Human Security Survey
2018 Annual Summary Report
Jubek State, South Sudan

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- Security perceptions have generally improved across Rejaf and Mangalla counties of Jubek State in 2018 compared to 2017.

- The amount of reported security incidents by respondents in Rejaf and Mangalla counties of Jubek have reduced considerably in 2018 compared to the survey 1,5 years before.

- Generally, community members in Jubek are supportive of formal security actors, most prominently the police. However, many people are dissatisfied with the police's performance, their capacities and resources. Even police officers agreed that the police is often not well positioned to execute their law enforcement duties effectively.

Introduction and methodology

The Human Security Survey (HSS) is a unique survey methodology developed by PAX, that includes a series of complementary activities, including population-based research, community engagement, and advocacy. The objectives of the HSS are: 1) to increase knowledge and understanding of local human security dynamics and trends; 2) to enhance the 'claim-making capacity' of civilians to hold security providers and decision-makers accountable; and 3) to inform evidence-based advocacy that enables international stakeholders to design and implement protection activities that reflect local realities. PAX currently implements the HSS in South Sudan in close collaboration with its long-standing local partners South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) and Assistance Mission to Africa (AMA).

The survey in Jubek State took place in the course of three weeks in November 2018 by 11 enumerators (7 men and 4 women) who were trained for four days in data collection skills and procedures.[1] A total of **474** surveys have been collected across 8 *payams*[2] in Rejaf and Mangalla counties of Jubek State. Within these payams, households and individual respondents were selected using an approximately random procedure to allow for some generalizability.

In August 2019 PAX and its local partners SSANSA and AMA facilitated a community security dialogue in Intra Africa Hotel, Juba. During this three-day dialogue the main survey findings and its practical implications were presented, discussed, and validated; participants jointly worked out an action plan for addressing security priorities locally; and the local Community Security Committee (COMSECCOM) set up in December 2017, consisting of community members including chiefs, women and local government officials, presented the activities it organized to implement the 2017 action plan during the last 1,5 years. This way, initiatives to address locally identified

security issues originate from the community and are increasingly locally accounted for, genuinely representing community-based bottom-up capacities.

MAP OF SOUTH SUDAN AND JUBEK STATE

Demographics of the survey sample

Almost half (**48%**) of respondents indicated that they belonged to the ethnic group of Bari, 13% indicated to be Dinka, **5%** was Acholi and the remaining third of respondents belonged to 15 different ethnic groups that each scored between **1-3%**. These numbers seem to reflect the fairly heterogeneous demographic situation in Jubek, more so than the other three locations where the HSS is conducted, where a single ethnic group clearly dominates the area.

Almost half (**46%**) of respondents were between 16-30 years of age, over a third (**35%**) were between the ages 31-45, **16%** between 45-65 years of age and only **3%** were above 65 years old.[5] **59%** of respondents were female, **41%** were male, most likely because surveys were primarily conducted during the morning and afternoon hours. At those times, many men are out herding cattle, working the fields, or engaging in other livelihood activities away from their homes. Female family members are more likely to be found in and around the house to look after children and do domestic chores, which was also confirmed by some enumerators who attended the community dialogue in Juba in August 2019.

Little over half of respondents (**57%**) indicated that they had a job or source of livelihood at the time of the interview, **43%** said that they didn't. The respondents who did have a job or livelihood were mostly farmers or land labourers (**46%**),[6] were working in small businesses (**24%**), were working in the security sector (**7%**), civil servants/government employees (**6%**), doing domestic work outside of their own household (**5%**), with smaller numbers (**1-3%**) representing 8 other types of livelihoods etc.

The respondents who did not have a job or source of livelihood described their situation as being a housewife and doing domestic work in their own household (**53%**),[7] being unemployed (**28%**), students (**12%**) or relying on aid from the UN, NGOs or others (**5%**).

Some participants to the community dialogue in Juba argued that some occupational groups such as cattle keepers were underrepresented in the survey, which is likely in Jubek as well as in other survey locations. This is largely explainable by the often remote areas where cattle camps are located, where cattle keepers sometimes reside together with their families, in the bush, far from settlements and road access, especially during the dry season when the survey in Jubek was conducted. In addition, some enumerators do not feel comfortable travelling this far or visiting the cattle camps altogether, reinforcing the underrepresentation of cattle keepers, or they were simply unable to locate them.

79% of all respondents indicated that they have lived in their current payams since 2013, while **19%** of respondents indicated that they moved their residence during the last five years at least once. Of all respondents who had to move from their payams during the last five years, **85%** claimed they had to do so because of insecurity, **41%** because of economic opportunities/work/education, **23%** did so to improve access to basic services/food/health care etc., **18%** because of marriage or living closer to family and **11%** due to seasonal or nomadic migration (see the figure below).[8]

WHAT WERE THE REASON FOR YOUR MIGRATION? *(N= 91)*

|	
Insecurity	85%
Economic opportunities/education	41%
Improve access to basic services	23%
Marriage/living closer to family	18%
Seasonal/nomadic migration	11%
Other	4%

Main findings

Perception of the general security situation

Respondents' assessment of developments in their personal security situation show that the general mood concerning the security situation has improved over the last year. More than half (**54%**) of respondents claim that their security situation has improved during the last year (compared to **48%** in 2017), while only **16%** said that their security situation got worse over the last year, a sharp decline from the **32%** who said their security got worse in 2017. Almost a third

(**30%**) did not perceive any positive or negative change in their security (see figure below).[8]

However, there was widespread regional variation concerning these security perceptions, with levels of perceived improvement much higher in Rejaf (**77%**) compared to Mangalla county (**20%**). This difference was debated during the community dialogue in Juba, also because the enumerators were not able to cover some of the 'hot areas' where insecurity was considered rampant and therefore advised not to cover these areas. Even leaving out these so called 'hot' areas showed sufficient differences between the two surveyed counties. It was argued that Rejaf county, being close to the capital of Juba, has a higher concentration of (visible) law enforcement agencies compared to the more remote and rural areas of Mangalla county. In addition, Mangalla county borders counties and states that some participants considered 'problematic' in terms of security dynamics.

HOW DID YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY CHANGE?

	Worsened	Unchanged	Improved
2017 (N= 524)	32%	20%	48%
2018 (N= 457)	16%	30%	54%

The main reasons why the security situation has improved (asked to respondents who claimed their security situation improved in 2018, compared to 2017) were mainly that there was "*less violence in our payam*" (**90%**) and "*there is less crime*" (**87%**), with lower amounts claiming that "*there were fewer weapons*" circulating (**31%**) and saying that they felt safer leaving their home (**24%**, see figure below). Of the respondents who thought the security situation had become worse, more than three-quarters (**77%**) claimed this was due to increased crime rates, while **74%** thought "*there was more violence*" in general and **59%** thought that "*There are more weapons*" and another **46%** indicated that they "*do not feel safe inside their home*", etc.[10]

WHY DID YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY SITUATION
IMPROVE? (N= 245)

There is less violence	90%
There is less crime	87%
There are fewer weapons	31%
I feel safer leaving my home	24%
I feel safer in general	14%
Friends or family have been able to return...	12%
There is less corruption/misuse of money	11%
I have better access to food	11%
I have better access to basic services...	11%
Other	11%

Irrespective of whether perceived insecurity levels improved or got worse over the last year, local communities generally develop strategies to cope with existing levels of insecurity in fragile contexts such as South Sudan. **30%** of all respondents indicated that they "*sought assistance from formal or informal security forces*", such as the army, police or local armed youth, in dealing with insecurity, **23%** avoided going to specific places or avoided going out after dark, **21%** travelled less frequently outside of the home, **12%** joined formal or informal security forces themselves, etc. Another **23%** said that they did not make any significant change in their daily lives.[11]

During the community dialogue in Juba, some participants questioned the views of the majority of respondents that the security situation in 2018 had indeed improved, compared to the previous year. However, members of the law enforcement agencies that were present confirmed that the overall view of improved security was backed up by lower levels of reported incidents, especially in Rejaf county, where coverage by law enforcement agencies was more reliable than in Mangalla (see more under the "security actors" paragraph).

Incident reporting

Respondents were asked whether they themselves or their household members experienced any given security incidents during the last year. Across the two surveyed counties of Jubek State, more than half of respondents (**56%**) indicated that they or their household members experienced one or more of a given list of security incidents during the last year. This is a little lower than the **65%** of respondents reporting that they were a victim of one or more of these types of incidents during the survey of 2017. Within Jubek State there was little regional variation in the shown victimization rates: **60%** of respondents in Mangalla county indicated that they were victims of at least one type of incident, compared to **52%** victimization rate in Rejaf county.

Generally across all reported security incidents, men indicated higher victimization rates than women: **52%** of incidents involved adult men as victims and in **22%** boys were victimized, while adult women (**34%**) and girls (**18%**) indicated less frequently being victims of the reported security incidents.[12] The explanation provided during the security dialogue was that it is mainly (young) men that are active in the fields and cattle camps, involved in committing cattle raids and other forms of criminality on the one hand, and also its prime targets and victims on the other.

The 2018 survey generally saw only a third of the total number of violent incidents reported (**596** incidents) compared to 2017 (**1775** incidents), by a lower number of households that reported incidents at all (**265** households in 2018, from **341** in 2017). Therefore, the number of incidents reported per household has greatly decreased (from **5.2** to **2.2** incidents reported per household on average).[13] The most reported type of incident by respondents throughout Jubek State in 2018 was robbery, reported by more than a quarter (**27%**) of surveyed households, a lot less frequent than the **59%** of respondents reporting robbery back in 2017. The amount of reports of murder or killing in 2018 (**22%**) had risen slightly compared to 2017 (**19%**), with a mixed pattern of other reported incidents in 2018, compared to 2017: assault with a weapon **17%** (**24%** in 2017), cattle raiding **13%** (**3%** in 2017), beating **11%** (same in 2017) and abduction or kidnapping **10%** (**5%** in 2017), with **26%** indicating a host of other incidents with lower frequencies. There was, however, quite some variety in incident reporting between Mangalla and Rejaf counties (see below).

PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS REPORTING INCIDENTS

Respondents indicated that **40%** of all reported incidents happened in their payam, with an additional **40%** claiming the incident happened inside their home, stressing that risky areas are likely located within people's direct day-to-day living environment. Most respondents who reported one or more security incidents happening to themselves or a household member, generally perceived that criminals were the most likely perpetrators of these incidents (**61%**), **8%** of respondents did not know who where the perpetrators, followed by lower frequencies for the national army (Sudan People's Liberation Army; **5%**), the oppositional Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Opposition or SPLA-IO (**5%**), local armed youth (**4%**), other armed groups (**4%**), and a total of **14%** summarizing other less mentioned potential perpetrators. Generally these perpetrator groups were equally recognized by the participants to the community dialogue.

More than half of respondents who were victimized

(**55%**) indicated that they contacted someone out-side their household to help them resolve the incident they experienced.[16] The most contacted actors generally were the police (**82%**), local leaders (chiefs; **32%**), the national army (**23%**), and a local government official, like the Commissioner or a payam administrator (**18%**).[17] The police was contacted in **83%** of all robbery cases, **83%** of all reported murder cases, in **82%** of cases of assault with a weapon, and two-thirds of cattle raiding cases (the four most frequently reported security incidents across Jubek), with an average of **82%** across all reported security incidents. Local community leaders (tribal elders or chiefs) were the second most frequently contacted actors, in **19%** of robbery cases, **38%** of murder cases, **27%** of assault cases involving a weapon and more than half (**52%**) of cattle raiding cases, resulting in an average requested response rate across all incidents of **32%**.[18] During the dialogue it was confirmed that most community members preferred contacting the police, but that in villages or areas where there is no police presence, community members often resort to contacting the chiefs.

In **94%** of all incidents where nobody was contacted (N= 179), this was because respondents didn't believe anyone could help them resolve the incident. On the other hand, a vast majority of respondents (**84%**) who did call in outside assistance indicated that they were not satisfied with the resolution of the incident by the security actor they contacted. When asked what made them dissatisfied, most respondents indicated this was because "*the perpetrator was not caught*" (**92%**), with lower numbers indicating that "*the perpetrator was not punished*" (**29%**), that "*no compensation for their losses was offered*" (**26%**) and that "*the person or institution I went to for help did nothing*" (**22%**), with four lower scoring responses receiving **2-8%** of respondents' scores.[19]

Vulnerability

When asked about the vulnerability of certain groups in society, half of respondents (**51%**) claimed that women and girls are equally likely to become a victim of violence than men and boys across Jubek State, while **21%** claimed women and girls were more likely to become a victim of violence, and **18%** thought that men or boys were more likely to become victimized (and **11%** didn't know). In a similar fashion, half of respondents (**49%**) agreed to the statement that "*All people in this community are equally likely to be exposed to violence*", irrespective of gender or age, while **29%** of respondents were of the opinion that "*some people in this community are more likely to be exposed to violence than others*", with a similar

distribution of views expressed by the participants to the community dialogue in Juba. Another **22%** of respondents didn't know or refused to answer altogether.

In addition, men and women are perceived to have different reasons or aspects of vulnerability according to respondents. Three-quarters of respondents (**74%**) think that women's and girls' vulnerability stems from the notion that "*they cannot physically protect themselves*", followed by "*they do not have anyone to protect them*" (**44%**). Men or boys were considered vulnerable by **55%** of respondents because "*they are likely to be seen as a threat*", for instance as a potential criminal, combatant or cattle raider. More than a third (**37%**) were of the opinion that men and boys "*are targeted as a matter of revenge or to restore honour*", **36%** because "*they do not have anyone to protect them*" and **30%** thought that "*they cannot physically protect themselves*".[20]

When groups in society beyond the gender dichotomy are considered in their vulnerability to violence, responses primarily highlighted people from specific ethnic groups (**49%**), young unmarried women or girls (**29%**), young men and boys (**27%**), IDPs or refugees (**22%**), small children (**21%**) being vulnerable to become victims of violence, etc. (see the graph below).[21] When asked what potential perpetrators the respondents themselves feared in the future, most of them mentioned criminals (**68%**).

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE/GROUPS DO YOU CONSIDER MOST LIKELY TO BE EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE IN THIS COMMUNITY? *(N= 231)*

|	
People from specific ethnic groups	49%
Young women or girls (unmarried)	29%
Young men and boys	27%
IDPs or refugees	22%
Small children	21%
Elderly people	19%
People without guns in general	19%
I don't know	19%
Other	29%

Security actors

We asked respondents what (security) actors were present and accessible in their respective payams throughout Jubek State. The actors that scored the highest for having a consistent presence were local leaders (**91%**), NGOs (**81%**), local government officials (commissioners; **80%**), religious leaders (**77%**), the police (**72%**), UNMISS (**65%**), lawyers or official (state) courts (**62%**) and the national army (**58%**). On the other hand, (security) actors that were mainly considered not or less present or accessible were SPLA-IO[22] (**79%** of respondents claiming it was *not* consistently

present in their payam), an "other armed group" (**78%**), local armed youth (**55%**) and paramilitary forces (**55%**). However, there is quite some regional variation in accessibility of security actors between Mangalla and Rejaf counties (see the table below).

DO THE FOLLOWING ACTORS HAVE A CONSISTENT PRESENCE IN YOUR PAYAM? *(N= 474)*

	Rejaf county (N= 274)	Mangalla county (N= 183)
NGOs	82%	83%
Government officials	84%	76%
Lawyers	73%	50%
Religious leaders	85%	64%
Local leaders	88%	97%
Other armed group	7%	0%
Paramilitary forces	35%	51%
UNMISS	80%	49%
Local armed youth	46%	2%
SPLA-IO	5%	0%
National army (SPLA)	62%	55%
Police	87%	52%

Overall, respondents overwhelmingly reported that the security actors most locally present and accessible, were also the actors considered to be most positive in their effect on the local security situation (see the figure below). Then, respondents were asked to rate only the five most prominent security actors at the South Sudanese national level (police, national army, SPLA-IO, local armed youth and UNMISS) more specifically, regardless of their local presence, on their perceived performance in providing security. Of these five actors, the police scored best (**60%** rated them as "good/very good"), followed by UNMISS (**55%** rated them "good/very good") and the national army (**48%** rated them "good/very good").[23] Meanwhile, SPLA-IO (**39%** "not good/very

IN GENERAL, HOW DO YOU RATE THEIR EFFECT ON YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY SITUATION? *(N= 474)*

	Mostly negative	No effect	Mostly positive
Police	16%	23%	53%
National army (SPLA)	20%	30%	39%
SPLA-IO	26%	35%	4%
Local armed youth	26%	35%	11%
UNMISS	17%	26%	47%
Paramilitary forces	19%	36%	30%
Another armed group	23%	38%	8%
Local leaders	4%	15%	77%
Religious leaders	5%	23%	66%
Lawyers or official courts	9%	31%	48%
Government officials	15%	21%	57%
NGOs	19%	23%	52%

bad") and local armed youth (**21%** "good/very good" and **26%** "not good/very bad") have a predominantly negative appreciation concerning security provision.[24]

When asked how these security actors could improve their performance, more than half of respondents (**52%**) said *"we need more presence of this actor"* (the police scored **82%** on this point, UNMISS **62%** and the national army **61%**), **41%** said *"we need this actor to be more visible, for instance through patrols"* (the police scored **70%** on this point, UNMISS **51%** and the national army **49%**), **38%** thought that *"this security actor needs to be better trained"* (**65%** said this about the police, **45%** about the national army and **31%** about local armed youth as well as UNMISS), **36%** indicated that *"we need this actor to be more responsive towards the civilians"* (the police scored **62%** on this point, UNMISS **45%** and the national army **42%**), etc.[25]

Two-thirds (**67%**) of respondents agreed with the statement that "*the police takes reports from community members seriously and are helpful in resolving them*"[26] and **65%** of respondents agreed that "*men and women in this community get equal assistance when reporting a security incident to the police.*" However, the support for more women officers serving in the police ("*there should be more women serving in the police to help with security issues facing women*") was high among respondents: **80%** agreed, while **16%** did not, suggesting that women who report security incidents need to be served better. In addition, most respondents indicated that they would go to the police in the hypothetical case they would be confronted with murder, rape, or when seeing unidentified armed men around their village (police scoring **83%**, **80%** and **80%** in these hypothetical cases respectively). The police scores higher than reporting these hypothetical cases to local leaders or chiefs (**47%**-**43%**-**45%** respectively), family or friends (scoring **47%**-**48%**-**40%** respectively), local government officials, such as Commissioners and payam administrators (scoring **28%**-**22%**-**26%** resp.), and the national army (scoring **23%**-**18%**-**31%** respectively).

The generally high approval rates of the police are not dissimilar with other surveyed areas in South Sudan, but what is notable in Jubek is that respondents have a less strong identification with and appreciation of more informal local armed youth, who are usually expected to provide security to their cattle and their surrounding local area. This became apparent in responses to the statement "*In my payam we trust local armed youth for our security more than any outsiders*". Only **35%** agreed to this statement, while **51%** disagreed. This indicates a preference for formal yet external security actors like the police over

informal but local (and therefore accessible) armed youth.[27] Similarly, two-thirds (**67%**) of respondents agreed with "*my community needs more police presence to provide security*" (**92%** of respondents in Mangalla County!), while **27%** supported the statement that "*my community should rely on local armed youth to provide protection and security*". However, support for the statement "*It is best for the security in our payam that security forces are from outside the payam, because they do not take sides*" was inconclusive, with almost half (**47%**) supporting it, and similarly **48%** in favour of the opposing statement "*It is best for security in our payam when security forces are from our own community, because they know us*".

However, despite the relatively high appreciation of the police shown by respondents in the survey, it was argued during the community dialogue in Juba that people's trust in the police is rather low. Many participants to the dialogue agreed that they do not have a good reputation. Examples to support this claim pointed to the limited capacity local police can offer outside of Juba: *"some people do not report issues because they don't believe their case will be followed up. We often hear police saying, 'there is no fuel in the car', so they cannot patrol an area or chase a criminal. If a criminal is arrested, but he pays the police more than you do, then he is released."* Some participants to the dialogue thought that the weakness of the police was a structural challenge due to its makeup: *"Most of the police consists of militias, made up of people who didn't go to school and/or didn't receive training, so they don't know the law. They will only work with what comes out of their own mind, but not according to the law. That's why the civilians are very much angry about the police. Only a minority is qualified and actually know the procedures. Thus, the government should train the police, and remove people that are not fit to serve. After screening, the police will remain with fewer personnel, but they will be trained and organized. That's why training is good: so that the police knows it's duties and the law."*

When confronted with these examples, the police officers present during the dialogue did not dismiss all of these remarks right away, but pointed towards a lack of investment and backup from higher authorities: *"the police do not have many resources, sometimes we cannot record anything or we are told to loot from people to feed ourselves as our salaries are not enough. Sometimes good officers leave because they don't get paid. Which leaves us with a dysfunctional police force. In this situation, some [police officers] may forget about the law. There is no motivation coming from the government, but we are part of the community and must serve it."* Low reporting from community members could partly be blamed on the confusing setup of the police, as the police officer explained: *"people get confused who to report to if both state police and national police are operating in the same location, while these are deployed from various branches of government. Sometimes people report incidents at the wrong office, because there are general police offices, but there are also police sector stations, from where joint operations involving police and military are deployed, and which are dominated by the military. Some generals were removed from the army and now work next to police generals, even though they didn't receive police trainings. This is a problem: because these generals will just work ac-*

cording to their own [military] background. There is sometimes disrespect between the national army and the police; the national army is undermining the police." Another participant suggested, *"the police should be given it's rightful authority by the Ministry of Interior, so that the police can be properly held accountable for their duties. Now police are just working on a combination of different commands; which is confusing and mixing up things. The police system needs harmonization from above, but the weakness is at the top and we have to deal with the results".*

A local chief confirmed that the police and the national army are often perceived differently by one another, as well as by community members: *"We have a problem in our payam concerning the police and the army. We have no presence of police in our payam, but the army is there. While it's the army's duty to protect the country and its borders, it's the police's duty to protect the community. Our payam faces a bad relationship between the community and the army, maybe because of a lack of police there is no communication. The community would rather have the police, but the police is not there. So hopefully with the help of this survey we can improve it's presence. (…) the army should be far away from the communities. And civilians should not intermingle with the armed forces."*

Participatory suggestions to address local insecurity

Two-thirds of respondents (**67%**) indicated that "*poverty or a lack of livelihood opportunities*" is the most likely factor to cause future conflicts in Jubek State, followed by "*poor governance at the national (Juba) level*" (**57%**), "the *national political power struggle*"[28] (**21%**), "*tribalism or discrimination between ethnic groups*" (**19%**) and "*poor governance at the local level*" (**10%**), see the graph below.[29]

WHAT ARE THE FACTORS MOST LIKELY CAUSING FURTHER CONFLICT IN YOUR COMMUNITY IN THE NEXT YEAR? *(N= 474)*

When community members generally discuss local security issues, they often mention the easy access to and distribution of guns within communities, to the extent that communities and armed youth often outgun formal security providers, thereby decreasing the security actors' ability to provide effective protection. However, **93%** of respondents indicated that civilian disarmament was needed to increase the security of their payam, resisting prevalent self-protection mechanisms found in remote locations, while **7%** said that people need guns to provide their own security.[30] However, two-thirds (**67%**) of all respondents disagreed with the statement that "*It is easy to buy new weapons in our payam*" and only **14%** of respondents mentioned easy access to weapons as an important conflict trigger, thereby countering the idea that proliferation of arms in their communities is particularly widespread.

Participants to the dialogue in Juba were commonly supportive of disarming civilians and the armed youth, who are blamed for misusing their guns and creating insecurity, but at the same time the lack of reliable alternative protection actors means that people cannot keep themselves or their belongings safe, as was narrated by a chief: "*I agree that communities should rely more on police instead of local armed youth. In the whole of South Sudan the youth are defenders of the villages and they protect their cattle by using guns. When you have cattle, but no gun, the cattle will not be with you again. If you have a gun, you can move freely, you can protect, you can stay somewhere. In difficult situations, people can even be robbed inside the house because there is no protection. Cattle is best protected with a gun. And I agree with those of you who are in the village, if you have cattle you buy a gun. Because you want to protect yourself and your cattle. But I also agree that we need disarmament and it must happen in the whole of South Sudan. If disarmament comes and the guns are removed from all civilians, and even from the organized forces, then you are safe and you can protect your cattle with your sticks only, like in the old days.*"

However, civilian disarmament was hardly mentioned during the survey as most viable solution for lasting peace (only by **4%** of respondents). Alternatively, respondents argued overwhelmingly for economic development in the country (**78%**), for "*improved governance at the national level*" (**58%**)[31] and "*implementation of the national peace agreement*" (**28%**) and "*improved (inter)community relations*" (**14%**), etc.[32] (see figure below). In 2017 by comparison, "*improved community relations through reconciliation*" (**54%**) and "*improved governance at

WHAT ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT CHANGES THAT NEED TO HAPPEN TO BRING LASTING PEACE TO SOUTH SUDAN? *(N= 474)*

Change	Percentage
Economic development	78%
Improved governance at the national level	58%
Implementation of the R-ARCSS	28%
Improved community relations	14%
Improved governance at the local level	5%
Civilian disarmament	4%
Other	7%

the national level" (**33%**) were considered the highest priorities by respondents.

Participants attending the community dialogue in Juba jointly identified seven main security priorities in need of addressing: 1) Poverty, hunger, and cutting down trees for charcoal, leading to desertification, 2) Child abduction, 3) Rape and sexual assault, 4) Tensions between pastoralists and farmers, 5) Land grabbing and land disputes, 6) (Armed) robbery and 7) youth gangs. Agreed common understanding of threats and priorities helps to focus local peacebuilding efforts in the upcoming year, as well as the follow-up activities initiated by the Community Security Committee on the basis of a joint action plan, which is supported by the local authorities and other community representatives.

Especially the fourth point was discussed extensively during the dialogue as in July 2018, the Community Security Committee, together with the Civil Affairs UNMISS Central Equatoria office, SSANSA and PAX had organized a successful 2-day Farmers-Pastoralist Forum in Mangalla, attended by relevant local authorities as well. This forum resulted in important agreements and recommendations, but unfortunately the follow-up from local authorities and other parties to the forum had stalled and many of the recommendations were not (yet) implemented. Suggestions were made to set up a committee consisting of farmers and pastoralists themselves, as was proposed during the Forum in 2018, in order to revive the recommendation made and boost implementation in the near future.

PAX and SSANSA are committed to conduct another annual round of survey collection and dialogue in the course of 2020, to generate additional insights into local security dynamics, to see how identified trends in local security develop over time, and to support the local follow-up activities undertaken by community representatives, with the aim of achieving sustainable

results in improving the local security situation for communities across Jubek State. As one of the participants to the Juba dialogue explained how he got convinced during the meeting that indeed security involves the entire community: *"I don't think the entire community thinks in the way we're thinking. They're not aware of the fact that [security] it's everyone's business – and that they should contribute themselves. They tend to rely on authorities only. Today I [started to] think that it's everyone's business, while yesterday I was thinking security should be provided."*

Notes

[1] Of one enumerator, the phone with all collected surveys was stolen before the end of data collection, therefore these surveys could not be added to our total tally.

[2] Lower governmental administrative area, mostly consisting of a town or a number of adjacent villages or hamlets. The payam often serves as a basic point of logistical orientation for many (rural) South Sudanese.

[3] We initially planned to conduct surveys in neighboring Lado county as well. However, after two days of surveying in Lado county, enumerators were stopped by the National Security Service due to issues with official permission (i.e. the go ahead given by the Governor, the office of the Minister of Local Government, and the commissioner of Lado county was not seen as sufficient). As a result, the enumerators who were assigned to survey in Lado county, instead surveyed areas belonging to Mangalla county. When we report findings on county level, we focus only on Rejaf and Mangalla county (N=274 and N= 183 respectively). When we report survey findings on general state level, we do include the only 17 surveys that were conducted in Lado county until the enumerators were stopped, as well.

[4] For more details on the survey methodology, please visit our website (https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/190129_HSS-SS-Methodology-one-pager.pdf)

[5] The median age in South Sudan is 17.3 years according to the CIA World Fact Book (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html). By excluding respondents below 16 years of age, the average age in our sample is necessarily much higher.

[6] 49% of male respondents were farmers, and 43% of females.

[7] 62% of those reportedly doing domestic work were women.

[8] Respondents could pick more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.

[9] However, this general dynamic seems to be contradicted in another question, whereby 42% of respondents agreed to the statement *"I generally feel safe from violence or crime in my community"*, while 48% disagreed (thereby indicating that they didn't feel safe in their community). This was a decrease in security perceptions from the numbers in the 2017 survey, when 54% agreed to the same statement and 43% disagreed.

[10] Respondents could pick more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.

[11] Respondents could pick more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%

[12] As a reported incident can involve more than one victim, the sum of percentages of alleged victims exceeds 100%.

[13] 44% of households did not report any incidents, 23% reported one incident, 17% reported two incidents, 7% reported three incidents and 9% reported more than three incidents over the last year.

[14] The national army was still called the SPLA at the time the surveys were collected, but has since been renamed as the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF). However, many people still refer to them as SPLA.

[15] Respondents could pick more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.

[16] Of the remaining respondents who did not seek external assistance, 58% said they did not do so because they *"did not believe anyone could help me resolve the issue"*, 31% because they *"could not get in touch with anyone for help"* and 25% because *"they feared more harm against myself or my family"*.

[17] For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%. In addition, 80% of respondents thought that in a general sense, the police was the best suited actor to respond to the incident they experienced, followed by local leaders (tribal leaders, chiefs; 32%), *"the Commissioner, payam administrator, or other local government official"* (25%) and the national army (22%).

[18] For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.

[19] Idem.

[20] Idem.

[21] Idem.

[22] The SPLA-IO, or Sudan People's Liberation Army – In Opposition, is the main political and armed oppositional group to the central government of South Sudan in Juba.

[23] In another question, 61% of respondents agreed with the statement "UNMISS is actively working to protect people in this community", while 30% disagreed. Notably, the closest UNMISS bases are in Juba.

[24] In 2017, the question assessing security actors' performance was asked slightly different, i.e.: rate those actors with positive influence, and negative influence. Often the influence of a given security actor was sometimes perceived ambivalently to be both positive and negative by respondents: the police scored 90% positive vs 60% negative perceptions (N= 414), the national army 66% positive vs 47% negative (N= 238) and traditional chiefs/courts 40% positive vs 32% negative (N= 222).

[25] For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.

[26] Down from 74% agreement rates in 2017.

[27] This rate was similar to the score in 2017, when 37% agreed to the statement, but 53% disagreed.

[28] Take note of the fact that the survey data were collected in November 2018, so shortly after the signing of the last Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) that took place in September 2018. Community perceptions might therefore have shifted since then, which we hope to collect in the upcoming 2020 survey.

[29] For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.

[30] Similarly, 86% of respondents preferred disarmament campaigns over self-protection in 2017.

[31] However, more than three-quarters of respondents (76%) agreed to the statement *"The national government in Juba is taking clear steps to reduce violence in our community"*, while 13% disagreed with the statement.

[32] For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result, the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.