

**Iraqi Handbook
on the Protection of Civilians
During Military, Security,
and Law Enforcement Operations**

2023

English translation

**Translation by PAX, the Iraqi Al Amal Association and the Al-Tameiuz Center,
for the Office of the National Security Advisory in Iraq,
to be used as an educational resource**

IMPORTANT

The Iraqi Handbook (2023) on the Protection of Civilians During Military, Security, and Law Enforcement Operations, as stipulated by the Ministerial Program in Chapter 32, 'Security and Stability of Iraq', Paragraph 4, 'Continuous follow-up of security institutions in their commitment to human rights principles, protecting citizens from all violations and transgressions, and holding negligent persons accountable'.

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Note on the English translation

The origin of this Iraqi Handbook on Protection of Civilians was found in the cooperation between the Dutch organization PAX and the representatives of Iraqi armed and security forces listed on the previous page. In 2022 and 2023, at the request of Mr. Saeed al-Jayashi, PAX developed a 12 day Protection of Civilians course for military and law enforcement officers from a wide range of federal and regional institutions involved in the provision of security and law enforcement in Iraq.

The Protection of Civilians Concept developed by NATO in the late 2010's and available in the public domain was used as the foundation on which we built a course relevant to Iraqi audiences. As part of that effort, PAX and its partner, the Iraqi Al-Amal Association translated several publicly available documents not yet available in Arabic at the time, as study materials and background reading for the students. The ACO Handbook on the Protection of Civilians (2020) was one of those documents and proved to be a valuable resource for the students.

From that course sprang the idea to produce a version of the Handbook that would no longer be just a translation but a reworked edition fit for purpose for Iraqi target audiences. Terminology was reviewed and adapted where needed, examples in the original handbook were replaced with real examples from Iraq and so forth. In several workshops financed by PAX, participants worked through the source material and delivered a unique document that can support the ongoing efforts in Iraq to build policy, guidance, curriculum and implementation capacity in Iraq for the protection of civilian.

At PAX we believe the resulting document is a compliment to the Iraqi team working on the various drafts, led by Mr. Saeed al-Jayashi, as much as it is a compliment to the staffers at ACO who produced the source material.

The document before you then, is an English translation of an Arabic Handbook using English source material translated into Arabic. Anyone familiar with the challenges of translation will understand that the translation of concepts and jargon from one language to the next and then back again, is difficult. And credits go to the translator, who was available to translate these complex concepts and ideas both from English to Arabic and back again.

We hope that this handbook will continue to be a useful resource to anyone involved in the Protection of Civilians in Iraq and that the handbook can be an inspiration to others in the Arabic world and beyond.

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Protection of Civilians Project Leads, PAX

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Contents

IMPORTANT	2
Drafting Team	2
Note on the English translation	3
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION	6
Foreword	6
Overview	7
Handbook Aim and Objectives	7
Intended Users	7
Handbook Structure	8
CHAPTER 2 - PoC DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS AND NATURAL DISASTERS	9
PoC Framework	9
Importance and Relevance of PoC for the Military	11
Legal Framework	11
Applying PoC to Core Tasks	12
PoC and Strategic Communications	12
PoC and Other Actors	12
CHAPTER 3 - UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (UHE)	14
Description	14
UHE in Planning and Execution	16
CHAPTER 4 - MITIGATE HARM (MH)	19
Description	19
MH as a Lens for Understanding – Planning	19
MH - Execution (How?)	21
Human Shields	25
Key Takeaways	25
CHAPTER 5 - FACILITATE ACCESS TO BASIC NEEDS (FABN)	26
Description	26
FABN as a Lens for Understanding – Planning (What)	26
FABN as a Line of Effort – Execution (How)	27
Key Takeaways	30
CHAPTER 6 - CONTRIBUTE TO A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT (C-SASE)	31
Description	31
C-SASE as a Lens for Understanding – Planning (What)	32
C-SASE as a Line of Effort – Execution (How)	33

Examples from Iraq	35
Global Examples for Reference	35
Key Takeaways	37
CHAPTER 7 - ASSESSMENT AND REPORTING	38
PoC and Operations Assessment	38
Reporting Mechanisms	40
ANNEX A - PoC Mindset	41
ANNEX B - THREAT ASSESSMENT – EIGHT SCENARIOS	45
Global Examples for Reference	1
ANNEX C - PoC KEY QUESTIONS/CONSIDERATIONS	1
ANNEX D - BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW	1
ANNEX E - TERMINOLOGY/LEXICON	1
PoC Key Terms	1
ANNEX F - Understanding Iraq's Security Environment Before 2014	1
Iraq: Western Provinces Before 10/6/2014	1
Urban Environments in Iraq	1
Key Takeaways	2

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Foreword

The National Security Council has always paid attention to developing the institutional framework and adopting professional and scientific standards. Based on the current constitution, Iraq has transformed into a civil democratic state. Thus, it becomes necessary that this be clearly reflected in all security, military, and intelligence institutions to prioritise the safety of citizens in security operations.

Following the lengthy and costly anti-terrorism operations from 2006 to 2017 and thereafter, an assessment was made of the observations and mistakes that accompanied the military and security work in the pursuit of terrorism. International experiences and institutions were reviewed, including human security and protection of civilians (PoC) standards and institutions in several democratic countries and military organisations, such as NATO, the EU, the UK, and the USA. The review aimed to learn about preparing a training handbook and materials for Iraqi military, security, and intelligence cadres to be adopted as a professional training curriculum.

Consequently, the National Security Council/Center for Excellence coordinated with the Dutch organisation PAX and the Iraqi Al-Amal Association to identify international trainers accredited according to NATO plus other serious international standards. The above aimed to begin training a select group of Iraqis to form a core of human security trainers inside the Iraqi Security System, in coordination with the Joint Operations Command, the Defence and Interior Ministries, the anti-terrorism unit, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, the National Security forces, and the Commands of the Special Unit, the Federal Police, and Rapid Response. The Interior Ministry in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region was also involved. Thus, 28 Iraqi trainers were nominated and trained under international supervision.

The efforts include the current Training Handbook and Appendices, which include seven chapters and six annexes. The Protection of Civilians Handbook shall be the first Iraqi step to adopt such standards and incorporate them in Iraq's military and security universities and academies under the National Security Council's guardianship.

May God grant us success and achievement,

Saeed al-Jayashi

Strategic Psychological Cell Secretary

Overview

Gaining an understanding of the increasing threat of armed conflict and its effects on civilians is essential, particularly in the current challenging operational environment. This is also in accordance with the Iraqi Government's policies and based on the Iraqi Constitution and Ministerial Program of the government of Prime Minister Mr. Mohammed Shaya al-Sudani, Chapter 21, Paragraph 3, and the commitments of all government institutions.

PoC (persons, objects and services) includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimise, and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from military, security, and law enforcement operations on the civilian population and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment. Thus, PoC includes not only persons but also all civilian objects (essential services), with particular attention paid to items of religious and cultural heritage and the natural environment. Additionally, PoC includes both military and non-military activities and leads Iraqi security and law enforcement forces in their operations to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to situations in which civilians suffer physical violence or are under the threat of physical violence.

Handbook Aim and Objectives

This Handbook aims to support the integration of PoC in all military, security, and law enforcement plans.

The Handbook's objectives are to

- a. Support and develop PoC commitments, as directed by Mr President of the Council of Ministers and Supreme Commander of Armed Forces, and understand its impact on mission planning and execution.
- b. Support the application and implementation of the PoC Policy and in the planning and execution of military, security, and other tasks mandated by the Iraqi Government.
- c. Provide information necessary to develop the collective knowledge on how to use and incorporate existing PoC concepts, doctrine, tools and processes into the planning and execution of military, security, and law-enforcement forces.

The Handbook is not intended to be prescriptive but rather as a tool to offer information and advice and to highlight the experiences gained to date through lessons identified and best practices.

Intended Users

This Handbook is designed to be used by all staff elements directly engaged in the planning and execution of military, security, and law-enforcement operations across different functional areas along the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The Handbook should be read in conjunction with the enforced national and international constitutional and legal commitments, Iraq's PoC Policy, and the Ministerial Program.

Military and humanitarian definitions of PoC are often complementary. However, by committing to implement the PoC Handbook, the National Security Council, the security ministries, the Joint Operations Command, and the operations commands aim to achieve the full respect of protecting civilians, whether Iraqi citizens or foreigners on Iraqi territory.

Handbook Structure

The Handbook is structured according to the PoC Framework in the Ministerial Program of the government of Prime Minister Mr Mohammed Shaya al-Sudani, building on international experiences, such as the NATO PoC Handbook, and focusing on relevant processes and tools to be addressed during the planning and execution in relation to each of the PoC Framework lenses, as well as operational examples (e.g., Iraqi experiences in liberation operations) and best practices in the application of PoC.

CHAPTER 2 - PoC DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS AND NATURAL DISASTERS

PoC Framework

Includes the following accordingly:

- **Outside Circle:** Understanding of the Human Environment (UHE)
- **Blue:** Perpetrators of Violence - Mitigate Harm (MH)
- **Green:** Civilians and Aid Workers - Facilitate Access to Public Needs (FABN)
- **Red:** Government and Institutions - Contribute to a Safe and Secure Environment (C-SASE)




Figure 1. PoC Framework

The PoC Framework is composed of four elements. They emphasise the need for a comprehensive and continuous assessment process aimed at generating sufficient awareness across all domains. This provides for the first element of the framework, Understanding the Human Environment (UHE), which is enabled by the other three elements. These are distinct but interrelated thematic lenses focused on key PoC issues and actors:

1. Mitigate Harm (MH), focused on Perpetrators of Violence and their victims;
2. Facilitate Access to Basic Needs (FABN), focused on Civilians, Civil Society and Aid Providers;
3. Contribute to a Safe and Secure Environment (C-SASE), focused on the Local Government and Institutions.

UHE enables the overall understanding of a crisis by emphasising a “population-centric” view, focusing on the population’s perception in regard to the safety and security of their environment, including what they perceive as threats. This could include, for example, a population threat assessment (a threat against the population) versus (or in addition to) the traditional threat assessment (a threat against the Force), as well as assessments of the population’s vulnerabilities, strengths and resiliencies. MH, FABN, and C-SASE can be used as thematic lenses to support the development of

overall UHE in providing comprehensive situational awareness in addition to traditional planning and assessment of operations.

The PoC Framework encourages proactivity in the identification and addressing of PoC issues. The three thematic lenses help inform the planning process by providing the focus on specific PoC issues and actors, thus helping organise and shape the collection, processing, and dissemination of information necessary to meet the requirements for UHE.¹

As lines of effort, MH, FABN, and C-SASE are enabled by UHE and can be used to aid the conduct of operations and to deal effectively with the multifaceted nature of protection. The balance between the three lines of effort will change in the course of an operation based on assessments informed by the UHE Process.

The PoC Framework must be considered as a whole, not as individual elements or as a linear or sequential framework. Although each of the PoC lenses is unique, with each focusing on a particular group of actors having an impact on causing or mitigating harm against civilians, when combined, the lenses provide a holistic picture of the operational area from a civilian protection perspective. Applied in isolation, each line of effort will likely have limited positive or potentially detrimental effects as it will fail to take into consideration all of the operational factors and relevant actors required to identify and address the sources of a crisis.

The timing and sequencing of PoC actions depend on the specific mission to which this framework is being applied. Understanding how the human environment is changing over the course of the operation is critical to the outcome of PoC objectives. If the executive authority focuses only on short-term activities, for example, only on MH, then long-term aspects of the mission, such as C-SASE, might fail. In other words, any actions taken under MH should be considered against any associated C-SASE or FABN activities. To improve the chances for both short and long-term success, these lines of effort can be used to comprehensively address a crisis or conflict.

Finally, it must be understood and emphasised that, while these elements/lenses are clearly defined in the PoC Framework to facilitate understanding of these distinct functions, the boundaries between these elements are flexible as they are interrelated and, therefore, most issues will span across more than one of them. For example, border control, fighting organised crime, and securing external routes are considered basic functions of the executive authority. The absence of any of them is detrimental to society and could have consequences that have a direct impact on individuals. Its negative economic impact is an impediment to development, thus increasing the harm to civilians in the region and in the long term. The threat required a comprehensive approach to solve the problem. MH, C-SASE, or FABN efforts alone simply cannot address the problem.

When terrorist ISIS gangs besieged Haditha in 2014, the Iraqi government took the following measures:

- 1) Securing an area close to Haditha to serve as a support and rescue station (Ain al-Asad Airbase).

¹ “Human Environment” (HE) is used in the PoC Concept to complement the term “Civil Environment” (CE). While both share many things in common, CE is viewed as the civil component of the overall assessment of the Operational Environment or Engagement Space. As such, it only focuses on the civil dimension of the environment, to include civilian actors. In contrast, HE includes all aspects of the broader human domain focusing on how all humans interact with their environment, especially each other. Therefore, it includes non-civil aspects of the environment, such as the military and irregular armed groups. This distinction is necessary as Perpetrators of Violence can be both military and civilian. Additionally, HE emphasises a ‘population-centric’ perspective, while CE is often done from a “military centric” perspective.

- 2) Setting up a security force for the movement between Ain al-Asad Base and the Haditha District Center (opening a safe passage between Haditha City Center and Ain al-Asad base).
- 3) Appointing a crisis cell at the Iraqi Council of Ministers through a decision by the Iraqi Government (charged with humanitarian relief, civilian transport, and providing essential living requirements).
- 4) Establishing a military airbridge from Mohammad Alaa Airbase to Ain al-Asad Base to transport food and health supplies.
- 5) Providing air ambulances between Haditha City Center and Ain al-Assad Base to rescue and evacuate medical cases and transport military forces to and from Haditha.
- 6) Support all social functions, social cohesion, and society's participation in protecting Haditha and restoring the necessities of life in the city.
- 7) Iraqi security forces began providing humanitarian and health services to society. They opened the roads from Haditha to other regions to restore normal life in the city.

These measures enabled the MH, C-SASE, and FABN processes inside the city.

Importance and Relevance of PoC for the Military

Our security forces of all types need to be prepared for asymmetrical/hybrid clashes against both state and non-state actors. Operations may be conducted amongst the population, for example, in urban areas. Other actors may not abide by international laws and may actively use civilians as shields, such as what happened when terrorist ISIS gangs used unarmed civilians as human shields. In this environment, mission success, credibility and legitimacy are closely linked to the protection of civilians.

Lack of consideration for PoC or PoC-related issues will have a negative impact on the overall mission and will hinder consideration of the root causes of the conflict or crisis, jeopardising its success and long-term stability in the conflict or crisis area. PoC failures will generate negative strategic effects, and their consequences will reverberate at all levels of command. PoC is, therefore, key to mission success and legitimacy. Operations conducted in permissive environments, such as support to disaster relief operations, also have PoC implications.

The Military Concept for the Protection of Civilians provides an overarching frame of reference for the work of Iraqi security forces, such as Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CR-SV), Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Cultural Property Protection (CPP), and Building Integrity (BI).

These CCTs need to be considered in a coherent and integrated manner during the planning and execution of operations, as they are interdependent. For example, increased sexual violence could be an indicator of greater violence and mass atrocities against civilians. Consideration of how to establish standing procedures, specific monitoring, assessment, reporting and/or mitigation mechanisms with this interdependency in mind will aid identification of these factors. (An example is when the various forms of the Iraqi security forces protected religious establishments and archaeological sites during the Nineveh operations, reopening and rehabilitating religious establishments immediately after liberation and prioritising women and children's camps during the evacuation of civilians)

Legal Framework

PoC is a fundamental obligation of the Iraqi government, in line with agreements and treaties it ratified and national and recognised international laws and standards related to protecting human rights at all times. These treaties, agreements, and the principles of international justice are considered a

reference for Iraqi legislation, along with religion and customs. The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq of 2005 included many guarantees to that effect in Articles 2 (1/C), 9 (1), 14, 15, 19, 37 (3). Moreover, the Iraqi Criminal Code No.111 of 1969 and its amendment in Article 370 contain such a guarantee in Article 45 (1). Other laws include NGO Law No.12 of 2010 and the Law for Compensation of Harm Due to War Operations, Military Mistakes, and Terrorist Operations No.20 of 2009 and its amendments.

Applying PoC to Core Tasks

PoC forms the basis of the work conducted by Iraqi security forces. It applies to all actions and procedures carried out by Iraqi security forces, such as defending the country, participating in crisis management, providing relief during crises, and planning military operations. A perfect example was the establishment of IDP camps before initiating the "Nineveh, We Are Coming" operations. Other examples include crisis response operations by the Defense and Interior ministries and the Popular Mobilisation Authority, which are committed to providing aid during natural disasters, rehabilitating roads, and providing drinking water to regions in need of services.

PoC and Strategic Communications

Communication between security forces and civilians is highly influential and could improve the work of security forces. The simplest example could be collecting information directly from civilians and the security forces' contribution to stopping the spread of crime and its prevention sometimes. Strategic communication with civilians across the relevant civilian and military domains helps identify and prevent hostile disinformation and propaganda activity to help manage and counter their effects on citizens. It could be through domestic radio stations in the Defense and Interior ministries, a department to counter disinformation at the Community Police Directorate at the Interior Ministry, and the Psychological Operations Cell at the National Security Council, which has an important role to play. Intelligence activities could be used to maximise the impact of PoC.

PoC and Other Actors

Protection is a shared, system-wide responsibility. Therefore, it involves and requires contributing actions from multiple actors in the international community beyond the military, including law enforcement agencies (LEA) such as customs police, border police, coast guard, gendarmerie-type forces, and a broad range of civilian actors. While military actions are essential, military force alone is insufficient to protect civilians from harm in armed conflict.

Every actor has different missions, mandates, structures and capabilities that provide comparative advantages in different roles. Additional factors include international interventions, civil society associations (CSOs). For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Iraqi Red Crescent play an important role in relief, not just by taking actions in response to emergency situations, but also as the custodian of IHL.² Moreover, the Global Protection Cluster, led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), coordinates the protection response and leads standards and policy setting.³ Within the Protection Cluster framework, protection is sub-divided in four areas of expertise, with designated lead agencies:

1. Gender-Based Violence (United Nations Populations Fund - UNFPA)

² ICRC Mandate and Mission, <https://www.icrc.org/en/mandate-and-mission>.

³ Global Protection Cluster - PoC, <http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/themes/protection-of-civilians>.

2. Child Protection (United Nations Children's Fund - UNICEF)
3. Mine Action (United Nations Mine Action Service - UNMAS)
4. Land, Housing and Property Rights (Norwegian Refugee Council - NRC).

The sub-clusters are activated in the field as needed. In addition, the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) delivers technical assistance in various corruption-related thematic areas such as prevention, education, asset recovery, and integrity in criminal justice.

CHAPTER 3 - UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (UHE)

Description

UHE provides a “population-centric” perspective that complements existing processes used to understand the operational environment. It looks beyond governmental and military perspectives that are focused on parties to the conflict/crisis as it complements the picture by adding a civilian angle to these views through the use of the MH, FABN and C-SASE lenses. This is essential as the Military is traditionally very good at assessing the “red” picture, i.e. opposing forces, and the “blue” picture, i.e. friendly forces, which is insufficient in current operational environments. This also requires gaining an understanding of the “green” picture, i.e., population perspective.

Understanding the crisis area is essential to inform decision-making in all phases of operations. In order to protect civilians, the unique characteristics of the population within the operating environment have to be considered during the decision-making process, including their culture, history, demographics, strengths, informal power structures such as religious and non-governmental leaders and influencers, resiliencies and vulnerabilities. Within crisis response operations, this also includes identifying the sources of instability and drivers of conflict. UHE is the necessary first step for the successful integration of PoC considerations into the planning and conduct of security forces operations and missions.

This function contributes to the Knowledge Development (KD) process by addressing the critical need for information pertaining to the human environment (domain, cultural, institutional, technological, economic, and physical factors). This is achieved through a continuous process of observation, perception and interpretation of a conflict/crisis that provides decision-makers with the context, insight and foresight to enable them to comprehend how best to approach a situation within the constraints of their mandate and force capability. In addition, the Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) process leverages both tools and techniques to harness the vast amount of data and information available and transform unprocessed and disaggregated data in order to create knowledge and understanding. Done properly, IKM enables crisis managers to focus on managing the crisis versus spending time managing information on that crisis. Furthermore, without a good IKM process, existing information to support UHE could be lost or not disseminated to relevant personnel.

In order to obtain up-to-date information and a holistic perspective of the human environment, active interaction, engagement and coordination with relevant actors are required to develop the necessary relationships, build trust and therefore encourage information sharing to take place.

In UHE, as well as in the application of the other lenses of the PoC framework, the creation of integrated in-theatre teams of Iraqi security forces personnel could be considered. The creation of such teams will have to be authorised on a case-by-case basis by the security authority.

Part of UHE is recognising the complexity and dynamic nature of the Human Domain. UHE is a continuous process that needs to be proactive/ pre-emptive in nature, supporting overall situational awareness (SA), the development of an initial understanding of a crisis, and KD. This is done through:

- a. **Persistent Monitoring and Assessment** to inform decision-makers with the most relevant and up-to-date information while also recognising that much of the knowledge and expertise of this environment resides outside of traditional military spheres of information. Therefore, this task requires the use of both military and civilian capabilities (human and technological) to systematically search, identify, collect, process (manage and analyse), and disseminate relevant operational information to decision-makers. This could include a systems perspective across the PMESII15 domains, focusing on potential adversaries and friendly and

neutral actors; a threat assessment broadened to include population-centric protection; or mission security threats and risk assessments. UHE also informs the development of Information, Intelligence and Knowledge Requirements, as well as Critical Operations and Support Requirements. UHE provides information and analysis that includes (but is not limited to) the following:

- i. Crisis/Conflict Environment:
 - Operational Domains (Air and Space, Land, Sea, and Cyberspace)
 - Human Domain (Political, Economic, Social, Culture, Institutions, Informal Power Dynamics, Technology)
 - Physical (Geography, Climate, Natural Resources, Infrastructure)
 - Information Environment
- ii. Crisis/Conflict Dynamics:
 - Mission/Mandate: Operational Objectives and Constraints
 - Type of Crisis/Conflict
 - Applicable Legal Framework
 - Effects of Operations
 - Vulnerabilities, Threats, Risks and Opportunities
 - Humanitarian Needs Assessments.
- iii. Crisis/Conflict Actors: Demographic (Age, Sex, Gender, Race, Physical ability, Language, etc.) assessment of the population, including:
 - Perpetrators of Violence – including their motivation, strategies and tactics, and capabilities. This group also comprises “Spoilers who use violence to undermine local authorities and hinder conflict settlement;
 - Civilians – including those most vulnerable (for example, those with disabilities, older people, gender, groups) or most at-risk (individuals with any attribute, characteristic or exposure that increases the likelihood of harm, i.e. in some cases military-aged males may be most at risk, in other cases it could be women gathering firewood). War and conflict affect different groups disproportionately. Vulnerability is context-driven and will vary from one operation to another. In some conflict areas, the most vulnerable group could be military-aged males. Therefore, it is essential to understand the different security needs and concerns of different groups, including distinctions between men, women, boys and girls;
 - Local Authorities - including their ability to protect the population;
 - Media and other “Influencers” – activities of populations will be influenced by information actors within and exterior to the conflict zone. While the digital age has “democratised” information, some voices will inevitably be louder than others and will use their position to their own advantage;
 - International Actors – including international organisations, non-governmental organisations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, governments and governmental organisations and private sector entities;
 - Cross-cutting Topics (CCTs) – a range of different topics which have a significant impact on all missions. Different military disciplines, branches and command levels may have to consider and deal with a variety of CCTs throughout an operation. NATO’s approach to CCTs is based on legal and political imperatives. The common denominator of all CCTs is that they overlap each other and have far-reaching effects in different areas of (civil) society. They are strongly influenced by culture and require military and non-military stakeholders to work together. To do so, characteristics of CCTs need

to be identified and analysed within the context of the civil environment/
operating environment.

- b. **Civil-Military Interaction (CMI).** CMI is the primary means for military forces to expand their knowledge networks and develop shared situational awareness, as well as develop an understanding of the human and natural environment with other relevant actors in the engagement space. This is essential for military forces, as the HN governmental actors, local civilians, and international actors that have been operating on the ground have in-depth knowledge and experience of the crisis area. Thus, interaction with other actors in the crisis area is highly important for UHE, particularly with regard to understanding the needs, dependencies, vulnerabilities and resiliencies of the population. Specific information requirements identified by the use of the three PoC lenses will inform the identification of requirements for interaction with relevant international and national actors and support the overall conduct of CMI. CMI supports UHE through the following activities:
- i. Relationship Building: Engagement with key leaders and other relevant local and international actors in the conflict/crisis area to develop relationships and build trust and transparency that will encourage better coordination and information sharing. This requires an understanding of the differences between organisations and their mandates, structures, cultures, languages, and capabilities. This includes engagement with formal and informal leadership structures such as elected officials, tribal or clan leaders, religious leaders, civil society organisations, women’s organisations and youth groups as appropriate. This interaction will enhance regional understanding and situational awareness and better inform decision-makers of local strengths, limitations, vulnerabilities and perceptions.
 - ii. Information Sharing (IS) which is based on the willingness and ability to exchange information between those actors involved, and both are required for this relationship to work. The “willingness to share” is usually founded on mutually beneficial relationships based on respect, trust and common goals. The “ability to share” is usually dependent on the established organisational policies, procedures and legal constraints of those involved but may be impacted by whether the crisis occurs in a permissive versus a non-permissive environment.

UHE in Planning and Execution

Consistent UHE throughout all phases of the mission is a key element as it underpins and provides guidance to planners on how to properly understand the operational space. To do so, a number of questions should be considered, reviewed and updated throughout the planning and conduct of operations, including:

1. What are the key protection concerns issues in the Area of Responsibility (AOR)? To include:
 - Main actors that threaten or pose a potential threat to civilians?
 - Actors being threatened?
 - Main protection actors
2. What is the composition of the civilian population? To include:
 - Demographics - age, race, gender, etc. o Social Groups – ethnicity, religion, etc.
 - Social Structure – literacy, education, urban, rural, class, caste, etc.
 - Which are the religious groups present in the AOR and which are their functions?
 - Which actors of the international community do the security forces have to talk to/link with to achieve their own PoC objectives/goals?

The main processes to be considered under UHE during the planning and execution of an operation are:

- a. **Development of the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE)**, which is crisis-specific and supports the development of a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment. This understanding should include a systems perspective, across the PMESII domains, focusing on potential adversaries, security targets, and actors supportive of the security forces, by approaching security and military activities and expanding threat assessment to include UHE, as well as mission threatening risk-based analysis.
- b. **Development of Initial Analysis and Factor Analysis:** The initial and factor analysis provide a strategic-level appreciation of the crisis, with the identification of the problem, main actors, and key factors, including strategic environment and PMESII factors, as well as potential threats and risks. This initial understanding of the crisis will also help identify knowledge gaps and, consequently, information, intelligence and knowledge requirements. From a PoC perspective, the strategic appreciation of the crisis can help highlight any specific threats to civilians in the crisis area. This assessment will include those actors that do not represent a threat to the force, which is the innovative aspect of the population threat assessment, as well as determine potential military options to protect those civilians. Once this initial understanding of the crisis is developed, continuous monitoring, assessment, and reporting need to be conducted to further refine the understanding of the problem and to address any developments or changes in the crisis environment.
- c. **Environmental Protection (EP) Considerations.** The aim of EP planning is to identify potential environmental issues and take reasonable actions that either sufficiently reduce or eliminate them while still meeting operational or training objectives. Early and continuous appreciation of EP factors during military planning will assist in avoiding or mitigating adverse effects of military actions on civilians. Effective environmental planning necessitates active liaison with HN authorities and the civilian population, where possible, to understand local environmental conditions and EP regulations. Thus, HN cooperation with security forces should be requested wherever possible to permit the successful conduct of military activities with due regard for EP. Mandatory environmental assessments and documentation will follow the procedures adopted by the security forces and according to the assessment:

Environmental Impact Assessments are required for all activities conducted by Iraqi security forces, including construction projects, military operations, and manoeuvres. Moreover, it essentially aims to identify the expected negative environmental impact and possible mitigation measures.
- d. **In-depth analysis of the crisis situation.** In order to better understand the problem and the overall operational environment and to develop courses of action (COA). An in-depth analysis of the crisis will help identify the key operational factors and centres of gravity that will influence the achievement of the conditions and any risks or threats to the success of the overall mission.
- e. **COA** should be developed, recognising that they are highly dependent on the operational conditions in order to achieve the mission. This requires knowledge and understanding of the operational environment, including opponents' capabilities and the potential risks posed by their actions in regard to civilians, as well as the consideration of the use of both military and non-military actions.
- f. **Specialised analysis and assessments** with particular reference to understanding the "white" picture, "green" actors and "blue" actors using the PMESII model.

- g. **Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Estimate**, which provides an assessment of the civil environment, including mutual impacts, contributes to the OPP and furthers the HQ's battle rhythm and decision-making. The CIMIC Estimate is to provide all relevant information available on PoC, thus supporting UHE and planning on MH, FABN and C-SASE. Thus, it is necessary to establish a civil-military cooperation component in the Iraqi Army, Anti-Terrorism Forces, the Popular Mobilisation Authority, and Federal Police and Rapid Response Commands. CIMIC activities should be the responsibility of relations departments in the intelligence and national security services, the Federal Agency for Intelligence and Investigation, the Peshmerga, and the security and intelligence agencies in the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
- h. **Common Operational Picture (COP)**, which provides a common view of the operational environment, improving and maintaining situational awareness. The COP includes not only pictures of land, maritime, air, and cyberspace but also a civilian picture, which can support and even enhance coordination and deconfliction with different actors in the operational environment.
- i. **Maintaining SA** through the continuous monitoring and assessment of the crisis, review of information, intelligence and knowledge requirements, and sharing of information with relevant actors in the operational environment, as appropriate.
- j. **Operational Assessment**, which informs the Commander of the progress of the mission, can support UHE by providing indications of specific trends within the operational environment. Operations assessment also provides an opportunity to look ahead and consider options for future action. Persistent monitoring and assessment will contribute to identifying if the mission plan needs to be adjusted by measuring the effectiveness of actions in creating desired effects, establishing desired conditions, and achieving objectives.

CHAPTER 4 - MITIGATE HARM (MH)

Description

Protecting civilians from violence focuses on two distinctive areas:

- 1) Committing security forces to avoid harming civilians during military operations.
- 2) Protecting civilians and infrastructure from the acts caused by armed groups actors that deliberately attack civilians as part of their strategy.

The focus on minimising and mitigating harm or threat of harm to civilians from Perpetrators of Violence and their own actions is the primary line in the government's PoC efforts. The focus of MH is on the Perpetrators of Violence and understanding the motivation, capabilities and threats to the population posed by perpetrators of violence who harm civilians through errors in actions, careless disregard for collateral damage, or deliberate targeting to achieve a specific goal or objective. MH is primarily a military line of effort that is accomplished by eliminating or reducing physical threats to civilians without causing more harm in the pursuit of this endeavour. This implies a need to protect civilians from both intended and unintended effects of hostile activities from perpetrators of violence and from their own actions. While it is recognised that it is not possible to fully guarantee safety to all civilians during crises and conflicts and that there will be instances when incidents will happen, the Iraqi constitution and recognised international and local laws contain obligations to avoid harm or the threat of harm and on MH in all situations.

MH is applicable across the entire spectrum of military operations, from Combat to Crisis Response, including Peace Support and Counterinsurgency efforts geared towards changing the behaviour of adversarial actors targeting or trying to control the civilian population for either political and/or ideological goals, tactical advantage or economic gain.

The military forces need to be prepared to deal with combat situations, banditry, acts of sabotage, environmental damage, the maintenance of vital infrastructure, and even crowd control during demonstrations and gatherings, including in secure, friendly areas.

Thus, military forces must receive additional support in numbers, equipment, or changing its usual military tactics. Moreover, the Community Police Forces should set up units to address cases of physical and sexual violence, in peace as in war.

On the other hand, special consideration should be given to protecting those groups identified by the UHE process as being most vulnerable to violence within the local context.

MH as a Lens for Understanding – Planning

The identification of Perpetrators of Violence is done from the perspective of the civilian population being harmed. Therefore, MH considerations focus on actions conducted by NATO military forces as well as actions conducted by other perpetrators. As such, even security forces could be considered perpetrators if they cause harm from their own actions in areas of operation.

From this population centric perspective, there are potentially a wide range of perpetrators in crises and/or conflicts, some with motivations to harm civilians that range from genocide, to ethnic cleansing, regime crackdown, post-conflict revenge, communal conflict, predatory violence and insurgency. Therefore, perpetrators can be friendly forces, enemy actors, local authorities, criminal groups, spoilers or even elements of the civilian population.

How to deal with each group will vary, depending not only on why and how they harm civilians, but also on mandate, legal constraints and restraints, and Rules of Engagement (RoE). However, all actors share the fact that their actions or negligence, intentional or not, caused harm to civilians. Thus, the analysis would be applicable during traditional threat situations, where traditional and asymmetric tactics could be used by adversaries simultaneously, such as during crisis response operations that might include governmental and non-governmental actors.

MH supports UHE by helping identify perpetrators of violence and those vulnerable to or affected by their actions, while contributing to an overall population threat analysis. To do so, a number of questions have to be answered, including:

- Who is the most vulnerable group?
- Who is being targeted and/or harmed? Who are the actors harming civilians?
- Who is the actor posing the greatest threat to civilians?
- Is their harm to civilians intentional or unintentional?
- If harm is intentional, what is their rationale/motivation to target civilians?
- If harm is intentional, what strategy and tactics do these perpetrators of violence use against civilians?
- What capabilities and means do they have and/or use to target civilians?

In reference to the security force's own actions, the main processes to be considered when applying the MH lens during planning are the following:

- A. Linking military objectives with effects to be achieved, through the identification of prioritised targets, as well as activities and resources required to achieve these effects, and assessment of effects generated. This process should include legal and engineering considerations and take into account second and third order effects that can negatively affect the civilian population for a longer time, such as impacts to the natural environment as well as to the civilian services and infrastructure. Within the targeting process, the use of the full spectrum of military capabilities (lethal and non-lethal) needs to be considered in order to reach the desired effects, while avoiding/ minimising harm to civilians and long lasting negative effects. Potential effects could be categorised as follows:
 - a. **Primary:**
 - i. Death and injury to civilians
 - ii. Sexual Violence
 - iii. Destruction of civilian objects (i.e. houses) and critical infrastructure (i.e. water treatment plant)
 - b. **Secondary:**
 - i. Forced displacement Family separation
 - ii. Inadequate access to food and water
 - iii. Damaged infrastructure, affecting transportation routes, electricity, water and telecommunications access
 - iv. Decreased mobility, lack of freedom of movement
 - v. Lack of access to medical attention
 - vi. Damages to schools, disruptions to education
 - vii. Disruption in financial services, access to banking and cash
 - c. **Tertiary:**
 - i. Weakened government and judicial services
 - ii. Traumatized population
 - iii. Sluggish and dysfunctional infrastructure
 - iv. Lack of medical services
 - v. Market disruption, reduced economic activity

- vi. Cycles of violence
 - vii. Increase in criminality
 - viii. Spread of infectious diseases
1. The Collateral Damage Estimate Methodology (CDEM), used to estimate civilian losses caused by an attack by the forces, also includes a mandatory analysis of potential secondary and tertiary effects and the consequences of secondary eruptions.
 2. Input on the civilian factor should also be integrated in the Target System Analysis (TSA), to provide an understanding and assessment of the will and capabilities of civilian actors in the operational environment and relationships with existing entities and networks. Along with a CoG analysis, this helps identify critical vulnerabilities that can be targeted or protected by either lethal or non-lethal capabilities.
 3. Iraqi military forces might be faced with a number of challenges to the application of Constitutional and legal obligations, the PoC Policy adopted by the Iraqi government, and international law during the planning of an operation, such as the identification of all feasible precaution measures to be taken prior to an attack; the use of effective warnings, and safe evacuations. The preceding was applied in the theatre of operations during the Liberation Operations, including dropping leaflets, directing civilians to safe passages through loudspeakers, and the consideration of the full spectrum of non-kinetic responses, such as manoeuvre, pause, extraction, etc.; and the distinction between lawful targets and civilians based on dynamic and permanently updated intelligence.
- B. Iraqi security forces have specific plans and procedures to manage the preparation and generation of FP measures, tasks, and activities, for all five possible threat environments (negligible, low, medium, high, and critical), even including potential CBRN and WMD threats.
 - C. A close link appears between the security forces on the ground and RoEs, when the force assumes the posture of defending its primary mission (PoC), especially in an area that is unsafe or subject to continuous threat. Thus it becomes more forceful and increases PoC measures, as long as they do not contradict the RoEs meant to protect the security forces. It becomes highly dependent on the enemy's reaction and decisions would tend to reduce restrictions on the use of force. The Commander must be aware of the risks based on the available information to balance between using the necessary force to achieve the mission's objective, on the one hand, and providing the Iraqi security forces with the necessary tools, in terms of position, protection measures, and RoEs that achieve the objectives while reducing risks to the civilian population, on the other.
 - D. Contractual mechanisms must follow the legal constraints and measures, taking into consideration the aspects of building the integrity of security forces and relevant actors linked to the common principles of Human Security.
 - E. Risks to the civilian population need to be considered during the Operational Design to ensure that the actions to be taken and effects to be created during the mission do not have a negative impact or cause harm to the civilian population while trying to achieve a military objective. This should include consideration for potential second and third order effects resulting from the planned actions.

MH - Execution (How?)

MH might require the use of military force, the mitigation of its negative effects or threat of force to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to situations where civilians are targets of violence or are under threat of violence. The use of force should always be conducted with a degree of caution and restraint in order to minimise any negative effects on the population (people, objects and services) and always in compliance with IHL and its principles during armed conflict. This also implies a need to protect civilians from both the intended and unintended effects of belligerent activities.

MH includes the following elements:

1. **Own Actions – Civilian Harm Mitigation.** Exercising restraint in the conduct of operations to avoid or in any case minimise harm in compliance with the principles of IHL, including actions regarding FP. This effort includes measures to prevent, identify, investigate, and track incidents of civilian casualties from own actions, while also providing amends and post-harm assistance when civilians are harmed as a result of these operations. Civilian harm mitigation is an essential component of the mission and includes:

- a. Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Management. Actions to monitor, investigate and track civilian casualty and collateral damage claims. It includes assessing damages resulting from battles on the first (civilian casualties), second, and third effect-level, especially damage to essential infrastructure and its impact on the Human Environment. It also requires Strategic Messaging to explain the need to use force, describe status of CIVCAS investigation, acknowledge harm, etc. In the aftermath of CIVCAS investigations it is also imperative that established corrective procedures and measures are properly followed and implemented by the PoC Center..This is imperative to quickly and accurately address any issues from "Own Actions" in order to control the narrative and maintain mission legitimacy. This also includes consideration for forces to provide lifesaving care for the injured CIVCAS needs to include the strengthening of the battle damage report to include an analysis of civilian losses and secondary and tertiary effects on the Human Environment, especially related to damage to vital infrastructure that provides essential goods and services.

Ignoring CIVCAS management can undermine the security effort, as the perception of being indifferent towards civilian casualties can result in a loss of support from the local population and other actors in the crisis/conflict area and, consequently, delegitimise the security forces' mission.

A reporting mechanism from the lowest tactical level to the command chain to the decision-makers must be established. A proposed reporting form is included in the annexes. Furthermore, as the Western military experience has highlighted, it is highly recommended to establish a parallel and non-official reporting mechanism, which is also anonymous, to encourage military personnel and law-enforcement staff and relieve any pressure they feel, while simultaneously protecting them from unnecessary repercussions.

- b. Post-harm Assistance. This is a direct response to civilian harm incidents and, as such, it should be distinguished from other types of assistance provided under FABN. If there is unintended harm caused by Iraqi security forces, this includes the making of amends to CIVCAS victims and their families in the form of recognition, apologies, monetary payments and/or other forms of assistance.

Post-harm responses must be planned ahead and provided with the needed resources before launching the operations to provide a quick and efficient response. Moreover, Iraq's PoC Policy and National Recompensation Plan highlight the need for necessary and timely amendments as a condition for mission requirements. They both stipulate the need to provide post-harm assistance for damages caused by National Security Forces. Iraqi military personnel and law-enforcement professionals must raise awareness about such assistance services among the harmed communities. The preceding is not merely a legal and moral demand, it also contributes to maintaining support for the security forces and the government.

- c. Challenges to the application of IHL include:
 - Distance from Population. In line with the considerations under FABN, "Own Impact Mitigation ", military forces should operate, to include logistics and sustainment functions, away from the civilian population as much as possible

as they could endanger civilians with their presence and proximity to weapons systems.

- Persistent Monitoring and Assessment. As outlined in the UHE section, it is of particular importance that the assessment and intelligence products are permanently updated in order to properly inform the execution of the operations.
- Distinction. Military forces should use tactics and weapons allowing for proper distinction in populated areas, especially when opposite fighters fail to distinguish themselves from the population.
- Populated areas. Military need to take into account the negative wide area effects of explosive weapons in populated and/or urban areas, including foreseeable second and third order effects.
- Special protection. Under IHL, Specific protection is to be provided to medical facilities and personnel, medical transportation, and essential civilian infrastructure (whose destruction will impede the survival of the population).
- IHL and the use of force. Military forces need to comply with IHL principles when using force in an armed conflict situation.

2. **Other's Actions – Adversarial Threat Mitigation.** Engaging hostile actors is the traditional role of Iraqi security forces. In a mission that is specifically mandated to protect the civilian population, the security forces are focused on engaging the perpetrators of violence that deliberately target civilians and/ or encourage civilian casualties by operating within their midst. This engagement is necessary in order to prevent, mitigate and/ or minimise the harm or threat of harm these actors inflict on the civilian population and could include both combat and policing activities.

When mandated, this line of effort uses influence, lethal and non-lethal military force or threat of force to affect perpetrators of violence in order to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to situations where civilians are targets of violence or are under threat of violence. These actions also demonstrate that Iraqi forces are willing and able to actively engage those actors harming civilians.

When the Perpetrators of Violence are either friendly forces, local authorities or selected groups within the civilian population, the main MH efforts will likely focus on 'guidance and influence' to stop or modify their harmful behaviour. If guidance and influence proves insufficient or when dealing with hostile actors, Iraqi security forces may have to engage them using the full range of actions, to stop, coerce or dissuade them from harming civilians.

Selecting the appropriate action or combination of actions will be a decision by the military Commander guided by the mandate, mission, and a comprehensive awareness and understanding of the human environment developed through the planning process³³, including threat assessments and risk analysis. These actions include:

- a. Active Protection: Security actions against the perpetrators of violence to neutralise and/or coerce them to stop attacks on civilians:
 - **Defeat/Destroy:** Offensive military actions to stop hostile activity and/or destroy their ability to physically threaten or harm civilians.
 - **Coerce:** Active force measures to threaten and compel targeted actors to stop their harmful activities towards civilians.
- b. Passive Protection: Security actions to prevent, inhibit and dissuade attacks or threats to civilians:
 - **Deter:** Threatening military posture and or demonstration of force used to dissuade hostile actors from conducting harmful activities against civilians.
 - **Contain:** Limited use of force to "prevent" the spread of violence and the

- harmful effects of military action or conflict.
- Evade: Withdrawal and/or
- removal of military forces to avert
- confrontation in order to avoid
- CIVCAS, de-escalate tensions,
- enable negotiations and allow for
- humanitarian activity.

As for the central government's own actions, the following processes are to be considered:

- A. **FP and force posture.** As outlined in the planning considerations related to “Own Actions”, it is of paramount importance to balance FP considerations and the posturing of force in order to minimise the negative impact on the civilian population while, at the same time, providing the force with adequate space of manoeuvre to achieve mission objectives and actively protect the civilian population if required.
- B. **CIVCAS mitigation procedures,** with particular relevance to the Collateral Damage Estimate Methodology (CDEM) process. These procedures include data/ evidence gathering, tracking, reporting and monitoring of CIVCAS, as well as actions to monitor, investigate and track civilian casualty and collateral damage claims. It is imperative to quickly and accurately address any harm from “Own Actions” in order to avoid misperceptions and maintain mission credibility and legitimacy. Coordination and reporting civilian casualties must be handled by the PoC Center. On the operational level and above, elements connected to the centre must be established to coordinate in the Operations Room (current operations) and on all levels (from the tactical to the strategic). The team must be formed of permanent members from the security forces, intelligence agencies, current operations, planners, and data analysts. On the operational and/or strategic levels, the team must be equipped with the ability to investigate to ensure accountability and better understand the incident dynamics, which should feed into lessons learned and prevent repeating similar actions in the future. For small claims, the minimum level of leadership must be empowered and provided with the necessary resources to respond quickly and efficiently to assistance requests. Larger and more sensitive claims need to be addressed at higher levels of leadership, in coordination with the political level. However, they must be resolved as soon as possible to maintain civilian support. Finally, the claims process should be the least possible form of bureaucracy and accessible to all civilians (for example, setting up a hotline with possible access through WhatsApp and establishing an online information portal accessible by email).
- C. **Execution of the targeting procedures identified during the planning phase,** including considerations related to side effects that can be caused to the civilian population when targets are connected to a direct impact on the Human Environment and PoC.
- D. **Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED)** is of paramount importance, also in consideration of the potential detrimental effects that IED/ Unexploded Ordnance (UXO35) can have on the civilian population. C-IED involves multiple military functional areas and, therefore, relies upon an integrated and comprehensive approach that involves robust intelligence and permanent and intensive CMI and CIMIC. It is worth noticing that a Commander and their staff will not necessarily make the technical distinction between, for instance, an IED placed on a route and an UXO such as a landmine, used on the same route. Both items are identical in terms of the potential effects the explosive ordnance can have on the civilian population.

The C-IED approach can be used for both items even though the latter is not, by definition, an improvised explosive device.

With reference to Others' Actions, the following processes are of particular relevance:

- A. **Identification of Persons/Property with Designated Special Status (PDSS/ PRDSS)**, which are provided with specific protection by the force during the conduct of operations. PDSS can be designated in the RoEs.
- B. **Execute in-theatre comprehensive approach to C-IED**, through the establishment of appropriate measures to combat and address the issue, in addition to information-sharing and establishing mechanisms to report to Operations Command.

In all cases, Iraqi Security Forces need to understand the long and short-term implications of MH efforts, while also ensuring that local populations and supporting entities appreciate the strenuous efforts they make to protect civilians and carefully explain when these measures may occasionally fail or be unavoidable.

Human Shields

It is important to stress that the prohibition on the use of human shields by State and non-State actors applies to international and non-international armed conflicts alike under International Law. In particular, the use of human shields is expressly prohibited by the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Art 51(7)), by the Fourth Geneva Convention (Art 28) and by the Third Geneva Convention (Art 23). Furthermore, the use of human shields is identified as a war crime by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in its Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii). Moreover, the use of human shields is prohibited under customary international law in both international and non-international armed conflicts. International Human Rights Law is silent on the use of human shields, but this practice constitutes, among other things, a violation of the non-derogable right not to be arbitrarily deprived of the right to life.³⁶ On 26 June 2018, the UN General Assembly condemned, for the first time, the use of civilians to shield military objectives from attacks.

Key Takeaways

- A. MH is a primary commitment of all Iraqi security forces in implementing the PoC Policy.
- B. Civilian harm can be intentional or unintentional. MH-based actions will largely depend on this determination;
- C. The identification of Perpetrators of Violence is done from the perspective of the civilian population being harmed. Therefore, perpetrators can be friendly forces, enemy actors, local authorities, criminal groups, spoilers or even elements of the civilian population.
- D. MH can include military force or threat of military force, lethal and non-lethal force, as well as guidance and influence activities, including policing activities.

CHAPTER 5 - FACILITATE ACCESS TO BASIC NEEDS (FABN)

Description

FABN focuses on the civilian population in the operational area, to include civil society and the local and international aid providers. As such, the role of FABN for Iraqi security forces in PoC is to facilitate access to civilians in need to basic needs⁴⁶ and services as well as to civilian vital infrastructure. This will be conducted by supporting aid workers in delivering humanitarian aid, when mandated.

Under Iraqi security forces FABN, basic needs and services refer to essential survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and basic medical care, which are humanitarian in nature.

In many cases, basic services can also encompass access to basic utilities, such as power, and local administrative services, such as sanitation and trash collection, that are essential for accessing basic needs and for maintenance of public health and safety. Facilitation of access to other needs and services, beyond survival, that enable the population to grow and thrive such as education, employment, etc., falls under "development aid."

Facilitation of any of these needs and services will depend on the mandate and a thorough analysis of the human environment to identify local requirements, level of development, and timescale of aid.

As an example:

In the Anti-Terrorism apparatus, Martyr Lieutenant Colonel Monqith Khlalf al-Rabihi, Commander of the Anti-Terrorism Regiment in Salaheddine Province, facilitated access to essential needs (food, first aid, and medical detachments), providing what people needed. However, he was taken by surprise by a truck bomb sent by ISIS gangs towards the displaced civilians. The Martyr Regiment Commander did not hesitate to intervene. However, it blew up close to the IDPs. The terrorist act led to his martyrdom along with four IDP children.

FABN as a Lens for Understanding – Planning (What)

Understanding the needs, weaknesses, and adaptability of supply chains to civilian populations is the basis of monitoring access to humanitarian needs. Thus, a comprehensive assessment is needed to identify the situation in the field of operations, while recognising the role played by security forces. This could include:

- Assessments by governmental, local, and international assistance providers who support the delivery of these needs.
- Assess why and how these needs are being satisfied, by whom, and based on which infrastructure. What are the potential implications of not meeting them?

Understanding these factors would help decision-makers identify basic needs and obstacles to the population's ability to access their needs or their delivery. Moreover, the analysis needs to consider whether the needs were satisfied, how, by whom, and the potential implication of not meeting them. It should be mentioned that FABN supports UHE by helping identify the essential needs and services required by civilians to survive and contributes to an overall population threat analysis.

To do so, a number of questions should be considered, reviewed and updated throughout the planning and conduct of operations, including:

1. What are the population's basic needs?
2. How do men, women, girls and boys define their needs differently?
3. Which needs are not being met?
4. Who/what can meet these needs?
5. Who/what is providing these needs?
6. What are the threats to the provision of these needs?
7. Is there sufficient capacity to meet these needs?
8. What expectations does the population have for NATO to meet their needs?
9. What are the security implications if these needs are not met?

Awareness of the basic needs, infrastructure and services of the population is a key component to UHE. These are contextual and therefore specific to each population and environment. As such these should be based on a thorough needs assessment.

The main processes to be considered when applying the FABN lens during the planning of an operation are the following:

- A. Develop a standard task tasking CIMIC officers with support by MILENG staff for infrastructure assessment to provide the basic monitoring necessary to allow the Command to identify and respond to basic needs;
- B. Identify FABN-related information/ knowledge requirements (sensitive to sex/age disaggregated data, if possible) to support analysis on FABN considerations. These requirements should be included in the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and duly reported to the Strategic Operation Centre (SOC) through the JFC/JTF.
- C. Include in the CIMIC Estimate all relevant information on the ability of the HN and of the local population to meet the basic needs. The CIMIC Estimate represents the basis of the CIMIC contribution to the CPOE;
- D. Establish liaison mechanisms with relevant non-military actors and the HN in order to acquire and exchange the relevant information. The needs assessment should take gender and cultural needs into consideration, in addition to the ability to remain steadfast through civil preparedness elements related to essential needs.

FABN as a Line of Effort – Execution (How)

As a line of effort, FABN seeks to reduce harm to civilians from the negative effects of conflicts and/or crises due to a lack of access to the basic needs for survival. Thus, Iraqi security forces seek to minimise its own adverse impact on the local environment, infrastructure, resources, and population while supporting, where appropriate, humanitarian operations. This is done by monitoring and assessing the needs of the civilian population and supporting Humanitarian Action through support to Humanitarian Access and support to Humanitarian Assistance if mandated. Security forces facilitate Humanitarian Access by setting the conditions required by local and international humanitarian aid actors to operate freely and reach affected people to ensure their access to basic needs and services. The fact that the military and humanitarian actors operate in the same space can create challenges and requires the establishment of functional de-confliction mechanisms, such as a hotline for the military or Humanitarian Notification Systems for Deconfliction (HNS4D), intended to inform the military of humanitarian locations, activities, and personnel, while helping promote their safety and security. In some cases, Humanitarian Assistance may be provided if requested by relevant authorities or as a lifesaving means of last resort when no other capable, willing and/or able actor is available, as follows:

- A. **Own Impact Mitigation.** This effort relates closely to the medical/humanitarian concept of “First, Do No Harm”. It focuses on reducing the adverse effects from the presence of NATO forces simply existing in the same space as the local population and aid providers. As such, this line of efforts seeks to minimise the harmful impact of military forces on the local environment, infrastructure and services to include competition for resources and capacities. Therefore, military forces need to continuously assess the effect of their operations and forces on the local community in terms of diversion of limited resources and services including skilled labour and professionals that would otherwise provide benefit to the local community. This self-assessment is essential, since deployed forces increasingly rely on the support of the central and local governments. Such actions, if not conducted carefully can create false local economies and unsustainable local dependencies, creating a perception of stability or normality that in reality does not exist. This can lead to further instability when security forces withdraw. Conversely, the draining of local resources can create animosity.

The following is a summary of issues that military planners and logisticians should take into consideration to ensure they do not exacerbate the negative effects of the crisis/conflict on the local population:

- a. Investing in Minds: Supporting and investing in minds and competencies in areas of operation could reduce their drain and increase local benefit.
- b. Economic Damage: Subsisting on the local economy can increase the prices of local land and property and can also place demands on local producers for staple foods and materials. This can lead to artificial inflation that puts basic goods financially out of reach for the local population.
- c. Logistics Infrastructure Capacity: Depending on the reliance of military forces on the local logistics infrastructure, many military operations through sheer size and volume of effort can hinder the activities of other actors sharing the same logistics network. This capacity is limited to the quantity and quality of its physical distribution network and logistic resource components. Capacity can be undermined through:
 - i. Infrastructure Deterioration: The use of local roads, bridges and waterways for military Lines of Communication (LOC), to transport equipment, supplies and reinforcements, can deteriorate or even destroy local transportation routes as many of these may not be designed to handle heavy military equipment such as armoured vehicles. The likelihood of traffic accidents involving military vehicles can also increase, affecting in particular some specific social groups such as children playing in the streets.
 - ii. Constrained Use and Movement: Ease of movement for the local population and their goods can be impeded if local transportation routes and hubs are dominated by military forces.
 - iii. Creation of Military Targets: Military use of local buildings and infrastructure for the reception, storage and movement of personnel, equipment and supplies makes these a lawful target for hostile perpetrators of violence, but increase the potential for civilian casualties due to the lack of information or potential dual-use of these structures.

Logistical supplies include trucks, ships, goods management equipment, lifts, trains, and storage containers. Material logistical capacities include airports, ports, streets, highways, railways, bridges, tunnels, stations, internal waterways, warehousing facilities, and pipelines.
- d. Environmental Damage: Environmental impacts, both deliberate and incidental, are a factor during all types of military activities. All military activities that change or impact the physical environment must be undertaken with the appropriate amount

of information and planning prior to execution, as they hold potential for adverse impacts ranging from difficult to impossible to reverse. Balancing military operational requirements with EP responsibilities is not intrinsically impossible and appropriate EP performance must be achieved by Iraqi security forces to reduce the environmental footprint of operations.

- e. Corruption: Enabling or being complicit with corrupt actors, many within the local government and business community. This can undermine the legitimacy of the mission, weaken BI efforts, while propping-up negative elements within the local population.
- f. Creation of Dependencies: Security forces must avoid creating dependencies that can influence the general quality of life for the local population, create animosity, lead to aggravating the humanitarian situation, and obstruct the return to normal life, including by merely being present in a certain environment. For example, local markets and industries (i.e. cleaning and maintenance services) may develop to supply and support military bases. Unnecessary “feel good” projects using spare military capabilities can also create expectations amongst the population.
- g. Support for Humanitarian Access. The provision of support to humanitarian access is related to the humanitarian actors’ ability to reach people affected by crises, as well as affected people’s ability to access humanitarian assistance and services on their own. Sustained and effective humanitarian access implies that all affected people can be reached and that the receipt of humanitarian assistance is not conditional upon the allegiance or support to parties involved in a conflict, but independent of political, military and other action in accordance with the humanitarian principles.

Security forces can facilitate access to humanitarian aid by setting the necessary safety and security conditions to allow for freedom of movement for both the population and aid providers. It is important to stress that relief requested from external actors should be supervised by the Iraqi security forces and according to official, legal procedures.

CMI is critical in enabling the security forces to support humanitarian access through deconfliction, coordination of activities, and sharing of local resources and capacities.

The military contribution in this effort is usually limited to the provision of a safe and secure environment (SASE) to suppress conflict and allow for the freedom of movement. Additionally, military forces can support the effort through:

1. Security: This is the provision of military assets to defend vital infrastructure, humanitarian safe-zones, food and water distribution points, displaced persons camps, etc. It also includes the establishment and maintenance of safe corridors for movement and evacuation of personnel. While this mission generally falls under the responsibility of local security forces, the responsibility could shift from one security force to another.
2. Support: Includes both indirect assistance and infrastructure support to the humanitarian access mission. The latter includes issues such as road and rubble clearance, and infrastructure reconstruction and maintenance that enables both the purely military and humanitarian missions. The former (indirect assistance) should be provided upon request from relevant authorities.

Military support to humanitarian assistance can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population:

- a. **Direct Assistance:** Face-to face distribution of goods and services, such as handing out relief goods, providing first aid, transporting people, interviewing refugees, locating families etc.
- b. **Indirect Assistance:** At least one step removed from the population, transporting relief goods, building camps and shelters, providing water sources, clearing mines and ordnance, etc.
- c. **Service Support:** General services that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to, or solely for, the benefit of the affected population, such as repairing infrastructure, operating airfields, providing weather info, ensuring access to communication networks, etc.

Examples:

Supporting the delivery of humanitarian aid:

During the operations to liberate Nineveh from terrorist ISIS gangs, Iraqi security forces ensured the delivery of essential humanitarian aid (such as food and medicine) provided by the government and international organisations.

Supporting the development of basic infrastructure:

During the liberation of the Karaghhol region and after a full night of battles, Automated and electrical MILENG units evacuated damaged electrical equipment, fixed the electricity infrastructure in the hot zones witnessing battles with terrorist ISIS gangs, and provided the necessary relevant support to the populations of liberated areas.

Key Takeaways

1. Iraqi security forces have a supportive role in FABN, seeking to minimise its own adverse impact on the local environment, infrastructure, resources, and population, and supporting aid workers in delivering humanitarian aid;
2. Efforts by Iraqi security forces in facilitating access is usually by enabling “freedom of movement” for the population and aid agencies. This is primarily done through the provision of a safe and secure environment and infrastructure support (i.e. clearing roads and repairing bridges);
3. Although Iraqi security forces only play a supporting role in FABN, it should be recognised that FABN is essential to mission success, as it will not only meet humanitarian obligations, but it will also help with force acceptance, mission legitimacy and minimise the chance of worsening the security situation.

CHAPTER 6 - CONTRIBUTE TO A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT (C-SASE)

Description

C-SASE provides comprehensive (political, civil and military) actions that enhance or support the development of local government and institutions capabilities and capacities. This includes Training, Advising and Assistance (TAA) activities. The role of the security forces in this line of effort is to provide the necessary security conditions to enable and support the development of local capabilities to reduce the chance of localised or widespread escalation, conflagration or reversion into armed conflict. C-SASE also focuses on supporting local governments, while taking into account the root causes of instability to prevent the conflagration and/or re-ignition of armed conflict. Despite the need for a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) in all missions and throughout their phases, most of the related activities occur in the pre- and post- phases of the conflict or crisis. As such, within collective defence and crisis response, it includes conflict prevention, stabilisation, capacity building and development tasks. C-SASE, just like MH and FABN, is not enclosed in a stovepipe and therefore, the lack of a SASE may impact MH and FABN; and solutions to the establishment of a SASE may be delivered by MH and FABN related actions.

The military is cognisant that the provision to return to a SASE is a political imperative for all the security forces and the missions and operations they lead. Supporting these forces can support the efforts of local governments in the setting of conditions for the growth and strengthening of local institutional capabilities that can provide for the legitimate governance, security, rule-of-law, public order and social well-being of the population. As such, the major military contribution to this line of effort is through conflict mitigation by providing security and stability, whilst supporting the development of independent and resilient local governmental institutions and security forces through Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Defence Capacity Building (DCB) initiatives.

Criminal activities could impact the establishment of SASE through the rule of law (RoL). However, they can also impact the facilitation of access to basic needs through restricting access (such as increasing the cost of conducting business affairs and protection plans). SSR entails the reform of security institutions to be able to play an efficient and accountable role in providing internal and external security. SSR focuses on providing the enabling conditions to achieve developmental governance in the long run. Moreover, a main consideration in C-SASE is the ability of security forces to keep the peace, mitigate harm, and provide assistance. They should be able to provide the following:

- a. **Security.** Security forces are responsible for the entire population and legally accountable. These forces must have the capability and will to protect their own population, ensure public order and public security, keep territorial integrity (border control), safeguard critical facilities and infrastructure, enable freedom of movement, and secure important cultural heritage sites.
- b. **Rule of Law:** Implement constitutional obligations and local and international human rights laws.
- c. **Economic and Infrastructure Development:** Economic, Monetary and Fiscal policy, that provides financial opportunities for the entire population. This includes conditions for both development and employment.
- d. The successful provision of the above will enable the social well-being of the population in which the basic human needs are met to include access to basic needs and services, security, human rights, education, and employment.

Achieving a safe environment is closely related to efforts to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).

UHE provides the context of SASE.

C-SASE as a Lens for Understanding – Planning (What)

C-SASE is focused on the understanding of the capacities and resiliencies of essential public services provided by local authorities and governmental institutions necessary to support the safety, security, social well-being and economic welfare needs of their population. This understanding contributes to UHE and to an overall population threat analysis.

The main questions to consider when applying the C-SASE lens include:

- What is the population's perception of the security environment (breaking down to sex/age disaggregated data if possible)? What would make the population safer?
- Are adults able to go to work and carry out economic activities? Are children able to go to school?
- Does the population have freedom of movement?
- Who controls the flow of goods and economic activity in the area?
- How are basic living conditions of the population changing over time?
- What are the public services required by the population within the crisis area?
- What are the safety and security implications if these essential services are insufficient?
- What are the vulnerabilities/threats to the provision of these services?
- What are the resiliencies to the provision of these services?
- Is the capacity of local authorities to provide for safety sufficient?
- Is the capacity of local authorities to provide for security sufficient?
- Who is providing/is supposed to provide these essential public services?
- Is the capacity of local authorities to provide for governance sufficient?
- Is the capacity of local authorities to provide for sufficient?

The main processes to be considered when applying the C-SASE lens during the planning of an operation are the following:

1. CPOE, which should include C-SASE-related considerations and threat assessments broadened to include capacities and resiliencies of the HN.
2. C-SASE-related considerations, including relevant information on the ability of the local government and population to meet the basic needs should be included in the CIMIC Estimate as the basis of the CIMIC contribution to the CPOE.
3. Operations Assessment Process, which needs to consider and include assessments of the human domain, including safety perception of the civilian population, governance, development and regional cooperation, or political, economic, social and information issues. This is key, as not only do NATO forces contribute to the achievement of non-military objectives, but they may be tasked with non-military activities that need to be assessed as part of understanding the progress of the operation, as well as transition aspects and the significance of non-military aspects for the long-term success of the mission. The inclusion of civilian assessments will require the sharing of information with HN, civilian authorities and local and international actors.
4. Plan for the return to the normal situation and transferring operations from the military to the Interior Ministry. The transfer of local security responsibilities from the military to law-enforcement forces should be incorporated in the amendment of RoEs (more restrictive since a security context should require the use of less force). This transition should also generate a transformation in the minds of security actors in relation to the conflict and the forward-leaning position into an approach of more rigid stabilisation operations. This should facilitate improving relations with local populations.

C-SASE as a Line of Effort – Execution (How)

Iraqi (fighting) forces are only one of many contributors to the establishment of a SASE. As such, the Joint Operations Command must be prepared to plan for and manage, in close coordination with other relevant local and international actors, the setting of conditions for mostly civilian-led efforts to maintain, foster, and restore stability for long term peace. This line of effort includes:

1. **Reducing instability:** The Iraqi security forces seek to establish an atmosphere that reduces the causes of instability, decreases the chances for conflict, and enables the building of an independent, sustainable and more resilient society. This is done by providing security and stability, in order to enable other activities to occur and may require NATO forces to replace and/or reinforce local forces while also conducting concurrent combat and policing activities. This effort includes:
 - a. Stabilisation: This approach is used to mitigate crises, promote legitimate political authority, and set conditions for long term-stability by using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security, and end social, economic and political turmoil. This effort is supported by Stability Policing (SP) which can reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous civil police in order to contribute to the restoration of public order, security, RoL, and the protection of human rights. Should no SP assets be available in theatre, Military Police (MP) units can, if they possess the required specific capacities, temporarily perform SP functions.
 - b. Engagement with non-military actors. Civil Engagement enables the sharing of information and permits the development of a shared understanding of the conflict/ crisis. This is important as SASE is often a matter of perception, and can vary widely from actor to actor. What is perceived as safe and secure by Iraqi security forces could be very different from the perception of international humanitarian actors or the local population. The Gender Perspective should also be thoroughly considered: men, boys, women, girls might have a different perception of security. In addition, the views of vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities and displaced persons should also be considered. Engagement through CMI/CIMIC activities and Strategic Communications is key to ensuring expectation management, counter-propaganda, education, etc.
 - c. Strategic Messaging. A significant component of security and stability is dependent on the perception of the population. By the same token, the population's perception of safety and security is key for mission legitimacy as well as for FP. A comprehensive Strategic Messaging campaign using Military Affairs for Civilian Purposes, Information Operations and PsyOps capabilities is required to communicate with the population, help manage expectations, clearly address issues of concern, and counter the narrative of potential "spoilers" such as criminal gangs and syndicates. At a minimum, locals must know why the government is there and what it is doing. If the government does not do this, others will fill the gap in the narrative. Therefore, NATO forces need to establish real-time communications with the local population through various media that would provide essential information to local communities about key local, national, and international efforts.
 - d. Explosive Removal. Explosive removal is an important component of reducing post-conflict civilian casualties. This effort will enhance security and freedom of movement by clearing Mines, UXO, Explosive Remnants of War

(ERW) and IED.⁴ Ideally, such activities should be paired with education and awareness campaigns of the civilian population tailored to specific social categories that are addressed.

2. **Defence and Related Security Capacity Building.** This effort includes advice, assistance, support, training, education and mentoring activities that support the projection of stability by contributing to the development of sustainable, resilient and legitimate security forces. This will be conducted by supporting SSR initiatives that build or reform relevant institutions to ensure sufficient capacity to support and protect the population. Defence and Related Security Capacity Building activities are conducted along with conflict mitigation measures with the overall aim of developing constitutional security institutions, which are also accountable and capable of providing efficient internal and external security, while addressing the root causes of instability and setting the foundations for long-term peace and development.⁵

These institutional changes aim to improve performance. SSR is supported by the following activities:

- a. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR):⁶ A mechanism utilised to promote reconciliation and enable the peace process by integrating ex-combatants both socially and economically back into society. This is achieved by removing their weapons and military structures, and working with communities.
- b. Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA refers to activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of local security forces and their associated governmental institutions.
- c. Stability Policing (SP). In addition to reinforcing and/or temporarily replacing indigenous civil police, SP supports SSR through Police Capacity Building (PCB) and its support to the Disarmament and Demobilisation aspects of DDR.
- d. Conflict Related DCB. This element refers to support to conflict prevention and/or conflagration by improving the capabilities (training and equipment) of security forces to enable them to take care of their own security. It must promote, among others, the knowledge and respect of constitutional obligations, enforced laws, Iraq's PoC Policy, international law principles.

The C-SASE line of effort seeks to lay the foundations for sustainable peace by supporting the building of functional governmental institutions that are:

- i. **Independent:** Independent governmental institutions have the authority, will and ability to administer governmental functions and do not rely on other actors to meet the governance, RoL, and security or stability needs of its population.
- ii. **Sustainable:** Sustainable governmental institutions are able to operate, maintain themselves and endure over time, while not dependent on outside support. The path to sustainability can be enabled through a well-planned and smooth transition process that properly sequences the withdrawal of support (financial and manpower) to ensure that local resources are able to cope.

⁴ CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, 1980, might apply in this case.

⁵ United Nations, Peacekeeping, DDR Issues: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml>.

⁶ United Nations, Peacekeeping, Security Issues: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml>.

- iii. **Resilient:** Resilient governmental institutions are those able to withstand (resist) and/or recover quickly from shock, adapt to changes in the environment, and transform to withstand emerging and future challenges. As such, resilient institutions are prepared to ensure the continuity of government and the provision of critical goods and services during periods of natural or man-caused disasters.
- iv. **Legitimate:** Legitimate governmental institutions are those that conform to local laws, norms and values, and have the consent of the population.

The main processes to be considered under C-SASE line of effort during the execution of an operation when the military is mandated to train, advise and assist are:

- i. **Security Force Assistance**, through activities that develop and improve, or directly support, the development of Iraqi security forces' military forces and their associated institutions in crisis zones, to assist Iraqi security forces in developing a sustainable capability, in order to enable its defence against threats to stability and security. This includes Generate, Organise, Train, Enable, Advise and Mentor (GOTEAM) activities.
- ii. **Stability Policing**, through activities aimed at (re-)building, developing and/or enhancing the capabilities and effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies (and their associated institutions) so that the security forces is capable of protecting human rights; providing public order and security; and enforcing RoL through sustainable, effective, accountable and legitimate institutions.
- iii. **Ensure the creation of appropriate feedback mechanisms** with the security forces in order to ensure accountability supported by the development of an ad hoc repository accessible by various levels of command where data is stored.

Examples from Iraq

Following the liberation of Iraqi territories from terrorist ISIS gangs, Iraqi forces controlled the border between Iraq and Syria. They established a border line between the two countries, patrolled the dividing area, maintained public security in the region, supported local security, and imposed RoL.

Iraqi security forces contributed to the western districts' security and prosperity following liberation from terrorist ISIS gangs.

The leadership of Iraqi forces supervised the liberation operations against ISIS, prioritised civilian protection and evacuation before the operations, and established a safe space for them. It also played a leading role in the return of IDPs to their areas of residence, providing essential needs and following up with them regularly to cover needs and provide job opportunities.

Global Examples for Reference

Conflict Mitigation and Defence and Related Security Capacity Building: Support to Development of RoL

In 2011, NATO established a RoL Field Support Mission (NROLFSM)⁷ as part of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. NROLFSM aimed to support the building of the Afghan criminal justice capacity and increasing civilian access to dispute resolution, thereby helping to improve the efficacy of the Afghan Government as part of the comprehensive approach. NROLFSM focused on a limited range of tasks: protecting civilian RoL experts and trainers, coordinating their movement with other stakeholders to provide liaison and outreach, and supporting infrastructure upgrades at RoL centres and courthouses. NROLFSM did not engage in RoL itself, rather it supported and enabled the HN and other IOs with the mandate to do so. In some crises, civilian access to basic administration and RoL will be considered critical to successful conflict resolution. However, support efforts must be carefully coordinated with other actors and the RoL domain may be particularly sensitive and problematic.

Defence and Related Security Capacity Building: Support to Integrating Agents for Change

Between 2009 and 2012, in Darfur (Sudan), the United Nation – African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) had the mandate to support the implementation of the peace agreement and protection of civilians. To this end, the mission facilitated the implementation of DDR projects together with the Sudanese government. By working closely with the community when planning and conducting their program, the DDR section gained an understanding of the gender relations in the Sudanese culture notably thanks to their 32% women strong workforce. This capacity also enabled the mission to properly engage with local women. They realised that Darfuri women took part in the peace process to a large extent when they learned that in both war and peacetime, women were involved in mobilising the community, especially groups called Hakamas who used singing as a method of activating people. In peacetime, their singing would maintain social order in the community. In wartime, they sang to encourage their sons and husbands to fight at the front. The Hakamas sometimes travelled with the armed forces to the battlefield and their singing would spur the fighters. The DDR section conducted a gender analysis of the influential function of the Hakamas in local communities, and how their role could impact the transitioning of the forces from the atrocities of war into a peaceful society. The importance of involving the Hakamas was assessed; hence the DDR section started contracting and training the Hakamas on the purpose of DDR, peace-building, gender and human rights. With this training, the Hakamas could develop songs that instead of urging men to fight were about peace and a better future. The mission used a force of the community itself as the Hakamas performed their newly written songs at ceremonies and large events, thus amplifying the participation of local actors of peace and security.⁸

Defence and Related Security Capacity Building: Support to Countering Corruption

The NATO BI programme was established in 2007 to support development of effective and efficient defence institutions under civilian and democratic control. Initially designed for NATO partner nations, NATO BI has since been employed in crisis-response situations as part of wider efforts to counter corruption, which prevents civilian access to basic state services. NATO BI approaches such as vulnerability assessments and training and education clearly have applicability across other sectors where civilians may be denied access to basic services such as education and healthcare.

Defence and Related Security Capacity Building: Support to Critical National Infrastructure and Resilience

Increasingly in contemporary crises, civilian access to water, sanitation and healthcare, power and food supplies, transportation and even banking and financial services, are all dependent on control systems

⁷ NROLFSM was organised and equipped militarily to execute a number of military and policing tasks. It was made up of police officers with a military rank. NATO Backgrounder: Rule of Law https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_06/20110609-Backgrounder-Rule_of_Law-en.pdf.

⁸ Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations' publication Whose Security, 2015, p. 25. <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/siteassets/english/swedint/engelska/swedint/nordic-centre-for-gender-in-military-operations/whose-security-2015-low-resolution.pdf>.

and communications networks which may be vulnerable to adversary threats, whether through cyber or hybrid means, physical attack and disruption by terrorists or proxies, as well as conventional forces. A recent example of this was the 2015 cyber-attack on Ukraine's power grid,⁹⁰ where unidentified actors introduced and activated a range of malware into control and switching systems on a synchronised basis. At the invitation of the Ukrainian government, an interagency team from the US quickly deployed to support national authorities in mitigating the impact of the attack and restoring the power grid, detecting and removing malware and identifying critical vulnerabilities to reduce the likelihood of a follow-on attack.

Training, Advising and Assistance: Children and Armed Conflict Policy

The NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) Mission, in partnership with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), supported the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD) in developing its own Child Protection Policy. On 5 December 2017, in the presence of the RS Mission Commander, the Afghan Minister of Defence signed and put the policy into force. The policy aims to shield children from the adverse effects of armed conflict and, especially, to prevent violence against children in combat operations involving military members or units of the Afghan National Army (ANA) or during activities controlled or conducted by the Afghan MoD. The policy prescribes clear procedures for monitoring, reporting and investigating violations by MoD personnel.

Training, Advising and Assistance: International Humanitarian Law/Human Rights Policy

NATO/RS provided support to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) capacity to protect the civilian population by developing an IHL/Human Rights Policy for the Afghan MoD that addresses investigating violations as well as annual, tailored training to all MoD personnel. NATO has been transferring its know-how on civilian casualty mitigation to the ANDSF for several years. Some practices in this regard include support in the creation of an Afghan policy on civilian casualty mitigation, assisting the ANDSF in developing a model similar to ISAF's "Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team", and the participation of mentors in the Afghan Air Force Targeting Cell, lending their expertise in mitigating against civilian harm.

Key Takeaways

- A. Iraqi security forces have a supporting role in C-SASE, seeking to provide the necessary security conditions to enable and support the development of local security forces to reduce the chance of localised or widespread escalation, conflagration or reversion into armed conflict;
- B. Iraqi security forces' role in C-SASE will be defined by its mandate and relationship with the HN and by the roles played by other international actors;
- C. Iraqi security forces contribute to SASE in the pre- and post- phases of the conflict or crisis. As such, it can include conflict prevention and mitigation, stabilisation, defence capacity building and development tasks;
- D. One of the key considerations related to C-SASE is the capacity of the security forces to create that environment and avoid the creation of dependencies;
- E. Iraqi security forces are only one of many contributors to the establishment of a SASE and, therefore, must be prepared to plan for and manage, in close coordination with other relevant local actors, the setting of conditions for mostly civilian-led efforts to maintain, foster, and restore stability.

CHAPTER 7 - ASSESSMENT AND REPORTING

PoC and Operations Assessment

The security forces operations assessment (OpsA) function is an evidence-based, systematic analysis of change and - where possible - its causality, to inform progress towards specific goals and any required plan adjustments. Ideally, security forces PoC assessments should draw on the widest possible sources of evidence relevant to understanding the PoC dynamics, although this will be dependent on the level of trust, formal and informal information sharing arrangements and interoperability between the security forces and other actors.

In some cases security forces will automatically collate evidence on PoC issues, such as in MH, and in some other areas it may have the ability to fill gaps in existing data sources through use of its own resources, but more generally the security forces will be reliant on other actors. These actors are likely to be civilian experts in specific PoC aspects, attuned to the local sensitivities and vulnerabilities of the civilian population and the threats they face. In some cases they will be IO/NGOs with established missions in the crisis area, or they may be local civil society groups, government, community leaders or academics. These actors will be relevant to security forces assessments in several ways, including:

- Firstly, they are likely to be the sources of evidence and data for any overall PoC assessment.
- Secondly, they will also likely conduct assessments of their own, whether informally or formally for their own audiences, stakeholders or sponsors.
- Thirdly, they are important “influencers” in the information environment; if they do not believe that security forces PoC efforts are succeeding, they are likely to be more influential in communicating this message.

However, working with civilian PoC stakeholders on military PoC assessment issues is far from straightforward. Their data collection and assessments may not be synchronised with the needs of security forces reporting, nor their methods transparent. The security forces need to be able to understand their methodologies, constraints, strengths and weaknesses and to access sufficient expertise to make sense of these. A recent example is the monitoring of civilian casualties during the liberation operation, where the Joint Operations Command maintained separate databases of reported civilian casualty incidents.

a. UHE

Those aspects of the human environment identified as critical to PoC during planning must be monitored persistently as an integral part of overall feedback on mission progress. In addition to assessing progress against mission objectives that are directly related to the human environment (e.g. local population’s support for an insurgency), UHE includes developing a comprehensive picture of the operating environment, including both the physical aspects of the human environment (e.g. population welfare, demographics, etc.), and the psychological aspects related to population perceptions (e.g. their attitudes towards respective factions, their support for the mission.)

Persistent monitoring of the human environment will require coordinated action of all relevant staff within the HQ, and possibly even the allocation of surveillance assets, focused CMI and liaison tasking to collate, analyse and systematically report on relevant PoC issues. This systematic assessment will likely require synthesis of a number of indicators or evidence sources to form an overall picture; each of MH, C-SASE and FABN will require different techniques and emphasis. Synthesis of PoC assessment into the battle rhythm is key to development of a PoC mind set.

b. MH

The dynamics of MH will be a significant issue in most crisis interventions. Relevant indicators will depend on the nature of harm being perpetrated, but will almost certainly include the number of civilian casualties and other measures of civilian harm such as numbers of displaced persons or those receiving humanitarian assistance. It will therefore be important for the security forces to have put in place appropriate methods for assessing these issues. However, the example of civilian casualty tracking is illustrative of the wider challenges the security forces will face in assessing MH, particularly in contemporary conflicts, where practical application of the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians is blurred and often ignored,⁹ and there are practical difficulties investigating and verifying claims of casualty events. Concurrently, the attention paid to the civilian casualties by international media, political leadership and domestic audiences means that assessments are likely to be contested (often by NGOs, IOs or human rights organisations who are monitoring and reporting on civilians casualties from the ground), disputed and “targeted” in any information campaign between conflict parties.

A further problem arises when security forces are working with international organisations, where security forces seek to avoid committing human rights and IHL violations, allowing the assessment of the prevailing attitude to human rights and IHL to mitigate (and plan to mitigate) specific risks associated with the proposed assistance. Monitoring and investigation processes by the Iraqi security forces will therefore be a crucial part of strengthening security, justice, and civilian protection within the state.

c. FABN and C-SASE

Security forces may support assessment of FABN and C-SASE aspects through use of their own resources, assets, research and analysis, such as during the liberation operations in Mosul. In that case, security forces collected data on basic food commodities' prices and availability in local markets to give insight into post-conflict FABN aspects. Other examples could include gathering and exploitation of imagery or other Geo-Spatial evidence to investigate specific FABN aspects, such as access to healthcare or water sources. However, in most cases, assessing FABN will be a synthesis of the assessments made by other PoC actors, mainly from the humanitarian community.

In several aspects of PoC assessment, the attitudes and perceptions of civilians affected by a crisis are the key to understanding whether PoC efforts are achieving desired objectives. However, understanding and monitoring civilian attitudes requires much more sophisticated techniques than those to examine actions or other observable phenomena such as civilian casualties. The use of opinion research in crisis situations, by both civilian and military organisations, has become widespread in recent years, but is far from a panacea as a research method. Designing, implementing and analysing opinion research efforts among crisis affected populations requires specific expertise to overcome diverse challenges including ensuring the sample selected is representative of the broader population of interest, that researchers are able to access the respondents in insecure areas, that questions are properly formulated and interpreted to achieve intended objectives, that research efforts enable proper longitudinal (trend) analysis,¹⁰ maintaining a systematic

⁹ Melzer, *The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants* in *The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict* (Edited by Clapham and Gaeta) Oxford, 2014.

¹⁰ OECD, Checklist to commission, design and run a perception survey, 2012, <http://www.oecd.org/governance/regulatory-policy/49217483.pdf>, "Aligning Surveys to the Mission: The Roles of Public Opinion Polling in Complex Operations" and "Beyond Descriptive Statistics in Survey Analysis: Practical Examples from NATO sponsored Surveys in Afghanistan" in the NATO Science and Technology Organisation

approach based on a set of core questions which best enables longer term trend analysis, and of triangulating attitudinal research results with other indicators. Other research methods also play a role, such as focus group studies, “atmospherics” and Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

Reporting Mechanisms

The human environment is very complex with a high quantity of variables and perspectives, which make gaining a meaningful understanding of the situation and consequences of action or inaction particularly challenging. Timely and substantive reporting is paramount to ensure effective action is taken to address PoC-related issues.

PoC-related considerations will be addressed in the following existing reporting mechanisms:

- a. Periodic Mission Review (PMR), produced twice a year, in order to review progress achieved by the mission against each Military Strategic Objective (MSO) and related Military Strategic Effects (MSE).
- b. CIMIC Report sent from Component Command level to Operational level and from JTF level to the PoC Center.
- c. CIVCAS tracking and analysis, on a systematic basis in order to increase transparency and allow appropriate corrective measures where necessary.
- d. Military Engineering (MILENG) reports, which cover the three functional areas:
 - i. enabling or preventing manoeuvre or mobility,
 - ii. (ii) supporting survivability and sustainability,
 - iii. (iii) developing, maintaining and improving infrastructure.

This functional reporting comprises the assessment of reports and information from all MILENG-related areas of expertise (engineering, EOD, military search, infrastructure management, and environmental protection).

- e. Monitoring and reporting on the six grave violations¹¹ and Information Sharing in Support of CAAC. Ad-hoc CAAC reports, such as CAAC Quarterly Report and End of Tour Report by CAAC Senior Advisor to Commander.
- f. Gender reports (on children, women, men, and minorities), such as Gender Monthly Report, Gender Summary Report, and Gender Event/Incident Report.

(STO) “Operations Assessment in Complex Environments: Theory 112 Technical Report (STO-TR-SAS) and Practice

¹¹ The six grave violations are: killing and maiming of children, recruiting and exploiting children, sexual violence against children, kidnapping children, attacks on schools and hospitals, and blocking humanitarian aid.

ANNEX A - PoC Mindset


The PoC mind-set is a shift in focus from the traditional “enemy centric” perspective to one that is “population centric”, which is required in order to avoid and in any case minimise and mitigate harm to civilians in security forces missions and operations. This shift is not intended to replace the previous perspective, but rather complement it. In order to integrate this approach it is required that military personnel understand the following:

- a. **PoC is core military business.** PoC has political-strategic consequences that can undermine a mission’s success and legitimacy, if not properly taken into consideration. Security forces always have to take PoC into consideration as a core military function, in line with constitutional obligations, local legislation, Iraq's PoC Policy, and international law. They have obligations to protect the population and the natural environment from harm (including both physical violence and risk of harm). As a cross-cutting topic, PoC is to be handled by all staff functions. In many cases, especially with regards to MH, the use of force is essential in order to protect civilians from violence or threat of violence.
- b. **You cannot protect what you do not understand.** One cannot mitigate and minimise harm to the civilian population if one does not first understand the human environment, meaning the threats, vulnerabilities, resiliencies, needs, and dependencies of the people we seek to protect. This understanding must be done from the civilian population’s point-of-view, not from the perspective of the security forces.
- c. **Perspectives matter.** PoC does not replace the “enemy centric” perspective in situations of armed conflict or potential for armed conflict. The “population centric” approach is intended to supplement this perspective, in order to take the civilian point-of-view into consideration, especially since civilians are often targeted directly by perpetrators and/or suffer indirectly from belligerent activities.
- d. **Must first protect civilians from “Own” actions.** This is based on the IHL principles of military necessity, proportionality, distinction and humanity. While these universal principles always apply in armed conflicts, it is important to understand that a compressed time frame may influence a Commander’s assessment regarding distinction, precaution and proportionality. When time is available to deliberately plan, discriminate and precisely target a force or object in accordance with the IHL principles the chances of CIVCAS are greatly minimised. However, if the use of force occurs outside of deliberate targeting, the likelihood of civilian harm increases significantly due to reductions in timescale for actions. In such situations, what is practically feasible in terms of precaution in attack and tactical patience is influenced by FP and self-defence considerations.
- e. **PoC Includes Protection from the actions of “Others”.** Traditionally, NATO PoC efforts have focused on “Own” actions, but this is insufficient and must include protection from the actions of Others against the population. As seen in the figure below, the traditional PoC perspective has belligerents opposing one another in an armed conflict, with civilians caught in the middle. In these cases, the harm to civilians is unintentional or due to careless disregard for their safety, to include poor adherence to IHL principles. Lessons learned from liberation operations show that Iraqi security forces have improved their performance in this respect. CIVCAS caused by security forces dropped dramatically, as planning, targeting, and HM processes have improved to mitigate civilian harm as seen in the role of the security forces during the liberation operations. These efforts and processes must be upheld and frequently adapted to respond to an increasingly challenging environment that includes an increase in urban warfare, the use of human shields and urban warfare as asymmetric means to reduce the technological advantage of security forces. The ideal military situation in these cases would be to remove civilians from the battlefield and not hinder military actions.

We should know that perpetrators of violence against civilians in modern conflicts are not necessarily hostile to the security forces. As shown in the figure below, they might not necessarily be an "enemy" or from aggressive forces. In some cases, those who commit violence against civilians could be friendly or neutral actors, which should be considered.

In some cases, these perpetrators could even be neutral or friendly actors. These perpetrators seek to harm civilians for a wide variety of reasons such as from communal conflict, post-conflict revenge, predatory violence, regime crackdown and government repression. In these cases, security forces are not a target and would traditionally not be mandated to intervene or act other than in cases of self-defence.

However, PoC now requires security forces to interpose themselves (not necessarily through physical means) between perpetrators and civilians to influence, stop, coerce or dissuade the harmful actions against civilians. This is the shift required for a PoC mind-set, where NATO forces do not focus solely on enemy forces and the requirements for FP, but now also endeavour to keep civilians from harm from actors who may not be hostile to the security forces, but do have a negative impact of the overall credibility and legitimacy of the security forces.¹² This threat to the population cannot be identified through traditional force-focused threat assessments.



¹² Understanding that the adversary's hostile forces is a through to power, where perpetrators are not only a threat to the population, but also to the mission. Failure to protect civilians from harm would certainly affect the integrity and legitimacy of security forces.




Figure 2 & 3: Civilians caught in the middle of conflict between belligerents

- f. **PoC requires a shift in Understanding the Operational Environment:** While traditional perspectives of security forces and hostile forces must still be taken into consideration, the perspective related to the population must be just as important. This understanding of different perspectives is required to assess the relevant PoC actors that include threatened actors, population threat actors and protection actors. From a traditional perspective, the Threatened Actors would be the civilians, while the threat actors would be enemy forces. The security forces would obviously be considered protection actors.

However, if we take a population perspective the identification and placement of PoC actors could be very different. In this case, some groups within the civilian population could be considered perpetrators, as could security forces from harmful activities caused by “Own Actions”. Understanding and taking into consideration this change in perspective is essential not only to mitigate civilian and environmental harm but to develop a successful information campaign, to manage the expectations of the population and create a successful narrative.

- g. **PoC should deal with the disease, not just the symptoms.** Frequently, military activities focus on the outcomes or “symptoms” of protection failures such as dealing with the needs of displaced persons. This is not usually the responsibility of the military and can take considerable time and resources from other military efforts in the area. In many cases, those military efforts would be better served dealing with the “disease” that caused the displacement of the population in the first place, especially if man-made. Hence, protecting civilians at the source can negate the population’s need to move as seen in the depiction below.




Figure 4: Dealing with disease Instead of symptoms

ANNEX B - THREAT ASSESSMENT – EIGHT SCENARIOS¹³

The following threat assessment is tailored to mitigate harm from the actions of others. Protecting civilians from unintended consequences of your own operations is always vital, but the greatest threat to civilians usually comes from perpetrators of violence who directly target civilians as part of their warfare.

Different perpetrators target civilians for different reasons, with different means, leading to different outcomes. In order to effectively use force to affect the perpetrators' will and capability to target civilians, it is necessary to first distinguish between the various types of threats. Threats to civilians may include killings, forced displacement, looting, rape, IEDs, plunder, abduction and taxation. However, particular rationales demand particular tactics and capabilities to succeed. A systematic analysing of perpetrators along the following five criteria in Table 1 will allow a better understanding of the threat to civilians and will facilitate the development of Military Response Options (MROs) and COAs.

These five questions will help determine the type of threat to civilians. Within any AOR, there will most likely be several types of threats to civilians, stemming from one or several different actors. One particular actor may also change rationale and tactics over time. Consequently, military responses and COA to protect will also change over time and across the conflict area. Hence, the PoC threat assessment is a continuous process. The five characteristics can be combined to build generic threat scenarios, shown in the below matrix. The scenarios serve as a helpful planning tool to distinguish between the different types of threats.

5 key questions for threat assessment	
1. Actor type	What type of actor is responsible for the violence against civilians?
2. Rationale	What is the perpetrator's rationale for attacking civilians?
3. Strategies and tactics	What strategies and tactics serve the perpetrator's rationale most effectively?
4. Capabilities	Which capabilities are relevant to the perpetrator's ability to target civilians?
5. Outcome	What is the expected outcome if the perpetrators succeed?

¹³ The eight scenarios approach to assess the threat to the civilian population has been developed at The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). See Beadle and Kjeksrud (2014) "Military planning and assessment guide for the protection of civilians". FFI-report 2014/00965. Kjeller.

Global Examples for Reference

Scenario	Actor	Rationale	Strategies and tactics	Necessary capabilities	Expected outcome
<p>Mob violence</p> <p>Liberia (2004, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015)</p> <p>Ivory Coast (2004)</p> <p>Sierra Leone (2000, 2002)</p> <p>DRC (2013,2015)</p>	Individuals or mobs	Exploit mob dynamics for personal gain, revenge or political influence	Non- or semi-organised criminal acts (e.g., murder, arson, looting)	Freedom of movement (FOM)	Few killed but possibly extensive material damage to property and general perception of insecurity
<p>Post-conflict revenge</p> <p>Kosovo (post-1999)</p> <p>Iraq (post-2003)</p>	Individuals or mobs	Avenge past crimes on a personal basis	Retaliatory score settling through criminal acts of violence (e.g., murder, arson, kidnapping, looting)	FOM for individuals and small groups to access victims	Few killed but groups associated with previous perpetrators may flee following relatively little violence
<p>Insurgency</p> <p>Mali (2013–2015)</p> <p>DRC (2012–2013)</p> <p>S. Sudan (2012–2013)</p>	Rebel groups (classic insurgents with political or ideological objectives)	Control populations upon which they depend and undermine trust in their rivals	Selective and indiscriminate violence through threats, targeted killings, bombings, retribution, depending on their level of control	FOM to pick time and place of attack, access to Indiscriminate and explosive weapons	Fewer killed and injured, most due to indiscriminate weapons; gradual displacement from areas of heavy fighting

<p>Predatory violence DRC (1999–2015)</p>	<p>Rebel groups (predatory behaviour)</p>	<p>Survive or make a profit by exploiting civilians</p>	<p>Coerce civilians into compliance through plunder, taxation, forced recruitment, opportunistic rape, brutality, against ‘easy targets’</p>	<p>FOM to pick time and place of attack, operational secrecy, often central command</p>	<p>Temporary, but large-scale, displacement which is disproportionate to the number of people actually attacked, many abductions, especially of young adolescents</p>
<p>Communal conflict Mali (the Tuareg vs. Fulani) South Sudan (the Lou Nuer vs. Murle) Abyei (Misserya vs. Ngok Dinka) DRC (Hema vs. Lendu)</p>	<p>Whole tribal, ethnic or sectarian communities (possibly with outside support)</p>	<p>Avenge a previous attack and to deter further retribution in order to protect their own community</p>	<p>Attempts to coerce other community into submission through massacres, abductions, raids, destruction of homes and means of survival, often seeking to maximise violence</p>	<p>FOM to reach other community, access to deadlier weapons is associated with higher number of deaths</p>	<p>Relatively high number of people killed and abducted on both sides, especially women and children; livelihoods stolen or destroyed; temporary displacement</p>
<p>Government repression Ivory Coast (2010–2011) Syria (12–present)</p>	<p>Authoritarian regimes, or de facto authorities</p>	<p>Control restless populations, on basis of real or perceived affiliation with opposition</p>	<p>Repress population through selective and indiscriminate violence (e.g., threats, detention, rape as terror, destruction, occasional massacres)</p>	<p>Command and control for governments, FOM for regular forces, heavy weapons, special/irregular units in support</p>	<p>Mostly combatant deaths, gradual increase in civilian deaths due to heavy weapons and in accordance with intensity of fighting, large-scale displacement, widespread destruction of population centres</p>

<p>Ethnic cleansing</p> <p>Bosnia (1992–1995)</p> <p>Central African Republic (2014)</p>	<p>States, or the militarily superior actor</p>	<p>Expel a certain group from a specific territory</p>	<p>Force targeted group to leave through threats, highly visible killings, brutality, mass-rape, destruction of property</p>	<p>Command and control, FOM for irregular units, regular units for military control</p>	<p>Only a few per cent killed, but the vast majority of the targeted population expelled (~90%); destruction of victim homes and cultural buildings</p>
<p>Genocide</p> <p>Rwanda (1994)</p> <p>Srebrenica in Bosnia (1995)</p>	<p>States, or the militarily superior actor</p>	<p>Exterminate a certain group</p>	<p>Destroy existence of a group through several, simultaneous mass-killings, deportation, camps, systematic rape to prevent reproduction</p>	<p>Command and control, FOM for special/irregular units, sufficient small arms</p>	<p>Majority of members of the targeted group killed (50+ percent), in relatively short time</p>

ANNEX C - PoC KEY QUESTIONS/CONSIDERATIONS

QUESTIONS/CONSIDERATIONS ¹⁰⁰	MAIN PoC FRAMEWORK ELEMENT ¹⁰¹
Ensure a “population centric” approach	UHE
Provide a PMESII Assessment from “green” perspective	UHE
What are the protection needs of the population?	UHE
What are the protection needs of the population’s sub groups?	UHE
Population Movement (also through sex/age disaggregated data lens): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Forced: Refugees and IDPs ● Unforced: Internal and External Migrants ● Why is the population moving and is their move complete? Is there sufficient humanitarian support in the area of refuge? ● What transport routes are safe for evacuations? 	UHE
Assess Legitimacy of HN authorities	UHE
Assess Independence of HN authorities	UHE
Assess resilience of HN, including with reference to cyber UHE	
Understanding of other actors in area, as well as their response to situation in area	UHE

Which non-military actors are willing to cooperate with Own forces/HN security forces?	UHE
Is any agreement in place with the HN or with the International Community IOs to coordinate the efforts?	UHE
Is any agreement necessary with the HN or with the International Community to coordinate the efforts?	UHE
What are the ethnic makeup and tensions that could be exploited in a crisis by belligerents?	UHE
Critical infrastructure for sustaining the civilian population (waterways, major supply routes, ports, airports, energy generation and distribution)	UHE
Is there any consideration related to climate change/ extreme weather and its consequences?	UHE
What are early warning indicators that might lead to humanitarian crises? (droughts, natural disasters, outbreaks)	UHE
Healthy info sharing and understanding of the existing protection mechanisms	UHE
What is the critical infrastructure and its vulnerabilities without (direct or indirect) civilian support (energy, water, food, telecommunications)?	UHE/C-SASE
Who is the most vulnerable group?	MH
Is military action (own forces) posing a threat to the population?	MH
Which military actions (own forces) pose the greatest threat to civilians (e.g., which effects, platforms, tactics, munitions)?	MH
How will their own force impact the local economy? Mitigation measures?	MH

Which/what efforts have been taken into consideration to avoid/minimise/mitigate negative effects on civilians?	MH
Which non-lethal effects are viable?	MH
Specific requirements to planning due to the urban environment? What are precautions?	MH
Operational constraints that NATO may face due to civilian population: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Convoy movement – impact of civilians on (Main Supply Routes) MSRs; competition with other MSR requirements ● Base access – throughput at entry control points; crowds (whether self-motivated or adversary utilised) ● Targeting – discriminating hostiles; CIVCAS 	MH
Are CIVCAS Management procedures integrated into the planning process? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CIVCAS Tracking ● CIVCAS Evacuation ● CIVCAS Communication ● CIVCAS Investigation ● CIVCAS Reporting ● CIVCAS Redress 	MH
Who is being targeted and/or harmed?	MH
Who are the actors harming civilians?	MH
Which are the provisions of the military mandate with reference to MH/other's action?	
Who is the actor posing the greatest threat to civilians?	MH
Is the harm to civilians intentional or unintentional?	MH

If harm is intentional, what is the rationale/motivation to target civilians?	MH
If harm is intentional, what strategy and tactics do the perpetrators of violence use against civilians?	MH
What are the capabilities of the perpetrators of violence? MH	
What capabilities do the perpetrators require to target civilians?	MH
What are the internal procedures/processes of the perpetrators of violence?	MH
Are civilians being used to harm other civilians?	MH
Where are the tools/instruments/weapons harming civilians coming from? Which network?	MH
Adversary's ability to influence and drive actions of individuals/groups – strategic communications, use of social networks, recruitment, fund raising, explicit/ implicit support for adversary activities	MH
What are the population's basic needs? How do civilians define their basic needs?	FABN
What are the most important needs? Is there a prioritisation?	FABN
Is the provision of basic needs sustainable?	FABN
What needs are not being met?	FABN
Who can meet these needs?	FABN
Who is providing these needs?	FABN

What are the risks related to the provision of these needs?	FABN
What dependencies does the population have on the natural environment?	FABN
Is there sufficient capacity to meet these needs?	FABN
What expectations does the population have for NATO to meet their needs?	FABN
What are the security implications if these needs are not met?	FABN
What is the impact on the mission if basic needs are not met?	FABN
Which public assets are more vulnerable?	C-SASE
What are the public services required by the population within the crisis area?	C-SASE
What are the public services expected by the population within the crisis area?	C-SASE
Who is providing these essential public services?	C-SASE
What institutions should be providing these services?	C-SASE
To whom are the essential public services provided?	C-SASE
What are the vulnerabilities/threats to the provision of these services?	C-SASE
What are the resiliencies to the provision of these services? C-SASE	
What are the safety and security implications if these essential services are insufficient?	C-SASE
Is the capacity of local authorities to provide for safety sufficient?	C-SASE

Is the capacity of local authorities to provide for security sufficient?	C-SASE
Is the capacity of local authorities to provide for governance sufficient?	C-SASE
Is the capacity of local authorities to provide for governance a sufficient area? The capacity of local authorities to provide for RoL sufficient?	C-SASE
Is the capacity of local authorities to provide for public order sufficient?	C-SASE
What is the level of resilience of the local population and HN?	C-SASE
How stable are local support structures? (all kinds of structures: trade, societal, etc.)	C-SASE
Host Nation/IO/NGO/Other capacity to sustain the situation	C-SASE
Training in support of HN – is there any legal package on IHL associated with cultural awareness?	C-SASE
How to reintegrate former combatants?	C-SASE
How to support the reconciliation process?	C-SASE
How to support implementation of UN resolutions on women and children?	C-SASE

ANNEX D - BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

International law is contained in agreements between States (usually, treaties and/or conventions), in customary rules (which consist of State practice considered by them as legally binding), and in general principles. As a country signatory to international treaties, it is bound by the treaties they have ratified and the relevant applicable international law and standards established in customary law along with its own national legislation.

IHL, also referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), is a set of international rules that seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed

conflict. It is intended to minimise the suffering caused by armed conflict rather than impede military efficiency. It protects those victims of conflict who are not or are no longer directly participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. IHL is recognised as forming a universal body of law. The main IHL rules that are of utmost importance for the protection of civilians during military operations and missions are the following:

a. Distinction

Military operations are to be conducted only against the enemy's armed forces and military objectives. As a result, the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between the armed forces and civilians or between combatants and non-combatants, and between objects that might legitimately be attacked and those that are protected from attack. Attacks must not be directed against civilians. Civilians are protected against attacks, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:

1. those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
2. those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
3. those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by IHL;

and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

b. Proportionality

The principle of proportionality requires that the expected losses resulting from a military action should not be excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated.

c. Military Necessity

A State engaged in an armed conflict may use that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by LOAC, to achieve the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources. However, it is important to note that the principle of military necessity does not justify acts that are otherwise prohibited by LOAC and is not a criminal defence for such acts, even if they hasten the surrender of the enemy.

d. Humanity

The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. It prohibits the intentional causing of unnecessary suffering, once the military purpose has been achieved.

e. Precautions in Attack

In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.

Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall do everything feasible¹⁰² to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives and that it is not prohibited to attack them.

Each party to the conflict shall take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimising, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

Each party to the conflict must refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection (or the attack violates the rule of proportionality).

Each party to the conflict shall give effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

Where a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the one whose attack is expected to cause the least incidental damage should be chosen.

ANNEX E - TERMINOLOGY/LEXICON

The following is a list of key terms that are related to Protection of Civilians:

PoC Key Terms

Terminology	Description/Definition
Centre of Gravity (CoG)	The primary source of power that provides an actor its strength, freedom of action and/or will to fight.
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)	CIMIC is a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling security forces commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.
Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)	CMI is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all security forces share and conduct with international and local non military actors, both during security forces operations and in preparation for them, which mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)	Any sexual violence against an individual or group of individuals, used or commissioned in relation to a crisis or an armed conflict.
Cyberspace	The global domain consists of all interconnected communication, information technology and other electronic systems, networks and their data, including those which are separated or independent, which process, store or transmit data.
Host Nation (HN)	A nation which, by agreement: a) receives forces and material of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b) allows material and/or NATO organisations to be located on its territory; and/or c) provides support for these purposes.

Host Nation Support	Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a HN to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations that are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the HN territory.
Humanitarian Aid	The resources needed to directly alleviate human suffering.
Humanitarian Assistance ¹⁰³	As part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialised civil humanitarian organisations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.
Internally Displaced Person (IDP)	A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised State border.
International Organisation (IO)	An intergovernmental, regional or global organisation governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterised, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purposes of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims. Note: Exceptionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross, although a non-governmental organisation formed under the Swiss Civil Code, is mandated by the international community of states and is founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, has an international legal personality or status on its own, and enjoys some immunities and privileges for the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate.
Governmental Organisation (GO)	An organisation controlled and financed by its national government.

<p>Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)</p>	<p>A private, not for profit, voluntary organisation with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities, in particular development related projects or the promotion of a specific cause, and organised at local, national, regional or international level. Note: 1. A non-governmental organisation does not necessarily have an official status or mandate for its existence or activities. 2. NATO may or may not support or cooperate with a given non-governmental organisation.</p>
<p>Refugee</p>	<p>Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.</p>
<p>Rules of Engagement (RoE)</p>	<p>Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.</p>
<p>Stability Policing (SP)</p>	<p>Police-related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, RoL, and the protection of human rights.</p>

ANNEX F - Understanding Iraq's Security Environment Before 2014

Iraq: Western Provinces Before 10/6/2014

Western cities and provinces were affected by some mistakes committed by security and military individuals, personnel, and even persons in a leadership position. These mistakes include the absence of a realistic understanding and analysis of the security environment in these cities and governorates, leading to:

1. The absence of the role of actors, such as tribal sheikhs and leaders, mosque imams and speakers, civil society, and local governmental agencies, in supporting the local and federal security forces in the enforcement of security and stability in these regions.
2. The regions were not divided into those that support the state's authority (green), dangerous ones (red), such as remote and far away areas that became a haven for extremists and terrorist organisations, and regions with a tribal characteristic that decided to stay away and not interfere in the situation in those regions (blue).\
3. Lack of understanding the basic needs of citizens, such as services, policing, and the impact of bandits and traffic in residential and commercial areas.
4. Lack of a serious analysis of security and military measures in those areas led to a wave of discontent and anger among the local population. Some practices and violations included mistreatment and taking bribes, impacting many of the region's population.
5. On some occasions, brute force was used to solve security problems, without being aware of the priority of civilians and their interests in the goals of security and military forces and civilian government agencies contributing to maintaining stability in those regions.

Urban Environments in Iraq

The ability of Iraqi liberation forces against ISIS to mitigate harm against civilians was impacted by several factors:

1. The ISIS tactic of deliberately hiding among civilians and using homes and infrastructure to attack Iraqi forces made it difficult to differentiate between civilians and belligerents.
2. During the battle for Mosul, best practices were utilised, such as using multiple sources to verify the presence of civilians near targets and using small or precision-guided ammunition, especially in the first phase of operations (East Mosul). These efforts faced several restrictions, as operations were concentrated in the heavily populated old city in western Mosul. Despite the security surveillance and reconnaissance, it was difficult to follow the patterns of civilian movement while searching for safe areas, as many hid in abandoned buildings for days when the operations intensified.
3. The alliance did not have a proper understanding of the urban terrain to estimate the net effect of weapons on old buildings and secondary explosions caused by ISIS's tactic to boobytrap buildings, causing civilian harm.
4. Local forces in Iraq did not conduct post-targeting assessments to better understand the impact of its operations on the city's civilians and civilian infrastructure. In the absence of such information, local forces and the alliance lacked the comprehensive ability to amend their tactics to mitigate harm against civilians. Despite applying CIVCAS and receiving data from NGOs, the intensity of battles in Mosul surpassed the resources available to conduct a real-time analysis of reasons for civilian harm to report on modifying tactics for MH.
5. Land-air coordination of targeting was impeded by the multiplicity of air platforms, conflict resolution challenges, and the lack of precision of various targeting maps and platforms used by local security forces in Iraq.

Key Takeaways

1. The UHE mind-set adds a population-centric perspective to the traditional security-military perspective.
2. UHE contributes to the development of knowledge and continues current processes used to understand the operational environment.
3. UHE is a continuous process, which needs to be preemptive and protective in nature, through constant monitoring, evaluation, and CMI.
4. Participation and information-sharing with other actors in the area of security and military operations is imperative to UHE. Usually, local government agencies, civilians, and actors working on the ground have a better understanding and experience in the area of security and military operations actions. They could enhance the understanding of the population's needs, trends, weaknesses, and resilience.
5. Consistency in UHE is imperative throughout the mission's phases, as it supports and provides the knowledge and understanding necessary for the operational environment from a population-centric perspective.