Central Activities	€ 60.000	€ 127.944	€ 302.936	€ 122.936	€ 300.000	101%
A.3 PAX Central Office	€ 218.694	€ 215.678	€ 471.524	-€ 26.759	€ 944.437	50%
A4. PAX Central Evaluations & Audits	€ 125.000	€ 24.563	€ 48.618	-€ 137.382	€ 511.000	10%
<i>Subtotal PAX Central</i>	€ 598.197	€ 574.646	€ 1.279.434	-€ 34.394	€ 2.618.831	49%
<b>B. HSS South Sudan</b>						
B.1 HSS South-Sudan Personnel	€ 161.955	€ 138.824	€ 315.699	-€ 52.262	€ 698.361	45%
B.2 HSS South-Sudan Activities	€ 178.565	€ 204.447	€ 292.674	-€ 145.036	€ 794.840	37%
B.3 HSS South-Sudan Audit & Other	€ 15.000	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 35.000	€ 65.000	0%
<i>Subtotal HSS South Sudan</i>	€ 355.520	€ 343.271	€ 608.373	-€ 232.298	€ 1.558.201	39%
<b>C. HSS Iraq</b>						
C.1 HSS Iraq Personnel	€ 161.955	€ 112.533	€ 274.623	-€ 99.738	€ 704.761	39%
C.2 HSS Iraq Activities	€ 194.906	€ 327.124	€ 449.120	€ 44.771	€ 794.161	57%
C.3 HSS Iraq Audit & Other	€ 62.850	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 135.969	€ 261.669	0%
<i>Subtotal HSS Iraq</i>	€ 419.711	€ 439.657	€ 723.743	-€ 190.936	€ 1.760.591	41%
<b>D. Engaging International Actors on PoC</b>						
D.1 EIA PAX Personnel	€ 114.707	€ 149.321	€ 341.545	€ 76.398	€ 499.158	68%
D.2 EIA PAX Activities	€ 64.250	€ 103.936	€ 124.432	-€ 21.118	€ 274.050	45%
D.3 EIA Stimson Personnel	€ 73.581	€ 52.138	€ 138.544	-€ 30.286	€ 219.356	63%
D.4 EIA Stimson Activities	€ 141.231	€ 153.186	€ 269.543	-€ 59.996	€ 423.693	64%
D.5 EIA Stimson Audit & Other	€ 67.549	€ 59.071	€ 102.548	-€ 54.211	€ 202.233	51%
<i>Subtotal EIA</i>	€ 461.318	€ 517.652	€ 976.613	-€ 89.212	€ 1.618.490	60%
<b>E. Protection in Practice</b>						
E.1 PiP Personnel	€ 168.082	€ 254.005	€ 376.369	€ 7.876	€ 711.394	53%
E.2 PiP Activities	€ 232.000	€ 248.525	€ 295.116	-€ 107.884	€ 817.000	36%
E.5 PiP Audit & Other	€ 6.000	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 13.000	€ 25.000	0%
<i>Subtotal PiP</i>	€ 406.082	€ 502.529	€ 671.484	-€ 113.009	€ 1.553.394	43%
<b>F. Overhead/Indirect costs</b>						
F.1 Staff support Costs	€ 83.176	€ 90.135	€ 192.368	€ 2.837	€ 359.216	54%
F.2 Not Directly Allocable Costs	€ 308.730	€ 376.866	€ 728.079	€ 22.818	€ 1.318.045	55%
<i>Subtotal Indirect</i>	€ 391.906	€ 467.001	€ 920.447	€ 25.656	€ 1.677.261	55%
Contingency	€ 52.655	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 116.286	€ 215.645	0%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>€ 2.685.389</b>	<b>€ 2.844.757</b>	<b>€ 5.180.094</b>	<b>-€ 750.478</b>	<b>€ 11.002.413</b>	<b>47%</b>

### Comments by Project

#### PoC Central

- Activity costs under the PoC Central line item are higher than originally projected as a result of some costs associated with the annual PoC Conference in both 2020 and 2021 being charged to the program level, rather than the

EIA project. Activities planned for 2022 at the program level – including the midterm evaluation and annual learning event – will draw from underspent activity resources elsewhere in the program.

### HSS Iraq

- New bureaucratic procedures imposed by the Directorate of NGOs in Baghdad in 2021 now require that both national and international organizations receive prior approval from the DNGO prior to undertaking any sort of “assessment” activity in the country. Our project partners responsible for overseeing the HSS data collection processes in Kirkuk and Salahaddin governorates were unable to acquire said approval in 2021, meaning that no data collection could occur in either region. We had originally planned to do 4 full survey rounds, so only met half of our target.
- Partner audit costs for our local partners in Iraq were accounted for within their general operating budgets and therefore are not separately reported herein.

### HSS South Sudan

- Anticipating ongoing pandemic limitations, the HSS South Sudan team had only planned to do 2 rounds of data collection in 2021, a target which we met. Hopefully it will be possible to complete 5 full rounds in 2022, as indicated in our annual workplan.
- Partner audit costs for our local partners in Iraq and South Sudan were accounted for within their general operating budgets and therefore are not separately reported herein.

### EIA

- Planned in-person events in New York, such as those on the sidelines of policy debates like UN

PoC Week and the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) were all held online in 2021, resulting in lower than anticipated activity costs.

- Some activity costs associated with the annual PoC Conference were accounted for under the PoC Central category, rather than EIA, resulting in slightly lower spending in 2021 than planned.
- The original partnership contract with Stimson ran only through October 2021; however, we together decided to extend the partnership through the end of the grant period in order to allow for more time to achieve intended institutional changes at NATO. Additional comments are detailed in the EIA chapter of this report.

### PiP

- A number of key activities, such as planned international launch events around the publication of our book, *On Civilian Harm*, were postponed until 2022 as a result of travel limitations. Other events, including various trainings, shifted to online settings. Both of these adaptations resulted in lower than anticipated activity spending.
- Previously, PAX accounted for the staffing costs of our two Military Advisors under activity costs, as they joined the program in consulting capacities. In this report and going forward, they will be counted towards personnel so as to more accurately reflect how those resources are allocated.

## For More Information

- Visit our website, [www.protectionofcivilians.org](http://www.protectionofcivilians.org), to read a wide variety of **publications** produced by PAX and its partners, including:
  - Interactive data dashboards, infographics, and analytical report from our HSS research in **Iraq** and **South Sudan**
  - The book *On Civilian Harm*, or any of its individual chapters (as well as a short **animated video** summarizing the book’s core themes)
  - A wide variety of research reports, policy briefs, event readouts, and blog articles on various PoC themes (also linked to throughout this report)
- Watch broadcasts of **online or hybrid events** from 2021, including:
  - 14 expert sessions from our **Annual PoC Conference** (in English, Arabic, or French)
  - A **launch event** for the book *On Civilian Harm*
  - UN PoC Week side events on *Emerging Practices in Effective Civilian Harm Mitigation* and on *Protecting the Environment is Protecting Civilians*

- A UN Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW) side event on *The Role of Women Leaders: How to Increase Women's Participation in the Military and Peacekeeping?*
- Listen to the entire first season of the **Civilian Protection Podcast**, including 3 episodes produced in 2021 focusing on documenting civilian harm in Iraq; seeking recognition and amends for harm in Somalia and Yemen; and on people-centered peacekeeping in Central African Republic and South Sudan.
- Sign up for our periodic **online newsletter** and follow PAX and its partners on social media:
  - Like our Human Security Survey projects on **Facebook** to receive regular updates about our work in Iraq and South Sudan.
  - Join our **PoC Program LinkedIn page** to read about developments in the field and engage with likeminded peers.
  - Follow **@PAXPoC** on Twitter for additional commentary on our work and items in the news.

## 2.1 PROJECT CHAPTER: Human Security Survey – Iraq

### Progress summary

The HSS Iraq project achieved significant successes in 2021, including results reflecting meaningful progress towards our longer-term desired outcomes. These include community level initiatives conducted by community champions that were lauded by local authorities, as well as strategic engagement with key national security institutions like the Iraqi National Security Advisory (NSA) towards the end of the year.



Figure 3. HSS Iraq progress in 2021

When it comes to implementing activities as laid out in the original workplan, PAX and its partners faced a series of delays and challenges that hampered the generation of regular outputs. For instance, data collection could not take place in either Kirkuk or Salahaddin governorates in 2021 because of new permission procedures put in place by the Directorate of NGOs (DNGO). This had ripple effects for the activities that traditionally build upon the survey research during each cycle, meaning that we had fewer opportunities to convene communities and authorities for dialogues about local security dynamics and priorities in a number of targeted governorates.

**The guiding focus for the year was how to move beyond just data collection and have a greater focus on utilizing the results, particularly for community engagement.** Instead of creating formal community security committees, which in certain locations can be challenging, the project piloted training so-called “community champions” from each of the HSS locations. These groups – largely made up of youth activists – then designed and implemented small, tailored interventions they wished to undertake in their communities focused around human security and peacebuilding. This pilot initiative generated positive results at the local level, and is something we will replicate and expand in the coming years.

### Context Analysis & Adaptations

#### Protection Dynamics in Iraq

Iraq held parliamentary elections on 10 October 2021. The voter turnout was just over 40%, among the lowest on record, in part because many youth activities called on their supporters to boycott the elections. Sadrists won the highest number of seats, but are in no way the clear majority. The pro-Iran Fatah Alliance won only 17 seats out of the total 329 – far fewer than in the previous parliament – and their disappointed supporters responded in the “Baghdad clashes” in November. People affiliated with pro-Iranian militias attempted to storm the Green Zone and government forces responded with force. The incident left 125 people injured and 2 people dead. There was subsequently a failed assassination attempt on Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi in a drone attack two days later on 7 November, with all evidence pointing to one of the same Iran-backed militias being responsible. Thus far, no new Prime Minister has been appointed in Iraq, and Al-Kadhimi remains in the role on an interim basis.

While not fully reflective of the security situation in Iraq in 2021, this set of events highlights several prevailing conflict dynamics in the country. There are deep political divisions in Iraq at the moment that impede the functioning of government institutions and breed mistrust among the public. Armed militias – many of which are funded, trained, and equipped by neighboring Iran – operate as unaccountable, informal security forces capable of great disruption. If the Prime Minister is so vulnerable and unable to receive justice after a brazen threat to his security, what guarantees do everyday Iraqis have that they will be protected?

There are other changes underway in Iraq with more direct implications for our work. In November 2021, the Director-General of the DNGO in Iraq passed a new rule that any NGO operating in the country – national or international – needs to receive prior permission from the DNGO in order to conduct any sort of needs assessment anywhere in Iraq. Previously, a permission letter and security approval from the governor's office of the respective governorates was sufficient. Going through the effort to receive official permissions can require time and political capital, but can also have the indirect benefit of maintaining relationships or securing buy-in for the broader HSS process. However, **the potential risk is that Iraqi authorities will leverage their positions to disrupt or try to exert influence over our research efforts, especially regarding politically-charged topics or regions.**




Figure 4. PAX works in 4 governorates in Iraq

Given the sensitive nature of the contents of the HSS, one of our partners, the Iraqi Al-Amal Association (IAA) was unable to obtain permission to carry out data collection in either Kirkuk or Salahaddin governorates in 2021. Together, PAX and Al Amal made the decision to soften some of the terminology used in certain questions in the survey, and create two versions of the questionnaire – one which only contains the questions, and a second version which also contains the more detailed instructions and response options for the enumerators. The former will be used for obtaining relevant government permissions, while the latter will be used for training purposes and in the field. We will test out these new protocols and hope to have restored access in these governorates in 2022.

### COVID-19 Pandemic

Travelling to and within Iraq became more bureaucratic in 2021 as a result of rigorous COVID-19 testing requirements – at times even for travel between governorates – which meant that planning time and travel costs rose for certain activities. We also instituted our own protocols to ensure the health and safety of our partners and participants. For instance, prior to every meeting or training we organized, PAX and its partners made sure that all the participants could display negative test results. We also continued integrating social distancing and hygiene practices recommended by public health professionals into our research and dialogue activities. Beyond these necessary adaptations, the pandemic did not have a significant impact on project activities in 2021.

### Management & Partnerships

This year we signed two new partnerships in Iraq. One was with **Wand Al-Khair Human Organization (WAHO)** in Diyala governorate, a partner we identified and vetted during 2020 and formally began work with in 2021. Considering that WAHO is a new partner for PAX, we initially signed a 9-month contract with them, followed by a 2-month no-cost extension. To date we are pleased with what we have been able to accomplish together in Diyala in 2021, and WAHO is similarly eager to continue the relationship.

PAX also signed a partnership agreement with **Al-Ghad League for Woman and Child Care (Al-Ghad)** to carry out research on the reverberating effects on civilian harm in Hawija (detailed further below). While this research falls financially under the PiP project, the partnership was managed by the HSS Iraq Project Lead. In November, the HSS signed another 8-month contract with Al-Ghad to follow up the research efforts with community engagement activities in Hawija.



## Project Results

### HSS Iraq Dashboard – 2021

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the Human Security Survey in Iraq in 2021, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

#### Impact Indicators

% of HSS respondents in Iraq reporting that their security situation has improved over the previous 12 months

Kirkuk (2020)	Salahaddin (2020)	Basra (2021)	Diyala (2021)	Average (2020-21)
52%	59%	23%	54%	<b>47%</b>

% of HSS respondents in Iraq reporting a favorable perception of the police in their area

Kirkuk (2020)	Salahaddin (2020)	Basra (2021)	Diyala (2021)	Average (2020-21)
86%	92%	86%	98%	<b>91%</b>

\* Explore more of the HSS Iraq data from 2017-2021 by visiting our interactive, online [data dashboard](#), or by reading our many [publications](#) on our website, including infographics, analytic reports, and videos (in English or Arabic).

#### Key Results

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of HSS data collection rounds completed	0	3	2		5
# of HSS enumerators trained	0	46	60		106
# of HSS respondents	0	2,295	1,478		3,773

	# of authorities making concrete commitments responding to civilians' protection concerns in 2021	5
	# of local partners or experts consulted in annual HSS methodology review process in 2021	8
	# of community engagement activities implemented by community champions in 2021	12
	# of community dialogues held with local civilians and relevant authorities in 2021	15
	# of local partner staff trained in facilitation or M&E skills in 2021	44

#### Budget & Spending

	Budget 2021	Actuals 2021	Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
Personnel	€ 161.955	€ 112.533	€ 274.623	-€ 99.738	€ 704.761	39%
Activities	€ 194.906	€ 327.124	€ 449.120	€ 44.771	€ 794.161	57%
Audit & Other	€ 62.850	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 135.969	€ 261.669	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 419.711</b>	<b>€ 439.657</b>	<b>€ 723.743</b>	<b>-€ 190.936</b>	<b>€ 1.760.591</b>	<b>41%</b>

\*Audit costs for our local partners in Iraq were accounted for within their general operating budgets and are not separately reported herein.

The ultimate objective of the Human Security Survey project is that civilians living in conflict settings improve their human security situation through constructive engagement with national and international security actors. **To date, the project has made great strides at the governorate and district levels, where PAX and its partners enjoy increasing trust and receptiveness on the part of local officials (both formal and more traditional authorities) to HSS findings.** The growing presence of PAX-trained “community champions” in each of the targeted regions also serves to raise the profile of the project and provide a means to begin addressing the specific security priorities in the regions covered by the project. Both of these developments have positive implications for the impact and sustainability of our work at the local level.

At the national level, given that the previous government was interim, and the new elections from October have not yielded any official results, targeting either political or security authorities for dialogue, advocacy, or training remains challenging. Moreover, given that PAX is not formally registered in Iraq, and the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior (MoD and MoI) are not particularly receptive to working with civilian organizations based in Europe, opening doors for constructive engagement requires creative solutions (some of which are described below). PAX will continue to rely on its local partners and emergent opportunities like the new relationship with the Iraqi NSA to seek out ways to inform and influence key protection actors at the national level in 2022 and beyond.

Below is a summary of key results related to each of our short-term outcomes (STOs) by results area:

**STO 1.1: Protection policies and practices in Iraq are increasingly informed by HSS findings**

- 2 rounds of HSS data collection completed (in Basra and Diyala)
- 60 enumerators trained, including 30 men (50%) and 30 women (50%)
- 1,478 interviews completed, including 757 men (51%) and 721 women (49%)
- 8 infographics published summarizing HSS data in English and Arabic
- 1,004 unique views of online publications of HSS Iraq findings
- 8 stakeholders or institutions contributed to a thorough methodology review process
- At least 4 organizations reported using the HSS data to inform their programming during the year

**STO 1.2: Community engagement activities inform more relevant protection of civilians strategies in target areas in Iraq**

- At least 5 security providers made commitments as a result of community engagement and targeted advocacy
- 30 community champions trained in peacebuilding design
- 12 community engagement initiatives conducted by community champions
- 15 community dialogues held with local civilians and relevant authorities in Salahaddin, Kirkuk, and Diyala
- 6 representatives from civil society or official authorities interviewed
- 44 local partner staff completed trainings in facilitation or M&E skills

PAX and its partners conducted 2 rounds of data collection in 2021 and published a series of reports in both English and Arabic. These included infographic data summaries for [Basra](#), [Diyala](#), [Kirkuk](#), [Salahaddin](#) governorates.<sup>2</sup> The HSS data can be explored in more detail by visiting the interactive online [data dashboard](#), where users can compare the findings between governorates or over time (going back to 2017), or disaggregate the data by gender.

The research and insights generated by the HSS in Iraq have the potential for a wide variety of uses by diverse stakeholders. In 2021 it was promising to see like-minded organizations like Global Public Policy Institute (GPPI), Social Inquiry (an Iraq-based think tank), and the German Agency for

<sup>2</sup> Note that the Salahaddin and Kirkuk research occurred in Q4 2020, although the reports were issued in 2021. Similarly, the Basra data collection took place in 2021, but the report was published in Q1 2022.

international Cooperation (GIZ) proactively use the HSS data to inform their programming. **This reflects the value of the data to new and diverse audiences, as it is being used by institutions not explicitly targeted for advocacy.** Moreover, the ASSER Institute, Human Security Collective, and other teams at PAX also used the HSS data to develop a joint proposal on training a new generation of civil society leaders on the theme of the rule of law in Iraq. We hope that our wealth of HSS data can continue to be integrated into the training and assessment work under projects like PiP as well.

Despite bureaucratic impediments to data collection in 2 targeted governorates in 2021, it was thrilling to see the data we did have be put to tangible use at the local level throughout the year. As described above, PAX and its partners piloted a new mechanism for community engagement, a critical component of our broader HSS methodology. We trained community champions from all 4 governorates in how to develop and implement initiatives to support human security in their areas. These led to some very inspiring activities, as well as active involvement of local authorities. For example, we supported an initiative in Kirkuk called *Taqarib*, which used art as a tool to foster social cohesion between children from ISIS families and other members of the community. There was also a campaign in Diyala raising awareness of the dangers of using firearms at social gatherings and celebrations, which was actively reinforced by senior members of the police force. We also supported an effort in Salahaddin to promote the role of women in peace and security, which included a campaign promoting a greater role for women in security-oriented ministries, as well as a workshop at Tikrit University aiming to appoint a female advisor to the university's President. **In total, 12 creative and inspiring community initiatives were spearheaded by young leaders across Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salahaddin. As a result of some of these activities, at least 5 local authorities representing key security institutions made clear commitments to address the human security dynamics highlighted in the campaigns.** We aim to continue working with the community champions who performed well in the coming year as well, while adding more to the cohort in 2022.

### Featured Story: A Marathon in Riyadh

**A multi-faceted campaign in Riyadh, Kirkuk engaged women, youth, and the broader community to promote peace and encourage safe returns, as well as to bridge gaps between residents and civil society organizations.**

Riyadh sub-district in Kirkuk suffers from great neglect, especially after the conflict against ISIS. It remains difficult to access by relief and development organizations due to ongoing security risks. One of our young community champions wanted to break this barrier between the civilians of Riyadh and civil society organizations.

To do so, he organized a workshop with women and youth on human rights defense and how to form advocacy teams so that civilians in Riyadh could be self-sufficient in raising issues that affect their communities. This was the first time that women in Riyadh participated publicly in such an initiative.

Ahmed also organized a team of volunteers who painted peace murals on school walls. And finally, in coordination with the Ministry of Youth and Sport he organized a marathon, in which over 100 residents participated to promote peace through sports and to suggest that Riyadh is safe enough for displaced families to return home. Watch a short video promoting the event on the [HSS Facebook page](#).



Figure 5. Participants in the Riyadh marathon

There is one additional result from 2021 that deserves particular attention. This year, **the National Security Advisory (NSA) – a key institution within the broader Iraqi security apparatus – formalized a collaboration with Al-Amal and PAX to improve the Peace & Conflict Studies programs at 13 research universities across Iraq, thereby also opening up doors for future strategic engagements with other security institutions for the PoC Program.** The NSA, which maintains a status much like the Special Forces within the Iraqi security structure, has close political ties with the Office of the Prime Minister, the MoI, and the MoD. In 2021, senior leadership from the NSA, including the National Security Advisor himself, began working formally with PAX's close and long-standing partners at Al-Amal to develop and improve the Peace & Conflict Studies programs for undergraduate and graduate students across Iraq. The NSA and its training institute, the Tamayuz Center, were motivated to reform this field of study and to better equip the next generation of conflict analysts, peacebuilders, and political scientists because their own intelligence agencies were unprepared for the takeover of large swaths of the country by ISIS in 2014. This effort could have direct effects on our desired results in the long term, as improving the quality of civilian-led research around peace and conflict dynamics in Iraq will hopefully end up in institutions like the Tamayuz Center and the NSA (as well as by extension the MoD and MoI) relying on more civilian-centric data and perspectives in designing, implementing, and evaluating their security strategies in the future.

This is the first time that the NSA, which has always been a very closed and inaccessible institution, is openly working with civil society partners. It is incredibly significant that they are recognizing the value and importance of engaging with civil society in this manner, and even publicizing the cooperation on social media. The first such opportunity to expand this relationship will hopefully take place in 2022, in which members of the PiP team will deliver a planned training on foundational PoC principles for the NSA (also including the MoI, MoD, Counter-Terrorism Services, and Special Forces).

Nearly all of these many achievements detailed above have to do with the positioning our partners have in the field (both geographically and sectorally), with PAX more in a supporting role. The partners in many of the success stories detailed above saw an opportunity, came up with creative ideas on how to seize them, and we provided resources and technical support. We are proud of the way our partnerships are leading to locally-driven change processes.

## Lessons Learned

PAX developed a series of project- and program-level learning questions at the outset of this program that continue to guide reflections on how we work and how we define success. We and our partners strive to learn and apply lessons in our day-to-day work, as well as through targeted research and in expert discussions with our peers. Below are some important takeaways from our work in the HSS Iraq project in 2021:

1. **How can we facilitate safe and effective community engagement at the local level that serves to build bridges between civilians and decision-makers (also at higher levels), even when their interests are not aligned?**

One of the key observations for PAX and its partners in recent years has been that during community engagement sessions, civilians and their security providers are not often on equal footing. Traditionally, authorities are eager to dominate dialogues and assert their perspectives. But in part this is because to date our research methodology has never specifically targeted security providers to ask for their unique perspectives. Often the security personnel from the district or sub-district levels have their own challenges that they are also keen to discuss and make clear to civilians. In order to foster more meaningful mutual exchange on improving protection capacities, the HSS intends to carry out a shorter, more targeted survey with security personnel in all 4 governorates starting in 2022.

2. **How can we have more targeted lobbying at the national level (including with like-minded organizations such as CIVIC and NDI) and with international actors both in Iraq and their HQs (like targeting the Dutch CBMI, NATO, etc.)?**

We learned a valuable lesson relevant to this question in 2021, largely as a result of the Hawija research undertaken jointly between the HSS Iraq and PiP project teams, alongside their partners from Al-Ghad and Utrecht University. The significant interest we have received for this research (even prior to publishing the report in 2022) is due in part to its rich qualitative data. While quantifiable facts and figures are valuable for providing a sense of the scope and scale of certain dynamics, individual stories that are visceral can have a different kind of impact. We feel that this more human-centric lens may be necessary to urge policymakers and implementers into action in Hawija.



Figure 6. Personal stories and images can better reflect just how much of Hawija remains destroyed after both ISIS occupation and the fight to liberate it

We also seek to apply this lesson elsewhere in our work, exploring smaller, more targeted qualitative research initiatives in Iraq to leverage for more targeted lobbying and advocacy at the national level. These will probably focus on geographic areas that are hard to access and under-served by the development community, particularly in Salahaddin and Diyala.

A final, broader lesson relates to the work underway with the NSA. **This growing relationship with the NSA represents a very significant opportunity to achieve institutional change within one of the central agencies that bridges the political and security infrastructure in Iraq.** It also reflects valuable lessons learned about our theory of change. First, developing professional relationships in Iraq requires building personal ones as well. The Executive Director of Al-Amal, Jamal Al-Jawahiri, devoted the last few years to this effort, first engaging with various Iraqi universities, and then reaching out the NSA and the Tamayuz Center. Leveraging his credibility with national institutions in Iraq (carefully built over years of running a credible and non-sectarian organization), Jamal slowly but deliberately opened these doors – always with the genuine interest of improving the Peace & Conflict Studies departments across Iraq – but also always with an eye towards the longer-term opportunities this could generate both for Al-Amal and partners like PAX. Second, by initially working on a less politically-sensitive joint endeavor, Al-Amal and PAX believe that we can build trust and create new opportunities to work with the NSA and relevant agencies over which it has influence. These are both important lessons to keep in mind when working on sensitive topics and with hard to access institutions in a context like Iraq.

## For More Information

- Visit our [HSS Iraq Dashboard](#) to compare results by region or over time, or disaggregate the survey results by gender.
- Read various [publications](#) on our website summarizing recent HSS data, including, but not limited to infographic data summaries from [Basra](#), [Diyala](#), [Kirkuk](#), and [Salahaddin](#).<sup>3</sup>
- Watch a [video](#) about the marathon organized in Kirkuk by an HSS community champion.
- Stay tuned for more on the [extensive research](#) done in Hawija, Iraq about the Dutch airstrike that devastated the area in 2016, the effects of which are still painfully visible today. The full report and launch events are scheduled for 2022 and will be detailed in a future report.
- Follow our Human Security Survey projects on [Facebook](#) to receive regular updates.
- **Please reach out to HSS Iraq Project Lead, Saba Azeem with any questions or comments ([azeem@paxforpeace.nl](mailto:azeem@paxforpeace.nl)).**

<sup>3</sup> Note that the Salahaddin and Kirkuk research occurred in Q4 2020, although the reports were issued in 2021. Similarly, the Basra data collection took place in 2021, but the report was published in Q1 2022.



## 2.2 PROJECT CHAPTER: Human Security Survey – South Sudan

### Progress summary

The main priority for the Human Security Survey (HSS) project in South Sudan in 2021 was restarting data collection and data validation processes that had stalled due to two years of pandemic-induced delays. PAX and its partners collected survey data in 2 locations and fed survey results back in 5 locations, thereby rounding up the third full data collection cycle. Preparations began for the subsequent cycle through the annual process of reviewing and updating the HSS methodology. A new complementary research effort initially piloted in 2020 – the Expert Panel Survey – was successfully introduced in 2 locations. Local Community Security Committees (COMSECCOMs) were very active in organizing follow-up community engagement activities to address the most important community security priorities in 4 locations, and as a result, legitimacy and support from local stakeholders gradually increased. PAX staff resumed field trips and restarted international advocacy engagements with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), other key UN agencies, and relevant Embassies.



Figure 7. HSS South Sudan Progress in 2021

We and our partners are particularly excited about the introduction of the Expert Panel Survey concept, which succeeded in narrowing the timespan between various data cycles and enabled in capturing new and additional data from local security experts. This initiative allows us to better integrate expertise from representatives from local government, security officials, traditional authorities, and civil society into our analysis. This initiative, coupled with extensive efforts to engage local officials in dialogue sessions and community engagement activities, is increasing buy-in from authorities and adding to greater credibility among local stakeholders, which facilitates better uptake of new research findings and recommendations.

### Context Analysis & Adaptations

#### Protection Dynamics in South Sudan

The implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), originally signed in September 2018, continues to lag behind schedule, even while the end of the transitional period comes into sight with elections scheduled to take place before the end of 2022. The international community (mostly through UNMISS) does not really have an alternative framework, and keeps encouraging South Sudanese authorities towards full implementation of the peace agreement, which they have to date been unwilling or unable to do. At the same time, many regions in the country are experiencing a worsening security situation and an upsurge in intra-communal tensions and violence, including some of the HSS survey locations. UNMISS is struggling to address these outbreaks and implement a new PoC strategy following their withdrawal from the official PoC sites (aside from Malakal), **and the power vacuum between national and local governance in South Sudan prevents adequate response to both acute and more structural community security challenges.**



Figure 8. PAX works in 5 states in South Sudan

Looking more specifically at the HSS survey locations, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria State witnessed significant intra-communal tensions, threatening local peace processes (in the case of Jonglei) and leading to violence between farmer and pastoralist communities (in Eastern Equatoria). Local officials

showed limited ability to quell these outbreaks of conflict, although we tried to advocate with UNMISS and other UN structures to take preventative action in response to our insights. HSS data continues to provide reliable and detailed information about the causes and effects of changing conflict dynamics in key parts of South Sudan, and our aim is to increase the utilization of this evidence for planning, early warning, and evaluation by relevant stakeholders to improve protection conditions.

### COVID-19 Pandemic

During 2021, the local conditions in South Sudan again allowed for domestic travel by Juba-based project staff, making enumerator trainings, data collection, and data validation sessions again possible. Internationally, COVID-induced travel restrictions prevented us from travelling during much of the first half of 2021, but during the second half of the year international staff could visit South Sudan again more easily. Our ability to travel and convene events has resulted in increased engagements with local authorities and first attempts to amplify their voices on a national level, priorities that had stalled as a result of the pandemic.

### Management & Partnerships

The transfer of operational responsibility for conducting field activities by Juba-based staff, which occurred in 2020 due to COVID-related travel restrictions, was retained and deepened, allowing for greater flexibility and quicker turnaround between data collection and community engagement phases. Additionally, leadership changes with the PAX Juba office streamlined internal work processes and facilitated more and better cooperation between the PoC Program and other in-country initiatives. In addition, a new 5<sup>th</sup> survey location was added in 2021, with a new contracted local partner organization, the Justice and Peace Commission – Catholic Diocese of Torit (JPC-CDOT).

### Project Results

The overall ambition of the Human Security Survey project is that **civilians in conflict enjoy improved human security as a result of constructive engagement with national and international security actors**. Underway since originally conceptualized in 2016, the HSS has built an extensive evidence base, as well as credibility with both civilians and officials, particularly at the local level in South Sudan. Over the course of 2021, various local political and security officials indicated that the HSS data provided them with insight in local security priorities (although tangible use of the data and formal commitments by authorities are admittedly harder to directly observe or measure). We have also witnessed increased quantity and quality of engagement by local authorities through the data validation workshops, Expert Panel Surveys, and COMSECCOM activities. This results in greater support for the HSS methodology, more acceptance of survey findings, less obstruction of research processes, and more effective dialogue with local communities. Community members across the survey areas agree; a majority of participants in data validation workshops in 2021 supported the dialogues as a means of demanding accountability by PoC actors in their areas. These are all important steps towards improving the inclusiveness and effectiveness of protection efforts, as well as greater accountability towards civilian populations.

Additionally, in 2021 we saw new opportunities to meaningfully connect field realities as captured in HSS activities with national and international peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan, most notably with UNMISS and other UN agencies. **The aim of advocacy towards international institutions is to better connect their resources and interventions with community needs and priorities.** An event detailed below that PAX convened in Juba in 2021 was a good example of this, but also showed that much more similar programming is needed, as well as efforts to engage meaningfully with more national security institutions. PAX and its partners are also working to produce more and different outputs, such as short and documentary films, radio broadcasts, and more tailored infographics in order to better connect with our various audiences, both within South Sudan and internationally.

# HSS South Sudan Dashboard – 2021

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the Human Security Survey in South Sudan in 2021, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

## Impact Indicators

% of HSS respondents in South Sudan reporting that their security situation has improved over the previous 12 months

Jonglei (2020)	Payinjiar (2020)	Yirol (2020)	Central Equatoria (2021)	Eastern Equatoria (2021)	Average (2020-21)
3%	34%	51%	40%	64%	<b>38%</b>

% of HSS respondents in South Sudan reporting a favorable perception of the police in their area

Jonglei (2020)	Payinjiar (2020)	Yirol (2020)	Central Equatoria (2021)	Eastern Equatoria (2021)	Average (2020-21)
65%	85%	73%	64%	57%	<b>69%</b>

\* Explore more of the HSS South Sudan data from 2017-2021 by visiting our interactive, online [data dashboard](#), or by reading our many [publications](#) on our website, including infographics, analytic reports, and videos.

## Key Results

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of HSS data collection rounds completed	0	3	2		5
# of authorities making concrete commitments responding to civilians' protection concerns	0	6	4		10
# of community engagement activities implemented by community committees	3	17	18		38
# of HSS enumerators trained	0	28	22		50
# of HSS respondents	0	1,325	852		2,177



# of community dialogues held with local civilians and relevant authorities in 2021

5



# of local partners or experts consulted in annual HSS methodology review process in 2021

32



# of local civil society representatives or authorities interviewed in Expert Panel Survey in 2021

47

## Budget & Spending

	Budget 2021	Actuals 2021	Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
Personnel	€ 161.955	€ 138.824	€ 315.699	-€ 52.262	€ 698.361	45%
Activities	€ 178.565	€ 204.447	€ 292.674	-€ 145.036	€ 794.840	37%
Audit & Other	€ 15.000	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 35.000	€ 65.000	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 355.520</b>	<b>€ 343.271</b>	<b>€ 608.373</b>	<b>-€ 232.298</b>	<b>€ 1.558.201</b>	<b>39%</b>

\* Audit costs for our partners in South Sudan were accounted for within their general operating budgets and are not separately reported.

Below is a summary of key outputs towards each of our short-term outcomes (STOs) by results area:

**STO 1.1: Protection policies and practices in South Sudan are increasingly informed by HSS findings**

- Trained **22** enumerators in data collection skills, including **12** men (55%) and **10** women (45%)
- Conducted **852** surveys in **2** states (Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria), including **359** men (42%) and **493** women (58%)
- Interviewed **47** authorities in longitudinal Expert Panel Surveys
- Facilitated **5** data validation and dialogue workshops with approximately **200** local government authorities, law enforcement officials, and community representatives
- Published **6** reports or infographics summarizing HSS data
- **1,310** unique views of online publications of HSS South Sudan findings

- **32** stakeholders (including local staff, partners, UNMISS, UNPOL, and UNDP) contributed to a thorough methodology review process

**STO 1.2: Community engagement activities inform more relevant protection of civilians strategies in target areas in South Sudan**

- **4** active COMSECOMs organized a total of **18** community engagement activities in our targeted survey locations
- Produced **3** videos showcasing HSS field activities and outlining local community security challenges and opportunities
- Organized 1-day event in Juba to discuss law enforcement gap in South Sudan, attended by **16** Police Commissioners, representatives from UNPOL and UNDP, diplomats, and civil society leaders

At this point in the program, the HSS research process tends to run rather smoothly and is increasingly managed at the local level by our partners, local consultants, and Juba-based staff. Two teams of enumerators conducted over 850 interviews across Central and Eastern Equatoria. The HSS team produced a wide variety of research outputs in 2021, including analytical reports covering [Eastern Equatoria](#) and [Unity \(Payinjar\)](#), infographic data summaries for [Eastern Equatoria](#) and [Central Equatoria](#), and Expert Panel Monitors from [Jonglei](#) and [Lakes \(Yirol\)](#).<sup>4</sup> Much more of the HSS data from 2017 until today is available to explore via our interactive online [data dashboard](#), where you can compare results by region or over time, or disaggregate the results by gender.

What is exciting to witness is that the community engagement activities in each survey location are also really picking up steam. **The COMSECOMs, formed from among the communities we survey, design and implement activities that respond to the protection dynamics raised in the research and dialogue phases. The resulting efforts are organic, creative, and community-driven.** In 2021, the COMSECOM activities included live radio talk shows mediation workshops to stop rivaling clans from committing revenge killings, visits to cattle camp, community meetings with police, public campaigns during sporting tournaments, and more. These engagements can also lead to significant longer-term



Figure 9. A diverse range of civilians and authorities attend a dialogue in Mingkaman, Lakes State

<sup>4</sup> Note that the analytic report from Eastern Equatoria and the Expert Panel Monitor for Lakes (Yirol) were published in Q1 2022, although the research was conducted in 2021. Also, the report from Unity (Payinjar) was published in 2021, but was based on research from Q4 2020.

changes. For example, during recent community engagement activities, representatives from the police, prison service, and judicial system in Jonglei asserted their commitment to better cooperate with community members and between various law enforcement agencies. **This component of the project is central to the HSS methodology, which aims to promote community-based peacebuilding facilitated by the effective and sustained use of evidence and dialogue.**

Another significant activity highlighted a strength of the HSS project and the broader PoC program in South Sudan: the unique bridge that we can provide between local communities and (inter)national security providers. In November 2021, PAX organized a one-day event in Juba entitled “Bridging the Law Enforcement Gap in South Sudan.” In total, 16 participants representing UN Police (UNPOL), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), diplomats from the Dutch Embassy, and members of civil society had an open discussion about the challenges and opportunities facing South Sudan’s law enforcement community. The discussion addressed current police capabilities, as what is currently offered and needed in terms of police training and assistance. Uniquely, it also provided the opportunity for current Police Commissioners from outside of Juba to directly voice their challenges and priorities to institutions that are capable of providing technical support and resources to the SSNPS. During the meeting, it became clear that **there is not only a gap between local community expectations and police capabilities, but also an additional gap between what local Police Commissioners need to better protect civilians and support the rule of law effectively, and the support that national and international actors are currently providing in terms of Security Sector Development and Reform (SSD/SSR).**

It is fair to say that local authority and law enforcement’s awareness and commitment to engage with communities on security are not solely attributable to the HSS and its data; however, the HSS offers many opportunities for community engagement and outreach (through data validation, Expert Panel Surveys, COMSECCOM activities, etc.). These activities make it easier to engage and commit more regularly and contribute to a better relationship between local authorities and communities regarding security and protection, a view which is confirmed by community members, local authorities, and law enforcement officials who attend our field activities.

### Featured Story: Mitigating Intercommunal Tensions in Yirol

**In the summer of 2021, the Community Security Committee (COMSECOM) in Yirol intervened to support a group of Nuer traders who were trapped in Dinka territory to facilitate their safe return home, mitigating a potentially dangerous security situation and helping to preserve a tenuous peace agreement in the region.**

The event occurred at a moment when tensions were high between communities in Yirol and neighboring Payinjiar, as a large cattle raid had recently taken place. Approximately 13 Nuer traders (who were uninvolved in the cattle raid) found themselves trapped in a Dinka region. The group did not dare to return on foot through the remote border areas where cattle raiders are said to take refuge, yet were fearful to remain in “hostile” territory where they might be at risk of reprisal attacks.

The Payinjiar Commissioner contacted PAX directly to bring the situation to our attention and requested support in securing safe passage for the traders to travel home. Together, the Yirol COMSECOM and PAX staff asked the Governor of Lakes State for the necessary travel permissions and escort for the men in question. Throughout this process, the COMSECOM aided the traders by providing food and accommodation, as it took a couple of weeks to resolve the situation. Ultimately, the intervention guaranteed the safety of these individuals and mitigated a potentially dangerous security situation, but also preserved the fragile peace agreement.

This outcome is an example of how individual initiatives at the community level contribute to the broader objectives of the HSS project. PAX has long actively supported community-based peace agreements in South Sudan. Working to keep these in place or help them be implemented goes a long way towards improving the protection environment for everyday civilians. Often it is up to local



authorities and even informal institutions like our COMSECOMs to intervene, as they are often the most relevant, closest, and best-equipped stakeholders to respond in situations of crisis, especially in rural areas where state security actors or UN peacekeepers are not present. Moments like these also do a great deal to build further confidence in the COMSECOMs, as it reinforces their legitimacy with communities and local authorities, which in turn bolsters their effectiveness.

## Lessons Learned

PAX developed a series of project- and program-level learning questions at the outset of this program that continue to guide reflections on how we work and how we define success. We and our partners strive to learn and apply lessons in our day-to-day work, as well as through targeted research and in expert discussions with our peers. Below are some important takeaways from our work in the HSS South Sudan project in 2021:

### 1. **How can we best develop and implement a coherent lobby and advocacy strategy jointly with partners and colleagues (EIA and PiP) that enables us to collectively and effectively engage with UNMISS, other relevant UN agencies, and T/PCCs regarding PoC and community engagement issues in South Sudan?**

In 2021 we developed and refined documents outlining a preliminary lobby and advocacy strategy. However, we recognize that – while developing these tools was a useful exercise in identifying targets and opportunities – the real value is in the actual contacts, relationships, and sustained engagements that determine whether advocacy messages are taken up. Joint advocacy with the PAX country team colleagues both in headquarters and in Juba expanded in 2021. Notably, we also deepened relations with different departments within UNMISS, as well as UNPOL, UNDP, and the Dutch Embassy as a result of regular sharing of data reports and contextual updates. However, even after years of engagements with UNMISS, particularly the Civil Affairs Division, we realized that we were missing key insights into how the mission acquires, validates, and uses data to inform its decision making. In order to identify new and better ways to tailor our research findings and recommendations, we began work in 2021 to contract a 3-month fieldwork consultancy into identify pathways for better utilization of HSS data by UNMISS, which will continue in 2022 and provide valuable guidance into how we implement our lobby and advocacy strategy.

### 2. **How can we and our partners constructively build an advocacy network with national-level South Sudanese political and security authorities, and most effectively encourage them to improve their protection strategies?**

Engagements with local authorities and law enforcement have been gradually increasing thanks to our frequent field activities, which is leading to greater mutual trust and improvements in the perceived legitimacy of PAX, its partners, and COMSECOMs. However, governance challenges and access issues have prohibited us from gaining a similar foothold at national level institutions in Juba, particularly since the pandemic. This year we made plans to conduct a second 3-month fieldwork consultancy to provide a detailed stakeholder mapping, as well as to provide advice for PAX about how to build our network and access relevant national-level institutions that impact law enforcement and community security provision in South Sudan. This will take place in 2022 and offer strategic insight into our lobby and advocacy efforts at the national level going forward.

### 3. **How can we help address the perceived “law enforcement gap” by community members and local authorities alike across South Sudan?**

This learning question was a particular point of focus for the HSS project in 2021. Over years of data collection in various parts of South Sudan, we have consistently heard that, while civilians tend to trust the police in their communities, they are perceived as lacking both adequate numbers and key technical competencies to help them fulfill their protection duties, particularly in more rural areas. These points were echoed by security sector specialists in our recent Expert Panel Surveys. To both

further explore these issues and to begin identifying opportunities to resolve them, PAX convened a 1-day expert event in Juba in November 2021 with an aim to connect field realities in law enforcement with international policies and development interventions. We invited local Police Commissioners from regions where we work to meet directly with UNPOL police trainers, UNDP policymakers, and Dutch diplomats specializing in SSR to see how we could better align local needs with international capacities. What we learned through this effort was not only is there a gap between communities' needs and what police can deliver, but there is also a critical gap between the support that law enforcement institutions want and need, and what is currently being provided by the international community. PAX will seek to utilize its unique position and relationships to help bridge these gaps so that decision making increasingly responds to field realities, and ultimately results in more effective protection.

### For More Information

- Visit our [HSS South Sudan Dashboard](#) to compare results by region or over time, or disaggregate the survey results by gender.
- Read various [publications](#) on our website summarizing recent HSS data, including, but not limited to:
  - Analytical reports: [Eastern Equatoria](#) and [Unity \(Payinjiar\)](#)
  - Infographic data summaries: [Eastern Equatoria](#) and [Central Equatoria](#)
  - Expert Panel Monitors: [Jonglei](#) and [Lakes \(Yirol\)](#)
- Watch a [video](#) summarizing the data validation and dialogue workshop held in Mingkaman, Lakes State in September 2021.
- Learn more about the event on [Bridging the Law Enforcement Gap in South Sudan](#) (co-organized with EIA and the Dutch Embassy in Juba)
  - Read the summary [event report](#).
  - View a [video summary](#) of the event.
- **Please reach out to HSS South Sudan Project Lead, Anton Quist with any questions or comments ([quist@paxforpeace.nl](mailto:quist@paxforpeace.nl)).**

## 2.3 PROJECT CHAPTER: Engaging International Actors On PoC

### Progress summary

COVID-19 continued to impact our work throughout 2021, although we were able to achieve tangible results despite the pandemic and associated travel limitations. Stimson colleagues were able to travel to Europe before the end of the year, and PAX staff returned to South Sudan as well. While pandemic conditions during much of the year required some scaling back of ambitions, we were at least able to return in part to the way we normally work.

**Having greater direct access to key stakeholders at both the local and international levels will enable more impact going forward, as most of our work deals with advocacy and is much aided by face-to-face interaction.**



Figure 10. EIA progress in 2021

Stimson made significant progress to date through the publication of 4 reports as part of a policy paper series, conducting virtual stakeholder engagement, and by developing a political advocacy strategy to influence key allies – such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Canada – in advancing PoC themes at NATO. We formed new and strengthened existing relationships with experts and practitioners both inside and outside of the Alliance. The shift in strategy proposed and implemented in 2020 by Stimson continued to allow us to make significant progress at NATO, and the agreement with PAX to extend the partnership with Stimson through the lifetime of the grant will enable deeper and more lasting results at in 2022 and beyond.

PAX conducted a series of in person, virtual, and hybrid events over the course of the year aimed at advancing PoC policy at the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union. This included a number of expert events on the sidelines of key UN policy debates, as well as our annual PoC conference in The Hague. Additionally, we positioned ourselves strategically with regards to the European Peace Facility (EPF) to make sure we are prepared to advise and monitor the instrument during the actual implementation phase. In line with this effort, we explored other means for civil society to engage security actors, especially at the international level, which will also be a priority from 2022 onward.

### Context Analysis & Adaptations

#### PoC in the Policy Realm

The **United Nations** remained a particularly key institution with which to engage in 2021, though the pandemic continued to impede our ability to convene events and hold advocacy meetings like we would under normal conditions. South Korea postponed hosting the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial (initially planned for April 2021) to December due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which made it difficult to keep the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial on the priority list of UN Member States. As a result, we adjusted our activity timeline and used the extra time for more lobby and advocacy efforts in the run-up to the Ministerial, and were eager to contribute civilian perspectives to the event.

At **NATO**, the existing PoC Policy and newer PoC Handbook provide a very solid foundation from which NATO will build an implementation strategy for its alliance partners to take forward into practice. The policy environment and ambitions embedded within are strong, but NATO will need to dedicate more focus and resources to the next phase of integrating these concepts into current and future field missions. The new Special Representative to the Secretary General on Women Peace and Security (WPS) as well as the new head of the Human Security Unit (HSU) have thus far responded very positively to the program's advocacy messages and are open to future engagement. The project effectively leveraged the experience and diversity of perspectives in the Expert Advisory Team in 2021, providing sounder and more sustainable guidance and advice to NATO.

The **European Union** was a very relevant stakeholder on PoC issues last year. On 22 March 2021, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union adopted a Council Decision establishing the EPF. The adoption of the EPF brings some significant changes in the EU and global context, in particular the possibility for the EU to provide military equipment (including weapons and ammunition) to third country armed forces and regional military operations through EPF assistance measures. PAX, in cooperation with other Brussels-based NGOs, worked on a non-exhaustive list of recommendations to the EU and EU Member States on how they could reduce the risks to civilians where the EU uses EPF assistance measures to support governments in conflict-affected places. Also, we started exploring new ways on how to better support civil society in countries where the EPF and EU security architecture are to be operational to inspire and hold EU policymakers to account for decisions affecting human security.

As a result of pandemic conditions, PAX and our partners were less able to engage deeply with troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) outside of existing strong relationships within Europe. However, the last year was also a politically challenging one for both the **Netherlands** and **Germany**, as both underwent competitive elections that disrupted the longstanding political landscape in each country, and disrupting defense and security policies at this time was not an easy sell.

### COVID-19 Pandemic

COVID-19 continued to impact our work throughout 2021. **Pandemic conditions in 2021 required that we maintain a hybrid form of working, with restricted access to offices and even more limited possibilities for travel and to convene or attend in-person events.** Accessibility to the UN, EU, and NATO via online events improved compared to 2020 with people adjusted to working remotely, yet is far from ideal for the type of relationship building and institutional support we seek to achieve under this project. We invested in virtual networking components for our online events and further developed our virtual advocacy skills (through online newsletters and hybrid and virtual events). Also, we developed a podcast series, with remote contributions from experts and practitioners from the field (civil and military, local, national, and international). We are hopeful that 2022 will allow us to travel regularly again and that most engagements, when possible, will again be in person.

### Partnership & Management

There were significant staffing changes within the Stimson team during the course of the last year. In June 2021, Project Lead and Stimson Vice President Victoria Holt departed to serve as the Director of the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College in the USA. Victoria remained an engaged member of the project's Expert Advisory Team, but her departure impacted staffing arrangements at Stimson, especially in terms of the project's leadership. Marla Keenan stepped into a new role as Project Lead, and she brought on career diplomat Andrew Hyde as a consultant to lead on the political strategy work at NATO.

Rosie Ball, PAX's EU Advocacy Advisor in Brussels, left her position in December 2021. Some strategic activities, including our internal discussions on what the implementation of the EPF would look like going forward were put on pause during the transition to her replacement (Wael Abdulshafi), who joined PAX in March 2022. Wael brings extensive experience and a vast network to this role, and will be a great asset to the PoC Program in Brussels.

PAX partnered with the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) to produce the **Civilian Protection Podcast** series in 2021. We are currently reviewing these episodes to see how we may continue after the first season concludes, and are discussing what type of leadership would serve our team best and how to implement changes to better serve our audience in 2022.

## Project Results

### EIA Dashboard – 2021

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the Engaging International Actors on PoC team in 2021, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

#### Advocacy Achievements

Long-term outcome 2: UN, NATO, T/PCCs, and missions increasingly articulate and implement inclusive PoC policies and practices

PAX contributed to the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial preparatory conference, presenting on an expert panel on community engagement and disseminating a policy brief on [training for PoC in peacekeeping operations](#).

PAX delivered a set of key [recommendations](#) to the government of the Netherlands following parliamentary elections in March 2021, including focused on the Dutch approach to PoC.

Short-term outcome 2.2: UN and NATO focus on PoC and inclusive community engagement in their operational plans and policies

PAX provided input into the UN's [Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace](#), and provided a focus on promoting inclusivity, consultation, and effective engagement between UN missions and local civil society.

PAX and 25 peer organizations published a [joint statement](#) ahead of the annual open debate on PoC calling for the UN, Member States, and armed actors to take ambitious action to ensure that inclusive protection is at the heart of UN peace operations.

#### Key Outputs

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of expert events facilitated to advance civilian-centered protection	0	3	3		6
# of specialized protection experts serving on the Expert Advisory Team to NATO in 2021	0	9	11		12
# of participants in trainings by Program staff or partners on PoC or human security themes	0	40	64		104
# of registrants for annual PoC Conference	54	418	323		795



# of roundtables organized with or by UN or NATO HQ on civilian-centered peacekeeping in 2021

2



# of episodes of the Civilian Protection podcast produced and published in 2021

3



# of research papers exploring future PoC challenges at NATO published in 2021

6



# of participants in PAX-organized UN PoC Week side events in 2021

621

#### Budget & Spending

	Budget 2021	Actuals 2021	Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
PAX Personnel	€ 114.707	€ 149.321	€ 341.545	€ 76.398	€ 499.158	68%
PAX Activities	€ 64.250	€ 103.936	€ 124.432	-€ 21.118	€ 274.050	45%
Stimson Personnel	€ 73.581	€ 52.138	€ 138.544	-€ 30.286	€ 219.356	63%
Stimson Activities	€ 141.231	€ 153.186	€ 269.543	-€ 59.996	€ 423.693	64%
Audit & Other	€ 67.549	€ 59.071	€ 102.548	-€ 54.211	€ 202.233	51%
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 461.318</b>	<b>€ 517.652</b>	<b>€ 976.613</b>	<b>-€ 89.212</b>	<b>€ 1.618.490</b>	<b>60%</b>



The overall goal of the EIA project is that the UN, NATO, targeted missions, and relevant member states increasingly articulate and implement inclusive PoC policies and practices. **Effectively protecting civilians is not just about security forces having the tools and capabilities to protect, but also the political and strategic will to make it a priority. This is why PAX and its partners consider advocacy a critical component of our programmatic approach.** One of the desired outcomes of this advocacy is to cultivate visible international leadership on PoC on the part of UN and NATO member states. While countries may call themselves “champions” of PoC in theory, we wish to see that reflected in their actions in the policy arena and on the battlefield. PoC needs to become a central feature of training and planning. At the present moment, we are keenly aware of the need to remind past champions and hesitant future champions of the importance of PoC in the context of near-peer conflict and broader great power competition.

The EIA team across both PAX and Stimson achieved many meaningful results in 2021 in pursuit of the project’s long- and short-term objectives by convening or contributing to a wide range of events, meetings, and conferences around key PoC themes. While advocacy aimed at institutional change at the UN and NATO can admittedly be slow and incredibly hard to quantify, **we interpret from by the increasing number of requests we are getting for speaking engagements, training inputs, requests for commentary/articles, and the requests for inputs into official documents that we are gaining a foothold as a key advisor and facilitator of this work.** Below is a summary of outputs by results area:

**LTO 2: UN, NATO, T/PCCs and missions increasingly articulate and implement inclusive protection of civilians policies and practices**

- Organized an invite-only political workshop on “*Championing PoC in International and Regional Organizations*” with **26** representatives from NATO, UN, EUCAP Sahel, and member states
- Presented on a panel on Community Engagement at the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial 2021 preparatory conference

**STO 2.1: T/PCCs gain knowledge about their current capacity for civilian-centered protection and how to increase their PoC capacity**

- Convened annual PoC Conference with **323** registrants and **34** expert speakers from **42** countries over the 3-day event
- Published recordings from **14** event sessions from the PoC Conference (in English, French, and/or Arabic)
- Produced **3** episodes of the Civilian Protection Podcast (with PiP and CIVIC)
- Organized **2** side events for UN PoC Week: “*Emerging Practices in Effective Civilian Harm Mitigation*” and “*Protecting the Environment is Protecting Civilians*”
- Participated in the UN Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW) side event on “*The Role of Women Leaders: How to Increase Women Participation in the Military and Peacekeeping?*”

- Presented key recommendations on how to include local partners in comprehensive approach to Early Warning/Early Action activities to representatives of the Dutch MFA and MoD on the lessons learned during the EW/EA Burkina Faso Pilot
- Delivered recommendations – including on the Dutch approach to PoC – to the new government after the March elections
- Convened a closed-door meeting between senior representatives from the Dutch government and the Mayor of Hawija, Iraq, establishing direct lines of communication with civilian leadership for the first time
- Stimson convened the Expert Advisory Team **3** times in 2021 to generate strategic guidance for NATO
- Stimson wrote **2** reports and edited **4** additional policy papers commissioned from experts on NATO-specific PoC topics
- Facilitated **8** presentations for **64** participants on general PoC or human security themes at various institutions

**STO 2.2: UN and NATO focus on PoC and inclusive community engagement in their operational plans and policies**

- Published report: “Literature review on concepts, guidelines, and recommendations for Community Engagement”

- Published policy brief on *“Training for the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations”*
- Published report: *“Mapping Data-Driven Tools and Systems for Early Warning, Situational Awareness, and Early Action”* (with PiP)
- Provided technical input into the UN’s *Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace*
- Contributed to *“Joint Civil Society Statement on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”* with peer organizations
- Contributed to an EPLO policy brief entitled *The European Peace Facility: Minimizing Significant Risks in Implementation*
- Organized a *PoC-focused tabletop exercise (TTX)* at the First German/Netherlands Corps (1GNC) headquarters (Stimson with PiP)

PAX and Stimson continued to grow their thought leadership and convening power on PoC topics at the international level in 2021. **Through this program, we are continuing to shape the agenda at important policymaking moments at the UN and NATO, and we are facilitating necessary sharing of lessons learned by convening expert events, including our Annual PoC Conference.** At this year’s conference, which took place from 1-3 December, we had 323 registrants, of whom 167 joined us from around the world via a customized online platform, and dozens of others participated in person in The Hague. Many of the 15 expert sessions offered live interpretation into Arabic or French (depending on the content of the session), and event recordings from the public sessions are available online in each of the relevant languages. Organizing a hybrid event in the midst of a pandemic posed countless challenges due to shifting regulations, travel guidance, testing requirements, and general fatigue with online events. However, we were very pleased with the diversity of voices we were able to bring together, as well as the quality and richness of the discussions between our expert speakers and participants.

The conference focused on three key themes: international support to local security actors, accountability for military missions, and PoC champions in the future of warfare. Some of the most relevant sessions to the EIA project included: a keynote delivered by ret. Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander at NATO on *“Lessons on the protection of civilians for future conflict;”* and an expert panel on *“Connecting realities to championing PoC,”* including with speakers from the Dutch MFA, MoD, and civil society experts from Iraq and Chad. In conjunction with the conference, PAX and Stimson also convened an invite-only political workshop on *“Championing PoC in international and regional organizations.”* This workshop was attended by 26 representatives from NATO, UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel, and several UN and NATO member states.



Figure 11. PAX and Al-Ghad present during the situation in Hawija, Iraq during the annual PoC Conference

## Featured Story: Engaging Political Leadership in Hawija

**In 2011, PAX convened an important closed-door meeting between a political leader from Hawija Iraq, and two officials from the Dutch government.**

This was the first time that a civilian official representing the people of Hawija was able to meet directly and face-to-face with representatives from the government of the Netherlands since the Dutch airstrike in Hawija in June 2015. The airstrike targeted an ISIS-run improvised explosive device (IED) factory in the industrial area of Hawija, a district capital in Kirkuk governorate. The attack resulted in at least 85 civilian deaths,<sup>5</sup> hundreds of injuries, and countless other indirect and lasting effects for the community's economy, physical infrastructure, social services, and psychological health. (More detail about the incident and its implications can be found in the 2022 publication, *After the Strike*.)

PAX, our partners from Al-Ghad, and civilian leaders from Hawija hope that this will be just a first conversation, and that more sustained engagement around how to support civilians on the ground will follow. We hope as well that we will continue to engage with the Dutch government on issues around responsibility for the reverberating effects of civilian harm incidents generally, and that we and our partners can continue to connect civilians' experiences and priorities to these critical policy discussions.

Another significant result emerged from an important collaboration between the EIA team and our colleagues on the HSS South Sudan project. Together we organized a unique event in Juba, South Sudan in November 2021 entitled, "[Bridging the Law Enforcement Gap in South Sudan](#)." The event brought together local police commissioners, representatives from UN Police and UNDP, diplomats, and civil society to discuss the gap in expectations between local communities and the actual capabilities of police to provide protection. The event provided good opportunities to expand our engagements with the UN and the Dutch embassy specifically on the need to connect police actors with local human security needs. While this theme is traditionally more Security Sector Reform (SSR)-oriented than PoC, it was perceived by participants as entirely useful to apply a similar lens as applied in our other work. While rife with challenges, it is a relevant approach and one we had not previously deemed possible within the projects. We were very pleased to co-organize this event with the Dutch Embassy, and we hope to engage the Dutch MFA in both Juba and The Hague to continue the conversation on related programmatic opportunities.

We are also finding new and creative ways to reach a broader audience, including launching the [Civilian Protection Podcast](#) in coordination with CIVIC and our colleagues on the PiP project. Between June and December 2021, the first 3 episodes of the podcast were downloaded 944 times. The most EIA-focused of these episodes on "[People-Centered Peacekeeping](#)," which featured experts from the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and UN DPO, was streamed 225 times before the end of the year. Our listeners come from a variety of countries, with the USA, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands at the top, but also with listeners in Mali, Kenya, and Australia making the top 10.



## Lessons Learned

PAX developed a series of project- and program-level learning questions at the outset of this program that continue to guide reflections on how we work and how we define success. We and our partners

<sup>5</sup> Most media reporting references a figure of approximately 70 fatalities; however, in PAX's extensive research with Al-Ghad and Utrecht University in Hawija, we verified at least 85 civilian deaths that directly resulted from the airstrike.

strive to learn and apply lessons in our day-to-day work, as well as through targeted research and in expert discussions with our peers. Below are some important takeaways from our work in the EIA project in 2021:

**1. How can we go from being “interesting” to “relevant and persuasive” when engaging international security actors? What makes a policymaker change behavior based on our interaction – is it mainly an effect of our position, network, unique data, relevant recommendations, or other factors?**

One key insight is that we need to be active at local, national and international levels with data collection, research, advocacy, and training in order to improve the impact of our work. Knowledge does not apply itself, and therefore strategically using our position, network, and relevant data and targeted recommendations will increase our chances of achieving advocacy outcomes. We also need to continue pushing innovation by bringing in new and big thinkers to talk about PoC to broader audiences, whether they be well-known experts like Dr. David Kilcullen, or local civilian specialists that bring deep and contextually-relevant expertise. Logically, it is our experience that what makes a policymaker change behavior is when you effectively identify how to line up what you can offer with what they most need, ideally at a strategic moment.

**2. How can EIA stimulate more comprehensive approaches to PoC in The Netherlands between MFA departments and MoD, and utilize these in the cases of coordination towards UN, NATO, and the EU? How can we go from policy coherence to implementation coherence?**

Creating a solid and comprehensive government approach to PoC remains a critical focus of the broader Program. PAX and its partners, and particularly the EIA team, will continue convening both public events and more targeted discussions to facilitate that the full spectrum of political, diplomatic, security, and civil society voices that need to engage together to approach common challenges in the realm of PoC. We will continue to gain insights and experiences from Dutch MFA and MoD on these matters to enable joint learning.

## For More Information

- Listen to the entire first season of the [Civilian Protection Podcast](#), including 3 episodes produced in 2021, the third of which focuses on [people-centered peacekeeping](#).
- Watch the available [session recordings](#) from PAX's [Annual PoC Conference](#) (in English, Arabic, or French, depending on the session). The event focused on 3 key themes: international support to local security actors, accountability for military missions, and PoC champions in the future of warfare. A detailed resource library is also available for the entire event.
  - Watch the [after-movie](#) for a brief overview of the conference.
- Watch the session recordings from UN PoC Week side events on [Emerging Practices in Effective Civilian Harm Mitigation](#) and on [Protecting the Environment is Protecting Civilians](#)
- Watch the session recording from a UN Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW) side event on [The Role of Women Leaders: How to Increase Women's Participation in the Military and Peacekeeping?](#)
- Review [10 pieces of advice in the name of peace](#) for the Dutch government following the March 2021 parliamentary elections, including a number of points related to protection policies (in Dutch).
- Read a [Joint Civil Society Statement on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict](#) calling on the UN and member states to better fulfil their commitment to PoC, signed by 28 organizations.
- Read the [full paper series](#) published by Stimson in 2021 about the future of PoC at NATO:
  - [The Protection of Civilians within Collective Defense](#): This paper by Andrew Atkinson aims to identify the role that NATO's PoC Policy and its supporting military contribution could provide within an in-area, Article 5 collective defense operation.

- *A Political and Diplomatic Case for Protection of Civilians at NATO*: This paper by Andrew Hyde explains how NATO's progress on PoC reinforces the values-based nature of the Alliance, though argues that NATO must refocus political attention on implementation – resourcing and adapting the concept to address new threats.
- *Building Bridges, Reinforcing Protection*: This paper by Beatrice Godefroy, Liza Baran, and Suleiman Mamutov draws on CIVIC's programmatic work in Ukraine and outlines recommendations for NATO and Ukraine on how to systematically integrate PoC into partnership frameworks and security force assistance activities.
- *Future Urban Conflict, Technology, and the Protection of Civilians*: This paper by Dr. David Kilcullen and Gordon Pendelton discusses the implications of new technologies an increasingly urbanized world for military operations, and consequently for the protection of civilians.
  - Watch a [video of the authors](#) discussing their conclusions.
- *Origins, Progress, and Unfinished Business: NATO's Protection of Civilians Policy*: This paper by Katie Dock reflects on the history of NATO's PoC policy and progress made in the 5 years after its adoption, and highlights opportunities for the future.
- *2020 Expert Workshop Readout - NATO & the Protection of Civilians: Toward Implementation*: This event report by Victoria Holt and Marla Keenan summarizes a series of workshops Stimson convened in December 2020 to discuss NATO's role in future conflict scenarios, particularly as it relates to PoC.
- Read a policy brief on *Training for the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, which provides recommendations to member states on making concrete and impactful pledges at the 2021 peacekeeping ministerial related to training for PoC.
- Read a policy brief entitled *The European Peace Facility: Minimizing Significant Risks in Implementation*, an EPLO statement with contributions from PAX.
- Read a comprehensive *Literature Review on Concepts, Guidelines, and Recommendations for Community Engagement*, which provides an overview of key publications addressing the concept and practice of community engagement in conflict- and crisis-affected contexts.
- Learn more about the event on **Bridging the Law Enforcement Gap in South Sudan** (co-organized with HSS South Sudan and Dutch Embassy in Juba) by reading the summary [event report](#).
  - View a [video summary](#) of the event.
- **Please reach out to EIA Project Lead, Hans Rouw with any questions or comments ([rouw@paxforpeace.nl](mailto:rouw@paxforpeace.nl)).**



## 2.4 PROJECT CHAPTER: Protection In Practice

### Progress summary

In 2021 the PiP project significantly expanded its capacity to research, advise, and train. The results are visible in the multitude of publications, advocacy results, and delivered training solutions achieved over the course of the last year. **The high pace of relevant outputs, combined with the growing demand for our advice and services is an exciting sign that we are on the right track.**

The main focus of the project in 2021 was to increase our ability to deliver training solutions to military entities and to produce high quality advice and publications on civilian harm. The PiP project began the year with 2 additional staff, both experienced subject matter experts with military background. This significantly widened our network, the range and depth of subject matter we can cover, as well as our capacity to deliver.



Figure 12. PiP Progress in 2021

### Context Analysis & Adaptations

#### PoC at the International Level

There are a number of positive developments in the operational space relevant to this program, particularly within the policymaking arena at the UN and NATO, but also in key countries for the PiP project, like the Netherlands.

Towards the end of the year we noticed a growing appetite at the **UN headquarters** level to revisit institutional understanding of how protection of civilians and civilian harm are conceptualized throughout diverse UN entities, including Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), Special Political Missions (SPMs), Commissions of Inquiry (COIs), etc. PAX was eager to both capitalize on and further contribute to this growing policy space. In 2021 we presented several research papers to UN entities such as the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) to stimulate discussion on the conceptualization of PoC and civilian harm in the UN system.

At **NATO**, we noticed a new drive to progress the implementation of the 2016 PoC Policy with the publication of the PoC Handbook and several adaptations of PoC training modules. Alongside partners at Stimson, PAX actively pursued opportunities to build relations with NATO military headquarters, NATO force structure, and various other NATO entities to find out where PAX can have added value in this next phase of actually operationalizing and implementing its PoC policy. Throughout the year we contributed actively to training and exercise efforts, such as the first LANDCOM-organized PoC Focal Point Training. In October, PAX and Stimson ran a tabletop exercise (TTX) hosted by the First German/Netherlands Corps (1GNC), which further helped to position PAX as one of a handful of outside entities actively engaging with NATO on these efforts. Throughout the year we also engaged with NATO LANDCOM and others to establish longer-term Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) or equivalent documentation underpinning future cooperation. PiP staff also remains engaged in relevant NATO PoC Policy debates in Brussels and elsewhere.

In the **Netherlands** we witnessed a changing attitude towards civilian harm and transparent reporting on civilian harm incidents, with new and meaningful interactions between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and civil society, as well as the establishment of the Sorgdrager Committee investigating the Dutch airstrike on Hawija, Iraq in 2015. PAX and peer institutions working in the PoC space had a lot to do with facilitating these changes. PiP staff coordinated and actively shaped a series of meetings with the MoD and a consortium of NGOs revisiting Dutch policies and practices on civilian harm, transparency, and accountability. PAX also actively offered to share expertise and information with the Sorgdrager Commission. Further, PAX, together with Iraqi NGO Al-Ghad and Utrecht University,

researched the short- and long-term direct and reverberating harmful effects of the airstrike on Hawija on civilians, which has become a pivotal case study for exploring lessons learned for the Netherlands – as well as Coalition partners – about how to avoid and respond to civilian harm incidents in the future.

### COVID-19 Pandemic

The pandemic continued to disrupt our ability to implement our workplan as intended in 2021, hampering plans to engage more actively with military missions in the field and causing the PiP team to delay several key activities.

The repeated lockdowns in the first half of the year, and then again in Q4 meant that we were unable to travel for most of 2021. For the 2<sup>nd</sup> year in a row this impeded our plans to engage more actively with UN and other security-providing entities in target countries. **COVID-19 forced us to remain flexible – for every activity we had to make contingency plans, sometimes resulting in postponing events or switching from physical to online.** For instance, it forced PAX to repeatedly cancel or delay plans for international book launch and review events for a book we published in 2021, *On Civilian Harm*. It also meant that we were unable to develop relationships and work in South Sudan the way we had hoped. Luckily, the expanded staff capacity for the project meant we were much better equipped to be adaptable and to stay abreast of the latest challenges and opportunities in implementing our workplan.

### Partnerships & Management

In 2021 PAX entered into formal partnerships with the **Intimacies of Remote Warfare** (IRW) program at Utrecht University and **Al-Ghad League for Women and Child Care** (Al-Ghad) for research in Iraq. While this effort is largely managed by the HSS Iraq team, PiP staffers contributed significantly as well. PAX staff also began coordinating actively with **InterAction** through our participation in the US Protection Working Group. PiP staff worked with **Stimson Center** and **Cordillera Applications Group** for the production and delivery of the PoC TTX for 1GNC, and with **FINCENT** to develop and deliver various targeted training modules. PAX also initiated a new partnership with the **Center for Civilians in Conflict** (CIVIC) to produce a series of podcasts on the highlighting the voices and experiences of civilians living through conflict. Finally, PAX worked extensively with the **Dutch MoD** and a **consortium of NGOs** in facilitating the so-called Roadmap Process.

### Project Results

Progress towards intended results for the PiP project was very significant in 2021. This is especially true for results area 3.2 on civilian harm, where we delivered multiple publications, including a book and a series of policy review workshops that led to desired policy changes; and results area 3.4 on PoC mainstreaming, with the delivery of multiple training and exercise modules and – significantly – the first ever NGO-run PoC-focused military tabletop exercise. Progress towards other short-term outcomes (STOs), including 3.1 on data-driven protection and 3.3 on in-mission effectiveness remained limited. Achievements were originally planned to start in 2021, but COVID-related travel and access restrictions have slowed down our efforts to build relations with targeted missions and institutions significantly.

# PiP Dashboard – 2021

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the Protection in Practice team in 2021, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

## Training & Advising Outcomes

STO 3.2: Targeted missions have increased capacity and mechanisms on independently verifiable civilian harm tracking, analysis, and response

Published, launched, and disseminated hundreds of digital and physical copies of the book *On Civilian Harm* to a wide range of expert stakeholders.

Coordinated a series of civilian harm policy review workshops with the Dutch MoD and NGO peers, and published a set of targeted recommendations.

Provided advice to and structured correspondence with Sorgdrager Commission investigating Hawija airstrike.

STO 3.4: Targeted missions possess fundamental knowledge of general PoC topics

Developed and delivered a 4-day PoC in high-intensity urban conflict military tabletop exercise for 1GNC (the first such TTX led by an NGO).

Advised NATO on producing draft standard operating procedures (SoPs) on PoC for the Allied Rapid Response Corps (ARRC) and First German/Netherlands Corps (1GNC).

Delivered the first of a planned annual PoC training program to NATO LANDCOM Focal Points.

## Key Outputs

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of trainings for T/PCCs on general or specialized PoC topics	0	1	5		6
# of engagements of PAX staff in training curriculum development	2	1	3		6
# of engagements with missions or government institutions to disseminate lessons learned about civilian harm tracking	0	2	6		8

	# of episodes of the Civilian Protection podcast produced and published in 2021	3
	# of military exercises with a focus on PoC themes organized in 2021	3
	# of participants in military exercises or trainings in general or specialized PoC topics in 2021	90
	# of participants in events to publicize or discuss PAX publications on civilian harm topics in 2021	97

## Budget & Spending

	Budget 2021	Actuals 2021	Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
Personnel	€ 168.082	€ 254.005	€ 376.369	€ 7.876	€ 711.394	53%
Activities	€ 232.000	€ 248.525	€ 295.116	-€ 107.884	€ 817.000	36%
Audit & Other	€ 6.000	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 13.000	€ 25.000	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 406.082</b>	<b>€ 502.529</b>	<b>€ 671.484</b>	<b>-€ 113.009</b>	<b>€ 1.553.394</b>	<b>43%</b>

Below is a summary of key outputs and outcomes by results area:

**STO 3.1: Targeted missions have increased knowledge of, capacity, and willingness for evidence-based and data-driven decision making on PoC**

- Published and disseminated the report [Mapping Data-Driven Tools and Systems for Early Warning, Situational Awareness, and Early Action](#) (with EIA)

**STO 3.2: Targeted missions have increased capacity and mechanisms on independently verifiable civilian harm tracking, analysis, and response**

- Published, launched, and disseminated hundreds of digital and physical copies of the book [On Civilian Harm](#) to a wide range of expert stakeholders
- Coordinated a series of civilian harm policy review workshops with the Dutch MoD and NGO peers, and published a set of [targeted recommendations](#)
- Contributed to field [research in Hawija, Iraq](#), leading to a major research publication in 2022 (with HSS Iraq)
- Provided advice to and structured correspondence with Sorgdrager Commission
- Provided advice to US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee civilian harm policy review process

**STO 3.3: Targeted missions have increased knowledge about and willingness to engage in comprehensive assessment of PoC effectiveness**

- Provided support for redevelopment of the UN/NATO comprehensive protection of civilians (CPOC) course

**STO 3.4: Targeted missions possess fundamental knowledge of general PoC topics**

- Developed and delivered a 4-day [PoC in urban conflict military tabletop exercise](#) (with Cordillera Applications Group, Stimson Center, and NATO/1GNC)
- Provided advice and support to Multi-National Corps Northeast (MNC NE)
- Advised NATO producing draft standard operating procedures (SoPs) on PoC for NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and 1GNC
- Delivered the first of an annual PoC training to NATO LANDCOM Focal Points
- Delivered 1-day PoC training to Dutch MLO course and participated as subject matter experts in 3-day TOOK EIBA exercise
- Produced 3 episodes of the [Civilian Protection Podcast](#) (with EIA and CIVIC)

Each of the above results reflects a great deal of work and the potential for exciting follow-on opportunities. A number of activities are worthy of being additionally highlighted. First, **PAX undertook a massive effort to comprehensively answer two key questions central to our work: What negative effects of the use of force do civilians experience in conflict beyond the direct, physical impacts? And how can we reduce both immediate and long-term suffering in future conflicts and interventions?** The book *On Civilian Harm* answers these questions through 13 case studies detailing different forms of civilian harm (from siege tactics to targeting essential infrastructure, to forced displacement) in various conflict contexts across recent history, and in 3 analytic chapters seeking to further define and articulate who constitutes the victims of violent conflict; how we can assess the intentions and responsibilities of the perpetrators of harm; and understanding the key factors influencing how harm is either caused or mitigated. The entire book or its individual chapters can be read or downloaded for free on our website: [protectionofcivilians.org](https://protectionofcivilians.org). There you can also watch a recording of the [public launch event](#), featuring a series of expert speakers, as well as a short [animated video](#) introducing the book's themes.



Figure 13. PAX published a detailed book on the complex effects of conflict on the lives of civilians

The book's authors and contributors identified three key challenges in how civilian harm is discussed in the media and even within our own field. First, we need to overcome the notion that war is too chaotic to really understand what is happening on the ground. There is more and better evidence than ever before about the realities of conflict in the moment, from satellite imagery, to citizen journalism on social media, to reporting from watchdogs and militaries themselves. We can no longer fall back on outdated assumptions that the so-called "fog of war" obscures reality and inhibits attempts at accountability. Second, even within our own community of practitioners, we often fail to use clear and consistent language when talking about civilian harm. This book proposes a common lexicon that is at once more explicit, but also more expansive than the default vocabulary. And finally, we noticed that public and professional attention is overwhelmingly focused on only a single, visible part of civilian harm – the so-called "wounded and the dead" – at the expense of other negative, but often less apparent effects that remain long after the fighting has stopped. These may include the loss of livelihoods associated with disrupted supply chains, increased food insecurity due to the destruction of markets or agricultural facilities, long-term health consequences when water infrastructure or hospitals are damaged, or devastating mental health strain on entire communities, among many other effects. We have already observed that since publishing this book, more of our peer organizations and even advocacy targets are starting to adopt similar language around the reverberating effects of conflict, indicating that these concepts resonate.

A second key activity for the PiP project in 2021 was the tabletop military exercise (TTX) on "Protecting Civilians in High-Intensity Urban Warfare," organized by PAX and Stimson, and facilitated by military experts from the Cordillera Applications Group, including famed strategist Dr. David Kilcullen. The TTX



Figure 14. Briefing during the TTX at 1GNC

was an innovative experiment that brought together both military and civilian experts who would have to engage with one another in a real-world scenario. As stated in the [wargame report](#), *"Too often, both parties have theorized on the role the other side would play in a high-intensity fight. While collective training efforts have attempted to test these assumptions, essential discussions on protection have usually occurred on the fringes of major exercise, often involving only the [Civil-Military Cooperation] specialists. This needs to change if both military and non-military actors wish to maximize the protection of civilians."* What was also unique about the exercise was that **the wargame focused on high-intensity combat in an urban setting against a near-peer adversary, which served to both stress-test NATO's PoC policy and handbook, and unfortunately formed a prelude to the current fighting in Ukraine** in spring of 2022. Participants were exposed to a variety of PoC-focused dilemmas throughout the exercise that forced them to reckon with the capability and doctrinal limitations of their institution, as well as the ethical challenges that they would face in urban-centric warfare on the European continent. The event was hosted by 1GNC and attended by 40 participants and observers from a variety of institutions,<sup>6</sup> and will hopefully be the first in a series of PoC-focused military exercises that this program will facilitate in the years to come.

<sup>6</sup> Participating institutions included: 1GNC, NATO HQ, NATO SHAPE, NATO ACT, NATO LANDCOM, CIMIC Center of Excellence (CCOE), WFP, CIVIC, FINCENT, ICRC, the German Ministry of Defense, and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as Stimson and PAX.



## Featured Story: The Roadmap Process

**The Dutch MoD is meaningfully updating its official policy on how it tracks, monitors, reports on, and mitigates incidents of civilian harm by its own actions, representing a significant shift away from a culture of intransparency towards taking greater responsibility for both the immediate and longer-term effects of military interventions.**

These changes are being spearheaded by the Department of International Affairs at the MoD, but with major contributions from the Directorate of Operational Planning & Strategy, the Intelligence Service, the Conflict Prevention Unit, and the Force Structure (Land and Air Commands).

The so-called "Roadmap Process" involves extensive and sustained consultations with an NGO consortium led by PAX, and with representatives from the Open State Foundation, Airwars, CIVIC, University of Utrecht, Amnesty International, and observed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The process to get to the start of this series of roundtables was long and demanded extensive trust building, negotiation on topics and participants, as well as relationship management, flexibility, and patience. Luckily these are all attributes required of peacebuilding professionals. We also benefited from the space and time that the MFA afforded us to facilitate these processes.

Especially during the last roundtables in the series, we recognized that MoD participants were able to engage openly in collaborative discussions not only on what the Netherlands wants in terms of transparency and accountability, but also that they were susceptible to our recommendation to broaden the discussion to include addressing the capability to monitor and respond to civilian harm as well. This allowed us to share our expertise and advise fully and concretely.

The Roadmap Process has achieved a meaningful change in policy, and one that is rather practical in nature. It will result in tangible changes to how Dutch troops define their mission mandates, plan their interventions, track the effects for civilians and civilian infrastructure, and respond to incidents of harm. While this is only one country and only one component of what we consider "protection of civilians," the idea of the Dutch government embracing civilian-focused accountability structures is incredibly significant and reflects why we as a program find it so critical to engage directly and in a sustained fashion with counterparts from within diplomatic and security institutions. The recommendations and lessons learned from this process may moreover be replicated to other contexts and security actors.

Finally, three additional achievements stood out as particularly unexpected or exciting in 2021:

- The **Civilian Protection Podcast** series with CIVIC was not originally part of the program planning, but developed as part of an internal brainstorm on ideas for activities and publications during the pandemic. It has been a really fruitful collaboration between PiP, EIA, and CIVIC, as well as a way to showcase civilian voices to a broader audience.
- The **inclusion of PAX in the NATO Force Structure partnership roster** signals that we are a credible and trusted stakeholder for NATO headquarters, and expands opportunities for contributing directly to curriculum development for practical application of PoC tasks by NATO-trained military, and the mainstreaming of PoC in NATO and Partnership for Peace countries.
- PAX has had **elaborate interactions with US policymakers and the Department of Defense (DoD)** in a range of topics, including the civilian harm policy review. This may open doors to a larger body of work focused on the US in the years to come. Recognizing the dominant role of the US in the NATO Alliance and in Coalition and partnered missions, we believe the US is a key target for our efforts.

All the results mentioned above are attributable to our program. Having said that, many of these were developed with one or more local partners, peer organizations, military headquarters, or others, and as such success cannot be attributed to PAX alone.

## Lessons Learned

PAX developed a series of project- and program-level learning questions at the outset of this program that continue to guide reflections on how we work and how we define success. We and our partners

strive to learn and apply lessons in our day-to-day work, as well as through targeted research and in expert discussions with our peers. Below are some important takeaways from our work in the PiP project in 2021:

### 1. How do we best formalize our relationships with military actors, particularly vis-à-vis training?

With regard to both learning questions 1 and 3, we learned that the best way to formalize our relations with military actors and to prevent cooptation is to establish clear MoUs or equivalent documents underpinning our cooperation. This establishes clear expectations from the outset of an engagement, befits the structured culture of military institutions, and supports our desire to clearly document and report on outcomes.

### 2. What is the “gold standard” with regards to civilian harm tracking and response?

We believe we are making significant progress towards formulating a comprehensive answer to this based on our research on reverberating effects, engagements with relevant actors, and reflection within the team and with partners. We would assert that PAX is now among a handful of entities worldwide with a comprehensive understanding of this complex and open question. This is an outcome of the dedicated effort that went into writing the book *On Civilian Harm*, as well as ongoing research, community engagement, and international advocacy efforts associated with the research in Hawija. Lessons we have learned to date are being systematically integrated into our training, advising, and advocacy work with military institutions, policymakers, and civil society.

### 3. How do we recognize or prevent cooptation (as opposed to cooperation) in joint efforts with missions and militaries? How do we best contribute to facilitating the implementation of lessons learned in targeted missions?

In addition to the lesson mentioned to above about signing formal MoUs with military stakeholders, we learned in 2021 that it is important that we control the selection of participants to trainings and exercises we deliver in a meaningful way. Rather than making ourselves available to an institution and asking them to send us a set of participants they deem to be relevant, interested, or simply available to contribute, we will more carefully vet training participant rosters in advance to ensure that the right set of individuals are convened each given session. This helps prevent that our efforts are coopted or used minimally as a check-the-box exercise on PoC.

## For More Information

- Read or download individual chapters or PAX’s entire book *[On Civilian Harm](#)* on our website (or request a hardcover copy).
  - Watch the video recording of the book’s [launch event](#).
  - View a [short animated summary](#) of the book’s content.
- Listen to the entire first season of the [Civilian Protection Podcast](#), including 3 episodes produced in 2021 focusing on documenting civilian harm in Iraq; seeking recognition and amends for harm in Somalia and Yemen; and on people-centered peacekeeping in Central African Republic and South Sudan.
- Review the [10 recommendations presented to the Dutch MoD](#) by the PAX-led NGO Consortium as part of the Roadmap Process.
- Read more about PAX and Stimson’s tabletop military exercise with 1GNC on “Protecting Civilians in High-Intensity Urban Warfare” in the detailed [Wargame Report](#). It includes an overview of key components of NATO’s PoC Military Framework, a summary of the wargame’s aims and learning objectives, a description of the scenario and vignettes, and critical observations and recommendations of relevance to a broader audience of PoC professionals.

- Stay tuned for more on the **extensive research** done in Hawija, Iraq about the Dutch airstrike that devastated the area in 2015. The full report and launch events are scheduled for 2022 and will be detailed in a future report.
- Read a report exploring existing tools and systems used by the UN and other missions entitled “*Mapping Data-Driven Tools and Systems for Early Warning, Situational Awareness, and Early Action.*”
- **Please reach out to PiP Project Lead, Wilbert van der Zeijden with any questions or comments ([vanderzeijden@paxforpeace.nl](mailto:vanderzeijden@paxforpeace.nl)).**

## 3. ANNEXES

### 3.1 Program Dashboard

## PoC Program Level Dashboard - 2021

Below is a summary of key metrics regarding the impact, context, and visibility of the PoC Program in 2021, as well as an overview of budget utilization to date.

### DSH Standard Indicators

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of formal/informal institutions strengthened in the field of human security	6	10	23		39
# of people trained in the field of human security	0	97	187		284

### Context Indicators

#### Fragile States Index (FSI)

The **Security Apparatus indicator** considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism; as well as serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security.

The **Group Grievance Indicator** focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society— particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics— and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process.

	2019	2020	2021	Ranking		2019	2020	2021	Ranking
Iraq	8,7	8,2	7,9	20 <sup>th</sup>	Iraq	8,8	8,5	8,2	20 <sup>th</sup>
South Sudan	9,7	9,4	9,7	4 <sup>th</sup>	South Sudan	9,4	9,1	8,8	4 <sup>th</sup>

\* Scores are from 1-10, with 10 the least positive. Rankings are by fragility score in 2021; 179 countries are analyzed for these years.

#### Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

# of estimated fatalities resulting from political violence per year: **ACLED defines events of violence against civilians as incidents where an organized armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants, and specifically includes sexual violence, attacks, and abduction/ forced disappearance.**

	2019	2020	2021	Total	Note: PAX also includes those killed as a result of protests or riots from the same dataset given the likelihood that these are civilians. According to their codebook, ACLED excludes casualties associated with battles, explosions, or remote violence because they are presumed to be aimed at military targets. This is a potential data limitation in both contexts.
Iraq	702	418	355	1475	
South Sudan	976	665	946	2487	

### Program Visibility

Publications & Events	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of presentations or events by program staff or partners on general PoC or human security themes	0	3	8		11
# of attendees at annual PoC Conference	54	418	323		795
# of online views of HSS Iraq publications	327	841	932		2100
# of online views of HSS South Sudan publications	167	352	1310		1829

#### Social Media & Podcast

# of recipients of PoC Newsletter	232	# of followers of PoC Twitter *	910
# of average monthly visitors to PoC website in 2021	709	# of members of PoC LinkedIn page *	1086
# of HSS followers on Facebook *	844	# of listeners to Civilian Protection podcast *	1939

# PoC Program Level Dashboard - 2021

Below is a summary of key metrics regarding the impact, context, and visibility of the PoC Program in 2021, as well as an overview of budget utilization to date.

## Budget Summary

	Budget (2021)	Actuals (2021)	Total Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
<b>A. PAX Central</b>						
A.1 Personnel	€ 194.503	€ 206.462	€ 456.356	€ 6.812	€ 863.394	53%
A.2 Activities	€ 60.000	€ 127.944	€ 302.936	€ 122.936	€ 300.000	101%
A.3 Office	€ 218.694	€ 215.678	€ 471.524	-€ 26.759	€ 944.437	50%
A4. Evaluations & Audits	€ 125.000	€ 24.563	€ 48.618	-€ 137.382	€ 511.000	10%
<i>Subtotal PAX Central</i>	<i>€ 598.197</i>	<i>€ 574.646</i>	<i>€ 1.279.434</i>	<i>-€ 34.394</i>	<i>€ 2.618.831</i>	<i>49%</i>
<b>B. HSS South Sudan</b>						
B.1 Personnel	€ 161.955	€ 138.824	€ 315.699	-€ 52.262	€ 698.361	45%
B.2 Activities	€ 178.565	€ 204.447	€ 292.674	-€ 145.036	€ 794.840	37%
B.3 Audit & Other	€ 15.000	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 35.000	€ 65.000	0%
<i>Subtotal HSS South Sudan</i>	<i>€ 355.520</i>	<i>€ 343.271</i>	<i>€ 608.373</i>	<i>-€ 232.298</i>	<i>€ 1.558.201</i>	<i>39%</i>
<b>C. HSS Iraq</b>						
C.1 Personnel	€ 161.955	€ 112.533	€ 274.623	-€ 99.738	€ 704.761	39%
C.2 Activities	€ 194.906	€ 327.124	€ 449.120	€ 44.771	€ 794.161	57%
C.3 Audit & Other	€ 62.850	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 135.969	€ 261.669	0%
<i>Subtotal HSS Iraq</i>	<i>€ 419.711</i>	<i>€ 439.657</i>	<i>€ 723.743</i>	<i>-€ 190.936</i>	<i>€ 1.760.591</i>	<i>41%</i>
<b>D. Engaging International Actors on PoC (EIA)</b>						
D.1 Personnel	€ 114.707	€ 149.321	€ 341.545	€ 76.398	€ 499.158	68%
D.2 Activities	€ 64.250	€ 103.936	€ 124.432	-€ 21.118	€ 274.050	45%
D.3 Stimson Personnel	€ 73.581	€ 52.138	€ 138.544	-€ 30.286	€ 219.356	63%
D.4 Stimson Activities	€ 141.231	€ 153.186	€ 269.543	-€ 59.996	€ 423.693	64%
D.5 Stimson Audit & Other	€ 67.549	€ 59.071	€ 102.548	-€ 54.211	€ 202.233	51%
<i>Subtotal EIA</i>	<i>€ 461.318</i>	<i>€ 517.652</i>	<i>€ 976.613</i>	<i>-€ 89.212</i>	<i>€ 1.618.490</i>	<i>60%</i>
<b>E. Protection in Practice (PiP)</b>						
E.1 Personnel	€ 168.082	€ 254.005	€ 376.369	€ 7.876	€ 711.394	53%
E.2 Activities	€ 232.000	€ 248.525	€ 295.116	-€ 107.884	€ 817.000	36%
E.5 Audit & Other	€ 6.000	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 13.000	€ 25.000	0%
<i>Subtotal PiP</i>	<i>€ 406.082</i>	<i>€ 502.529</i>	<i>€ 671.484</i>	<i>-€ 113.009</i>	<i>€ 1.553.394</i>	<i>43%</i>
<b>F. Overhead/Indirect costs</b>						
F.1 Staff support Costs	€ 83.176	€ 90.135	€ 192.368	€ 2.837	€ 359.216	54%
F.2 Not Directly Allocable Costs	€ 308.730	€ 376.866	€ 728.079	€ 22.818	€ 1.318.045	55%
<i>Subtotal Indirect</i>	<i>€ 391.906</i>	<i>€ 467.001</i>	<i>€ 920.447</i>	<i>€ 25.656</i>	<i>€ 1.677.261</i>	<i>55%</i>
Contingency	€ 52.655	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 116.286	€ 215.645	0%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>€ 2.685.389</b>	<b>€ 2.844.757</b>	<b>€ 5.180.094</b>	<b>-€ 750.478</b>	<b>€ 11.002.413</b>	<b>47%</b>

### Notes:

- Partner audit costs for our local partners in Iraq and South Sudan were accounted for within their general operating budgets and therefore are not separately reported herein.
- No other budget lines deviated by more than 10% from the budget as approved by DSH in our 2021 workplan.



### 3.2 Project Dashboards

## HSS Iraq Dashboard – 2021

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the Human Security Survey in Iraq in 2021, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

### Impact Indicators

% of HSS respondents in Iraq reporting that their security situation has improved over the previous 12 months

Kirkuk (2020)	Salahaddin (2020)	Basra (2021)	Diyala (2021)	Average (2020-21)
52%	59%	23%	54%	<b>47%</b>

% of HSS respondents in Iraq reporting a favorable perception of the police in their area

Kirkuk (2020)	Salahaddin (2020)	Basra (2021)	Diyala (2021)	Average (2020-21)
86%	92%	86%	98%	<b>91%</b>

\* Explore more of the HSS Iraq data from 2017-2021 by visiting our interactive, online [data dashboard](#), or by reading our many [publications](#) on our website, including infographics, analytic reports, and videos (in English or Arabic).

### Key Results

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of HSS data collection rounds completed	0	3	2		5
# of HSS enumerators trained	0	46	60		106
# of HSS respondents	0	2,295	1,478		3,773

	# of authorities making concrete commitments responding to civilians' protection concerns in 2021	5
	# of local partners or experts consulted in annual HSS methodology review process in 2021	8
	# of community engagement activities implemented by community champions in 2021	12
	# of community dialogues held with local civilians and relevant authorities in 2021	15
	# of local partner staff trained in facilitation or M&E skills in 2021	44

### Budget & Spending

	Budget 2021	Actuals 2021	Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
Personnel	€ 161.955	€ 112.533	€ 274.623	-€ 99.738	€ 704.761	39%
Activities	€ 194.906	€ 327.124	€ 449.120	€ 44.771	€ 794.161	57%
Audit & Other	€ 62.850	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 135.969	€ 261.669	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 419.711</b>	<b>€ 439.657</b>	<b>€ 723.743</b>	<b>-€ 190.936</b>	<b>€ 1.760.591</b>	<b>41%</b>

\*Audit costs for our local partners in Iraq were accounted for within their general operating budgets and are not separately reported herein.

# HSS South Sudan Dashboard – 2021

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the Human Security Survey in South Sudan in 2021, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

## Impact Indicators

% of HSS respondents in South Sudan reporting that their security situation has improved over the previous 12 months

Jonglei (2020)	Payinjiar (2020)	Yirol (2020)	Central Equatoria (2021)	Eastern Equatoria (2021)	Average (2020-21)
3%	34%	51%	40%	64%	<b>38%</b>

% of HSS respondents in South Sudan reporting a favorable perception of the police in their area

Jonglei (2020)	Payinjiar (2020)	Yirol (2020)	Central Equatoria (2021)	Eastern Equatoria (2021)	Average (2020-21)
65%	85%	73%	64%	57%	<b>69%</b>

\* Explore more of the HSS South Sudan data from 2017-2021 by visiting our interactive, online [data dashboard](#), or by reading our many [publications](#) on our website, including infographics, analytic reports, and videos.

## Key Results

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of HSS data collection rounds completed	0	3	2		5
# of authorities making concrete commitments responding to civilians' protection concerns	0	6	4		10
# of community engagement activities implemented by community committees	3	17	18		38
# of HSS enumerators trained	0	28	22		50
# of HSS respondents	0	1,325	852		2,177



# of community dialogues held with local civilians and relevant authorities in 2021

5



# of local partners or experts consulted in annual HSS methodology review process in 2021

32



# of local civil society representatives or authorities interviewed in Expert Panel Survey in 2021

47

## Budget & Spending

	Budget 2021	Actuals 2021	Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
Personnel	€ 161.955	€ 138.824	€ 315.699	-€ 52.262	€ 698.361	45%
Activities	€ 178.565	€ 204.447	€ 292.674	-€ 145.036	€ 794.840	37%
Audit & Other	€ 15.000	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 35.000	€ 65.000	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 355.520</b>	<b>€ 343.271</b>	<b>€ 608.373</b>	<b>-€ 232.298</b>	<b>€ 1.558.201</b>	<b>39%</b>

\* Audit costs for our partners in South Sudan were accounted for within their general operating budgets and are not separately reported.

# EIA Dashboard – 2021

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the Engaging International Actors on PoC team in 2021, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

## Advocacy Achievements

Long-term outcome 2: UN, NATO, T/PCCs, and missions increasingly articulate and implement inclusive PoC policies and practices

PAX contributed to the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial preparatory conference, presenting on an expert panel on community engagement and disseminating a policy brief on [training for PoC in peacekeeping operations](#).

PAX delivered a set of key [recommendations](#) to the government of the Netherlands following parliamentary elections in March 2021, including focused on the Dutch approach to PoC.

Short-term outcome 2.2: UN and NATO focus on PoC and inclusive community engagement in their operational plans and policies

PAX provided input into the UN's [Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace](#), and provided a focus on promoting inclusivity, consultation, and effective engagement between UN missions and local civil society.

PAX and 25 peer organizations published a [joint statement](#) ahead of the annual open debate on PoC calling for the UN, Member States, and armed actors to take ambitious action to ensure that inclusive protection is at the heart of UN peace operations.

## Key Outputs

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of expert events facilitated to advance civilian-centered protection	0	3	3		6
# of specialized protection experts serving on the Expert Advisory Team to NATO in 2021	0	9	11		12
# of participants in trainings by Program staff or partners on PoC or human security themes	0	40	64		104
# of registrants for annual PoC Conference	54	418	323		795

	# of roundtables organized with or by UN or NATO HQ on civilian-centered peacekeeping in 2021	2
	# of episodes of the Civilian Protection podcast produced and published in 2021	3
	# of research papers exploring future PoC challenges at NATO published in 2021	6
	# of participants in PAX-organized UN PoC Week side events in 2021	621

## Budget & Spending

	Budget 2021	Actuals 2021	Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
PAX Personnel	€ 114.707	€ 149.321	€ 341.545	€ 76.398	€ 499.158	68%
PAX Activities	€ 64.250	€ 103.936	€ 124.432	-€ 21.118	€ 274.050	45%
Stimson Personnel	€ 73.581	€ 52.138	€ 138.544	-€ 30.286	€ 219.356	63%
Stimson Activities	€ 141.231	€ 153.186	€ 269.543	-€ 59.996	€ 423.693	64%
Audit & Other	€ 67.549	€ 59.071	€ 102.548	-€ 54.211	€ 202.233	51%
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 461.318</b>	<b>€ 517.652</b>	<b>€ 976.613</b>	<b>-€ 89.212</b>	<b>€ 1.618.490</b>	<b>60%</b>

# PiP Dashboard – 2021

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the Protection in Practice team in 2021, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

## Training & Advising Outcomes

STO 3.2: Targeted missions have increased capacity and mechanisms on independently verifiable civilian harm tracking, analysis, and response

Published, launched, and disseminated hundreds of digital and physical copies of the book *On Civilian Harm* to a wide range of expert stakeholders.

Coordinated a series of civilian harm policy review workshops with the Dutch MoD and NGO peers, and published a set of targeted recommendations.

Provided advice to and structured correspondence with Sorgdrager Commission investigating Hawija airstrike.

STO 3.4: Targeted missions possess fundamental knowledge of general PoC topics

Developed and delivered a 4-day PoC in high-intensity urban conflict military tabletop exercise for 1GNC (the first such TTX led by an NGO).

Advised NATO on producing draft standard operating procedures (SoPs) on PoC for the Allied Rapid Response Corps (ARRC) and First German/Netherlands Corps (1GNC).

Delivered the first of a planned annual PoC training program to NATO LANDCOM Focal Points.

## Key Outputs

	2019	2020	2021	Trend	Total
# of trainings for T/PCCs on general or specialized PoC topics	0	1	5		6
# of engagements of PAX staff in training curriculum development	2	1	3		6
# of engagements with missions or government institutions to disseminate lessons learned about civilian harm tracking	0	2	6		8

	# of episodes of the Civilian Protection podcast produced and published in 2021	3
	# of military exercises with a focus on PoC themes organized in 2021	3
	# of participants in military exercises or trainings in general or specialized PoC topics in 2021	90
	# of participants in events to publicize or discuss PAX publications on civilian harm topics in 2021	97

## Budget & Spending

	Budget 2021	Actuals 2021	Spending to Date	Cumulative Underspending	Total Budget (original)	% Realized
Personnel	€ 168.082	€ 254.005	€ 376.369	€ 7.876	€ 711.394	53%
Activities	€ 232.000	€ 248.525	€ 295.116	-€ 107.884	€ 817.000	36%
Audit & Other	€ 6.000	€ 0	€ 0	-€ 13.000	€ 25.000	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 406.082</b>	<b>€ 502.529</b>	<b>€ 671.484</b>	<b>-€ 113.009</b>	<b>€ 1.553.394</b>	<b>43%</b>

### 3.3 Results Framework

