



PAX PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS PROGRAM

ANNUAL REPORT 2022

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AMPLIFYING VOICES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

PAX's Protection of Civilians (PoC) program seeks to increase the effectiveness of PoC interventions by facilitating that civilians can hold local and international security actors to account, and by enabling and motivating security actors to design and implement protection strategies that are civilian-centered.

PAX works together with committed citizens and partners to protect civilians against acts of war, to end armed violence, and to build a just peace.

For more information about this program please visit www.protectionofcivilians.org. If you have any additional comments or questions, you are also welcome to contact Hans Rouw, PoC Program Team Lead (rouw@paxforpeace.nl) or Carrie Huisman, PoC Partnership Coordinator (huisman@paxforpeace.nl).

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This program is supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of its foreign development policy.

Period of Implementation: 1 September 2019 – 31 December 2023

Total Budget: €11.002.413

Funding Partner: Department for Stabilization & Humanitarian Aid (DSH)

MFA Reference Code: DSH-4000002936

PAX

PAX means peace. PAX works with people in conflict areas and concerned citizens worldwide to build just and peaceful societies. PAX brings together people who dare to stand for peace. Everyone who believes in peace can contribute. We believe that all these steps, whether small or large, inevitably lead to the greater sum of peace.

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Contents

PROGRAM OVERVIEW	2
Progress Summary	2
Context & Adaptations	3
Program-Level Results	4
Featured Story	7
Lessons Learned	8
Budget & Spending	9
For More Information	10
2022 Results Dashboard	12
PROJECT CHAPTERS	13
Human Security Survey – Iraq	13
Human Security Survey – South Sudan	23
Protection in Practice & Engaging International Actors (PiPEIA)	31
Progress Summary	
Context & Adaptations	
Project Results	
Featured Story	
Lessons Learned	
Budget & Spending	
For More Information	
2022 Results Dashboard	
ANNEXES	45
1. Overview of Projects	45
2. Results Framework	46
3. Partner Organizations	47
4. 2022 Results Dashboards	48

1. Program Overview

PROGRESS SUMMARY

Working from the grassroots to the international, and with both civilians and authorities, PAX's Protection of Civilians (PoC) Program facilitates the design, implementation, and assessment of civilian-centered protection strategies. For an overview of the program's approach and results framework, please see Annexes 1 and 2.

In 2022, the PoC Program witnessed many of the original ideas in our Theory of Change coming to fruition in powerful ways. For instance, the diverse and creative community-driven peacebuilding initiatives stemming from Human Security Survey (HSS) activities in both Iraq and South Sudan demonstrate the unique value of our data to civilian populations themselves. That same data and analysis was also integrated throughout the year into advocacy with (sub)national authorities, and used to lend nuanced examples for our training and exercise work with security actors internationally. PAX also witnessed incredible demand for its technical expertise in 2022, particularly when it comes to providing training and advisory services for security actors in PoC principles, policy, and practice. We have also rapidly grown our thought leadership on specific topics, including civilian harm mitigation and response.

The guiding focus for the PoC Program in 2022 was connecting with key partners and stakeholders after 2 years of pandemic-adapted programming. Many of our greatest successes build on deepening engagement with key institutions, including NATO, the UN, the Iraqi government, and a wide range of sub-national authorities in South Sudan. For an overview of PAX's core partners in this program, please see Annex 3.

Human Security Survey – Iraq

It was a year of deepening our partnerships and making meaningful contributions towards our desired long-term impact for the PoC Program in Iraq. We maintained the program's unique approach to working at various levels and with diverse stakeholders in Iraq. At the grassroots level, we continued supporting our network of Community Champions, who utilize the Human Security Survey (HSS) to inspire and inform creative community-based peacebuilding initiatives. At the governorate level, we contributed unique analysis and facilitated dialogues with civil society actors and local authorities about the state of protection in their regions from the perspective of civilians. And at the national level, we worked closely with the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) to develop and implement multiple in-depth trainings for Iraqi security forces on PoC policy and practice—the first initiative of its kind between the security structure and civil society in Iraq. More details about the HSS Iraq project can be found in chapter 2 of this report.

Human Security Survey – South Sudan

Throughout 2022, the HSS continued to improve public awareness about security trends and create means for community-driven solutions, as well as motivate and empower authorities to affect positive changes. PAX and its partners made up for time lost during the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic by delivering on a busy workplan for 2022. Across its various components, the availability of such a large and comprehensive body of data emerging from the HSS covering multiple years provides ever-greater opportunities for more accurate analysis, engagement, and understanding of subnational security dynamics and trends. We are heartened by improved confidence and willingness on the part of (sub)national actors to discuss community security issues with PAX and its partners, and especially to engage directly with communities on how to improve current protection strategies. The project's Community Security Committees (COMSECCOMs) also proved to be incredibly active this year, organizing a wide variety of different types of activities, all stemming from HSS



SCALING UP SUCCESSFUL INITIATIVES

- A pilot training with the Iraqi national security forces evolved into a full PoC policy initiative
- Volunteer in Iraq implemented dozens of peacebuilding activities



RECOGNIZED THOUGHT LEADERSHIP

- PAX is now globally recognized as an expert on civilian harm mitigation and response
- PAX leveraged its convening power to facilitate dialogues on people-centered security in world capitals and conflict-affected communities



MEANINGFUL PARTNERSHIPS

- Program partners explored deep and participatory learning through a Midterm Review process
- PAX continued to lead a Consortium of experts providing valued policy guidance to the Dutch MoD

research and dialogue processes, but tailored to the specific needs and interests of participating communities. More details about the HSS South Sudan project can be found in chapter 3 of this report.

Protection in Practice and Engaging International Actors on PoC (PiPEIA)

In 2022, PAX decided to merge its two internationally-oriented projects within the broader program, PiP and EIA, in order to facilitate greater collaboration and synergies. This resulted in the combined project having an incredibly full and diverse workplan for the year, upon which the team and our partners certainly delivered. While many more initiatives and results are detailed in the project chapter, below are a few highlights.

PAX is in the process of formalizing cooperation with the Iraqi government and security structure that will allow us to co-develop reference curriculum on PoC, as well as a national PoC policy and guidance. This is an incredibly unique initiative and a testament to both the great deal of effort expended by our partners at the Iraqi Al Amal Association to build the relationships and political will that have resulted in these opportunities, as well as the flexible nature of the program's approach, which enables us to take advantage of emergent opportunities such as this.

Additionally, PAX has become a true international leader in the field of civilian harm, and we anticipate playing a central role in the further shaping and prioritizing of Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) within international security institutions like NATO, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and with several countries we work with closely on a bilateral basis, including the Netherlands, the United States (US) and Iraq. Specifically regarding NATO, the fact that the Alliance has formalized relations with both Stimson Center and PAX creates the chance for us to structurally engage with NATO on policy, training and exercise, and evaluation of policy and practice.

"PAX is better than anyone else to bring the voices of civilians to the political level."

Key informant quoted in the PoC Program's Midterm Review (MTR), conducted by WINS & ICS



Figure 1. PAX staff moderated a session at the NATO Headquarters Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA)

Finally, PAX initiated its Civil Society Engagement Facility (CSEF) in 2022. While currently in a pilot stage to test out the concept, a kickoff workshop for Burkinabe and Nigerien experts generated valuable learning about how to pursue constructive engagement between international security actors and civil society living in conflict contexts. More details about the combined PiPEIA project can be found in chapter 4 of this report.

CONTEXT & ADAPTATIONS

International/institutional level

In the Netherlands and in the US, we witnessed highly relevant changes in how these countries conceptualize people-centered security and discuss and address civilian harm. The implementation of the 10-step plan in the Netherlands (a result from our earlier engagement in phase 1 of the Roadmap Process) and the development of the US Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMRAP) and Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI)—each of which incorporated a lot of input from our program—reflect a significant change in how

For detailed analysis on trends in security in both Iraq and South Sudan dating from 2017 to the present day, visit our [Human Security Survey](#).

these key countries look at their role in understanding and addressing civilian harm. We are eager to remain part of these policy development processes, and leverage lessons learned in our work with other institutions and states.

Iraq and South Sudan

The political and security contexts in South Sudan and Iraq both experienced relatively stable periods during 2022. This had a positive impact on access for our staff and partners when compared to recent years, when the COVID-19 pandemic severely impeded our ability to travel or meet in person. These contextual improvements also enabled various opportunities for sustainable cooperation with civilian, governmental, and military or law enforcement stakeholders in both countries. That said, security dynamics in both South Sudan and Iraq can be heavily localized, and while some of the regions that we surveyed or otherwise engaged with in 2022 experienced marked improvements in their perceptions and experiences of human security, other regions witnessed significant deteriorations. Climate change also continues to be a disruptive and impactful force on human security in both countries. Much more analysis on contextual changes and their implications for our programming are detailed in the project chapters to this report.

Ukraine

The war in Ukraine unfortunately provided us with opportunities to see up close and personal what war with a near-peer adversary looks like today. Ukrainian civilians are today bearing witness to dramatic and complex protection threats, like those posed by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), the environmental effects of conflict, attacks on cultural property, and the targeting of critical infrastructure, among others. While many of these impacts are direct and visible, others will compound over time and pose new risks, particularly for civilians.

The war has also translated into more focus on Article 5 operations and the importance of human security and protection of civilians in a European battlespace. This made the advocacy, training, and policy guidance work we have done with NATO on PoC generally—and on the civilian harm implications in high-intensity urban conflicts in particular—incredibly timely and relevant.

Program level

The end of the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic had a big impact on the operational context. For the first time during this program, we were able to host and participate in as many physical meetings and events as were strategic and useful.

There were no significant changes to our partnership structure, and we continue to work with all of our existing and long-standing partners in Iraq, South Sudan, and the United States. For an overview of the partners contributing to this program, see Annex 3.

The only updates on a management level were the hiring of a new Senior Data Analyst for the two HSS projects, and the strategic decision to combine our PiP and EIA projects to facilitate greater coordination and synergy. A new initiative, CSEF, also falls under the new project, though remained in a piloting phase in 2022. The resulting adaptations to our Results Framework can be found in Annex 2.

PROGRAM-LEVEL RESULTS

Annual PoC Conference

On 8 November 2022, PAX hosted its annual Protection of Civilians Conference (PoCCon22) in The Hague. The event convened a rich community of experts to discuss lessons learned about people-centered approaches to security. This year's conference provided reflections from policymakers, military experts, researchers, and civil society leaders on how to meaningfully engage with civilians living in conflict in order to sustainably and inclusively improve security.

Rather than organizing the largest possible event or trying to arrange it in a remote or hybrid setup as we had in recent years, this year we opted for an in-person meeting in order to focus on the depth of the discussions and connecting with our network. The more intimate and expert-level setting created space for some very thoughtful discussions around a number of key topics: the evidence base on people-centered security, creating programmatic space for engaging security actors in fragile settings, and lessons learned from the policy processes underway in the US and the Netherlands on civilian harm mitigation and response. There were also ample opportunities for reconnecting and networking.

In total, 52 experts attended, of whom half were practitioners, 12 were policymakers, 10 were academics, 3 were military. All of DSH's main partners on the theme of protection and security sector governance and reform were in the room, including CIVIC, DCAF, SIPRI, and Geneva Call, among others. A more detailed readout on the event can be found in the event's [summary report](#).



Figure 2. Expert panelists from DCAF, the Dutch MFA, and the Dutch MoD participating in a “setting the stage” session facilitated by PAX

Midterm evaluation

This midterm evaluation (MTR) conducted in 2022 was intended to facilitate deep reflection about progress towards intended results at the midpoint of the program, to identify potential course corrections in the remaining grant period, and to inform future program design. The main evaluation questions focus on the effectiveness of our Theory of Change and approach, as well as the sustainability of results achieved to date. The evaluation also examined several key cross-cutting themes, such as gender- and conflict sensitivity, inclusivity, synergies, and adaptive implementation. Overall, our goal with this evaluation was less to generate a detailed accounting of our program's results to date, and more to facilitate participatory and engaged learning from within our staff, partners, and other key stakeholders.

Two specialist evaluation firms joined forces to conduct this assignment: WINS Global Consult (based in Berlin, Germany) and Innovation Consulting & Solutions (ICS, based in Gaziantep, Turkey and Birmingham, UK).¹ The evaluation design and implementation were very participatory in nature, including opportunities for our local partners to provide input into the evaluation questions, methodology, and reflections on initial findings. Below is a summary of some of those findings and conclusions, although much more detail can be found in the program-level [Evaluation Report](#).

The evaluation found that our strategic approach and program structure support effective implementation and potentially sustainable results. Three unique selling points include: the

“PAX are incredibly rigorous and committed. They do their best, and their best is very good.”

Quote from key informant in PoC Program Midterm Review

¹ The core team from WINS and ICS was also supported by 2 local consulting researchers based in both Iraq and South Sudan who helped to mitigate access issues and observe activities outside of the narrow fieldwork period. The team was selected for their technical competence; experience evaluating humanitarian and peace programming in conflict-affected countries; and diversity in terms of expertise, background, language skills, and gender. Bios for all 6 team members can be found in Appendix 4 of the main evaluation report.

The summary Evaluation Report is available publicly on our website. The specific project chapters, which provide much more detail, are available upon request.

HSS methodology (particularly its focus on civilian perspectives and on facilitating cooperative, locally grounded solutions); our constructive working relationships with security actors, including through our on-staff military advisors; and our multi-level approach to bring local voices to the national level and international arena (and vice versa). Engagement on these different levels (local, national, and international) is a major strength, as activities at the community level are aimed at improving circumstances for civilians in conflict (effectiveness), and efforts at the international level contribute to structural change within key institutions like the UN and NATO (sustainability). The program has room for improvement in building relationships and focusing training, advocacy, and technical advisory services towards national-level stakeholders and institutions. However, network building during the first half of the program—especially at the national level in Iraq and South Sudan—was significantly impeded by the global COVID-19 pandemic and associated travel limitations.

Generally, the many recommendations centered around the need for the PoC program to consolidate results where we have built good relationships when it comes to our work at the international level (rather than continuing to catalyze additional new opportunities). The evaluation suggests we and our partners continue with much of our community-focused work through the HSS projects as we have been doing to date, but to better sync up research products, success stories, and networks at the local level with programmatic efforts also nationally and internationally through advocacy and training components under the combined PiP and EIA projects.

Annual Partner Meeting

In March 2022, PAX and its partners under the PoC Program convened in the Netherlands for an Annual Partner Meeting. Over the course of 3 days program partners engaged in wide-ranging discussions on a variety of topics, including detailed conversations about our learning questions, presentations on successful approaches, innovation pitches, and more. The evaluation team responsible for the MTR process also attended in order to observe our partnership in action, as well as to present preliminary findings for feedback. In total, more than 50 participants attended the event in person, and an additional 10 joined online. The event was inspiring and motivating, and provided a good reminder of the value of these kinds of engagements after years of remote meetings and limited travel.



Figure 3. Representatives from our partner organizations in Iraq and South Sudan participated actively in the Annual Partner Meeting in Utrecht, the Netherlands

Learning events

In pursuit of the many learning questions integrated into the PoC Program’s learning agenda, and in order to support norms of continuous reflection, PAX convened a number of events for staff and partners in 2022. These included:

- 3 skills workshops on managing stress and mitigating the effects of direct and vicarious trauma. There was 1 workshop each for our partners in Iraq and South

Sudan, and a third for PAX staff. The workshops were prepared and facilitated by external experts with significant practical experience in conflict contexts and working with civilians and practitioners like ourselves.

- 2 multi-day security and first aid trainings arranged for all of our partners in both Iraq and South Sudan and delivered by experts in the field. The trainings were heavily practical and scenario-based, and the lessons about risks and mitigation measures were deeply rooted in their local contexts.
- 2 PAX team learning days, one of which focused on more inward-looking aspects of our learning questions, such as on improving internal coordination and synergies, and also included a “Fail Fair” to share important lessons learned in our work. The second learning day involved a training on presence and influencing skills.
- 1 PAX team strategy day, which we arranged as a fully unstructured, agenda-free day to facilitate creative discussion. The main topics that emerged for discussion included: the future of the HSS, pathways for working in Ukraine, inclusivity in our approach, and collaboration in lobby and advocacy.

FEATURED STORY


On the night of 2-3 June 2015, forces party to the Global Coalition against Daesh delivered an airstrike on a suspected ISIS munitions factory in the city of Hawija, Iraq. Four and a half years later, following media pressure, the Dutch government acknowledged its role in the event. Since then, PAX has worked to both uncover the impacts of the airstrike and advocate for survivors, while also working constructively with the Dutch military to learn from the experience and prevent future such devastating mistakes in the future.

In 2021-22, PAX, its Iraqi partner [Al-Ghad League for Women and Child Care](#), and Utrecht University’s [Intimacies of Remote Warfare](#) (IRW) program did what the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed at the time to be impossible: comprehensively traced the direct and reverberating civilian harm effects of the airstrike. We went to Hawija, investigated the impact of the bombing in greater detail, and documented the experiences of 119 direct victims in a report we subsequently published called [After the Strike](#). Our researchers saw for themselves how the city was still in ruins, how survivors were left to grapple with mental and physical health challenges without any compensation, and how the economic damage prevented them from restoring their livelihoods.

Hawija is a dramatic example of what happens to civilians on the ground as a result of the increased reliance of Western states on tools of remote warfare. The ISIS munitions factory that was the F-16s’ target was located in the middle of the city and contained an estimated 18,000 kilos of TNT, triggering a secondary explosion that recorded 4.3 on the Richter scale. While those commanding the airstrike observed the explosions on a screen from a faraway base in Jordan, at least 85 civilians died and hundreds of others incurred injuries and trauma that may remain for the rest of their lives. Further, our research indicated that 6,000 houses, 1,200 businesses, and much of the city’s critical public infrastructure were destroyed, devastating the whole community. These are the real and reverberating civilian harm effects of military operations that are often neglected by decisionmakers.

It is also our belief that the Coalition forces are responsible for the ongoing suffering of the citizens of Hawija because they could and should have understood these potential consequences beforehand. Had those involved more appropriately assessed and applied core International Humanitarian Law (IHL) principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity, perhaps this devastating event could have been prevented.

PAX continues to support the people of Hawija in their search for appropriate justice and reparations. Given the varied and significant impacts of the Dutch airstrike, the requests of the survivors are fair. They want the Dutch government to sincerely apologize and publicly acknowledge its responsibility for the harm caused in Hawija. They also want full, individual compensation in order to rebuild their lives and their community. While the Dutch government created a “goodwill” fund of €4,4 million for community projects in Hawija, they did so without consulting the civilians or authorities in the city on what they need and how best to deliver it, and it will ultimately fall far short of what is required to rebuild the city. PAX will continue advocating with the Dutch government to create a civilian harm compensation fund to benefit victims and their communities, now and in the future.



PAX also continues to work directly and constructively with the Dutch government regarding its response to the Hawija incident. In 2021, PAX convened an important closed-door meeting between a political leader from Hawija, and two senior officials from the Dutch government. This was the first time that a civilian official representing the affected community was able to meet face-to-face with representatives from the Dutch since the airstrike. The Dutch Minister of Defence subsequently visited Iraq in November 2022, where she met with civilians from Hawija in Erbil. Though it should be noted, that Dutch officials have never visited Hawija itself, and an independent committee led by Minister of State Winnie Sorgdrager investigating the airstrike is yet to share its findings publicly.

During the research, PAX set up a consortium of like-minded experts and civil society organizations to advise the Dutch MoD on improved practices on civilian harm tracking, reporting, mitigation, and response to avoid another ‘Hawija’ in the future. After the launch of the report in April 2022, the MoD announced key policy changes. The consortium acknowledges and appreciates these necessary developments, though have warned in [policy notes](#), an [opinion editorial](#), and in a [briefing to Parliament](#) that various loopholes remain that could lead to future civilian harm events or the mishandling of the response to them. PAX remains actively engaged with policymakers and military planners to integrate lessons learned and international best practices into current and future policy through the so-called ‘Roadmap Process.’

PAX has become an international thought leader on civilian harm and will continue working in the future to support affected communities and assist governments and militaries in how to understand, prevent, and—when mistakes occur—take responsibility for the full and comprehensive negative consequences of their military operations.

LESSONS LEARNED

Below—and in each of the project chapters to this report—we have collected some specific learning points from the last year of implementation related to core questions that make up our Learning Agenda. We compile these insights through our day-to-day implementation, by contributing to public or expert events in the field, through casual engagement with our partners and key stakeholders, via facilitated learning exchanges, and other means.

1. What does meaningful accountability to civilians in conflict really look like in practice? What are the best interventions to build and foster this kind of accountability? How can we observe and assess our influence on these accountability dynamics?

Much of our reflection around accountability in 2022 drew from our work investigating civilian harm incidents. The Hawija report, our work with the Dutch and US governments and the research on drone strikes in Somalia all brought this question into focus this year. Over time, PAX has become one of the most outspoken and recognized organizations on this theme, and three lines of argumentation are central in our work. First, we continue to raise the question of how civilians can report harm that befalls them. Through our research, we find there is very little experience with creating claim-making capacity for civilians during conflict. It is one of our objectives for 2023 to shape a coherent view of what a standard for civilian harm reporting—by civilians—should look like, and what the responsibilities and roles of military actors are in this. Second, we continue to argue that civilian harm is a phenomenon that develops over time. Meaning, harm is not just the dead and wounded and at one moment in time; rather, harm is long term, complex, and multidimensional. In the Hawija report, we specifically addressed this issue and laid out in great detail the many facets of harm that continue to impact that community. Third, we continue to ask civilians what constitutes accountability to them, and to aid them in their advocacy and pursuit of justice. Based upon these research efforts and experiences in practice, we distilled several important lessons that are now part of our standard repertoire when working with countries, missions, and civil society.

The MTR in 2022 provided useful insights into the level of recognition we get from stakeholders, particularly around this theme. We were pleased to see that key stakeholders recognise us as subject matter experts (SMEs), and as reliable counterparts in policy development processes. In addition, we believe that the growing willingness of stakeholders to engage in longer-term commitments with us—through memoranda of

For more information on what PAX means when it talks about accountability for civilian harm, read a report from 2022 entitled, [“Civilian Harm Reporting Mechanisms: A useful means to support monitoring and accountability?”](#)

understanding (MoUs), Letters of Cooperation, etc., can be regarded as a positive indication of our current and future capacity to influence PoC policy and practice.

2. Are data and evidence enough? How do we go beyond generating interesting information towards fostering ownership for taking action rooted in local priorities? Do we sufficiently understand the needs, interests, motivations, or challenges of those we are trying to influence?

The development of the cooperation with the Iraqi ONSA on building both a PoC curriculum and a PoC policy is a good example of how—through establishing ourselves as constructive and informed partners that generate relevant data rooted in local priorities—we opened new doors allowing us to exercise direct influence on a national ministerial and governmental level. Ultimately, PoC and civilian-centered security must be carried by Iraqi society for it to lead to lasting change, so for sustainability it is imperative that the changes we advocate are supported by and carried forward by Iraqi institutions and Iraqi civil society. We believe this experience in Iraq is one that has bearing on all of our work, and underpins the need for long-term approaches, flexible program designs, and committed partnerships.

We believe that we are quite capable of understanding the needs of the institutions and stakeholders we aim to influence, while recognizing the investment of time and effort necessary to build and maintain that knowledge over time. We have observed over the course of 2022 authorities, community leaders, and peer organizations actively wanting to participate in our activities or throwing their support behind our initiatives. There is currently far more demand for our technical training and advisory support than we are capable of providing, given resource and staffing constraints. Whether it is with the UN, NATO or within the diverse governments we work with, it remains crucial that we understand—but remain insulated from—the politics surrounding what we try to achieve. The Roadmap Process in the Netherlands, the ONSA track in Iraq, the MoU with NATO, our involvement in the US CHMRAP, and the fact that the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) asked us to facilitate sensitive workshops for them—these are all signs that our approach works.

"PAX has a good name in at the UN" and Stimson provides the "policy brain and analytical capacities."

Quotes from key informants in PoC Program Midterm Review

BUDGET & SPENDING

Budget Notes

At the program level, our personnel spending was very much in line with our budget projections; although, we exceeded the 2022 workplan budget on activity spending (114%) and evaluation and learning (133%). After 2 years of pandemic travel limitations, we opted to convene a larger and more inclusive group for our Annual Partner Meeting—including representatives from most of our partners from around the world—which resulted in higher than anticipated travel, accommodations, and venue costs. Additionally, the midterm evaluation, which was originally planned and budgeted to begin in 2021, occurred instead fully in 2022. In general, while there were some shifts within each project budget, the program utilized 104% of the planned budget overall. PAX is well positioned heading into the final year of the program given that we are currently at 74% of total projected spending.

Please note that additional budget notes at the level of each project can be found in the respective chapters to this report. The full budget summary will also be provided in an Excel format to facilitate easier review.

	Budget 2022	Actuals 2022	Deviation	Total Spending	Difference	Total Budget	% Realized
	<i>as approved in 2022 workplan</i>		<i>actuals- budget</i>	<i>actuals 2022- 2022</i>	<i>original budget : total actuals</i>	<i>updated in 2023 workplan</i>	<i>total spending : updated budget</i>
A. PAX Central							
A.1 PAX Central Personnel	€ 235.672	€ 241.071	102%	€ 697.427	€ -42.325	€ 916.166	76%
A.2 PAX Central Activities	€ 85.000	€ 97.193	114%	€ 400.128	€ -160.128	€ 490.936	82%
A.3 PAX Central Office	€ 221.532	€ 201.187	91%	€ 681.668	€ 38.218	€ 941.860	72%
A.3 PAC Central Evaluations & Audits	€ 100.000	€ 132.695	133%	€ 180.281	€ 55.719	€ 230.618	78%
<i>Subtotal PAX Central</i>	<i>€ 642.204</i>	<i>€ 672.146</i>	<i>105%</i>	<i>€ 1.959.504</i>	<i>€ -108.516</i>	<i>€ 2.579.579</i>	<i>76%</i>
B. Human Security Survey (HSS) - South Sudan							
B.1 HSS South Sudan Personnel	€ 148.000	€ 148.510	100%	€ 464.209	€ 67.861	€ 614.317	76%
B.2 HSS South Sudan Activities	€ 256.608	€ 375.756	146%	€ 668.430	€ -52.155	€ 758.247	88%
B.3 HSS South Sudan Audit & Other	€ 5.160	€ 0		€ 0	€ 50.000	€ 0	N/A
<i>Subtotal HSS South Sudan</i>	<i>€ 409.768</i>	<i>€ 524.266</i>	<i>128%</i>	<i>€ 1.132.639</i>	<i>€ 65.706</i>	<i>€ 1.372.564</i>	<i>83%</i>
C. Human Security Survey (HSS) - Iraq							
C.1 HSS Iraq Personnel	€ 118.000	€ 118.804	101%	€ 393.428	€ 145.042	€ 509.882	77%
C.1 HSS Iraq Activities	€ 456.620	€ 379.174	83%	€ 828.294	€ -229.039	€ 1.147.485	72%
C.1 HSS Iraq Audit & Other	€ 16.000	€ 0		€ 0	€ 198.819	€ 0	N/A
<i>Subtotal HSS Iraq</i>	<i>€ 590.620</i>	<i>€ 497.978</i>	<i>84%</i>	<i>€ 1.221.722</i>	<i>€ 114.822</i>	<i>€ 1.657.367</i>	<i>74%</i>
D. Engaging International Actors on PoC (EIA)							
D.1 EIA Personnel (PAX)	€ 178.400	€ 157.059	88%	€ 498.604	€ -117.225	€ 671.035	74%
D.2 EIA Activities (PAX)	€ 163.500	€ 78.431	48%	€ 202.863	€ 6.937	€ 250.582	81%
D.3 EIA Personnel (Stimson)	€ 83.794	€ 78.015	93%	€ 216.560	€ 2.797	€ 222.760	97%
D.4 EIA Activities (Stimson)	€ 182.644	€ 155.455	85%	€ 424.998	€ -1.305	€ 544.044	78%
D.5 EIA Audit & Other (Stimson)	€ 88.529	€ 63.300	72%	€ 165.848	€ 36.384	€ 225.832	73%
<i>Subtotal EIA</i>	<i>€ 696.867</i>	<i>€ 532.260</i>	<i>76%</i>	<i>€ 1.508.873</i>	<i>€ -72.412</i>	<i>€ 1.914.253</i>	<i>79%</i>
E. Protection in Practice (PiP)							
E.1 Personnel	€ 107.792	€ 271.106	252%	€ 647.475	€ -108.665	€ 911.903	71%
E.2 Activities	€ 429.000	€ 352.259	82%	€ 647.374	€ -12.374	€ 670.366	97%
E.3 Audit & Other	€ 0	€ 0		€ 0	€ 19.000	€ 0	N/A
<i>Subtotal PiP</i>	<i>€ 536.792</i>	<i>€ 623.365</i>	<i>116%</i>	<i>€ 1.294.849</i>	<i>€ -102.039</i>	<i>€ 1.582.269</i>	<i>82%</i>
F. Overhead/Indirect Costs							
F.1 Staff Support Costs	€ 87.424	€ 96.167	110%	€ 288.535	€ -14.723	€ 393.108	73%
F.2 Not Directly Allowable Costs	€ 350.000	€ 507.450	145%	€ 1.234.466	€ -224.837	€ 1.503.274	82%
<i>Subtotal Overhead/Indirect</i>	<i>€ 437.424</i>	<i>€ 603.617</i>	<i>138%</i>	<i>€ 1.523.001</i>	<i>€ -239.560</i>	<i>€ 1.896.381</i>	<i>80%</i>
Contingency	€ 0	€ 0		€ 0	€ 165.972	€ 0	N/A
TOTAL	€ 3.313.675	€ 3.453.632	104%	€ 8.640.588	€ -176.027	€ 11.002.413	79%

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Each of the project chapters attached to this report contain links to new publications, event summaries and recordings, podcast episodes, and other program outputs. Below are links to a few more general sources of information about PAX, its partners, and our work on the protection of civilians in conflict.



- For general information about the PoC program and our approach, please visit our website: www.protectionofcivilians.org
- On our [News & Publications](#) page, you can find more than 200 research reports, infographics, blog posts, event summaries, and other sources of information
- Listen to Seasons 1 and 2 of the [Civilian Protection Podcast](#) for civilian perspectives on conflict and what can be done to better protect them
- Follow the Human Security Survey on [Facebook](#)
- Follow the PoC Program on [LinkedIn](#) and [Twitter](#)
- Sign up for our periodic [newsletter](#) for updates on our work



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PAX Protection of Civilians Program

Program Level Summary - 2022



Below is a summary of key metrics regarding the impact and visibility of the PoC Program in 2022, as well as an overview of budget utilization to date.

DSH Standard Indicators	2019	2020	2021	2022	Trend	Total
# of formal/informal institutions strengthened in the field of human security	6	10	23	25		64
# of people trained in the field of human security	0	97	187	504		788

Key Advocacy & Policy Outcomes

LTO 1: Civilians in conflict improve their human security situation through constructive engagement with (inter)national security actors

Convened civil society experts from Burkina Faso and Niger for a kickoff workshop for the Civil Society Engagement Facility, including direct engagement with EU officials in the Sahel	Interviewed 119 survivors of a devastating airstrike in Hawija, Iraq in 2015 and shared their lived experiences of lasting civilian harm through a detailed report, public events, and advocacy initiatives	Co-wrote and signed a Civil Society Statement on Protection of Civilians in Urban Conflict and briefed the UN Security Council in advance of the 2022 UNSC Open Debate on PoC
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LTO 2: Targeted security actors increasingly articulate and implement inclusive protection of civilians policies and practices

Formalized cooperation with the Iraqi government and security forces enabling PAX to co-develop a reference curriculum on PoC, as well as a national PoC policy and guidance	Delivered briefings to NATO Operations Policy Committee and multiple workshops to NATO Allied Command Transformation on PoC and Russia's invasion of Ukraine	Contributed extensively to the US Department of Defense's Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, and shared lessons learned with Dutch policymakers through the Roadmap Process
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Program Visibility

Publications & Events	2019	2020	2021	2022	Trend	Total
# of presentations or events by program staff on general PoC or human security themes	0	3	8	11		22
# of attendees at annual PoC Conference	54	418	323	52		847

Social Media & Podcast (2022)

# of followers of HSS Facebook page	933	# of followers of PoC LinkedIn page	2824
# of followers of PoC Twitter	1163	# of Civilian Protection Podcast listeners	2285

2. Human Security Survey (HSS) – Iraq

PROGRESS SUMMARY



DEEPENING PARTNERSHIPS

- Expanded contract for Al Amal to include technical advisory support to the ONSA
- Organized security training for partners and enumerators
- Enjoyed effective coordination with Dutch MFA & Embassy



SUPPORTING COMMUNITY-DRIVEN PEACEBUILDING

- Trained Community Champions
- Supported 12 diverse local initiatives



ACHIEVING LONGER-TERM IMPACTS

- Building technical capacity and political will among Iraqi security forces
- Using lessons learned from Hawija to impact updated Dutch policy on civilian harm

It was a year of deepening our partnerships and making meaningful contributions towards our desired long-term impact for the PoC Program in Iraq. PAX continued working closely with each of its existing core partners—the Iraqi Al Amal Association (Al Amal), the Iraqi Al Firdaws Society (Al Firdaws), and Wand Al Khair Human Organization (WAHO)—as well as collaborating on multiple initiatives with colleagues from the PiPEIA project. We also maintained the program’s unique approach to working at various levels and with diverse stakeholders in Iraq. At the grassroots level, we continued supporting our network of Community Champions, who utilize the Human Security Survey (HSS) to inspire and inform creative community-based peacebuilding initiatives. At the governorate level, we contributed unique analysis and facilitated dialogues with civil society actors and local authorities about the state of protection in their regions from the perspective of civilians. And at the national level, we worked closely with the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) to develop and implement multiple in-depth trainings for Iraqi security forces on PoC policy and practice—the first initiative of its kind between the security structure and civil society in Iraq.

The HSS Iraq project made solid progress towards its longer-term objectives throughout 2022; however, we also faced challenges that impeded basic implementation and delivery of outputs. PAX and its partners conducted two rounds of data collection in Basra and Diyala, reaching a total of 1.534 respondents across nearly all districts in each governorate.¹ Unfortunately, our partners in Kirkuk and Salahaddin—Al Amal—did not receive permission from the Directorate of Non-Governmental Organizations (DNGO) to conduct the research, which is discussed in more detail below.

In reflecting on the past year, one aspect of the project that we are most excited about is the ownership that our partners and enumerators feel towards the HSS. This has always been a core aspiration of the project and is paying off in various ways. For instance, we held a multi-day methodology workshop with enumerators where they were able to provide input into each and every question and work collaboratively on the language of the questionnaire. While in years past we had done this kind of detailed review at the level of the partner organizations or addressing translation nuances at the level of individual questions with our enumerators during a training, this provided them with a chance to deepen their ownership of the tool and lend their vital expertise as researchers who have used the HSS in the field.

Additionally, we were able to facilitate a “Violent Environment Preparedness Training” for a total of 44 enumerators from all 4 survey locations this year. This was an internationally certified, 2-day training conducted by a professional security training company in Erbil with extensive experience in Iraq. The feedback received from enumerators who participated was extremely positive, and they requested a more detailed course in the future. Based on a survey conducted among the enumerators about other capacities we could best support, a

Progress Score: HSS-Iraq



¹ Data was collected in Diyala governorate between 1-18 February 2022. Two regions were omitted from the survey sample: Kifri Center (which remains under Kurdish Regional Government control) and Al Sadiyah (for security concerns), as in 2021.

Watch a recording of the public launch event for the Hawija report at De Balie in Amsterdam [here](#).

total of 57 enumerators from all governorates were also trained on report writing, psychosocial support, and safeguarding.

Our enumerators also demonstrated their renewed commitment to the project by requesting that they also be enabled to apply for small grants to conduct initiatives in their own communities, similar to the Community Champions. They argued that they have learned a great deal about their own communities through the course of conducting surveys and facilitating dialogues and wanted to find additional ways to support and contribute to improved security. As a result, a few enumerators joined this year's Community Champions for a training in December on how to design and implement such initiatives, including advocacy campaigns. At the time of writing this report, many have applied for funding for these initiatives, and some have successfully completed them already; however, these will be highlighted in next year's annual report.

Finally, HSS-Iraq staff collaborated closely with other PAX colleagues and partners in two program-level initiatives that are covered in more detail in the PiPEIA chapter below. These include the Hawija research that resulted in the publication [After the Strike](#), significant public outreach and advocacy, and sustained engagement with the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD) on civilian harm mitigation and response. This work has been a source of pride and enabled us to amplify the voices of those so devastatingly impacted by the airstrike; however, it feels bittersweet given the persistent harm experienced by the citizens of Hawija. The other main effort to which the HSS contributed was the training and advisory initiative with the Iraqi NSA, which exceeded our expectations in terms of our ability to discuss topics like human security, gender, children in armed conflict, and the value of community engagement with mid- and senior-level members of the Iraqi security forces. This work gained significant traction within the Iraqi government and continues to open doors for meaningful improvements in the delivery of security in the country. Both of these efforts demonstrate how PAX and its partners are making meaningful progress towards the ultimate goal of the overall program—namely, contributing to civilian-centered protection strategies that are more inclusive, accountable, and effective.



Figure 1. PAX and its partners from Al Ghad and the Intimacies of Remote Warfare program launching the Hawija research report in Erbil.

CONTEXT & ADAPTATIONS

For a full year between October 2021 and October 2022, Iraq was in a state of political deadlock with a caretaker Prime Minister and no formal mandate to govern. The election resulted in 2 broad coalitions, neither of which had enough support to form a government. Muqtada Al Sadr, whose bloc won the largest number of seats (73), sought to form a majoritarian government with Sunni Arabs and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The Coordination Framework—a motley crew of Shia political parties considered to be Iran-backed—succeeded in blocking Al Sadr. While political battles raged, physical violence also characterized the period, including drone attacks on then Prime Minister Mustafa Al Kadhimi's house, armed attacks on the offices and residences of various political elites, and recurrent violence in Baghdad's Green Zone.

On 27 July 2022, hundreds of Iraqi demonstrators supporting Al Sadr stormed the Council of Representatives of Iraq building after news was leaked about the nomination of Coordination Framework-backed candidate Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani for the position of Prime Minister. From 29-31 July, Al Sadr-backed protesters stormed, occupied, and besieged the Iraq Parliament, initiating a sit-in. Multiple people died and scores were injured, until protests finally ended on 30 August. Since Al Sudani took office on 27 October 2022, things have remained relatively calm in the country. Until now, the Prime Minister appears to be a pragmatic politician working hard to balance good relations with Iran-friendly security forces, as well as with Arab neighbors, the United States, and domestic constituency. Galvanizing and maintaining public support—especially in advance of planned provincial elections in late 2023—will require making good on promises to address persistent challenges like unemployment and corruption.

Programmatic implications

The political turmoil in Baghdad throughout much of the year meant that most public officials—whether at the local, governorate or national level—were all in interim positions, and therefore could not be engaged meaningfully. Planned dialogue and advocacy efforts were more limited as a result.

In an interest to supervise and monitor the work of both national and international organizations operating within Iraq, the DNGO has relatively strict reporting mechanisms and compliance protocols for registered entities. Given the sensitive nature of some topics within the HSS, our partners at Al Amal were not able to obtain permission from the DNGO to carry out data collection in Kirkuk and Salahaddin at any point in 2022. Earlier in the year, a team of experienced enumerators worked hard to revise the language used to ask certain questions in the survey, and to create a version of the questionnaire omitting all of the detailed instructions for the enumerators that may indicate potential response options or probing questions. Despite these measures, the DNGO still refused to grant permission to Al Amal, and we had to request the Dutch Embassy to leverage its relationships with the Iraqi government to eventually secure the necessary permissions. Thanks to this support, Al Amal finally secured the approval in early 2023 for the next round of data collection; although we missed a year's worth of research and dialogue activities in 2 key targeted governorates.

Management changes

This year we signed a follow-on contract with our colleagues from WAHO in Diyala. They were given another 11-month contract to conduct HSS activities, and once again proved to be a valuable partner. At Al Amal, there was also a change in the Project Coordinator for the HSS. With the departure of the previous coordinator, one of the more experienced enumerators from the Kirkuk team took over the position. This meant that not a lot of time was spent onboarding our new counterpart, as she already had known the project intimately since 2017. No changes were made in the partnership agreements with Al Firdaws. However, it is worth noting that our team of enumerators in Basra—many of whom are by now quite experienced with the HSS, having served on data collection teams for multiple years—were trained fully by staff from our partners at Al Firdaws. This reflects the strong ownership and accrued capacity of our longstanding partners in Iraq.

In 2022, PAX pursued significant developments in how we clean, analyze, and present data. Notably, we transitioned from using STATA to R for all of our data processing, which has resulted in greater efficiency and the possibility for automation. We also moved our data collection from KoboCollect to ODK Collect, another open-source software platform but with better data security protocols and encryption practices.²

Finally, in the second half of the year we recruited a new HSS Senior Data Analyst at PAX to succeed a departing colleague. Thanks to a short-term consultancy, this did not result in

Read more about PAX's approach, our team, and our partners on the PoC Program's [website](#).

² During data collection in Basra in November 2022, KoboCollect stopped supporting ODK Briefcase for encryption, so unfortunately some of the data was lost and the team had to re-survey these places. Diyala was the last team which used Kobo Collect during data collection in February 2023. Kirkuk and Salahaddin began using ODK Collect for surveying in March 2023.

long delays of data analysis or a significant backlog in creating reports and deliverables. We are very happy to have Abdullatif Sleibi now fully on board as we prepare for a busy period of HSS activities in the final year of the grant.

PROJECT-LEVEL RESULTS

Long-Term Outcome 1: Civilians in conflict improve their human security situation through constructive engagement with (inter)national security actors

The PoC program has succeeded in building relationships with key institutions like the NATO Mission in Iraqi (NMI) and European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq (EUAM). Staff members of both missions credit PAX with having significant expertise, evidence, and access that can be an asset to their work. In addition, training initiatives that our program is a part of outside of Iraq—like with FINCENT or the Dutch military—the HSS is featured heavily as a tool, and civilian-centric findings from it are also highlighted to emphasize the importance of considering civilian needs and perspectives at all stages of planning, implementing, and assessing security interventions.

At the national level in Iraq, even though there was an interim government until the end of October, the program was able to make great strides when it came to training and policy development together with the ONSA and our partners at Al Amal. The HSS was referenced extensively in both trainings conducted for Iraqi security forces in 2022 and will continue to feature in future exchanges with the ONSA about the nascent national PoC Policy, with which PAX is heavily involved in crafting. *(See the PiPEIA project chapter for more details.)*

At the governorate and district levels, great strides have been made as well with our Community Champions leading the process. This is also significant in terms of the sustainability of such relationships when they are grounded locally.

"I regularly use the survey during my engagement with Iraqi stakeholders in order to enhance awareness of how security needs are diversified on the basis of gender and to support the claim that females need to be actively engaged in understanding these diversified needs. I particularly appreciate questions in the survey that highlight the need for female security professionals and their crucial role in responding to gender specific security challenges."

Anette Schwitzke, Senior Gender Advisor at the European Union Advisory Mission-Iraq (EUAM Iraq)



Figure 2. Colleagues from WAHO and security officials during community engagement activities in Diyala Governorate

Short-Term Objective 1.1: Protection policies and practices in Iraq and South Sudan are increasingly informed by HSS findings

- **32** enumerators trained in conflict-sensitive quantitative research methods and the HSS methodology (50% women, 50% men)
- **2** rounds of HSS data collection completed (in Basra and Diyala governorates)
- **1.534** HSS respondents (42% women, 58% men)

While we and our partners would have preferred to conduct surveys in all 4 targeted governorates, we are pleased to have done so successfully in Basra and Diyala. It is worth highlighting some of the actual data emerging from the HSS. Looking specifically at Diyala governorate, while 62% of our respondents reported that their security situation has improved in the last 12 months, 53% of the respondents still felt that they were likely to

become victims of violence in the next year.³ When asked what factors would most likely cause conflict in their communities in the next year, 58% believed it would be lack of livelihood opportunities and poverty, 47% believed it would be continued presence of Daesh or other armed terrorist groups, and 38% believed it would be poor national governance at the national level. Indeed, a wide range of both endemic and acute conflict risks remain in this critical region.

When asked about the three most significant changes needed to bring peace to Iraq, 62% chose improved quality and access to justice, 52% chose military suppression of armed insurgencies like Daesh, and 42% chose security sector reform. Notably, 87% of respondents argued that political and security actors need more information about civilian priorities in order to better respond to civilian needs, which is also testament to the need for initiatives such as the HSS.

There is also an eager audience for this data within Diyala. For instance, subsequent to community dialogues to discuss the data, a representative of the Diyala Governorate Police Command, the Director of Community Police, members of various local government departments, and civil society participants in the sessions greatly praised the efforts made by WAHO to compile such solid information and results that contribute to the protection of civilians, and key parties expressed their readiness for more cooperation in order to serve the affected communities. Al-Baghdadiya satellite channel and a group of journalists covered the community sessions and showed great interest in these events as well.

STO 1.2: Community engagement activities inform more relevant protection of civilians strategies in target areas in Iraq and South Sudan

- **28** Community Champions and enumerators were trained in how to design peacebuilding initiatives and advocacy campaigns
- At least **5** security providers made commitments as a result of community engagement and targeted advocacy initiatives
- **12** community engagement initiatives were conducted during the course of the year in Basra and Diyala
- **44** partner staff and enumerators from all 4 governorates participated in a “Violent Environment Preparedness Training” (an internationally-certified course that included simulation exercises, theory, and first aid)

Watch a [video](#) about another initiative, entitled “Fabric of Cohesion and Peaceful Coexistence,” which supported women in Hawija to develop sewing and embroidery skills for improved livelihoods, social cohesion, and women’s empowerment.




Figure 3. A total of 29 Community Champions were trained on how to design and implement advocacy initiatives linked to HSS results. Trainees were from all 4 targeted governorates.

³ Violence can take many potential forms, from physical attacks or threats to subtler examples. For instance, a worrying data point in 2022 was that at least 70% of respondents in Diyala reported hearing about or witnessing instances of early marriages in their communities in the previous year.

"In view of the efforts made, your dedication to work, and your keenness to perform the duties assigned to you with accuracy and sincerity, we can only direct our thanks and appreciation to you, hoping that everyone will follow this approach in service of our great society."

Muthanna Ali Mahdi Al Tamimi, Governor of Diyala Governorate, in a formal letter of appreciation delivered to WAHO.

A total of 5 community engagement activities occurred in Basra in 2022, including:

- A **bicycle marathon** along the Shatt Al Arab corniche on 21 July gave a message of peace and tolerance, as well as respect towards women and youth. The marathon was attended by security personnel, members of various professional associations and unions, bloggers, journalists, social media influencers, and civil society.
- A **peace bazaar** was held on 12 November in Al Madina district attended by over 90 civilians, the mayor, mukhtar, members of the Bar Association, and civil society. The goal was to highlight the professional skills of rural women and strengthen their position in society, as well as giving them an avenue to sell the artisanal products that they produce.
- A **book** highlighting leaders from Southern Iraq was published. A total of 150 civilians attended the launch event, which highlighted the positive leaders from the region over the years, especially in the face of political uncertainty.
- On 29 October, a **tree planting campaign** was held with the Department of Displacement and Migration, along with a team of volunteers from 4 schools in Basra, which demonstrated the need for collective action to combat climate change in the governorate.
- In Jubail, approximately 300 civilians came together on 15 October for a **public exchange** on to address the different needs of the most vulnerable groups of society and how they should be integrated.

In Diyala, a total of 7 community engagement activities took place, including:

- A **public awareness campaign** on reducing the spreading of drugs, to address gender-based violence, and strengthening environmental protection, in which 3,000 brochures were distributed.
- A **roundtable** was held to highlight obstacles facing poor and vulnerable families in receiving social support and the gaps faced by the Department of Social Welfare in Khanaqain, some of which were addressed. A trained team of volunteers also registered upwards of 500 families to receive social welfare support as a result.
- A **tree planting campaign** was carried out in 5 schools to raise awareness on counteracting the effects of climate change in the governorate.
- The **health center** of Sheikh Baba village had insufficient first aid materials to respond to the needs of civilians who are injured in security incidents in the area. The center was equipped with lifesaving medical equipment in order to support communities living in this conflict-affected region.
- A total of 30 schools were equipped with 60 waste containers so that they were able to adequately dispose of garbage at their facilities, contributing to **decreasing pollution** in their areas.



Figure 4. Our partner in Diyala, WAHO, following up with the Diyala Police Command on the issue of drug abuse, which came up during the HSS research earlier in the year

Local authorities are also directly engaged through local dialogue processes, targeted advocacy, and community-based initiatives that all follow from HSS data collection. Despite only having completed data collection and community engagement activities in 2 of the 4

"One of the 'adaptive' good practices was the shift...towards supporting Community Champions... through which young people and activists can propose creative solutions and activities to address their communities' needs. These initiatives, which are based on HSS results and security priorities, have improved HSS overall visibility and contributed to the HSS mission of increasing engagement between communities and local authorities in the areas covered by the project, as well as supported the promotion of the HSS mission as a community-led project during the outbreak of COVID-19."

Quote from the PoC Program's Midterm Review (MTR), conducted by WINS & ICS

targeted regions, it was positive to see governorate-level authorities taking recommendations from our community engagement sessions seriously in Basra and Diyala. In Basra, a number of sessions, campaigns, and activities were launched by relevant authorities on the issues arising from the HSS. While many of these may not appear to directly address security considerations, we know from years of working in Basra that access to basic public services, the spread of drugs, and governance issues have all been flashpoints triggering severe social unrest in recent years. While multiple actions and campaigns were undertaken by local authorities, a selection are included below, grouped together by theme:

- **Water scarcity and network violations:** A number of senior officials and engineers discussed solutions to water scarcity and visited sites affected by obstacles to access across Basra. For instance, a campaign was launched in May to remove water network violations in Al Deir and Al Houd areas, subsequently improving water delivery.
- **Street maintenance:** In August, the paving and maintenance of streets started in Al-Hussein neighborhood in Basra. This was done after approval from the Directorate of Planning and the Directorate of Sewage and in response to requests from the community.
- **Electronic extortion:** The Media and Relations department from the Ministry of Interior and Basra Police Directorate held various events throughout the year to raise awareness on electronic extortion and bullying, especially on how to identify such cases and report them. Some of these campaigns targeted secondary and high schools and were aimed at both students and teachers. Others included public events in malls and cultural sites to raise general awareness and discuss gender implications in particular.
- **Anti-drug campaigns in Basra:** In December, the Educational Guidance Unit held an awareness campaign on combating drug use among university students, also involving teachers and administrative staff on their roles in combating addiction in their institutions. Another campaign was held by the Media Department of the Basra Police in the Kasnazani Cultural Council.
- **Anti-drugs campaign in Diyala:** After attending an engagement session held by WAHO in Baqubah, the Diyala Police Commander, Maj. Gen. Abbas Muhammad Hussein, launched a campaign on educating and spreading awareness across Diyala on drugs and their negative impacts.
- **Security infrastructure in Diyala:** To reduce the insecurity on the northern entrance of Jalawla—especially owing to attacks by non-state armed groups—surveillance cameras were installed for security forces to be able to detect any crimes.
- **Governance issues in Diyala:** A 3-day workshop was held on good governance with 25 representatives from the police, Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment, Directorate of Water, the Municipality Department, and Department of Migration and Displacement, as well as the Bar Association. As a result, 300 employees of these departments also signed the Code of Conduct for government employees, which although it already existed, was never previously signed or filed.

We are proud of the diversity of stakeholders involved and activities undertaken. The subsequent efforts by Iraqi authorities positively reflects the impact of community engagement, especially when backed up with verifiable data.

FEATURED STORY

Partner staff underwent personal security training in 2 iterations: a total of 24 enumerators from Salahaddin and Kirkuk were trained on 7-8 November, while 20 enumerators from Basra and Diyala were trained on 12-13 December. The course 'Violent Environment Preparedness Training' is an internationally certified course, and it included simulation exercises, theory, as well as first aid. The training was provided by Strategic Edge, which has been based in Iraq since 2016 and train Iraqi and international NGO staff on safety and security.

This was the first time most of the participants had attended such a training. It made good on a commitment the PoC team had made to support our partners and data collection teams, recognizing that they may face significant security risks as a result of their work, and simply as civilians living in situations of conflict. We received very positive feedback from all the trainees and a few of the participants later used their new skills to act out appropriate responses to security threats during the HSS enumerator training in Diyala in 2023.

One of the enumerators from Salahaddin mentioned that 'this was one of the best training initiatives' she had ever attended, and how she was already using what she learned in her daily practices, for instance keeping water and blankets in the car and knowing how to behave when passing through checkpoints. She also expressed an interest in doing more advanced security trainings in the future.



Figure 5. Trainees participating in a simulation exercise

LESSONS LEARNED

1. How can we facilitate safe and effective community engagement at the local level that serves to build bridges between civilians and decision-makers (also at higher levels), even when their interests are not aligned?

Supporting initiatives conceived, designed, and implemented by Community Champions is a great lesson in how we can build bridges and support meaningful outcomes at the local level, especially within diverse communities. The HSS data serves as a starting point for creative solutions or opportunities identified by those driven to pursue change. This also has the secondary impact of empowering youth in particular, as they are the ones who our partners typically identify to serve as Community Champions, which thus far has also been lauded by the communities themselves.

2. How can we have more targeted lobbying at the national level (including with like-minded organizations) and with international actors both in Iraq and their headquarters?

National-level lobbying with the government is providing direct venues to impact human security situations, as it enables us to work on the interaction between the supply of and demand for security. While it took long (as it always does when it comes to opening doors nationally), the engagement with the ONSA on PoC is proving to be a clear success story in terms of shifting the mindset of Iraqi security institutions to be more civilian-centric. And once PAX and Al Amal were able to demonstrate having built a constructive working relationship with the ONSA—a unique feat given that no civil society organization had previously worked directly with the security infrastructure in this way—institutions like NMI and EUAM became more interested in learning about our work and whether we can support one another directly in the future.

BUDGET & SPENDING

	Budget 2022	Actuals 2022	Total Spending	Difference	Total Budget	% Realized
HSS Iraq	<i>as approved in 2022 workplan</i>		<i>actuals 2019-2022</i>	<i>original budget : total actuals</i>	<i>updated in 2023 workplan</i>	<i>total spending : updated budget</i>
Personnel	€ 118.000	€ 118.804	€ 393.428	€ 145.042	€ 509.882	77%
Activities	€ 456.620	€ 379.174	€ 828.294	-€ 229.039	€ 1.147.485	72%
Audit & Other	€ 16.000	€ 0	€ 0	€ 198.819	€ 0	N/A
Subtotal	€ 590.620	€ 497.978	€ 1.221.722	€ 114.822	€ 1.657.367	74%

Budget Notes

The most significant discrepancy between budgeted and realized spending had to do with postponed field activities in 2022, resulting in 83% of projected activity spending (84% overall). Planned data collection and follow-up community engagement activities were not able to take place in 2 targeted governorates (Kirkuk and Salahaddin) due to the DNGO refusing to grant formal approval of the survey methodology. With support from the Dutch Embassy, the issue was resolved for 2023.

Note that partner audit costs are accounted for within their activity spending for 2022, as in previous years.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

New Publications

- HSS Iraq's online, interactive [data dashboard](#) (also in [Arabic](#))
- Infographic data summaries: Basra (2021: [English](#), [Arabic](#)), Diyala (2022: [English](#), [Arabic](#))
- "[After the Strike](#)" report (also in [Arabic](#))

Events

- Watch a [recording](#) of the "After the Strike" launch event in Amsterdam.

Podcast

- Season 1, Episode 5: "[Reverberating Effects: The Aftermath of Hawija](#)," featuring Mohammad Abdulkareem Khthar from Al Ghad

Social media

- Follow the Human Security Survey on [Facebook](#)
- Follow the PoC Program on [LinkedIn](#) and [Twitter](#)

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PAX Protection of Civilians Program

Human Security Survey - Iraq 2022

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the HSS in Iraq in 2022, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.



Impact Indicators

% of HSS respondents in Iraq reporting that their security situation has improved over the previous 12 months

Basra (2021)	Basra (2022)	Diyala (2021)	Diyala (2022)	Trend
23%	41%	54%	62%	▲ Basra ▲ Diyala

% of HSS respondents in Iraq reporting a favorable perception of national security actors in their area

Basra (2021)	Basra (2022)	Diyala (2021)	Diyala (2022)	Trend
86%	81%	86%	96%	▼ Basra ▲ Diyala

Key Results Over Time

	2019	2020	2021	2022	Trend	Total
# of HSS data collection rounds completed	0	3	2	2		7
# of community dialogues with local civilians and relevant authorities to validate data	0	0	15	19		34
# of HSS enumerators trained	0	46	60	32		138
# of HSS respondents	0	2295	1478	1534		5307

Additional Results in 2022

	# of events at which HSS data is presented to international institutions or stakeholders interested in protection issues	2
	# of local project partners or experts consulted in annual HSS methodology review	37
	# of community engagement activities implemented by community security committees	12
	# of Iraqi government or security institutions constructively engaged through advocacy meetings about protection issues	43
	# of data collection team members receiving tailored capacity building (e.g., advocacy, security, psychosocial support)	129

Budget & Spending

	Budget 2022	Actuals 2022	Total Spending	Difference	Total Budget	% Realized
	as approved in 2022 workplan		actuals 2019-2022	original budget : total actuals	updated in 2023 workplan	total spending : updated budget
HSS Iraq						
Personnel	€ 118.000	€ 118.804	€ 393.428	€ 145.042	€ 509.882	77%
Activities	€ 456.620	€ 379.174	€ 828.294	-€ 229.039	€ 1.147.485	72%
Audit & Other	€ 16.000	€ 0	€ 0	€ 198.819	€ 0	N/A
Subtotal	€ 590.620	€ 497.978	€ 1.221.722	€ 114.822	€ 1.657.367	74%

3. Human Security Survey – South Sudan

PROGRESS SUMMARY



EMPOWERING PARTNERS

- Provided trainings in advocacy skills and personal security
- Produced a documentary on people-to-people peace processes featuring partners



COMMUNITY-DRIVEN SOLUTIONS

- Trained COMSECCOM members in peacebuilding and mediation
- Supported 20 diverse community engagement activities



LONGER-TERM IMPACTS

- Maintained constructive relations with local authorities
- Improved efficiency and security of data processing and analysis

Repeated rounds of data collection and dialogue within the Human Security Survey (HSS) project have contributed demonstrably to an expanded knowledge base on local security dynamics in South Sudan, and particularly civilian perspectives on protection in key regions of the country. Throughout 2022, the HSS continued to improve public awareness about security trends and create means for community-driven solutions, as well as motivate and empower authorities to affect positive changes.

PAX and its partners made up for time lost during the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic by delivering on a busy workplan for 2022. In total, 5 field data collection processes occurred in the targeted regions throughout the country, with a total of 2,675 respondents added to the overall dataset. In addition, the team conducted 2 longitudinal Expert Panel Surveys to solicit additional insights from local governance and security experts. We are heartened by improved confidence and willingness on the part of (sub)national actors to discuss community security issues with PAX and its partners, and especially to engage directly with communities on how to improve current protection strategies.

PAX also continued its strategic shift towards increasing HSS data utilization at the national level in South Sudan. PAX commissioned 2 consultancies in 2022, the first exploring opportunities for greater uptake of HSS results within UNMISS, and the other investigating how to best engage with national security authorities in furthering people-centric security and community engagement.¹ Preliminary results from these consultancies suggest that a shift in focus from international actors as principal advocacy audience towards South Sudanese security actors will help us to achieve more direct and potentially more sustainable results for human security in South Sudan. We therefore focus our efforts on the uptake of community security priorities and the development of law enforcement capabilities² within targeted states and at the national level.

All of the efforts detailed herein were planned and implemented in close coordination with our trusted local partners in South Sudan: Assistance Mission for Africa (AMA) and the Justice and Peace Commission – Catholic Diocese of Torit (JPC-CDoT), as well as a number of experienced consultants from regions that we survey.

CONTEXT & ADAPTATIONS

South Sudan keeps stumbling forward where the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) is concerned, much to the frustration of the international community. This is most visible in the halting preparations towards the country's first general elections since independence,

Progress Score: HSS-South Sudan



¹ The second consultancy will conclude in early 2023.

² PAX and its partners still aim to develop a proactive active law enforcement/security sector reform (SSR) component in any new Partnership after 2023 to complement our existing data collection and dialogue efforts and to more directly address some of the most prominent security challenges that the survey respondents, Expert Panels, and community engagement efforts consistently describe.

"This is not my first time to learn about PAX and HSS as a project...My colleagues in the local government started narrating to me the good work PAX is doing in greater Yirol...[so] I am not doubtful about this NGO called PAX. I trust it because its work is trusted by my colleagues. I can only ask John Malith to pass my request to PAX HQ that let this good work continue to go on in Greater Yirol because we as government found it helpful as problems facing our communities are brought out through this technical survey process."

Majok Wel Alier, Executive Director, Yirol West County

which were originally scheduled for July 2015 but have been postponed at least 4 times. Given delays in the development of the necessary institutions to support further democratic progress—including the judiciary and interim Constitution—as well as worrying threats to civic space and media freedom, the parties to the peace agreement extended the transitional period for another 2 years until December 2024. Unfortunately, even this new forecast seems to be in danger due to the Government falling behind so many benchmarks already.

The security situation also continues to deteriorate in key parts of the country, including in Jonglei,³ the Greater Pibor Administrative Area, Upper Nile, Tambura in Western Equatoria, Tonj in Warrap State, and parts of Central Equatoria State. Further, environmental stresses and climate change continue to affect conflict conditions across the country. For instance, yearly floods in Jonglei and Unity⁴ had a big impact on not just the displacement and humanitarian situation of the communities concerned, but also on intercommunal tensions across a wider swath of territory.

On the other hand, as security dynamics in South Sudan can be heavily localized, other parts of the country enjoyed improved conditions. For instance, security levels in Greater Yirol (Lakes) improved according to 94% of HSS respondents, and in Payinjiar (Unity) according to 83% of those surveyed. This is most likely attributable to the successful implementation of their locally-brokered joint peace agreement between the two regions dating from 2018, to which PAX and its partners contributed. Therefore, the security picture across South Sudan is mixed, contextual, and prone to significant and rapid change.

Programmatic implications

The safety and security of our partners, enumerators, and participating communities are always of foremost concern, and deteriorating conflict conditions can directly impact our ability to implement planned activities. For instance, data collection was underway in Central Equatoria in late 2022 when communal relations deteriorated into outright conflict.⁵ The survey had to be briefly halted until the tensions and violence subsided to such a degree that the survey work could continue.

Management & operational changes

The HSS project is committed to iterative methodological improvement. Prior the start of each new survey cycle, PAX, its partners, and selected external experts provide insights on how to refine our questionnaire and research process. In 2022 we pursued significant developments in how we clean, analyze, and present data. Notably, we transitioned from using STATA to R for all of our data processing, which has resulted in greater efficiency and the possibility for automation. We also began the process of moving our data collection procedures from KoboCollect to ODK Collect, another open-source software platform but with more advanced data security protocols and encryption practices.

Finally, in the second half of the year we recruited a new HSS Senior Data Analyst to follow a departing colleague. Thanks to a short-term consultancy, this did not result in long delays in data analysis or a significant backlog in creating reports and deliverables.

PROJECT-LEVEL RESULTS

Long-Term Outcome 1: Civilians in conflict improve their human security situation through constructive engagement with (inter)national security actors

³ In Greater Bor (Jonglei) 56% of HSS respondents indicated that their personal security situation had deteriorated when compared to the previous year, and just 6% of respondents said that it had improved.

⁴ In our 2022 surveys, 88% of respondents in Greater Bor (Jonglei) and 94% of respondents in Payinjiar (Unity) indicated that higher than average flooding occurred during the year.

⁵ See: "Mangala clashes leave 3,000 people displaced, says chief." [Radio Tamazuj](#). 22 December 2022.

"Our communities of the two states [Lakes and Unity] are very thankful to PAX and Anton Quist because they have brought peace among the communities, and this peace will last and we must work harder for it to be maintained."

Debora Yier Jany, Peace Mobilizer in Yirol

South Sudan remains a complex and dynamic context in which change is not necessarily linear nor guaranteed to be sustained. However, despite the localized security dynamics outside of our control, we are confident that significant outcomes have been achieved to which the PoC program has meaningfully contributed.

While monitoring the local peace agreement between Greater Yirol and Payinjiar communities (which we assisted in 2018) is going well and communities are reporting improvements and enjoying peace dividends, the situation in other areas has deteriorated, often due to communal tensions with neighboring communities, seasonal flooding, and persistent governance challenges. Nevertheless, confidence among civil society representatives, local government officials, and members of security institutions in our survey data appears on the rise throughout each of our targeted regions. Meaningful engagement continues to grow, with authorities giving us public recognition and readily providing official permissions (or at least ceasing to interfere or obstruct). This also affects the open atmosphere and constructive engagement during the validation sessions and dialogues we facilitate throughout the 5 participating states, as well as the community activities organized by the various Community Security Committees (COMSECCOMs). However, it is still challenging to get authorities to commit to practical changes and developments as a direct result of our HSS interventions, beyond providing a generally positive and constructive willingness to engage or requesting more such assistance. This makes it challenging to hold them accountable to local communities for improving security.

FEATURED STORY

PAX has surveyed and engaged communities in Greater Yirol and Payinjiar since 2017, when communal violence and mistrust was high. We subsequently assisted in a local peace process that resulted in an agreement between community leaders in 2018. Since then, monitoring the agreement as well as ensuring that the benefits of this inclusive and local peace process are documented, recorded, and sustained, has been our main objective in this critical border region. When our colleague met with a staff member of a South Sudanese NGO working on peacebuilding who had moved recently to Payinjiar, he was told: "If you are not working with PAX...then we really doubt whether you are doing a genuine peace work here in Payinjiar County...PAX and AMA were with us here on the ground during the bad times [but] now the rest of the NGOs started coming to our area when the situation is fairly good." Although no NGO or CSO should be obstructed or doubted only because they entered an area at a certain time, it is a testimony to the sustainability and the "we're in here for the long haul" approach that PAX and its partners aspire to, and for which we receive appreciation from authorities and community members alike.



Figure 1. Chiefs and other participants attending a cross-order dialogue in Yirol hosted by PAX and AMA

Short-Term Outcome 1.1: Protection policies and practices in Iraq and South Sudan are increasingly informed by HSS findings

- **90** individuals trained in conflict-sensitive quantitative research methods and the HSS methodology (of which 70 were hired to become enumerators; 26% women, 74% men)
- **5** HSS field collections completed (in Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, and Unity States)
- **2.675** HSS respondents (65% women, 35% men)⁶

⁶ The total number of respondents refers to all completed surveys that remain following a thorough data cleaning and quality assessment process. Any surveys not meeting core eligibility requirements or quality criteria are excluded from the dataset and are not reported herein.

"A main strength of all HSS South Sudan activities is an established, bottom-up approach that nourishes meaningful contributions on the local level...Overall the HSS South Sudan activities, including conflict mitigation, have generated for PAX a good reputation in the implementing regions and an increased legitimacy to continue work."

Quote from the PoC Program's Midterm Review (MTR), conducted by WINS & ICS

- 2 data validation sessions (in Jonglei and Unity States)
- 14 analytical or infographic reports published (including analytical reports, infographic data summaries, Expert Panel Monitors, multi-year trend analyses)

In 2022 we succeeded in collecting the highest volume of new surveys since we initiated the HSS in South Sudan, this year reaching all 5 targeted states. We trained and hired more enumerators than in previous years to expand the reach and access within surveyed regions. Specifically, 2 additional counties were added to the survey locations: Torit County in Eastern Equatoria State and Terekeka County in Central Equatoria State. Further, due to the larger data collection teams, we were able to conduct a larger volume of interviews. This resulted in a total of 2,675 valid surveys (following rigorous data cleaning), nearly 500 more than in the previous full cycle.

Our teams also concluded 2 Expert Panel Surveys in [Jonglei](#) and [Greater Yiroi](#) (Lakes) in June 2022, which provided additional timely and informed insights into changing security dynamics from a longitudinal panel of security and governance leaders.

The practice of facilitating detailed and constructive dialogues at the community level is a critical step in the HSS methodology. In 2022, the survey data was presented back to communities and validated in both Jonglei and Payinjiar. In each location, 50-60 diverse stakeholders attended the 3-day discussions, including local government officials, police, army, prison officials, paramount chiefs, *payam* administrators, and women and youth leaders. In Bor (Jonglei), participants from 3 different counties discussed decreasing community security levels due to raids from Murle youth, as well as the widely divergent law enforcement situation between Bor Town (experiencing gradual improvements due to more visible police presence) and more remote and rural Twic East & Duk counties, where people rely on armed youth in the midst of persistent cattle raids and abductions of women and children. In Nyal (Payinjiar, Unity) representatives from the region discussed the improved physical security situation, while recognizing the remaining challenges facing and performance of law enforcement actors in the area. Note that in both dialogues, worsening floods during the rainy season and the varied human security impacts (e.g., on food security, migration, livelihoods, health, conflict) featured heavily.

There are many ways to engage with the HSS data community insights. In 2022, PAX updated its interactive [data dashboard](#) and produced 14 different types of publications, most of which were based on 2022 data, although some leveraged insights from earlier data collection cycles. These included 4 detailed analytical reports, 4 infographic summaries, 4 Expert Panel Monitors, and 2 multi-year trend analyses, each of which can be found on our website and are outlined at the end of this report chapter.

STO 1.2: Community engagement activities inform more relevant protection of civilians strategies in target areas in Iraq and South Sudan

- 20 community engagement initiatives conducted by COMSECCOMs
- "Building our Peace," a **documentary film** was produced and launched through 2 events in Juba and Yiroi

Following the dialogues, the local COMSECCOMs, consisting of volunteers from each region, organized a total of 20 activities throughout the 5 states we surveyed in 2022. These activities addressed the most prominent security concerns according to the community perceptions collected through the surveys and dialogues, and approached the topics through varied and creative means. Some of these activities and their results (grouped by theme) included:

- **Resolving land conflicts**: Numerous meetings were convened on the issue of land grabbing in Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and Payinjiar. The purpose was to increase awareness about lawful ways to legal recourse as well as to identify critical gaps in land management and implementation. During the Payinjiar meeting, COMSECCOM members mediated a land conflict between host community and individuals who had

Watch the full documentary film "Building our Peace," which celebrates the successful Wunlit peace process between Payinjiar County and Greater Yirol [here](#).

been displaced due to flooding. In addition, the project sponsored a radio talk show on land disputes in Bor about how to seek legal recourse in preventing the outbreak of violence (with 20 listeners calling in).

- **Raising awareness about forced marriage:** COMSECCOM members held meetings on forced marriages in Payinjiar and hosted a radio talk show in Jonglei on the topic of forced marriages and elopements, cases that often result in intracommunal violence.
- **Addressing violence in cattle camps:** Committee members held sensitizations in cattle camps across Greater Yirol (Lakes) with camp leaders and youth on combating cattle raids, on peaceful disarmament and recent local alcohol bans, as well as an additional meeting with law enforcement and local chiefs to discuss communal disarmament, alcoholism, and forced/early marriages in the area.
- **Preventing revenge killings:** the COMSECCOM in Payinjiar convened a successful mediation and reconciliation meeting between 2 warring clans to stop cycles of revenge killing.
- **Conflict early warning:** the COMSECCOM in Central Equatoria held a meeting between 40 pastoralists and farmers to monitor communal tensions between them and reassess pre-agreed migration routes to avoid tensions and mitigate future outbreaks of violence.

Finally, we recorded, produced, and launched a documentary film in 2022 celebrating the success of local peacebuilding initiatives. Together with our partners at AMA, we launched the film first in Juba among an audience of authorities, including members of Parliament and international diplomats. We organized a second launch event in Yirol—one of the border regions highlighted in the film. Read more about the unique event below.

FEATURED STORY

In 2022, PAX worked with a South Sudanese filmmaker, Silvano Yokwe, to produce a documentary on people-to-people peacebuilding in South Sudan called "Building Our Peace." The film celebrates the tireless efforts of community-based peacebuilders, including some of our own partners in Yirol and Payinjiar. We launched the film through two events in country, including one in Juba aimed at (inter)national stakeholders and a second in Yirol for our local network, some of whom had been interviewed and shared testimonies during the making of the film.

We set up for a film screening in a church expecting a few hundred people would come and discuss the documentary. In the morning there would be a wrestling match as a public side event later in the day to mark the occasion. We hoped that a few hundred spectators would come watch as they passed by the central Freedom Square in town. However, when we arrived in Yirol the day prior to the launch, the atmosphere was buzzing and the town was packed. It turned out that many more people came—from the villages, the cattle camps, but even as far as Juba—especially to witness the wrestling tournament. In the end, it was estimated that between 5,000-10,000 spectators attended the wrestling match, which was also [streamed live](#) and watched by an additional 30,000 people both within and outside of the country. In a way, this made viewing the documentary the *actual* side event, but it ended up being a fun, engaging, and thoroughly South Sudanese way to raise awareness about and to celebrate local peacebuilding successes.



Figure 2. Thousands of people came to Yirol for the celebratory wrestling match and film screening

LESSONS LEARNED

1. How can we best develop and implement a coherent lobby and advocacy strategy that enables us to collectively and effectively engage with UNMISS, other relevant UN agencies, and troop contributing countries in South Sudan?

"It is so powerful to hear affected voices directly."

Key informant quoted in the PoC Program's Midterm Review

2. How can we and our partners constructively build an advocacy network with South Sudanese political and security authorities, and most effectively encourage them to improve their protection strategies?

During the course of this program, we sought to develop a robust advocacy strategy for both international audiences (most notably UNMISS) and Juba-based domestic audiences (especially the security ministries) separately. However, both of these strategies were challenging in their own regards. When it came to engaging with the UN mission, we enjoyed positive engagement with various sections within UNMISS, as well as UNDP. Yet the main challenge was to go beyond merely disseminating our reports, making our project known, and being considered as "interesting." Our aim was to actually elevate this engagement to include better understanding of civilian security concerns, mutual information sharing, and the actual practical use and uptake of our data to improve the protection environment.

In order to bolster the uptake of HSS findings and recommendations among key advocacy audiences, PAX commissioned 2 consultancies over the year. One consultancy focused on understanding entry points within various parts of UNMISS and how to best leverage our data, analysis, and community engagement efforts to better inform the mission's planning and evaluation. The second consultancy investigated how to best build out our network within South Sudanese national political and security institutions.

It turned out that although consulted UNMISS experts valued our data and were generally interested to engage with PAX on the HSS, the organizational capacities and realities to have an impact on daily UNMISS dynamics and analyses proved challenging enough (coupled with the outlook that UNMISS would likely scale down its protection activities over the next few years rather than scaling up). Together this provided a clear cue to increase our engagements with South Sudanese security actors to affect human security.

On the other hand, the consultancy into gaining access to domestic security-related authorities in Juba seem to point towards a general willingness and ability to increase engagement with PAX and HSS-produced data and insights among these institutions, which lends credence to rebalance focus from international actors to domestic institutions based in Juba (e.g., relevant Ministries, members of Parliament, commissions, and think tanks). While the research on how best to engage with national-level institutions was still ongoing at the start of 2023, we are confident that this effort will facilitate improved access to key decisionmakers and processes in Juba that are relevant for addressing community security issues and persistent law enforcement gaps.

BUDGET & SPENDING

	Budget 2022	Actuals 2022	Total Spending	Difference	Total Budget	% Realized
	<i>as approved in 2022 workplan</i>		<i>actuals 2019-2022</i>	<i>original budget : total actuals</i>	<i>updated in 2023 workplan</i>	<i>total spending : updated budget</i>
HSS South Sudan						
Personnel	€ 148.000	€ 148.510	€ 464.209	€ 67.861	€ 614.317	76%
Activities	€ 256.608	€ 375.756	€ 668.430	-€ 52.155	€ 758.247	88%
Audit & Other	€ 5.160	€ 0	€ 0	€ 50.000	€ 0	N/A
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>€ 409.768</i>	<i>€ 524.265</i>	<i>€ 1.132.639</i>	<i>€ 65.706</i>	<i>€ 1.372.564</i>	<i>83%</i>

Budget Notes

Overall spending on the HSS South Sudan project was 128% of original projections. While personnel costs were directly in line with the workplan budget, activity spending in 2022 was 146% of the original planning. This is due to the fact that PAX and its partners caught up after a sustained period of pandemic-related delays earlier in the program and implemented a higher than anticipated volume of field activities (including research, data validation, community engagement, and partner capacity building efforts).

FOR MORE INFORMATION

New Publications

- HSS South Sudan's online, interactive [data dashboard](#)
- Infographic data summaries: Greater Yirol ([2022](#)), Eastern Equatoria ([2022](#)), Payinjar ([2022](#)), Jonglei ([2022](#))
- Analytic summary reports: Jonglei ([2022](#)), Central Equatoria ([2021](#)), Eastern Equatoria ([2021](#)), Greater Yirol ([2020](#))
- Expert Panel Monitor: Jonglei ([02-04 2021](#), [01-02 2022](#)), Greater Yirol ([03-04 2021](#), [01-02 2022](#))
- Trend analysis: Payinjar ([2016-2022](#)), Jonglei ([2016-2022](#))

Media

- Watch the documentary film "Building our Peace" [here](#).

Social Media

- Follow the Human Security Survey on [Facebook](#)
- Follow the PoC Program on [LinkedIn](#) and [Twitter](#)

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PAX Protection of Civilians Program

Human Security Survey - South Sudan 2022

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the HSS in South Sudan in 2022, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.



Protection of Civilians.

Impact Indicators

	Central Equatoria	Eastern Equatoria	Jonglei	Payinjiar	Greater Yirol	Average
% of HSS respondents in South Sudan reporting that their security situation has improved over the previous 12 months	38%	30%	6%	83%	94%	50%
% of HSS respondents in South Sudan reporting a favorable perception of national security actors in their area	53%	66%	64%	94%	95%	74%

Key Results Over Time

	2019	2020	2021	2022	Trend	Total
# of HSS data collection rounds completed	0	3	2	5		10
# of community dialogues with local civilians and relevant authorities to validate data	0	0	5	3		8
# of HSS enumerators trained	0	28	22	70		120
# of HSS respondents	0	1325	852	2165		4342

Additional Results in 2022

# of community dialogues with local civilians and relevant authorities	2
# of community engagement activities implemented by community security committees	16
# of partner staff or Community Security Committee members with improved skills in peacebuilding & mediation or advocacy	32
# of local civil society or authorities interviewed	28

Budget & Spending

	Budget 2022	Actuals 2022	Total Spending	Difference	Total Budget	% Realized
	as approved in 2022 workplan		actuals 2019-2022	original budget : total actuals	updated in 2023 workplan	total spending : updated budget
HSS South Sudan						
Personnel	€ 148.000	€ 148.510	€ 464.209	€ 67.861	€ 614.317	76%
Activities	€ 256.608	€ 375.756	€ 668.430	-€ 52.155	€ 758.247	88%
Audit & Other	€ 5.160	€ 0	€ 0	€ 50.000	€ 0	N/A
Subtotal	€ 409.768	€ 524.265	€ 1.132.639	€ 65.706	€ 1.372.564	83%

4. Protection in Practice & Engaging International Actors on PoC (PiPEIA)

PROGRESS SUMMARY



GROWING THOUGHT LEADERSHIP

- Leveraged local networks and analysis to build credibility in Civilian Harm space
- Provided expert guidance in key PoC policy developments



SPECIALIZED TRAINING & POLICY ADVICE

- Formalized relations with NATO, facilitating greater access
- Initiated training and policy advisory track with Iraqi government
- Organized or contributed to 14 PoC courses or exercises



LEVERAGING OUR CONVENING POWER

- Launched the Civil Society Engagement Facility in the Sahel
- Contributed to 5 events on the sideline of UN policy debates

In 2022 the now combined PiP and EIA projects achieved prioritized results—often going beyond the already ambitious plans set for this year—and continued to solidify formal and informal relations with key stakeholders and institutions. The demand for our work and expertise continues to exceed our capacity, which is positive in the sense that it allows us to prioritize those activities that generate the most effect. At the same time, this is a potential pitfall too; it forces us to walk a fine line setting expectations to a level we can deliver on without burning out our staff, while continuing to try to open new doors based on our growing name recognition and thought leadership in the PoC space.

Generally speaking, there were four main priorities for the PiP and EIA projects in 2023. First, on the practice side, the PiP team focused resources on targeting opportunities in the countries where our colleagues also implement HSS to leverage our local partnerships and sync up the grassroots, national, and international levels of our program’s theory of change. In Iraq this led to very successful cooperation with both our existing partners and the Iraqi government, as well as impressive results. We’re on the brink of formalizing cooperation with the Iraqi government allowing us to co-develop reference curriculum on PoC, as well as a national PoC policy and guidance and seeking additional donors and partners to implement an ambitious multi-year strategy.

On the international advocacy side, the EIA project focused on further formalizing our cooperation with targeted military and governmental stakeholders to support longer-term cooperation in a sustainable way. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formalized relations with both the Stimson Center and PAX, enabling us to structurally engage with NATO on policy, training, and exercises, and evaluation of policy and practice. We also continued to leverage our convening power through events like our annual PoC Conference and roundtables on the sidelines of international policy debates.

A third and combined focus was to become a leader in the development and prioritization of Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) on international and national levels. Our extensive research and advocacy related to a civilian harm incident in Hawija, Iraq has created constructive opportunities to work with the Dutch military to improve their transparency and response mechanisms, and with the Iraqi government with regards to their own national security strategies. The level of engagement and influence we had with regard to the policy development processes of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMRAP) in the US also went far beyond our original expectations. Building on these experiences, we are anticipating playing a central role in the further shaping and prioritizing of civilian harm policy at NATO, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and African Union (AU).

Progress Score: PiPEIA



Finally, PAX launched the Civil Society Engagement Facility (CSEF) in 2022 and focused on exploring opportunities in the Sahel region for testing and furthering developing this initiative in the future. In addition to general network-building, the event sought to identify concrete actions that civil society organizations (CSOs) and international NGO partners can take to improve interaction with the European Union and other international actors in order to improve people-centered security. While many challenges were identified, all participants remain interested to work with the international community on these themes and PAX is eager to continue facilitating meaningful engagement.

CONTEXT & ADAPTATIONS

The end of the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic had a big impact on the operational context. For the first time during this program, we were able to host and participate in as many physical meetings and events as we deemed strategic. In addition, the political and security context in the countries we focused on in 2022, South Sudan and Iraq both experienced relatively stable periods. This had a positive impact on access for our staff, but also on the opportunities for sustainable cooperation with civilian experts, government officials, and—in some cases—military or law enforcement institutions.

In both the Netherlands and in the US, we witnessed highly relevant changes in how these countries discuss and address civilian harm. The implementation of the 10-step plan in the Netherlands (a result from the previous phase of the so-called “Roadmap Process”) and the development of the US Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMRAP) and Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI)—both with a great deal of input from our team—reflect a significant change in how these key countries look at their role in understanding and addressing instances of civilian harm.

Finally, the war in Ukraine unfortunately provided us with opportunities to see up close and personal what war with a near-peer adversary looks like today. It also meant more focus on Article 5 operations and the importance of human security and protection of civilians in a European battlespace, particularly in the kind of high-intensity urban warfare settings that we had already been [writing about](#) and [integrating into exercises](#) prior to Russia’s invasion.

Programmatic implications

Improved ability to travel and engage directly with targeted institutions allowed us to step up our research, advocacy, and training efforts significantly in 2022. We anticipated this change well and in time and therefore hit the ground running, prioritizing traveling to deepen relationships and work practically with targeted stakeholders and hosting or participating in key events throughout the year. This allowed us to set up a number of very successful and ambitious meetings and cooperation, such as the first-ever UN Workshop on Civilian Harm Mitigation in Entebbe, Uganda, which involved representatives from a range of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and other UN stakeholders.

In South Sudan and Iraq, we prioritized the identification of opportunities to work with security actors on the development of PoC policy and curriculum, admittedly with mixed success. While our successes in Iraq will feature throughout this report, we concluded in South Sudan after several attempts that there was too little political will and momentum for more hands-on cooperation on PoC policymaking or training, and that the limited opportunities for cooperation would be too far removed from our current programmatic focus and expertise. Based on the advice of 2 consultancy reports (explained in more detail in the HSS South Sudan chapter to this report), we attempted in 2022 to develop new relations with UNMISS, international organizations like UNDP, and national entities, to explore future cooperation on the development, training, and monitoring of specific protection tasks for security actors in South Sudan. Unfortunately, the interest shown by potential counterparts remained limited. The most promising new inroads were with national level governmental agencies and UNDP on the importance of PoC-related training

Listen to episodes of the [Civilian Protection Podcast](#) to hear civilian perspectives on the war in Ukraine and its myriad effects on local communities. [Episode #6 \(from March 2022\)](#) reflects on the initial invasion and [Episode #8 \(from November 2022\)](#) discusses the environmental effects of the conflict in Ukraine.

for (newly integrated) police forces. This will be explored further when developing new programming after 2023.

In the Netherlands, the changes in the policy context referenced above also meant that our research and advocacy work on the notable civilian harm incident in Hawija, Iraq is no longer considered divisive or particularly sensitive. Our report on Hawija published in 2022 and our subsequent and ongoing advocacy on behalf of the citizens of Hawija is discussed more openly than would have been possible a couple years ago. PAX is widely recognized for its leading role bringing these changes about. Our critical field reporting from Hawija, combined with our leadership in setting up, facilitating, and offering technical expertise to the Roadmap Process in the Netherlands has allowed us to position ourselves as independent, constructive counterpart for the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD) and others. This continues to lead to formal engagements on pre-agreed topics, but also to many informal and ad hoc exchanges.

Management & operational changes

The PiP and EIA projects were functionally merged in early 2022, and are now led by a single Project Lead who can fully prioritize achieving results for both projects while facilitating strategic linkages between our policy and practice-oriented tracks of work, as well as with the Human Security Survey (HSS) projects. Further, the CSEF project was started in 2022 as a small start-up initiative currently still administered under the umbrella of the combined PiP and EIA projects, but with ambitions to expand beyond 2023.

As indicated in the 2022 workplan, PAX and Stimson decided to extend their partnership until 2023 in order to create more space for realizing intended results at NATO. During 2022, Stimson brought Ms. Samantha Turner on board as a Senior Military and Gender Advisor to assist the team as they built out their approach to protection, looking specifically at the nexus of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and Human Security (HS) agendas. Both have been critical in the context of the Ukraine war, and have created opportunities for this program to provide expert guidance to NATO on how to better integrate gender into PoC tools and capabilities.

PROJECT-LEVEL RESULTS

Long-Term Outcome 2: Targeted security actors increasingly articulate and implement inclusive protection of civilians policies and practices

Overall, we made great progress towards achieving LTO 2 in the sense that security actors we have identified as priority targets (UN PKOs, NATO, Iraq, South Sudan, the Netherlands, and the US) are actively developing or refining more inclusive protection of civilians policies and practices with meaningful direct contributions from our experts, analysis, and grassroots networks linked to this program.

In Iraq, we made exceptionally relevant progress on our policy and practice objectives through cooperation with the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA). We developed and delivered the first comprehensive PoC training for future military trainers and we worked with the ONSA to deliver a draft of what is set to become a formalized Iraqi PoC Policy—the first such policy anywhere in the Middle East, and one of just a few in existence globally. In a politically complex environment, we managed to establish ourselves as a relevant partner that can move between the various institutional and political branches of the Iraqi state, while—or maybe because of—creating space for Iraqi civil society organizations to engage directly with Iraqi security forces, something very unique in this context.

In the UN context, we made progress on achieving advocacy ambitions at the international level through our continuous engagement with various UN missions, departments, and agencies, providing them with feedback and evidence-based recommendations, including

"PAX is able to create an environment that makes partners feel safe to move forward together...There is mutual respect"

Key informant quoted in the PoC Program's Midterm Revoew

"We are doing our best to raise the level of understanding of the complexities that affect NATO at the operational level. We can no longer consider warfighting as distinct from Human Security, nor working in isolation from all the other actors in a region of conflict. As ever, it's best to make friends before you need them."

Chas Story, HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, UK following a PAX inject into a Disaster Response Study Day

on protection tasks of Special Political Missions (SPMs); lessons from the US CHMRAP; long-term effects of civilian harm (Somalia); and the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA).

In the US, we made big progress on policy developments underway by contributing extensively to the formulation of the CHMRAP. Throughout 2022, our colleague Marc Garlasco, often with support from others in our team, contributed formally and informally to the preparation of the CHMRAP and then to the assessment of the eventual policy and debates about next steps. Our interventions were often part of a concerted effort by the InterAction-led US Working Group on PoC, but just as often through direct connections between Marc, PAX, and the experts working on the policy. The CHMRAP is considered a big step in the development of a stronger, better organized approach to CHMR for the US and potentially its allies and friends. As we have made clear in [our analysis](#), we consider the establishment of the CHMRAP a success in itself, while remaining constructively critical of some elements we believe to be underdeveloped or missing altogether.

In the Netherlands we took the next step together with the Dutch MOD in developing the second phase of the so-called Roadmap Process, with PAX still in a leading role. In 2022 the Consortium reflected on the outcomes of Phase 1, strategized on priorities for the future, and agreed to an implementation schedule for phase 2 in 2023. In addition, PAX facilitated contact between Dutch MoD staff and the US team working on the development of the CHMRAP to share critical lessons learned.

In the NATO context, we continued to contribute to achieving our objectives by providing targeted PoC-relevant training, technical assistance, and advice. In 2022 PAX signed an MoU with NATO SHAPE, an important step towards formalizing (and making more predictable) our cooperation with NATO on training and exercise, including our long-term involvement in development of reference curriculum. The MoU sets us up for more structured, longer-term support to NATO training and exercises and gives us a more solid foundation for cooperation with entities such as the NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI). At the same time, Stimson signed an MoU with NATO ACT, allowing for more formal engagement on political and policy level, further strengthening the influence of the NATO Expert Advisory Team led by Stimson as part of this program. Requests in 2022 from NATO for our subject matter experts (SMEs) to help them understand the [relevance of the US CHMRAP](#) and to build relations with the CHMRAP team of experts; and requests to brief NATO on the situation in Ukraine are testament to our established role as relevant sources of expertise for the Alliance.

Short-Term Objective 2.1: Targeted security actors meaningfully implement PoC policies, mandates, or general narratives around civilian-centered security

- 29 advocacy meetings or strategic engagements with targeted security actors or institutions
- 7 expert events organized at the headquarters level with the UN, EU, and NATO on civilian-centered security issues
- 7 research products or policy briefs published exploring PoC approaches within international security institutions

PAX and its partners were very busy in delivering on detailed research and targeted policy briefs during the last year. We published 2 major reports relevant to this outcome in 2022, including: a report about protection tasks of [UN Special Political Missions](#) (SPMs), and the widely publicized "[After the Strike](#)" report on Hawija (as well as several supporting publications, including [opinion editorials](#) and a chapter in the book [Hawija](#)). We also co-wrote and co-signed the [2022 Civil Society Statement on the Protection of Civilians in Urban Conflict](#), and briefed the UNSC on this subject in preparation of the 2022 UNSC Open Debate hosted by Norway.

Our program team is now fully recognized for their subject matter expertise leading to many relevant advocacy meetings throughout the year, including:

“Thank you [PAX] for the objective insights to protection of civilians: what constitutes effective protection of civilians is relative and not independent of civilians’ perceptions. We continue to explore approaches to PoC and share knowledge with fellow participants from NATO and the UN.”

Julie Kiwanuka, Chief Protection, Transition, and Reintegration Section at UNMISS and participant in FINCENT’s Comprehensive UN and NATO PoC course

- With leaders of UN DPO, DPPA, USUN, and OCHA to discuss UN policy, including on CHMR and SPMs.
- With diplomatic and governmental officials from the US, the Netherlands, Germany, UN, EU, and AU on a wide range of topics, including CHMR, climate and conflict, EWIPA, PoC, and Ukraine.
- With NATO, with Stimson providing input for the NATO Strategic Concept, the NATO Human Security Approach, and other PoC policies and policy revisions. This program NATO advised on a wide range of PoC-related topics, including, CHMR, climate, and conflict, PoC and urban warfare, EWIPA, PoC and Ukraine, WPS, and conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (CR-SGBV).
- With US officials through close communication throughout the year to provide advice on the development of the CHMRAP and the DoDI.
- With the ONSA and other security institutions in Iraq we co-facilitated a 5-day writing session for the first Iraqi PoC Policy and accompanying military guidance.

These efforts also included a series major events (co-)organized by the PiPEIA team: For instance, we jointly organized a session on civilian support to military training for the UN Humanitarian Network and Partnership Week in Geneva, attended by 50 experts. We also co-organized with UN DPO and CIVIC the first-ever UN workshop on CHMR, with 33 participants (mostly representatives of UN PKO and SPMs). In this 3-day roundtable, PAX co-facilitated discussions among staff from UN PKOs, SPMs, and UN Directorates on harm mitigation: how is it defined in the UN context; what are mitigation tasks, and how are they currently operationalized? This roundtable resulted in internal reports with recommendations for further discussion and concept development and is expected to lead to additional events in 2023.

We also hosted 3 official side events at the UN PoC week, and contributed to 2 others: On [Protection of water and water infrastructure in armed conflicts](#) (with Switzerland, Slovenia, Senegal, Vietnam, UNICEF, and ICRC). On [PoC in UN peace operations: Lessons from peacekeeping and special political missions](#) (with Australia, Rwanda, the US, OHCHR, and the Stimson Center). On [Protecting the environment is protecting civilians: Environmental and climate tools in peace operations](#) (with Switzerland, Costa Rica, and SIPRI). We also presented at a session on [Urban Warfare and Displacement](#) (hosted by Ireland, UNIDIR, UNHCR, UNMAS, and the ICRC). And we co-hosted a reflective event after PoC Week [Taking Stock of the Protection of Civilians](#) (with Switzerland, OCHA, Geneva Call, and CIVIC).

In addition, our staff contributed to third party events as speaker, facilitator, or expert, including:

- Briefings to NATO Operations Policy Committee (OPC) on PoC in the context of Ukraine. The Russian invasion of Ukraine sparked a new interest among NATO states in understanding civilian harm in a near-peer conflict in an urbanized country. Stimson, PAX, Save the Children, and CIVIC were asked to help NATO OPC draw lessons about the pathways to civilian harm and potential measures that could mitigate harm if NATO forces ever find themselves in a similar setting in the future.
- 2 NATO workshops on developing a Human Security Policy, revisions to the PoC Action Plan, and on implementation of the US CHMRAP.
- 2 NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) workshops on lessons learned on PoC from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- Stimson and PAX met with 12 NATO units and national diplomatic missions during 3 visits to NATO HQ in Brussels to discuss the future of PoC and (broader) human security policy and application by NATO. This included meetings with the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) Gen. Philippe Lavigne, with the NATO Human Security Unit, and with ambassadors of countries considered to be on the cutting edge of developing new PoC, CHMR and HS capabilities, including the US, UK, and Germany.

Finally, to support the policy guidance efforts detailed above, PAX and its partners published a series of policy briefs:

- Lessons from our PoC in Urban Warfare Tabletop Exercise (a close-hold recommendations paper and a public [wargame report](#))
- Human Security Policy Recommendations (a close-hold paper produced with Stimson, along with [public comments](#) on the resulting Human Security Approach)
- [Reflections](#) on CHMR developments in the Netherlands and the US
- [Policy guidance](#) on human security and resilience in urban conflicts (with Stimson)




Figure 1. Publicizing lessons learned in resilience and urban warfare at NATO Landcom PoC Focal Point training

Short-Term Objective 2.2: Targeted security actors demonstrate improved capacities and more civilian-centric behavior in the delivery of PoC in practice

- **14** trainings or military exercises designed, implemented, and/or contributed to on general or specialized PoC topics
- Over **330** participants in military exercises or trainings in general or specialized PoC topics
- **4** engagements of PAX staff in training curriculum development efforts

Starting with Iraq, we and our partners at Al Amal fully embraced the opportunity offered by the ONSA to develop curriculum for training on PoC for the Iraqi military and law enforcement context. We tested these materials in a pilot intensive course for future PoC trainers from a wide spectrum of Iraqi security institutions. Both 6-day courses we delivered included 20-30 military and law enforcement experts from across the Iraqi security infrastructure. As a spin-off initiative we embraced the opportunity to provide technical support and expertise to the drafting of the country's first-ever PoC Policy. There are no examples of other nations that have a dedicated, comprehensive national PoC Policy, so for a country with recent and dramatic experience in conflict to be a global leader in this topic is highly significant on an international level. PAX has been part of all the writing sessions and was asked specifically to help make sure the national policy will align with international standards. PAX, together with Al Amal provided the writing team with a collection of translated examples of potentially useful documents (like the UN PoC Policy, the NATO PoC Handbook, and excerpts from the CHMRAP); by providing the writing team with a comprehensive set of definitions; and by offering a first draft for a national policy.

Also outside of Iraq, 2022 was an incredibly active and productive year for our training and advisory interventions. These included:

- We delivered two 1-day modules in EU pre-deployment training for troops rotating into Ukraine (for 22 trainees each).

Watch a video produced by the Al Tameiuz Center—a thinktank associated with the ONSA—about the second workshop organized with PAX on PoC capacity development for Iraqi security forces [here](#). [In Arabic]

“Huge thanks to the excellent Marco Grandi as ever for his deep expertise and wise insights on this crucial issue for a war fighting corps.”

Nick Borton, Lieutenant General and Commander of UK Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) after a PAX presentation on Resilience and PoC

- We taught PoC Basic Principles to Dutch military participating in the MLO course (20 trainees)
- We twice delivered several modules and provided general support to the 10-day Comprehensive UN/NATO PoC Course run by FINCENT (20 and 30 trainees)
- We delivered a module on Human Security and PoC for a 1-day training with NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NDRC) (40 trainees)
- We delivered several modules and an exercise during a 2-day training for NATO PoC Focal Points (60 trainees)
- We supported as SME the Dutch military’s 3-day TOOK EIBA exercise (20 trainees)
- PoC team staff twice contributed to 3-day trainings for Ukrainian War Crimes Investigation teams (20 trainees each)



Figure 2. PAX staff contributing to a wargame exercise at ARRC

We furthermore offered technical assistance to key stakeholders, resulting in 21 strategic engagements with the Dutch MoD on the Dutch Roadmap Process implementation (4x), the US government and military agencies on CHMRAP/DoDI (6x), US DoD and NATO on comparative CHMR approaches, UNOCHA on PoC in urban contexts, NATO Allied Rapid Response Corps (ARRC) through a tabletop exercise on PoC in urban contexts (with Stimson), ARRC seminars on various PoC related topics (3x), NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence on PoC tasks for Intelligence officers, NATO Rapid Deployment Core (NDRC) on PoC and resilience, NATO’s Human Security Unit to provide resource documents and recommendations for the NATO Summit (Stimson), and with Iraqi and international institutions on the development and implementation of PoC Policy in Iraq (4x).

Finally, we delivered two proposals for Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Protection of Civilians in military organizations, one to NDRC and one to the US Indian Ocean and Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).

Short-Term Objective 2.3: Civilian-centered PoC features more on the agenda of international security institutions

- **6** publications (co-)produced on themes related to civilian harm tracking, reporting, mitigation, or response
- **475** participants in events to publicize or discuss publications on civilian harm topics
- **6** episodes published of the Civilian Protection Podcast
- **18** presentations by Program staff or partners on PoC or human security themes for general audiences
- **52** experts attending PAX’s annual PoC Conference

PAX and its partners leveraged our expertise and civilian-focused networks to contribute extensively to the growing evidence base on PoC, and to engage a wide and diverse audience in discussion of core themes. A number of key publications have already been reported above. In addition, and in our continued effort to create space for evidence-based discussion

In addition to publicizing our own research, PAX staff participated in a debate about civilian harm focused on the Hawija case attended by a large public audience in Utrecht. [Details in Dutch]

on PoC, we published a report on the effects of US drone strikes on civilians in Somalia entitled “[It is too much to kill three or four Al Shabaab](#)” detailing civilian perceptions and examples of harm. We also distributed dozens of additional copies of our book published in 2021, [On Civilian Harm](#), prioritizing personal handovers to relevant stakeholders.

We published 2 additional episodes to close out season 1 of the [Civilian Production Podcast](#), and then released a further 4 episodes in our second season. These included detailed and civilian-focused stories about reverberating effects of civilian harm in Hawija, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US arms trade system, conflict and environmental effects in Ukraine, and a landmark political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

We also made a concerted effort in 2022 to thoroughly publicize and utilize our research to increase its potential impact. For the launch of the “After the Strike” report we organized 2 major launch events. The first took place at [De Balie in Amsterdam](#) and included an impressive series of expert speakers and 157 participants. There was also an event in Erbil for 80 participants, including members of Parliament, civilians directly affected by the airstrike, journalists, and staff from the humanitarian and development sectors. Finally, we returned to Hawija to formally present the report to the mayor of Hawija, Mr. Sabhan Khalaf Ali, and to offer both gratitude to the community for engaging in this effort with us and our continued commitment to advocating with and for them.



Figure 3. One of the expert panels during the launch event for “After the Strike” in Amsterdam

Throughout the year, our program contributed to events and publications on PoC, including: 4 external podcasts ([Voices of War](#); [Lawfare](#); [Civics 101](#); Stimson’s [Europe Desk Podcast](#)); 18 lectures and workshops reaching over 500 individuals directly (NATO Parliamentary Assembly; NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives; Joint Advanced Warfighting School; 2x Marine Corps University; West Point; UMASS 2x; Canberra Law School; Leiden University; 2x PAX Peace Week lectures; Princeton University; Utrecht University; University of Middle Georgia; City Club Boise; Global Austin).

Finally, we also organized a 1-day event in our annual series of PoC Conferences attended by 52 invited experts. This event is described in more detail in the Program Overview of this report.

Read a report summarizing the outcomes of the first CSEF workshop for Burkina Faso and Niger [here](#).

Short-Term Objective 2.4: Civil society from conflict contexts are equipped to more meaningfully engage with security actors at national and international levels

- 1 formal exchange session with 16 civil society experts in the Sahel on constructive engagement with the EU and international security actors

In late 2022, we facilitated engagement between civil society representatives and (inter)national officials in our [first CSEF workshop](#) in Ouagadougou. Representatives of CSOs from Burkina Faso and Niger active in the domain of peacebuilding and human rights took part in the event. They were asked to share their experiences on engaging with the EU and other international stakeholders, and to join an open and frank conversation on the challenges to meaningful interaction. PAX also convened a networking event between participating CSOs and European diplomats, and additionally briefed Belgian, Dutch, German, and EU officials on future plans for the CSEF.



Figure 4. Civil society experts from Burkina Faso and Niger convened for a CSO workshop in Ouagadougou

A military coup occurred in Burkina Faso in the days immediately following the inaugural workshop, which caused uncertainty and resulted in a temporary shift in focus for PAX's colleagues working in and on the Sahel region. These conditions also impeded planned follow up activities, which were postponed to 2023.

FEATURED STORY

In October 2022, we delivered a 6-day PoC Training of Trainers course in Erbil. The 21 trainees were selected to represent the broadest possible spectrum of Iraqi military and law enforcement entities, including Counter Insurgency Services (ICTS), National Security Service (NSS), Baghdad Crisis Response units, and Peshmerga Policy forces. All trainees had followed our PoC Basics course earlier in the year and by now we had gotten to know some of them more personally. We had long working days, combining theory and exercises, and in this second course, the emphasis was shifting towards trainees practicing their own training skills. During one particular day, we were challenging them to come up with real-life examples they could use in their own future trainings.

During a morning break, one of the trainees came up to PiPEIA Project Lead, Wilbert van der Zeijden (interpreter in toe) because he wanted to share an example of PoC from his recent experience. The trainee, an officer of a regional police unit, had been sent out during the summer to arrest a car thief living with his wives and sons. When they arrived at the gated house, the suspect's sons and their families were outside trying to block the police from entering. The situation escalated; at one point the suspect got on the roof of the house with a rifle and started shooting at the police, hitting one in the shoulder. The trainee showed Wilbert a video on his phone of a man angrily waving and pointing a rifle, and a threatening scene with young men and women confronting a police squad. He explained what happened next:

"We would normally have fired back, probably killing the man and possibly some of the sons and wives. But I thought to myself: Marco and Wilbert have taught me that they are civilians and that they deserve protection too. So I told my men not to shoot

and to retreat. I called my HQ to tell them we would be leaving, but they told me I could not because that would give the wrong signal—as in, the police will leave you alone if you just shoot at them.

“In the end I retreated to a safe distance, waited for reinforcements, and surrounded the building. I then, personally, negotiated for a long time with the wives [also captured on video]. I explained that we would not leave because we needed to arrest their father-in-law, but that we did not want to harm anyone. I promised them we would not torture him would give him a fair trial. And that we would not hurt anyone in the family if he would stop shooting and gave himself up...After more than an hour, the man came out and gave himself up without any more violence [more video].”

Back at HQ, the trainee said that he was welcomed with applause by his colleagues, he said. I thanked him for sharing the anecdote and I asked him if he felt we were teaching useful things in the course. He replied it was the most important course of his career, because, in his words: *“After all the violence and misery, we need to find out how we can trust each other again. Because without trust from civilians, police cannot function.”*

This is just one anecdote of course. But in a field where we rarely see the direct effects of our work, this was an encouraging sign that we may be tangibly changing behavior and improving outcomes.

“The PoC program contributions were a game-changer to our workshops.”

Key informant from a targeted security institution quoted in the PoC Program’s Midterm Review

LESSONS LEARNED

1. How do we best formalize our relationships with military actors, particularly vis-à-vis training?

We learned that the best way to formalize our relations with military actors and to prevent cooptation is to establish clear MoUs or equivalent documents underpinning our cooperation. In the context of NATO, we concluded in 2022 that “just” an MoU is not enough to achieve the level of structural engagement we want to achieve. PAX now has an MoU with SHAPE and Stimson has a Letter of Cooperation with ACT, although planned cooperation remains largely personality based. As a next step, NATO needs to standardize their agreements with organizations like ours if they want to best utilize the expertise we can offer them.

2. What is the “gold standard” with regards to civilian harm [tracking and response]?

We believe we keep making significant progress towards formulating a comprehensive answer to this question. Our involvement in the CHMRAP, the Dutch Roadmap outcomes, and the first workshop in this topic for UN PKOs puts us in the front row. We see real progress happening over time, albeit slower and more limited than we would want from our perspectives as civil society. The new phase we are entering allows us to answer more specific elements of this question, including: ‘what should civilian-centered civilian harm response look like? We anticipate shifting more focus to the implementation side of civilian harm mitigation in practice.

3. How do we recognize or prevent co-optation (as opposed to cooperation) in joint efforts with missions and militaries? How do we best contribute to facilitating the implementation of lessons learned in targeted missions?

In 2022 we learned how important it is to make sure we are not sucked in to institutional or national political competition. Whether it is in working with UN agencies or with Iraqi national security authorities, it can be challenging—especially as an outsider—to understand what political processes are at play between different persons and entities. It made it more important to communicate clearly to all our partners and stakeholders that we are interested in understanding the politics at play (if for no other reason than to understand if we are on track to fail in a given effort). However, it is equally important to us that we do not become an active participant in any of it. This is not always easy to achieve, though we have successfully shown in 2022 that we can do it; for example, by the way we managed the

"Bringing the voices from civilians on the ground to the political debate is seen as a strength and unique selling point of PAX compared to other INGOs active in the field of PoC."

Quote from the PoC Program's Midterm Review

complicated relations between DPO and DPPA at the UN level and between the various entities within the ONSA, MoD, and MoI in Iraq.

4. How can we go from being "interesting" to "relevant and persuasive" when engaging international security actors? What makes a policymaker change behavior based on our interaction – is it mainly an effect of our position, network, unique data, relevant recommendations, or other factors?

We have strong indicators that we generally go beyond just being interesting, as we prove time and again our relevance with our top-notch research and timely advocacy. An important underlying factor for success continues to be our ability to identify clearly what our stakeholders need and how we can help them. Many of our relations in that sense are not centered on us trying to convince anyone from the outside in, but on working constructively together on identified objectives. This is apparent in almost all our work with NATO, the UN, the Dutch MoD, US DoD, and also in our work with Iraqi institutions.

5. (EIA) How can EIA stimulate more comprehensive approaches to PoC in The Netherlands between MFA departments and MoD, and utilize these in the cases of coordination towards UN, NATO, and the EU? How can we go from policy coherence to implementation coherence?

This continues to be a tricky question to answer because much of this is beyond our control as a relatively small program. The Netherlands is one of the most active, progressive, and easy to work with countries in the international playing field. However, policy coherence is not always apparent in the political areas where we "meet" the Netherlands in policymaking capacities. NATO is a good example: the political positions the Netherlands takes in the NATO context can seem to diverge considerably from the positions of country in the UN context, or even nationally. We would like to pose this question to the Dutch ministries as well: how could PAX support comprehensive approaches in the Netherlands in coordination with the EU, NATO, and the UN?

BUDGET & SPENDING

	Budget 2022	Actuals 2022	Total Spending	Difference	Total Budget	% Realized
	<i>as approved in 2022 workplan</i>		<i>actuals 2019-2022</i>	<i>original budget : total actuals</i>	<i>updated in 2023 workplan</i>	<i>total spending : updated budget</i>
EIA						
Personnel (PAX)	€ 178.400	€ 157.059	€ 498.604	-€ 117.225	€ 671.035	74%
Activities (PAX)	€ 163.500	€ 78.431	€ 202.863	€ 6.937	€ 250.582	81%
Personnel (Stimson)	€ 83.794	€ 78.015	€ 216.560	€ 2.797	€ 222.760	97%
Activities (Stimson)	€ 182.644	€ 155.455	€ 424.998	-€ 1.305	€ 544.044	78%
Audit & Other (Stimson)	€ 88.529	€ 63.300	€ 165.848	€ 36.384	€ 225.832	73%
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>€ 696.867</i>	<i>€ 532.260</i>	<i>€ 1.508.873</i>	<i>-€ 72.412</i>	<i>€ 1.914.253</i>	<i>79%</i>
PiP						
Personnel	€ 107.792	€ 271.106	€ 647.475	-€ 108.665	€ 911.903	71%
Activities	€ 429.000	€ 352.259	€ 647.374	-€ 12.374	€ 670.366	97%
Audit & Other	€ 0	€ 0	€ 0	€ 19.000	€ 0	N/A
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>€ 536.792</i>	<i>€ 623.365</i>	<i>€ 1.294.849</i>	<i>-€ 102.039</i>	<i>€ 1.582.268</i>	<i>82%</i>

Budget notes

PiP: Overall, PAX's expenditures came to 116% of our original PiP budget for 2022. We increased the budget for personnel significantly as a result of opting to report our 2 Military Advisors under that line item, rather than as consultants (under activity costs) in an effort to more accurately present staffing costs in practice. Given underspending on staff earlier in

the grant, we are still comfortably within the overall personnel budget through the end of 2023. The PiP project underspent somewhat on activities in 2022 (82% of projected spending), although we had significantly grown the workplan budget beyond the original ambitions and absorbed underspending from other projects' budgets in 2020-21.

EIA: PAX and Stimson reached just 76% of our planned budget for 2022. We had slightly lower than anticipated personnel spending (88% of budget), but much lower activity spending (48%) as a result of some planned events continuing in an online format on the tail end of the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, a pared down version of our annual PoC Conference, and fewer CSEF activities following the kickoff workshop due to a coup in Burkina Faso. Stimson activities and indirect costs were also lower than anticipated and cost savings will be applied to their 2023 budget (which was not included in the original program budget).

FOR MORE INFORMATION

New Publications

- Research report on reverberating effects of an airstrike in Hawija, Iraq: "[After the Strike](#)"
- Research report on civilian harm incidents linked to US airstrikes in Somalia: "[It is too much to kill three or four Al Shabaab](#)"
- Report detailing "[Reflections on Protection of Civilians in UN Special Political Missions](#)"
- Recommendations brief on "[Assessing US and Dutch Advances in Building New CHM Policies](#)"
- [Briefing notes](#) for Dutch Parliament's Defence Commission on Hawija and civilian harm *[in Dutch]*
- Blog posts on various topics, including: "[New US Civilian Harm Policy: 5 Takeaways for the Netherlands](#);" and "[Larger Budget for Armed Forces Should Include Fund for Civilian Harm](#);"
- Report discussing "[Civil Society Guidance for the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan](#)"
- Joint "[Civil Society Statement on the Protection of Civilians in Urban Conflict](#)"
- A public [wargame report](#) on protecting civilians in high-intensity urban warfare
- [Commentary](#) on NATO's Human Security Approach
- Policy paper on "[Resilience, Human Security, and the Protection of Civilians: A Critical Approach for Future Urban Conflict](#)" (with Stimson)
- Joint policy brief on "[The Dutch MoD announces Policy Changes Regarding Civilian Harm](#)"
- A [summary report](#) about the first CSEF workshop for Sahelian CSOs



Events

- Watch a [recording](#) of the "After the Strike" launch event in Amsterdam
- Watch recordings or read about various PoC Week side events: "[Protecting The Environment Is Protecting Civilians](#);" "[PoC in UN Peace Operations: Lessons from Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions](#);" and "[Protection of Water and Water Infrastructure in Armed Conflicts](#)"



Podcast

- Season 1, Episode 4: "[Afghanistan: A Legacy of Harm](#)," featuring Shaharзад Akbar, (Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission)
- Season 1, Episode 5: "[Reverberating Effects: The Aftermath of Hawija](#)," featuring Mohammad Abdulkareem Khthar (Al Ghad League for Women and Child Care)
- Season 1, Episode 6: "[The Invasion of Ukraine](#)," featuring Beatrice Godefroy (CIVIC) and Oksana and Liza (CIVIC's Ukraine team)
- Season 2, Episode 1: "[Made in the USA: Arms Sales & Civilian Harm](#)," featuring Ali Jameel (Mwatana for Human Rights), Joyce Soyhun Lee (The Washington Post), and Tony Wilson (Security Force Monitor)





- Season 2, Episode 2: “[Conflict, Climate, and the Environment, Part I: Ukraine](#),” featuring Yevheniia Zasiadko (Ecoaction), Iryna Nikolaieva (PAX) and Erin Bijl (PAX)
- Season 2, Episode 3: “[A Landmark Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas](#),” featuring Hajer Naili (CIVIC), Sahr Muhammedally (CIVIC), and Roos Boer (PAX).

Social media

- Follow the Civilian Protection Podcast on [Twitter](#)
- Follow the PoC Program on [LinkedIn](#) and [Twitter](#)

Point of Contact

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PAX Protection of Civilians Program

Protection in Practice & Engaging International Actors on PoC (PiPEIA) - 2022



Below is a summary of key results achieved by the combined PiPEIA initiatives in 2022, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

Key Results Over Time

	2019	2020	2021	2022	Trend	Total
# of publications produced related to civilian harm tracking, reporting, mitigation, or response	1	5	2	6		14
# of expert events organized at the HQ level with the UN, EU or NATO on civilian-centered security	0	4	5	7		16
# of trainings or military exercises designed, implemented, and/or contributed to on PoC topics	0	2	4	14		20
# of research products or policy briefs exploring PoC approaches within international institutions	4	9	8	7		28
# of advocacy meetings or strategic engagements with targeted security actors or institutions	6	6	21	29		62
# of participants in military exercises or trainings in general or specialized PoC topics	0	13	29	333		375

Additional Results in 2022

	# of episodes of the Civilian Protection Podcast published	3
	# of strategic engagements with targeted security actors in training curriculum development	4
	# of specialized protection experts serving on the Expert Advisory Team to NATO in 2021	13
	# of formal strategic engagements or informal meetings with targeted security actors to translate PoC policy into practice	14
	# of civil society representatives from Burkina Faso and Niger participating in roundtable on CSO-EU engagement	16
	# of participants in events to publicize or discuss publications on civilian harm topics	150

Budget & Spending

	Budget 2022	Actuals 2022	Total Spending	Difference	Total Budget	% Realized
	as approved in 2022 workplan		actuals 2019-2022	original budget : total actuals	updated in 2022 workplan	total spending : updated budget
EIA						
Personnel (PAX)	€ 178.400	€ 157.059	€ 498.604	-€ 117.225	€ 671.035	74%
Activities (PAX)	€ 163.500	€ 78.431	€ 202.863	€ 6.937	€ 250.582	81%
Personnel (Stimson)	€ 83.794	€ 78.015	€ 216.560	€ 2.797	€ 222.760	97%
Activities (Stimson)	€ 182.644	€ 155.455	€ 424.998	-€ 1.305	€ 544.044	78%
Audit & Other (Stimson)	€ 88.529	€ 63.300	€ 165.848	€ 36.384	€ 225.832	73%
Subtotal	€ 696.867	€ 532.260	€ 1.508.873	-€ 72.412	€ 1.914.253	79%
PIP						
Personnel	€ 107.792	€ 271.106	€ 647.475	-€ 108.665	€ 911.903	71%
Activities	€ 429.000	€ 352.259	€ 647.374	-€ 12.374	€ 670.366	97%
Audit & Other	€ 0	€ 0	€ 0	€ 19.000	€ 0	N/A
Subtotal	€ 536.792	€ 623.365	€ 1.294.849	-€ 102.039	€ 1.582.268	82%

Annexes

1. Overview of Projects

Human Security Survey (HSS) - Iraq & South Sudan

The HSS is a research and dialogue methodology developed by PAX to improve understanding of civilians' experiences in conflict. Currently implemented as two separate projects in Iraq and South Sudan, we work closely with trusted partners to interview scores of everyday people about their experiences, perceptions, and priorities related to security and protection. Additional data comes from longitudinal Expert Panel Surveys, which provide further insights from the perspective of local specialists and authorities. We then facilitate dialogues with civilians and authorities to validate the survey findings and identify practical, community-driven ways to improve security conditions, which we support via local committees. Data are also presented through analytical reports and interactive dashboards. By continuing this cycle of data collection, analysis, and facilitated discussion over multiple years, PAX and its partners can track trends and work to affect sustainable change. HSS results also contribute nuanced examples to training and advocacy components of the broader PoC Program.


Engaging International Actors on PoC (EIA) and Protection in Practice (PiP)

In addition to working at the grassroots level, the program also targets key national and international institutions to ensure that sufficient policies and capacities exist to effectively deliver people-centered protection. While the commitment to protecting civilians in conflict is firmly on the agenda of institutions like the EU, UN, and NATO, international military missions still struggle to translate policy into effective practice. This program seeks to bridge the gap between local protection needs and the capacities of given missions, centering civilian perspectives to inform more inclusive, relevant strategies and to hold decisionmakers accountable. This part of the approach includes international advocacy, supporting local organizations through the Civil Society Engagement Facility, convening expert roundtables on the sidelines of policy debates, co-producing the Civilian Protection Podcast, and hosting an annual PoC Conference.

In parallel to the policy context, security providers also require support or advice in how to put these concepts into practice in different operating environments. The program seeks to meet the information needs of security institutions by providing PoC-focused training and exercise modules that are grounded in field realities and the lived experiences of civilians. Additionally, PAX promotes greater transparency and accountability of military missions by providing best practice guidance to security providers in how to track, report, mitigate, and respond to incidents of civilian harm. Note that these two projects were merged in 2022 for the purposes of more coordinated management and implementation.

For more information, about our projects, please visit: <https://protectionofcivilians.org/about-us/>

2. Results Framework



3. Partner Organizations

PAX works with a number of trusted local and international partners in execution of the PoC Program. Many of the below organizations are longstanding partners of PAX, and others reflect newer relationships. Some work at the national or international levels, and others are very rooted in their local communities. Together the program benefits from the vast technical, operational, and geographically-grounded expertise of its implementation team. Below is an overview of each of the core partners engaged in this program:

Assistance Mission for Africa (AMA)

AMA is a South Sudanese NGO working to promote human rights and communities to work towards their own development. They also work on peace and community security, social justice, sustainability, livelihoods, and capacity development.

Intimacies of Remote Warfare (IRW)

The Intimacies of Remote warfare is an independent, evidence-based research program within the Utrecht University Centre for Global Challenges that aims to inform scholars, policymakers, and the public about the realities of today's remote wars.

Iraqi Al-Amal Association (Al-Amal)

Al-Amal is a non-political, non-sectarian NGO that builds capacity and raises awareness about social issues in Iraq. Its goal is to foster peace, sustainable development, gender equality, and respect for human rights, and has programs around income generation, advocacy on law reform, psycho-social support, legal assistance, and training courses.

Iraqi Al-Firdaws Society (Al-Firdaws)

Al-Firdaws is a local NGO based in Iraq that promotes women's rights and supports youth, particularly greater economic empowerment and political participation. They provide training and education on leadership skills and democracy, and engage diverse communities to work together for a better future. Al-Firdaws also works to demilitarize communities and support those who are affected by conflict.

Justice and Peace Commission-Catholic Diocese of Torit (JPC-CDoT)

JPC-CDoT is a faith-based organization working in South Sudan that actively engages with diverse communities to work for a better future for the members of the community and for more peace and security in their region as a whole.

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

The Netherlands is committed to building a safe, stable and prosperous world. To contribute to this broader foreign policy goal, the Department of Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid (DSH) uses an integrated approach to humanitarian aid, reconstruction programs and improvement of security, rule of law, and governance, particularly in crisis and (post-)conflict settings. The PoC team partners with the Dutch MFA to develop training modules on PoC and provides policy advice based on research in conflict area

The Stimson Center (Stimson)

Stimson is a neutral policy research center working to promote international security, shared prosperity and justice through applied research and independent analysis, deep engagement, and policy innovation. Headquartered in Washington, DC, their award-winning research serves as a roadmap to address borderless threats through coordinated action. Stimson provides strategic guidance to NATO on PoC issues.

Wand Al-Khair Human Organization (WAHO)

WAHO is an Iraqi NGO on a mission to ensure a dignified life for people affected by displacement, including host communities. To achieve this, they organize a variety of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding activities to protect human rights, promote social justice, and battle discrimination. WAHO implements projects to advocate for women's empowerment, provide legal assistance, support emergency livelihoods, and enhance access to justice.

In addition to the formal partnerships described above, PAX also worked closely in 2022 with institutions like the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) to develop and deliver PoC training modules; InterAction and members of the US-based Protection Working Group on joint advocacy; an NGO Consortium made up of peer organizations, including Open State Foundation, Airwars, the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), University of Utrecht, Amnesty International, and occasionally the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as part of the Roadmap Process; and CIVIC again as co-producers and co-hosts of the Civilian Protection Podcast.

4. Results Dashboards

PAX Protection of Civilians Program

Program Level Summary - 2022

Below is a summary of key metrics regarding the impact and visibility of the PoC Program in 2022, as well as an overview of budget utilization to date.



DSH Standard Indicators

	2019	2020	2021	2022	Trend	Total
# of formal/informal institutions strengthened in the field of human security	6	10	23	25		64
# of people trained in the field of human security	0	97	187	504		788

Key Advocacy & Policy Outcomes

LTO 1: Civilians in conflict improve their human security situation through constructive engagement with (inter)national security actors

Convened civil society experts from Burkina Faso and Niger for a kickoff workshop for the Civil Society Engagement Facility, including direct engagement with EU officials in the Sahel	Interviewed 119 survivors of a devastating airstrike in Hawija, Iraq in 2015 and shared their lived experiences of lasting civilian harm through a detailed report, public events, and advocacy initiatives	Co-wrote and signed a Civil Society Statement on Protection of Civilians in Urban Conflict and briefed the UN Security Council in advance of the 2022 UNSC Open Debate on PoC
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LTO 2: Targeted security actors increasingly articulate and implement inclusive protection of civilians policies and practices

Formalized cooperation with the Iraqi government and security forces enabling PAX to co-develop a reference curriculum on PoC, as well as a national PoC policy and guidance	Delivered briefings to NATO Operations Policy Committee and multiple workshops to NATO Allied Command Transformation on PoC and Russia's invasion of Ukraine	Contributed extensively to the US Department of Defense's Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, and shared lessons learned with Dutch policymakers through the Roadmap Process
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Program Visibility

Publications & Events

	2019	2020	2021	2022	Trend	Total
# of presentations or events by program staff on general PoC or human security themes	0	3	8	11		22
# of attendees at annual PoC Conference	54	418	323	52		847

Social Media & Podcast (2022)

# of followers of HSS Facebook page	933	# of followers of PoC LinkedIn page	2824
# of followers of PoC Twitter	1163	# of Civilian Protection Podcast listeners	2285

Budget & Spending Overview

	Budget 2022	Actuals 2022	Total Spending	Difference	Total Budget	% Realized
	<i>as approved in 2022 workplan</i>		<i>actuals 2019- 2022</i>	<i>original budget : total actuals</i>	<i>updated in 2023 workplan</i>	<i>total spending : updated budget</i>
A. PAX Central						
A.1 PAX Central Personnel	€ 235.672	€ 241.071	€ 697.427	-€ 42.325	€ 916.166	76%
A.2 PAX Central Activities	€ 85.000	€ 97.193	€ 400.128	-€ 160.128	€ 490.936	82%
A.3 PAX Central Office	€ 221.532	€ 201.187	€ 681.668	€ 38.218	€ 941.860	72%
A.3 Evaluations & Audits	€ 100.000	€ 132.695	€ 180.281	€ 55.719	€ 230.618	N/A
<i>Subtotal PAX Central</i>	<i>€ 642.204</i>	<i>€ 672.146</i>	<i>€ 1.959.504</i>	<i>-€ 108.516</i>	<i>€ 2.579.580</i>	<i>76%</i>
B. Human Security Survey (HSS) - South Sudan						
B.1 HSS South Sudan Personnel	€ 148.000	€ 148.510	€ 464.209	€ 67.861	€ 614.317	76%
B.2 HSS South Sudan Activities	€ 256.608	€ 375.756	€ 668.430	-€ 52.155	€ 758.247	88%
B.3 Audit & Other	€ 5.160	€ 0	€ 0	€ 50.000	€ 0	N/A
<i>Subtotal HSS South Sudan</i>	<i>€ 409.768</i>	<i>€ 524.265</i>	<i>€ 1.132.639</i>	<i>€ 65.706</i>	<i>€ 1.372.564</i>	<i>83%</i>
C. Human Security Survey (HSS) - Iraq						
C.1 HSS Iraq Personnel	€ 118.000	€ 118.804	€ 393.428	€ 145.042	€ 509.882	77%
C.1 HSS Iraq Activities	€ 456.620	€ 379.174	€ 828.294	-€ 229.039	€ 1.147.485	72%
C.1 HSS Iraq Audit & Other	€ 16.000	€ 0	€ 0	€ 198.819	€ 0	N/A
<i>Subtotal HSS Iraq</i>	<i>€ 590.620</i>	<i>€ 497.978</i>	<i>€ 1.221.722</i>	<i>€ 114.822</i>	<i>€ 1.657.367</i>	<i>74%</i>
D. Engaging International Actors on PoC (EIA)						
D.1 EIA Personnel (PAX)	€ 178.400	€ 157.059	€ 498.604	-€ 117.225	€ 671.035	74%
D.2 EIA Activities (PAX)	€ 163.500	€ 78.431	€ 202.863	€ 6.937	€ 250.582	81%
D.3 EIA Personnel (Stimson)	€ 83.794	€ 78.015	€ 216.560	€ 2.797	€ 222.760	97%
D.4 EIA Activities (Stimson)	€ 182.644	€ 155.455	€ 424.998	-€ 1.305	€ 544.044	78%
D.5 EIA Audit & Other (Stimson)	€ 88.529	€ 63.300	€ 165.848	€ 36.384	€ 225.832	73%
<i>Subtotal EIA</i>	<i>€ 696.867</i>	<i>€ 532.260</i>	<i>€ 1.508.873</i>	<i>-€ 72.412</i>	<i>€ 1.914.253</i>	<i>79%</i>
E. Protection in Practice (PiP)						
E.1 PiP Personnel	€ 107.792	€ 271.106	€ 647.475	-€ 108.665	€ 911.903	71%
E.2 PiP Activities	€ 429.000	€ 352.259	€ 647.374	-€ 12.374	€ 670.366	97%
E.3 PiP Audit & Other	€ 0	€ 0	€ 0	€ 19.000	€ 0	N/A
<i>Subtotal PiP</i>	<i>€ 536.792</i>	<i>€ 623.365</i>	<i>€ 1.294.849</i>	<i>-€ 102.039</i>	<i>€ 1.582.268</i>	<i>82%</i>
F. Overhead/Indirect Costs						
F.1 Staff Support Costs	€ 87.424	€ 96.167	€ 288.535	-€ 14.723	€ 393.108	73%
F.2 Not Directly Allowable Costs	€ 350.000	€ 507.450	€ 1.234.466	-€ 224.837	€ 1.503.274	82%
<i>Subtotal Overhead/Indirect</i>	<i>€ 437.424</i>	<i>€ 603.617</i>	<i>€ 1.523.001</i>	<i>-€ 239.560</i>	<i>€ 1.896.381</i>	<i>80%</i>
Contingency	€ 0	€ 0	€ 0	€ 165.972	€ 0	N/A
TOTAL	€ 3.313.675	€ 3.453.632	€ 8.640.588	-€ 176.027	€ 11.002.413	79%

PAX Protection of Civilians Program

Human Security Survey - Iraq 2022

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the HSS in Iraq in 2022, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.

Impact Indicators

% of HSS respondents in Iraq reporting that their security situation has improved over the previous 12 months

Basra (2021)	Basra (2022)	Diyala (2021)	Diyala (2022)	Trend
23%	41%	54%	62%	▲ Basra ▲ Diyala






% of HSS respondents in Iraq reporting a favorable perception of national security actors in their area

Basra (2021)	Basra (2022)	Diyala (2021)	Diyala (2022)	Trend
86%	81%	86%	96%	▼ Basra ▲ Diyala

Key Results Over Time

	2019	2020	2021	2022	Trend	Total
# of HSS data collection rounds completed	0	3	2	2		7
# of community dialogues with local civilians and relevant authorities to validate data	0	0	15	19		34
# of HSS enumerators trained	0	46	60	32		138
# of HSS respondents	0	2295	1478	1534		5307

Additional Results in 2022

	# of events at which HSS data is presented to international institutions or stakeholders interested in protection issues	2
	# of local project partners or experts consulted in annual HSS methodology review	37
	# of community engagement activities implemented by community security committees	12
	# of Iraqi government or security institutions constructively engaged through advocacy meetings about protection issues	43
	# of data collection team members receiving tailored capacity building (e.g., advocacy, security, psychosocial support)	129

Budget & Spending

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PAX Protection of Civilians Program

Human Security Survey - South Sudan 2022

Below is a summary of key results achieved by the HSS in South Sudan in 2022, as well as trends over the lifetime of the project.



Impact Indicators

	Central Equatoria	Eastern Equatoria	Jonglei	Payinjiar	Greater Yirol	Average
% of HSS respondents in South Sudan reporting that their security situation has improved over the previous 12 months	38%	30%	6%	83%	94%	50%
% of HSS respondents in South Sudan reporting a favorable perception of national security actors in their area	53%	66%	64%	94%	95%	74%

Key Results Over Time

	2019	2020	2021	2022	Trend	Total
# of HSS data collection rounds completed	0	3	2	5		10
# of community dialogues with local civilians and relevant authorities to validate data	0	0	5	3		8
# of HSS enumerators trained	0	28	22	70		120
# of HSS respondents	0	1325	852	2165		4342

Additional Results in 2022

# of community dialogues with local civilians and relevant authorities	2
# of community engagement activities implemented by community security committees	16
# of partner staff or Community Security Committee members with improved skills in peacebuilding & mediation or advocacy	32
# of local civil society or authorities interviewed	28

Budget & Spending

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PAX Protection of Civilians Program

Protection in Practice & Engaging International Actors on PoC (PiPEIA) - 2022



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