



Human Security Survey 2020 Annual Summary Report Jonglei State, South Sudan

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protectionofcivilians.org

- Jonglei respondents report that **general security levels** have sharply declined both in Bor South and Twic East counties since 2019, compared to 2018 data looking back at 2017; More respondents indicate feeling insecure in their communities to crime or violence (**78%** in 2020, up from **50%** in 2018).
- **Victimization rates** among respondents have also increased: more than two-thirds (**68%**) of respondents experienced at least one security incident over the last year, up from **45%** in 2018. Reported rates of cattle raiding have increased, from **26%** of reporting cases in 2018 to **33%** in 2020, making it the most frequently reported security incident in Jonglei.
- **Widespread flooding** has not only profoundly impacted the community's short-term humanitarian situation, but also put longer-term pressure on vital resources and intercommunal relations.
- There exists overall **reliance on local armed youth** and self-protection mechanisms in Twic East and rural areas of Bor South. However, both formal and informal security actors face considerable operational constraints in daily security provision.

Introduction & Methodology

The Human Security Survey (HSS) is a unique survey methodology developed by PAX, that includes a series of complementary activities, including population-based research, active community engagement, and advocacy. The objectives of the HSS are: 1) to increase knowledge and understanding of local human security dynamics and trends; 2) to enhance the 'claim-making capacity' of civilians to hold security providers and decision-makers accountable; and 3) to inform evidence-based advocacy that enables international stakeholders to design and implement protection activities that reflect local realities. PAX currently implements the HSS in South Sudan in close collaboration with local field partners and consultants on the ground.

This survey cycle was the third to take place in Jonglei, after the initial data collections in 2016-17 and in 2018. This third data collection in Jonglei State took place in

the course of three weeks in July and August 2020 by **8** enumerators (5 men, 3 women) who were trained for four days in data collection skills and procedures. A total of **468** surveys were collected across 10 *payams*¹ in Bor

Map of South Sudan



South and Twic East counties of Jonglei State.² Within these payams, households and individual respondents were selected using an approximately random procedure to allow for some generalizability.³

In February 2021 PAX, the local Community Security Committee (COMSECCOM) and our local consultant on the ground facilitated a 3-day community validation and security dialogue in Jonglei's state capital, Bor. During this three-day dialogue the main survey findings and its practical implications were presented, discussed, and validated; participants suggested main priorities and practical ways of addressing the main security issues, culminating in a community action plan. The local Community Security Committee (COMSECCOM), set up in 2017 after the first data collection cycle and consisting of concerned community members of different backgrounds, presented its main activities and achievements regarding the 2018 community action plan. The COMSECCOM will also take responsibility to implement the new action plan


Map of Jonglei State



HSS data collection during a pandemic

The global COVID-19 pandemic also hit South Sudan in 2020, affecting the implementation of the Human Security Survey in various ways. After South Sudan went into a lockdown in late March 2020, PAX office and field activities were hibernated for a few months. When the country slowly re-opened in July, data collection in Jonglei proved to be our first gradual return to the field under COVID-19 imposed restrictions.

These restrictions varied from travel restrictions, as well as limitations posed on the size of gatherings and the interaction during trainings. This meant that only 8 enumerators could be trained in Bor Town in July 2020, where COVID-related instructions for field data collection



agreed based on 2020-21 data and communal discussions during the upcoming 1-1,5 years. This way, initiatives to address locally identified security issues really originate from the community, and will also be locally followed up and accounted for, genuinely representing community-based bottom-up capacities.

Demographics of the survey sample


Almost all (99%) of respondents indicated that they belonged to the ethnic group of Dinka, reflecting the most common ethnic group across the counties of Bor South and Twic East, where 69% and 31% of respondents were based, respectively.

More than a third (35%) of respondents were between 16-30 years of age, a similar segment (36%) were

were introduced to the curriculum limiting the travel movements and social interactions of enumerators with their respondents. The reduced number of trained enumerators also resulted in a lower number of field surveys collected, and a smaller geographical area covered across two counties.

On top of this, data collection had to take place during the rainy season. During the rainy season of 2020, Jonglei State was affected by devastating floods, further restricting freedom of movement by the enumerators and their access to the targeted communities. Data collection therefore took place under difficult circumstances, and all planned data validation and dialogue sessions were postponed until early 2021.

WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR YOUR MIGRATION? (N = 304)



between the ages 31-45, over a quarter (27%) were between 45-65 years of age and only 3% were above 65 years old.⁴ 63% of respondents were female, 37% were male, most likely because surveys were primarily conducted during the morning and afternoon hours. At those times, many men are out herding cattle, working the fields, or engaging in other livelihood activities away from their homes. Female family members are more likely to be found in and around the house to look after children and do domestic chores, which was also confirmed by some participants to the community dialogue in Bor. Other participants to that meeting claimed that recent conflict has led to a situation in which many women find themselves heading a household⁵: “females form the majority in numbers now in Jonglei, this is because the men have always been exposed to danger that may claim a lot of their lives over females.”⁶

Over a quarter of respondents (28%) indicated that they relied on subsistence agriculture as their main source of livelihood at the time of the interview,⁷ with other respondents relying on domestic work (16% of all respondents; 23% of women), being a student (13%), cattle keeping (11%) or wage labour (10%, of which 40% was civil servant), while 12% claimed to be unemployed and 10% mentioned other sources of livelihood.⁸ 61% of all respondents (71% of women, 43% of men) indicated that they hadn’t completed any education, while 16% completed primary education, and a similar amount of respondents completed secondary

education, and only 7% completing a higher level than secondary education.


Only 35% of all respondents indicated that they have lived in their current payams since 2013, while almost two-thirds (65%) of respondents indicated that they have moved their residence during the last 7 years at least once.⁹ Of all respondents who had to move from their payams during the last five years, a staggering 99% claimed they had to do so because of insecurity, thereby minimizing other potential reasons for migration, such as economic opportunities/work/education, improved access to basic services/food/health care, marriage/living closer to family and seasonal or nomadic migration, among others (see figure above).^{10,11}

MAIN FINDINGS


Perception of the general security situation

On the whole, respondents conclude that their personal situation has deteriorated in the last 12 months: almost two-thirds of respondents (65%) claim that their security situation has worsened since mid-2019 (compared to 67% indicating worse security in 2017 and 31% in 2018), while only 3% said that their security situation improved during the last year, a sharp decline from the 10% indicating improvements in 2017, and 28% in 2018. Almost a third (32%) did not perceive any positive or negative change in their security (see figure below).¹²

HOW DID YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY SITUATION CHANGE SINCE LAST YEAR? (2017-2020)



WHY DID YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY SITUATION WORSEN? (N = 302)



Geographically, the data shows some regional variation as **81%** of respondents in Twic East County indicated their security situation worsened since 2019, compared to **57%** of respondents from Bor South County. This picture was confirmed by responses on the statement about how people perceived their immediate environment, with **92%** of respondents replying with either “*somewhat unsafe*” or “*very unsafe*” (**100%** of Twic East; **90%** of Bor South respondents). Showing a similar picture were responses to the statement “*I generally feel safe from violence and crime in my community*”, with which **78%** of respondents disagreed (**93%** Twic East; **71%** Bor South).

The main practical consequences of reduced security¹³ were mainly “*feeling frightened or stressed*” (**33%**), claims that “*more strangers have moved into our areas*” (**31%**), feeling “*more exposed to violence or harassment when out of the house*” (**28%**), having “*less access to food*” (**18%**), having “*more worries related to my livelihood*” (**18%**), seeing “*more criminal gangs in the streets*” (**17%**), seeing “*more weapons in the streets*” (**14%**), and “*losing my house*” (**11%**), among others options receiving less than **10%** agreement (see figure above).¹⁴

Irrespective of whether perceived insecurity levels improve or deteriorate, local communities generally develop strategies to cope with existing levels of insecurity in fragile contexts such as South Sudan. **31%** of all respondents indicated that they “*sought assistance from formal or informal security forces*” such as local armed youth in dealing with insecurity, **28%** said they “*acquired or used weapons*” like guns or spears, **23%** said that they “*sought assistance from formal security forces*” such as police, SSPDF (the national army) or chiefs, **19%** “*travelled less frequently outside of the home or avoided going to specific places*”, **12%** “*joined formal or informal security forces*” themselves, and **10%** “*made the house safer*” with fences or guard dogs for example, among other options less often mentioned.¹⁵

During the community data validation and dialogue

meeting in Bor, most participants confirmed and adopted the views of the respondents, reflecting the worsening situation in Jonglei since the last similar dialogue held late 2018.

Environment

For the first time since the inception of the Human Security Survey, a module on the physical environment and climate change, and its relation to (in)security, was added to the survey. The period of data collection was July and August 2020, months that usually are part of the rainy season in Jonglei. That year however, the rainy season coincided with serious floods, affecting large parts of Jonglei and others states striding the Nile River, affecting communities for many months after. The floods also had a negative impact on the data collection process, limiting enumerators’ access to certain communities, or forcing them to be transported by canoe where they could have walked or used motorbikes under normal circumstances.

Considering these circumstances during data collection, it came as no surprise that flooding was mentioned by **98%** of respondents as being the most important environmental change observed in Jonglei,¹⁶ with only **9%** indicating temperature changes and **7%** experiencing changes in the duration of dry and rainy seasons. About the consequences of these environmental changes to their community, views were more diverse: more than half (**57%**) of respondents



98%

Respondents observing increased flooding



An enumerator conducts an interview amid heavy flooding in Jonglei State, July 2020

claimed that it affected their access to food, **45%** said it worsened their security situation, or increased migration among communities (**38%**), communal conflicts (**21%**) and competition over resources such as land and drinking water (**19%**; see figure below).¹⁷

We asked respondents how and by whom these negative impacts of environmental changes on their community should be addressed. Almost half of them (**46%**) indicated that “NGOs teach us new practices that help us to continue our livelihood or make necessary changes to our livelihood despite environmental changes”, whereas **38%** answered that local authorities in their area are able to address environmental changes, **15%** resorted to (temporary) migration with their families, and **11%** said that their community members/leaders should agree with neighboring communities to share and exchange resources in times of shortage and contested access. Nearly a quarter (**23%**) said that there are no ways at all to address the effects of environmental changes in the communities (or at least none of the response options provided).


Some respondents gave concrete examples of what

needs to happen to combat the risk of flooding: inhabitants of Kongor payam in Twic East indicated that they requested outside assistance from both local government officials as well as NGOs, while community members from Pakeer payam (Twic East) repeatedly mentioned attempts by the community themselves to build a dyke, and respondents from Bor town mentioned that money was raised from the community to construct tunnels to drain the floodwaters, but this seemed to be unsuccessful in the end. In addition, the participants to the data validation workshop agreed with the pictures provided by the respondents and warned that the state capital, Bor Town, too, urgently needs a dyke and other flooding preparations to avoid another disaster during the next rainy season. Because the displacement caused by the floods puts even greater pressure on already scarce resources, one of the chiefs attending the workshop said that he tries to talk to neighboring communities living on higher ground “to let their brothers and sisters share land with them, because this flooding has brought conflict over space and boreholes [water points, AQ].”

Incident reporting

Apart from environmental challenges to human security, community members in Jonglei have to deal with a variety of security-related incidents and threats. Two thirds (**68%**) of all respondents indicated that they experienced one or more security incident in the previous year,¹⁸ compared to **45%** of respondents in 2018 and **80%** in 2017. **19%** of all respondents actually reported only one security incident over the last year, **22%** reported two incidents, **13%** reported three incidents and a total of **13%** reported four or more security incidents over the last year. Over half of respondents (**54%**) reported just one type of security incident, **12%** reported two types of incidents. All 468 respondents reported a total of 777 incidents, **33%** of which referred to cattle raids, **23%** to a murder case and **13%** to a robbery, with other types of incidents

WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES IN YOUR AREA? (N = 465)



Conflict between Bor Dinka and Murle communities

Many, if not most, of the reported cattle raids, murders and (child) abductions reported by respondents are not merely stand-alone incidents, but part of a long cycle of rivalry between the Bor Dinka, the main ethnic group inhabiting Jonglei State (including Bor South and Twic East counties surveyed here) and the Murle, the ethnic group inhabiting the Greater Pibor Autonomous Area (GPAA), a semi-autonomous area which was part of Jonglei State before. After the Murle waged an insurrection against the (Dinka-dominated) national government right

after independence between 2011-2014, and the subsequent creation of a semi-autonomous region controlled by Murle, the inter-ethnic rivalry transformed into a low-intensity seasonal cycle of attacks and revenge attacks, mostly evolving around the raiding of cows, as well as the abduction (and assimilation) of women and children. The increase of reported violent incidents over the years 2019 and 2020 coincided with an increase of hostilities between Dinka Bor and Murle armed community-based militias, consisting of youths.¹⁹


amounting to less than **10%** each.

Most participants to the data validation workshop confirmed that the situation in 2016-17 was bad, and that after an initial improvement in 2018, the situation has now again deteriorated, and a community leader or chief who was present could link this to clearly marked socio-political developments: *“I agree with the views of our community, it is true the security situation of 2017 was very bad indeed because of 2016 fighting that broke out in Juba and the data was collected that same year. While in 2018 there was improvement because the negotiation on the revitalized agreement was ongoing, leading to the signing of the 2018 R-ACRSS in September that year. While in 2020, the reason why the security situation got worse again was the increase of cattle raiding and child abduction, and inter-communal violence between greater Bor and the Murle.”* A police officer concurred and added: *“The data was collected in a situation in which the war was on between the two communities [Murle and Dinka Bor]. Murle had committed several cattle raids and child abductions from the end of 2019 to earlier 2020, which was responded to by Bor youth to attack Murle leading to loss of a lot of lives, so the*

community is right to say the security situation in 2020 was indeed worse than in 2018.”

Specifying the kind of security incidents respondents reported, more than half of respondents (**56%**) said their household experienced at least one incident of cattle raiding, **39%** reported a killing, followed by a robbery (**22%**) and a beating (**13%**, see figure below).²⁰ This mirrored the dynamics described by the data validation participants, as the **56%** of respondents reporting cattle raids in 2020 was much higher than the previously reported **26%** cattle raids in 2017 and **22%** in 2018. Reported murders were highest in 2017 (**52%** of respondents reporting first-hand experience with killing incidents), seeing a drop in 2018 (**20%**), before seeing a rise again in 2020 (**39%**). Robberies saw a comparable development, from **16%** of respondents reporting experience with robberies, dropping to **4%** in 2018, rising to **22%** in 2020. A police officer during the data validation workshop tried to put these numbers into perspective: *“cases of cattle raiding, child abduction and killing have increased in 2020. But cattle raiding and killing cannot be treated separately, they go hand in hand. Most*

HOUSEHOLDS REPORTING AN INCIDENT (N = 468)



killing happened during cattle raiding, especially during such attacks and in pursuing the raided cattle.” Some women participants contested the low prevalence of reported cases of rape or sexual assault (4%), saying that this issue was largely underreported to police and also in this survey due to its sensitive nature in the community: *“our security challenge is that women are raped but they don’t report incidents to police because they fear stigmatization.”*

Generally across all reported security incidents, men indicated much higher victimization rates than women: 72% of incidents involved adult men as victims and in 21% boys were victimized, while adult women (18%) and girls (12%) were less frequently identified as being victims of the reported security incidents.²¹ The participants to the data validation workshop confirmed this dynamic because they claimed men are primarily responsible for taking care of cattle in the cattle camps, and therefore have a higher likelihood of getting caught up or involved in potentially deadly cattle raiding in the process.

Almost half of respondents (46%) who reported one or more security incidents happening to themselves or a household member, generally perceived that *“someone from a neighboring community”* were the most likely perpetrators of these incidents (among them allegedly, 50% of cattle raids), followed by criminals (39%), with other potential perpetrators (police, armed youth, someone from own community, etc.) scoring no more than 3%.²²

Almost two-thirds (62%)²³ of all incidents reported by respondents who were victimized, indicated that they contacted someone outside their household to help them resolve the incident they experienced.²⁴ The most contacted actors generally were the police (77%), local armed youth (54%), local leaders (chiefs; 12%), among other actors receiving 5% or less reports from community members.²⁵ The police was contacted in 69% of all cattle raiding cases, 80% of all reported murder cases, 88% of robbery cases and 86% of physical assault cases (the four most frequently reported security incidents across Jonglei), with an average of 77% across all reported security incidents. Local armed youth were the second most frequently contacted actors, in 68% of cattle raiding cases, 53% of murder cases, 49% of robbery cases and 41% of physical assault cases, resulting in an average requested response rate across all incidents of 54%.²⁶ During the data validation workshop, participants confirmed that most community members preferred contacting the police, but that communities in rural areas such as Twic East in practice contact the local armed youth more often than the police because police stations were fewer in those areas compared to towns in Bor South, and armed youth are the main security actor that remote communities rely on.

Three-quarters of the respondents seeking outside assistance in resolving the incident, were not satisfied with the outcome or quality of the response received. 91% of respondents who were not satisfied with the response indicated that this was the case because *“the perpetrator was not caught”*, followed by *“no compensation for losses was offered”* (42%), and *“the perpetrator was not punished”* (11%). The 24% of respondents who requested assistance and were satisfied with the response, saying that *“the perpetrator was caught and punished”* (68%), *“compensation for losses was offered”* (39%), *“stolen goods, cattle or abducted people returned”* (23%), *“reconciliation with the perpetrator took place”* (15%) or *“revenge was taken against the perpetrator”* (6%).²⁷

Vulnerability

As already became apparent in the victimization rates of the reported incidents, the level of vulnerability of certain groups in society is very contextual. Nearly half of respondents (49%) claimed that women and girls are equally likely to become a victim of violence than men and boys across Jonglei State,²⁸ while 14% claimed women and girls were more likely to become a victim of violence, and 11% thought that men or boys were more likely to become victimized. In a similar fashion, more than half of respondents (54%) agreed to the statement that *“All people in this community are equally likely to be exposed to violence”*,²⁹ meaning this is irrespective of gender or age, while 20% of respondents were of the opinion that *“some people in this community are more likely to be exposed to violence than others”*, and another 25% of respondents didn’t know or refused to answer altogether. When respondents reported security incidents they experienced first-hand in their households, the two most reported incidents (cattle raiding and murder) involved primarily adult men (90% and 72%, respectively), with a 72% average victimization of adult men over all reported incidents.


During the data validation workshop, participants agreed to the data suggesting that men and women are perceived to have different reasons or aspects of vulnerability. Three-quarters of respondents (73%) think that women’s and girls’ vulnerability stems from the notion that *“they cannot physically protect themselves”*,³⁰ followed by *“their rights are often ignored”* (39%), *“they*



41%

“Elderly people are the most vulnerable to violence”

WHICH SECURITY ACTORS ARE PRESENT IN YOUR COMMUNITY? (N = 468)



are targeted as a matter of revenge” (14%) and “they are often in dangerous situations” (11%). Men or boys were considered vulnerable by 72% of respondents because “they are likely to be seen as a threat”³¹, for instance as a potential criminal, combatant or cattle raider. In addition, 43% were of the opinion that men and boys “are targeted as a matter of revenge” and 26% because “they are often in dangerous situations”. Other responses received less than 10 percent of respondents’ approval.³²

When groups in society beyond the gender dichotomy are assessed concerning their vulnerability to violence, responses primarily highlighted elderly people (41%) as being most vulnerable, followed by young married women or girls (33%), small children (23%),³³ people with physical/mental disability (21%), young men and boys (12%), and cattle keepers (12%), with other responses receiving less than 10%.³⁴ Participants to the community data validation meeting concluded that “everyone is vulnerable in his or her own unique way.”

Security actor performance

Respondents were asked which of the listed (security) actors they trusted the most. Two-thirds of them (68%) mentioned armed youth to be most trusted, followed by the police (54%), and the national army or SSPDF³⁵ (16%), UNMISS (4%) and a few other options receiving less votes.^{36,37} Similarly, when asked which security actors were actually present and accessible in their respective payams throughout Jonglei State, armed youth came out as most accessible security actor according to 71% of all respondents, followed by the police (64%), UNMISS (19%),³⁸ the SSPDF or army (17%), paramilitary forces

(mostly wildlife brigades, fire brigades, etc.; 9%) and local leaders/traditional chiefs (7%).³⁹ However, there is quite some regional variation in accessibility of security actors between Bor South and Twic East counties (see figure above).

These local dynamics also came to the forefront in responses to the statement “In my payam we trust local armed youth for our security more than any outsiders.” Almost three-quarters (74%) of all respondents agreed to this statement, while 25% disagreed.⁴⁰ In more rural Twic East County however, agreement to this statement was much higher (90%) compared to more urban Bor South County (two-thirds). This indicates a preference for informal and deeply local (and therefore accessible) armed youth in more remote and rural areas such as Twic East and parts of Bor South County beyond Bor town. This tendency to prefer local and accessible law enforcement actors was somewhat confirmed by 54% of all respondents agreeing that “It is best when security forces are recruited from within our own community because they know us”, while still 45% agreed that “It is best when security forces are from outside the payam, because they do not take sides”, with the balance in Twic East County being 58%-42% respectively.

In addition, almost two-thirds (64%) of all respondents agreed with “My community relies on local armed youth to provide protection and security” (however here, 69% of Bor South agrees with this statement, whereas ‘only’ 53% of respondents from Twic East County), while 35% said their community relies on the police for security provision. During the survey data validation workshop, participants recognized that armed youth are often more

trusted in rural areas, where presence of police and other more 'formal' security actors is much more limited: "The youth have acquired weapons and they are energetic and big in numbers and weapons, and they are found within their communities. The police manpower is less and they have also less presence in some community or areas. (...) We don't have power now until in the future when civilians are disarmed then we can do our mandate properly", said a police officer attending the workshop. A local government official added in approval: "our police forces cannot suppress the local armed youth, who are better armed than the few police we have. The proliferation of arms in the hands of civilians is a big local government challenge. Now as we talk our police force is becoming smaller because they desert the work and start their own businesses, either due to small salaries or their delayed payment. The majority of our police and even the national army have resorted to charcoal making for their survival."

Similar to the preference for informal law enforcement actors, **57%** of all respondents (but **81%** of Twic East respondents) prefers informal justice provision and communal dispute resolution by local community leaders or chiefs, over the judges and lawyers representing the state court system, preferred by **40%** of total (but only **18%** of Twic East) respondents. Chiefs who attended the data validation meeting in Bor however, complained that "we are also being intimidated by the armed youth, whom you see as civilians but with arms it is a threat to us as we do our work." Another chief explained their precarious position in local security and justice provision as follows: "We give judgement but cannot guarantee implementation, because we don't have police personals to impose a ruling. Unlike state courts, as they have police as their protection and enforcers. Some of our decisions are overruled by guns. The laws of our country did not give the chiefs more powers or jurisdiction."

They [the state courts] are not allowed to settle minor family dispute cases, adultery cases or divorce cases, but other cases like murder, rape and robberies are all tried by state courts, leaving us with less or no cases to try."

On the other hand, chiefs and other community leaders are sometimes blamed for not cooperating well with local government officials either, as one appointed official complained: "some of our payam administrators [lower level local government officials, AQ] have surrendered to the local youths or else they cannot work in the payams they are deployed to. If you do not cooperate with them, the chiefs will wrangle and mobilize themselves to remove you, but local government officials are not politicians but civil servants. The Chiefs must respect the local government officers. I would propose PAX to initiate training chiefs on the local government act (2009), so that they know their role." A senior police official added that "chiefs and state courts are excessively fining the community, they imposed a lot of fines on people, as if crimes have been turned into a communal issue nowadays, but what I know, crimes are an individual's responsibility. We cannot arrest or fine a mother because her son has stolen cattle."

Respondents reporting security incidents usually associate certain incidents more or less with particular security actors. As reported in the previous paragraph, armed youth were relatively more often called in after cattle raids, while the police was preferred in murder, assault and robbery cases. Confirming this tendency, when respondents were asked to indicate who they would contact in imaginary cases, the police scored consistently high in a murder case (**91%**), a sexual assault (**93%**) or a case of unidentified gunmen around their village (**83%**), while armed youth were only seriously considered in case of unidentified gunmen in the area (**47%**) and much less so in murder (**13%**) and



Participants to the data validation workshop and "Security is Everyone's Business" community dialogue. Attendees included local government officials, security sector officials (police), community leaders and civil society representatives from media, church, women's and youth groups (17 February 2021, Bor)

sexual assault (6%) cases. Participants to the data validation in Bor confirmed these views, as even a police officer had to concede that “there are certain cases in which the community will seek the assistance of police, things connected to law and order. If it was a rape case definitely the community will seek police assistance, but if it is an enemy, a police force cannot do anything.” Another participant agreed and witnessed this in reality: “when an unknown gunman is spotted around a community and incidents of killing take place, then the local armed youth is the right actor to be contacted.”

When respondents rated the most prominent security actors at the South Sudanese national level (local government, police, SSPDF, local armed youth, UNMISS, paramilitary forces, chiefs), based on their perceived performance in providing security, it turned out that most local security actors were considered to perform well, with paramilitary forces (wildlife rangers, fire brigade, etc.), local armed youth, SSPDF and the police receiving highest performance reviews, and UNMISS’ judgement being split evenly⁴¹ (see figure below).⁴²


When asked how the three security actors most mentioned (armed youth, police and UNMISS) could improve their performance, respondents responded by saying that local armed youth “should be better armed or equipped” (67%), “they need to be more visible/patrolling” (46%), “we need more presence of armed youth” (39%) and “they need to be better trained” (37%). To improve police performance, 63% of respondents indicated “we need more presence of the police”, “they should be better armed or equipped” (57%), “they need to be more visible/patrolling” (50%), “they need to be better

trained” (39%) and “we need this actor to be more responsive towards the civilians” (31%). Regarding UNMISS, 63% of respondents who claim their presence in their area said “they need to be more responsive towards the civilians”, while 59% said “they need to be more visible/patrolling.”⁴³


A pastor during the data validation workshop partly agreed with the views of the community: “I agree that what is needed to improve the performance of police is that they need to be more responsive, more visible and need to be equipped. (...) However, I am against the community views that suggested the local armed youth be well armed, instead I need them all disarmed but the government is not doing its protection role, that’s what confuses people really.” A local administrator complained of unlawful arrests made by the police, to which he was subjected himself while they were collecting taxes from the market in Bor Town: “we had a quarrel with a disobeying businessman, the police interfered in defense of the businessman and I was arrested unlawfully for one hour, till the State Minister of Local Government intervened, and I was released. It was very wrong for me to be arrested when I was executing my duties and when I was having immunity as a local government administrative officer.”

A senior official representing the police acknowledged that challenges facing the police were many and created obstacles to execute their mandate properly: “The number of policemen has diminished due to the economic crisis and the situation we are in, we are trying our very best but you people have to appreciate, we have so many challenges, including lack of mobility and guns in the hands of our civil population, which has made it a bit

HOW DO YOU RATE THE PERFORMANCE OF THESE ACTORS IN PROVIDING SECURITY? (N = 468)



WHAT CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO BRING LASTING PEACE TO SOUTH SUDAN? (N = 468)



difficult for us to deliver according to the people's expectations. The organized forces [police] were not allowed to do their mandate. Chiefs and youth sabotage police work. The community does not cooperate with the police to report cases, then how will the police know what is happening in the village or in the area? The local chiefs and residential local leaders must cooperate with the police to report crimes, as [we know that] security is a joint business."

More than two-thirds (71%) of respondents agreed with the statement that "the police takes reports from community members seriously and are helpful in resolving them"⁴⁴ and 76% of respondents agreed that "men and women in this community get equal assistance when reporting a security incident to the police." However, the support for more women officers serving in the police ("there should be more women serving in the police to help with security issues facing women") was high among respondents: 82% agreed, while 16% did not, implying that women who report security incidents need to be served better. Another 84% of respondents would actually support women in their families who wanted to apply for a position in the police force. On a similar note, 86% of respondents agreed that more women should serve in the (local) courts.

Participatory suggestions to address local insecurity

When asked to look into the future, more than two-thirds of all respondents (69%) indicated that "poor governance at the national level" is the most likely factor to cause future conflicts in Jonglei State, with a similar number of respondents (67%) saying that poverty is the most likely factor, followed by "high crime rates", "tribalism or discrimination between ethnic groups" (both 34% of respondents) and "easy access to weapons" (31%).⁴⁵ That local government authorities enjoy higher confidence rates than the national authorities in Juba, also became apparent in responses to the statement about the impact of local elites who are based in Juba, on the security situation in Jonglei.

41% of all respondents agreed that "Local politicians and community leaders from this area who live in Juba are often creating community conflicts in their home area, or make them worse", whereas 24% was of the opinion that "Local politicians and community leaders from Jonglei who live in Juba are helpful in preventing or resolving community conflicts", while 29% didn't know.⁴⁶ More than half of respondents (58%) did not agree that the national government in Juba "is taking effective steps to reduce violence", and 14% agreed. In addition, while almost a third of respondents said that the availability of guns would likely cause conflict, two-thirds of respondents (66%) disagreed with the statement that it is "too easy to buy new weapons in our payam", while only 6% agreed that weapons can be obtained too easily (28% didn't know), similar to community views back in 2018.

When putting future expectations more positively ("What are the 3 most significant changes that need to happen to bring lasting peace to South Sudan?"), almost three-quarters of the respondents (74%) answered that "Improved governance at the national level" was needed, followed by economic development (65%), improved community relations (43%), implementation of the national peace agreement⁴⁷ (36%) and civilian development (30%), see figure above.⁴⁸

Data validation participants were commonly supportive of disarming civilians and the armed youth, who are blamed for often misusing their guns and initiating communal violence, but it was stressed that at this point in time there is no reliable alternative protection actor to keep communities and their belongings safe. "You cannot disarm the local youth at this time, as nothing will protect the community. The results of this survey also show that the local armed youth are playing an important community security role in their communities." Therefore, respondents' expectations on how the local security situation would develop over the next year were not very high: 37% thought it would become worse, 30% said it wouldn't change and 16% believed the situation would improve (with the remaining 18% not risking any prediction).

Respondents feel that the results of this and future surveys should be actively shared with the community, primarily through “organizing community meetings with citizens, local authorities and security actors” (86% of all respondents; 99% of Twic East respondents), by “organizing meetings with specific groups in society, like women, youth, or chiefs” (29%⁴⁹), through local radio broadcasts (12%) and through publishing a report (9%), among other lesser-mentioned options.

Participants to the multi-day data validation and community security dialogue in Bor jointly identified five main security priorities most in need of addressing, based on the survey data and subsequent discussions: 1) cattle raids/child abductions/kidnappings, 2) robberies 3) rapes/sexual assaults, 4) flooding, and 5) land disputes. Common understanding of threats and priorities helps to focus local peacebuilding efforts in the upcoming year, as well as the follow-up activities initiated by the Community Security Committee (COMSECCOM) on the basis of a joint action plan, which is agreed and supported by the local authorities and other community representatives.

PAX is committed to continue conducting (bi-)annual rounds of survey collection and community engagement in the course of 2021-2023, to generate additional insights into local security dynamics, to monitor how identified trends in local security provision develop over time, and to support the local follow-up activities undertaken by community representatives, with the aim of achieving sustainable results in improving the local security situation for communities across the surveyed counties of Jonglei State. As a participant to a previous dialogue meeting expressed how he got convinced that security issues involved him as well as the whole community:

“I don’t think the entire community thinks in the way we’re thinking here. They’re not aware of the fact that security is everyone’s business – and that they should contribute themselves. They tend to rely on authorities only. Today I started to think that it’s everyone’s business, while yesterday I was thinking security should be provided to me.”

Notes

¹ Lower governmental administrative area, mostly consisting of a town or a number of adjacent villages or hamlets. The payam often serves as a basic point of logistical orientation for many (rural) South Sudanese.

² In previous data collections cycles, Duk County was also surveyed, but as a result of the COVID-19 global pandemic and subsequent national measures curbing the spread of the

infection, including far-reaching travel restrictions and limitations to the number of participants to trainings, workshops and meetings, a more limited number of enumerators could be trained for data collection. In addition, the availability of enumerators able to cover Duk County was too limited so that this area was eventually dropped from the survey. However, we hope to include Duk County again during future data collection cycles as before.

³ For more details on the survey methodology, please visit <https://protectionofcivilians.org/report/human-security-survey-methodology-south-sudan/>

⁴ The median age in South Sudan is 18.6 years according to the CIA World Fact Book (<https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/south-sudan/>). By excluding respondents below 16 years of age, the average age in our sample is necessarily much higher.

⁵ In fact, 43% of all respondents (62% of women and 1% of men) indicated that their household was headed by a woman.

⁶ 16% of all women respondents claimed they were widowed, as did 1% of men.

⁷ While it was agreed during the community meeting in Bor (Feb 2021) that indeed most people rely on farming in Jonglei, many participants placed this in a historical perspective, saying that originally the people of Jonglei owned many more cows, but that most of their animals were raided during the previous years and decades, going back as far as the 1991 conflict between Dinka Bor and Nuer. It was claimed that the majority of families in greater Bor and Duk have subsequently lost most of their cattle, and because their level of cattle ownership never recovered, many communities now rely solely on farming.

⁸ More than a third of respondents (37%) said that their own livelihood did not comprise the main livelihood of their household, most of these respondents (60%) claimed that their household relies on aid from NGOs or the UN.

⁹ Nearly half (49%) of respondents who have moved their residence indicated they did this once (65% respondents from Twic East County), 41% migrated twice, 9% migrated three times and 1% migrated four or more times over the last 7 years. 63% of respondents indicated they moved from a different state into Jonglei.

¹⁰ Respondents could pick more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.

¹¹ A local government official countered during the Bor dialogue that “the reason for migration was not only insecurity, I think people also migrate to look for social amenities and services. The SPLM [South Sudanese political movement dominating the independence struggle as well as post-independence national politics, AQ] objective and policy of taking town and services to rural areas and communities was just a theory that was not implemented by the people currently in the government.”

¹² When asked on what sources they based their response, 90% of respondents claimed this was based on their own experiences, while 35% mentioned that this was what people around them were saying, among other options as this was a multiple choice question.

¹³ Asked to respondents who claimed their security situation worsened in the last 12 months in 2020.

¹⁴ Respondents could pick more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.

- ¹⁵ Idem.
- ¹⁶ The floods in Jonglei were also reported in the national media during the time of field data collection: *“Heavy flood forces thousands of Bor residents out of their homes”* (Radio Tamazuj, 03-08-2020) and *“Governor Denay warns of crisis as floods hit Jonglei”* (Radio Tamazuj, 13-08-2020), among others.
- ¹⁷ Respondents could select more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ¹⁸ 74% of respondents from Twic East reported one or more incidents over the last year, compared to 65% of Bor South respondents.
- ¹⁹ Radio Tamazuj, *Escalating intercommunal conflict could unravel peace pact: Shearer*, 10-06-2020; Radio Tamazuj, *‘Militias responsible for most violence in South Sudan’-UNMISS*, 31-03-2021, among many other available news reports on the issue.
- ²⁰ As respondents could indicate more than one (kind of) security incident, the sum of percentages of reported security incidents exceeds 100%.
- ²¹ As a reported incident can involve more than one victim, the sum of percentages of alleged victims exceeds 100%.
- ²² Respondents could pick more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ²³ Ranging from 49% of murder cases, 57% of cattle raiding cases to 74% of robbery cases.
- ²⁴ Of the remaining respondents who did not seek external assistance, 62% said they did not do so because they *“did not believe anyone could help me resolve the issue”* (72% of respondents in Twic East, compared to 55% in Bor South), while 29% said that they *“could not get in contact with anyone for help”*, for example because they found themselves in remote areas without network connection.
- ²⁵ For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result, the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ²⁶ Idem.
- ²⁷ Idem.
- ²⁸ 88% of Twic East respondents were of this opinion.
- ²⁹ 90% of Twic East respondents agreed with this notion.
- ³⁰ 90% of Twic East respondents agreed with this.
- ³¹ 96% of Twic East respondents agreed with this.
- ³² For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ³³ 73% of Twic East respondents.
- ³⁴ For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ³⁵ SSPDF stands for South Sudan People’s Defense Forces, a term adopted in 2017 replacing the term SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army), referring to the main armed group fighting the Sudanese regime in Khartoum in the decades preceding independence in 2011.
- ³⁶ Geographical difference in trust levels between Bor South and Twic East counties was clear: in Bor South respondents trusted the police (58%), the armed youth (57%), the SSPDF (21%) and UNMISS (6%) and community leaders or chiefs (4%) most, whereas in Twic East, respondents trusted armed youth (92%), police (46%), SSPDF (7%), community leaders or chiefs (1%) and UNMISS (0%) most.
- ³⁷ For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ³⁸ A local pastor agreed that UNMISS did not have any presence in Twic East County: *“UNMISS also needed to be more responsive and to be more visible, but unfortunately UNMISS is zero percentage in Twic East county which is true, in Bor one cannot patrol there, due to bad roads and logistical challenges.”*
- ³⁹ For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ⁴⁰ In 2018, 84% agreed to this statement, while 15% disagreed.
- ⁴¹ 56% of all respondents disagreed with the statement that *“UNMISS is actively assisting the government to protect people in this community”*, with only 22% agreeing to it (and another 22% saying they didn’t know). This data was collected in July, well before UNMISS started to withdraw its troops from the protection (PoC) site in Bor Town in September 2020. However, it was an improvement from results in 2018, when 63% of respondents disagreed with this statement, and 22% agreed.
- ⁴² Some geographical variation could be found here too: in Twic East County 92% of respondents thought that the armed youth did either a very good job or a good job, while only 1% thought they did a bad or very bad job, compared to 67% and 17% for Bor South respondents respectively.
- ⁴³ For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ⁴⁴ Down from 88% of enumerators agreeing to this statement in 2018.
- ⁴⁵ For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ⁴⁶ Participants to the data validation meeting in Bor also voted and agreed in majority that local elites and politicians based in Juba often create conflicts or make them worse.
- ⁴⁷ The national peace agreement meant here is the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which was signed in September 2018 by the national government and the main armed opposition (SPLA-IO).
- ⁴⁸ For this question, respondents were allowed to give three answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- ⁴⁹ 41% of Bor South respondents think this is a good idea, compared to just 1% of Twic East respondents.



Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Peace. Are you in?

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