Human Security Survey 2018: Annual Summary Report Payinjiar County, Southern Liech State, South Sudan

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- Security levels have improved in Payinjiar in 2018 compared to 2017. The current local peace process is seen as an important contributor to improved security;

- Cattle raiding, killing/murder, forced marriage and forced recruitment in security forces were the most frequently reported security incidents across Payinjiar in 2018;

- To reduce the risk of community members taking the law into their own hands triggering revenge cycles of violence, local authorities should actively encourage community members to report any incidents to the relevant authorities, followed by serious action by these authorities.

Introduction and Methodology

The **Human Security Survey (HSS)** is a unique survey methodology developed by **PAX**, that includes a series of complementary activities, including population-based research, community engagement, and advocacy. The objectives of the HSS are: 1) to increase knowledge and understanding of local human security dynamics and trends; 2) to enhance the 'claim-making capacity' of civilians to hold security providers and decision-makers accountable; and 3) to inform evidence-based advocacy that enables international stakeholders to design and implement protection activities that reflect local realities. PAX currently implements the HSS in South Sudan in close collaboration with its long-standing local partners **South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA)** and **Assistance Mission to Africa (AMA)**.

MAP OF SOUTH SUDAN AND PAYINJIAR COUNTY

The **survey** in Payinjiar county (Southern Liech state) took place over three weeks in **May 2018**[1]. Because Payinjiar county is controlled by the SPLA-IO, while the rest of the state's counties fall largely under gov-

ernment authority, we could not conduct the survey across the entire state at the same time. In combination with a volatile security situation in the other counties at the time of survey collection, access was severely restricted. We therefore conducted this survey in Payinjiar county only. In total **354** surveys have been collected across 13 of Payinjiar county's 16 payams[2]. Within these payams, households and individual respondents were selected using an approximately random procedure to allow for some generalizability[3].

ENUMERATORS SHOWING THEIR CERTIFICATE AFTER THE 4-DAY TRAINING, GANYLIEL APRIL 2018

In **March 2019** PAX and local partners SSANSA and AMA facilitated a **community security dialogue** in Payinjiar county[4]. During this three-day dialogue the main survey findings and its practical implications were presented, discussed, and validated; participants jointly worked out an action plan for addressing security priorities locally; and a local Community Security Committee (COMSECCOM) consisting of community members with diverse backgrounds, is monitoring the local security situation, and organizing activities that address the identified main security priorities. This way, initiatives to work on locally identified security issues originate from the community, genuinely representing community-based bottom-up endeavors.

In between the HSS data collection and corresponding community security dialogue, a lot has happened in Payinjiar county. In **May 2018** a broader **peace process** between Greater Yirol (Eastern Lakes), Amongpiny (Western Lakes), and Payinjiar initiated with a peace conference in Ganyliel, in which chiefs and authorities from these areas agreed they would address issues of cattle raiding and (revenge) killing jointly,

and that there should be freedom of movement by the communities into each other's territories. A follow-up meeting was held in **September 2018** in Nyang (Eastern Lakes), again attended by both Nuer and Dinka chiefs as well as local authorities at county and state levels.


NUER AND DINKA LEADERS AFTER SIGNING THE LOCAL PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAYINJIAR AND EASTERN + WESTERN LAKES

Demographics of the Survey Sample

Of the **354** respondents, **66%** is female and **34%** is male. This slight overrepresentation of women is most likely due to the fact that for security reasons surveys are conducted during daylight hours only,

HSS Respondents

AGE

16-30	31-45	46-65	66+
47%	44%	8%	1%

GENDER

34% Male   66% Female

ETHNICITY

99% Nuer
1% Azande

18% Migrant

JOB/OCCUPATION

51% Farmer

15% Small business

10% Domestic work

5% Cattle keeper

5% Rely on aid from UN/NGO

5% Unemployed

when it is most likely to find women around the household. The average age of respondents in the sample is **33 years** old. Almost all respondents (**99%**) identify themselves with the Nuer ethnicity.

On average **82%** of respondents indicate having primarily lived in the payam during the last 5 years. Of the **18%** that have not (N= 63), **60%** indicate having moved because of insecurity. The majority (**59%**) has moved from another payam within Payinjiar county. The sample underrepresents the number of IDPs living in Payinjiar county[5]. In terms of livelihood strategy, **65%** of respondents work on the land (e.g. as farmer and/or to collect firewood), **15%** work in a small business, **10%** carry out domestic chores, and **5%** are cattle keeper[6]. On average **5%** of respondents rely on aid from NGOs, and **5%** are unemployed. However, during the community security dialogue it was discussed that in reality the unemployment rate and the rate of people relying on aid are much higher: *"This country is in crisis. Many people from town (i.e. Khartoum) have come to Payinjiar county and don't have jobs. Also, there are many displaced people, which don't have jobs either. They don't even have houses, and are thus depending on the host community for housing and on NGOs for food."*

Main Findings

Security Context

Respondents were asked to assess the change in their personal security situation since last year. Overall the *relative* improvement is larger in 2018 than in 2017: in 2018 **58%** of respondents indicate an improved personal security situation, while this was still **31%** in 2017. When looking at a few demographic characteristics of people who mention an improved security situation, we don't find any significant results in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity. On the contrary, respondents *with* a job outside of the household

more often than those *without* mention an improved security situation (**63%** vs **41%**). Participants in the dialogue generally agreed with the statement that the security situation improved. They mainly referred to the local peace process with communities in neighboring Western and Eastern Lakes states as one of the reasons for this[7], even though the promised freedom of movement between Payinjiar and Yirol in Eastern Lakes, where an important (cattle) market is hosted, had not yet materialized.

When asked about the main impacts on daily life as a result of the improved security situation (N= 206), respondents mainly refer to less violence (**80%**) and less crime (**51%**) prevalent in the community[8].

Irrespective of whether perceived insecurity levels improved or got worse over the last year, respondents were asked whether they have developed strategies for coping with general levels of insecurity. The most frequently mentioned strategies are '*seeking assistance from formal or informal security forces*' (**58%**), '*joining formal or informal security forces*' (**28%**), and '*acquiring or using weapons*' (**19%**)[9]. In terms of gender, men more often than women rely on the latter strategy (i.e. acquiring/using weapons) (**28%** vs **15%**), while women more often than men rely on the former (i.e. seeking assistance) (**63%** vs **48%**). During the dialogue it was mentioned as well that some people take the law into their own hands, by i.a. using arms as a means for self-defense. In terms of access to weapons, although **63%** of respondents disagree with the statement that '*it is easy to buy new weapons in my payam*'[10], participants in the dialogue argue that *"as long as you have cows you can buy a gun within one day"*[11]. Nevertheless, **70%** of respondents agree that '*disarmament in the payam is needed for security*', which is a statement

HOW DID YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY SITUATION CHANGE SINCE LAST YEAR?

	Worsened	Unchanged	Improved
2017 (N= 399)	38%	31%	31%
2018 (N= 354)	20%	21%	58%

DURING THE LAST YEAR, HAVE YOU OR YOUR HOUSEHOLD DONE THINGS TO PROTECT YOURSELVES AS A RESULT OF INSECURITY? *(N= 354)*

Sought assistance from security forces	58%
Joined formal or informal security forces	28%
Acquired or used weapons	19%
Fortified household	10%
Participated in peacebuilding initiatives	9%
Provided money, food, or services to security forces	7%
Avoided going to specific places or going out after dark	7%
Other	9%

that is also supported by participants in the dialogue[12]. Notable in this regard is a rule that dialogue participants mentioned aiming to limit the carrying of guns inside payams, which seems to be implemented: *"Movement with guns is forbidden in the town. People cannot bring their guns inside Ganyliel or the other payams, they have to hand over their gun to be stored temporarily, to be returned after they come back from the market"*.

Generally speaking, respondents acquiring or using weapons don't significantly differ from respondents not acquiring or using weapons in terms of reporting security incidents (see next section), the perceived relative change in personal security situation, and the expected likeliness of becoming a victim (see section on vulnerability). However, respondents relying on security forces[13] are more positive about the change in the personal security situation than respondents who did not.

Incident Reporting

Respondents were given a list of twelve types of security incidents and were asked whether they themselves or someone from their household experienced any of these incidents during the last year. From all respondents, **77%** mention having experienced *at least one* of these incidents[14]. A similar percentage (**73%**) was the case in 2017. Although in this survey we ask about incidents at the *household* level, female respondents more often than male respondents reported incidents (**81%** vs **70%**). Also respondents *not*

having a job outside of the household more often than those who have, reported at least one incident (**89%** vs **74%**).

In 2018 the most frequently reported incidents are cattle raiding (**44%** of households), killing or murder (**31%**), forced marriage (**27%**), and forced recruitment into security forces (**27%**). Largest differences between 2017 and 2018 in terms of households reporting incidents exist for the incidents of cattle raiding (↑), killing or murder (↓), forced marriage (↑), forced recruitment (↑), and sexual assault (↓) (see figure below).

Participants in the dialogue generally agree with the reporting rates; especially with the finding that incidents of cattle raiding and killing or murder are the most frequently experienced security threats. One participants explained: *"Our youth raids from our neighbors, and our neighbors raid from our youth. The implementation of peace must be called for. Many youth raid cattle because they are uneducated and*

PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS REPORTING INCIDENTS

	2017 (N= 412)	2018 (N=354)
Cattle raiding	19%	44%
Killing or murder	51%	31%
Forced marriage	11%	27%
Forced recruitment into security forces	6%	27%
Beating, physical abuse	15%	20%
Assault with a weapon	18%	19%
Unlawful imprisonment	5%	17%
Sexual assault	36%	14%
Robbery	23%	13%
Slavery, forced labor, or trafficking	1%	12%
Abduction	17%	12%
Other	10%	5%

FORCED/EARLY MARRIAGE AND ELOPEMENT

When talking about forced marriage a distinction is made between forced/early marriage and elopement: *"We can blame the parents for early marriage of their daughters. However, we cannot blame parents for elopement of their daughters – in these cases either the man who takes the girl should be blamed and/or the girl herself when she gets pregnant at an early age. Both forced marriage and elopement brings conflict to the family."* One of the dialogue participants painted a picture of how the need for the potential husband to provide cows as dowry can be linked to involuntary marriage and elopement, by describing a current case in his village: *"A boy and girl fell in love, but the boy didn't have cows to marry her. So the family of the girl took her out of the house, married her off against her will to someone else who has cows, but the girl ran away from her husband, back to her boyfriend. Now her family attacks the family of the boyfriend."* Furthermore, the issue was raised that some girls prefer to be married at an early age, as they often don't go to school so they have nothing to entertain them. However, other people in the dialogue argued that *"If both boys and girls are send to school they will be educated, which will reduce the issues of forced marriage. This is because then boys and girls will both better understand the issue."* Generally speaking, the majority of both respondents (**66%**) and dialogue participants agree with the statement that *'early marriage does not provide girls with more protection from violence'*.

don't have casual work. They just raid cattle and sell it for money. We should convince the youth that cattle raiding is wrong." During the dialogue it was also mentioned that especially the rate of sexual assault likely suffers from underreporting; in reality likely more than the reported **14%** of households experience sexual assault and/or rape. The relationship between relatively low levels of education and sexual assault was stressed: *"An educated man will not rape a beautiful woman in the field, because he is aware of the consequences. It is mainly the uneducated people who do these bad things."*

When looking at the weighted average of all reported security incidents, the majority of incidents took place *'along the road between payams'* (**58%**). Most frequently the victims were adult men (**48%**) and/or adult women (**36%**). Boys are mentioned in **36%** of all incidents as victims, and girls in **27%**. Thus, overall victimization rates are quite dispersed across age and gender. On average local armed groups are most frequently mentioned as perpetrator (**38%** of all incidents), followed by the police (**16%**), criminals (**15%**), and SPLA (**11%**)[15].

WHAT WERE THE GENDER AND AGE OF THE VICTIM (S) FROM YOUR HOUSEHOLD? *(N= 462)*

Man/men, 18 or above	48%
Boy(s) under 18	36%
Woman/women, 18 or above	36%
Girl(s) under 18	27%

On average, in **71%** of all reported incidents, respondents contacted someone outside the household for help. Most frequently mentioned reasons for *not* contacting someone were *'I did not believe anyone could help me'* (**43%**), *'I feared more harm against me'* (**26%**), and *'I could not get into contact with anyone to help'* (**24%**). If respondents did contact someone (N= 263), the most frequently contacted actor was the police (**70%**), local armed youth (**37%**), the local leader or chief (**37%**), and/or the commissioner or payam administrator or other government official (**30%**). On average **64%** of respondents who contacted someone for help is satisfied with how the incident was resolved[16]. Most often respondents are satisfied with how the incident was resolved because *'the per-*

petrator was caught and punished' (**74%**), and/or 'because compensation for losses was offered' (**43%**).

Vulnerability

On average, **64%** of respondents indicate generally feeling safe from violence or crime in the community[18]. In the community dialogue it was mentioned that people might feel unsafe because of the crisis between payams and communities which induces

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instability. More often respondents who have *not* reported security incident(s) (see previous section) state they feel safe compared to respondents who have (**85%** vs **59%**). Thus, there is a statistically significant correlation between having experienced security incidents and feeling safe.

IN THE NEXT YEAR, DO YOU EXPECT THAT YOU ARE LIKELY TO BECOME A VICTIM OF VIOLENCE?
*(N= 354)*

Respondents have been asked whether they expect themselves to become a victim of violence in the next year. Although around **one-third** of respondents find it difficult to predict what will happen in the future[19], more than half of respondents (**56%**) perceive this as a somewhat likely to very likely situation[20]. During the community dialogue we asked for possible reasons why this likeliness of becoming a victim rate is so high. Generally speaking, participants point to the volatility of the security situation: *"Although the security situation has improved, it is not stable. Today the situation can be okay, while tomorrow it can worsen again. This instability is strengthened by guns in the hands of youth and by no freedom of movement."*. Respondents who perceive themselves as likely victim of violence (N= 198) most frequently point to *'local armed youth'* (**42%**), *'criminals'* (**40%**), and *'the police'* (**31%**) as likely perpetrator[21]. Main reasons for pointing to those actors are *'they have already committed violence to me or my family'* (**50%**), and *'they have already committed violence in my community'* (**50%**)[22].

When asking respondents to choose between the two statements *"All people in this community are equally likely to be exposed to violence"* and *"Some people in this community are more likely to be exposed to violence than others"*, we get a diverse picture. On average **41%** agree most with the former statement, while

56% agree most with the latter. Voting for both statements among the participants in the dialogue show similar results. When asking those 205 respondents who are in favor of the second statement which groups of people are most likely to be exposed to violence, the most frequently mentioned groups are *'young men and boys'* (**53%**), *'people from specific ethnic groups'* (**42%**), and *'elderly people'* (**19%**). During the dialogue the point was raised that in general youth (often men/boys) who raid cattle are exposed to violence. It was also discussed that home communities of cattle raiders might be exposed to violence as well, as youth might be followed home by the affected communities who are after revenge for their stolen cattle and/or injured or lost sons and daughters. Thus, cattle raiding might trigger a chain of violence while exposing people beyond those involved in the actual raid. However, still over one-third of respondents (**36%**) agree with the statement that *'a young men who raids lots of cattle from a neighboring community is to be respected'*. Participants in the dialogue are very clear on this: *"cattle raiding causes death, so it should never be respected"*.

We also asked respondents whether gender affects the exposure to violence. Similarly, half of respondents (**51%**) state that men and boys are more likely to be exposed to violence than women and girls, while **10%** state the opposite. Slightly over one-third of respondents (**36%**) state that gender does not influence the likeliness of becoming a victim of violence.

WHO IS MOST LIKELY TO BE EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE?
(N= 354)

Reasons why they are exposed to violence differ for both men/boys and women/girls. Respondents most frequently mention *'they are likely to be seen as a threat'* (**56%**), *'they are often in dangerous situations'* (**40%**), and *'they are targeted as a matter of revenge or to restore honor'* (**32%**) as reasons why men/boys are exposed to violence[23]. For women/girls the most frequently mentioned reasons are *'they cannot physically protect themselves'* (**68%**), and *'their rights are often ignored'* (**48%**).

Security Actors

Respondents are asked about the presence of a number of security actors, both formal and informal. Generally speaking, actors which are present are the police, SPLA-IO, local armed youth, local leaders, religious leaders, lawyers/official courts, commissioners/payam administrators/other government officials, and NGOs[24]. Although lawyers and official courts are mentioned by **72%** of respondents for having a consistent presence in the payam, **71%** of respondents prefers dispute resolution to be handled by local elders or chiefs over the state court system. When asking respondents whether, in general, security forces should be recruited from outside the community (as they do not take sides) or from within (as they know the community), we get a diverse picture: **54%** of respondents favors recruitment from outside, while **44%** votes for within. Also dialogue participants did not reach consensus about this statement.


DO THE FOLLOWING ACTORS HAVE A CONSISTENT PRESENCE IN YOUR AREA? *(N= 354)*

We asked about the perceived *effect* of the present security actors on the personal security situation of respondents. Overall respondents are positive about all of these actors (see figure on the right)[25]. Also when asked about the *performance* of some of these actors, respondents are positive. On average **75%** of respondents indicate the police having a good to very good performance in providing security, which is **87%** for the SPLA-IO. Also local armed youth have a good rating: **77%** of respondents say they have a good-very good performance in providing security. Interesting is the fact that local armed youth are also the most frequently mentioned perpetrator of violence in reported security incidents (**38%** of all cases), and that they are also mentioned as one of the most likely perpetrators of violence (see previous section). In the com-

munity security dialogue we asked for clarification. Participants generally agree that local armed youth have two faces: they can both be a perpetrator and a helper. Nevertheless, the majority of respondents (**87%**) agree that '*in my payam we trust local armed youth more than any outsiders*'.

IN GENERAL, HOW DO YOU RATE THEIR EFFECT ON YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY SITUATION? *(N= only when actors are present)*

Respondents were asked about what would be suitable ways to improve the performance of security actors in providing security. For both the police, SPLA-IO, and local armed youth, respondents most frequently mention '*we need more presence of this actor*' (ranging from **58%-69%**), and '*we need this actor to be better trained*' (ranging from **63%-68%**). Participants in the dialogue generally agree that more training is needed: *"The police needs more training especially in human rights, and police/military in law. They need to have more knowledge of the law, as they are the one who control law and order, so that the law can be applied better. If the police is accountable and ensures the law, this can really help protect civilians."* Nevertheless, the majority of respondents (**81%**) agree with the statement that '*the police takes reports from community members seriously and are helpful in resolving them*'. Also the majority of respondents (**72%**) agree that '*men and women in this community get equal assistance when reporting a security incident to the police*'.

We presented respondents with three hypothetical scenarios and asked them who they would contact for help in resolving the crime. The scenarios were: (1) a family/friend being killed or murdered; (2) a family/friend being sexually assaulted; and (3) a family/friend seeing unidentified armed men. In all three cases the most frequently contacted actor is the po-

lice (**52%-62%**). Other frequently mentioned actors are local armed youth (**39%-45%**), family or friends (**31%-38%**), local leader (**31%-34%**), SPLA-IO (**24%-38%**), and the commissioner or payam administrator (**19-28%**)[26]. When categorizing all contacted actors as either being formal or informal[27], on average slightly more than half of respondents (**57%**) indicate contacting both formal and informal actors. One-third of respondents (**32%**) would contact only formal actors, while **10%** would contact only informal actors[28].

Suggestions to Address Local Insecurity

Respondents are quite divided about what they expect to happen with the security in their community in the next year. Around **one-third** expect that it will remain the same, slightly over one-third (**36%**) expect that it will worsen, while **17%** expect it will improve[29]. Also **15%** of respondents indicate they don't know what will happen. The unpredictability of the situation was also mentioned by some participants from the community dialogue. They referred to the outbreak of war in 2016 as an example of this unpredictability.

WHAT DO YOU EXPECT TO HAPPEN WITH SECURITY IN YOUR COMMUNITY IN THE NEXT YEAR? *(N= 354)*


The most frequently mentioned conflict drivers according to both respondents and participants in the community dialogue are of (1) political, and (2) socio-economic nature. On average **66%** of respondents indicate that *'poor governance at the national level'* is a factor likely causing further conflict, and *'poverty or lack of livelihood opportunities'* is mentioned by **35%** of respondents[30]. During the dialogue one participant stressed that: *"All crisis comes from the national government. The national government is violating the peace agreement, which is why the government can be blamed for the conflict in which we are."*, while

another said that *"food shortages bring people to rob and take something by force, which increases insecurity"*.

Similarly, suggested changes that need to happen to bring lasting peace to the country have a political or socio-economic nature. *'Improved governance at the national level'* is mentioned by **59%** of respondents as a way forward, and **41%** of respondents mention *'economic development'*. Also *'the implementation of the national peace agreement'* was mentioned by almost **one-third** of respondents.

WHAT ARE THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT CHANGES THAT NEED TO HAPPEN TO BRING LASTING PEACE TO SOUTH SUDAN? *(N= 354)*

However, it should be kept in mind that the survey data was collected in May 2018, a few months before the signing of the Revitalized Agreement to Resolve the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS, September 2018). At the timing of survey also **84%** of respondents disagreed with the statement that *'the national government is taking clear steps to reduce violence in the community'*, which was disputed by participants in the community dialogue. Participants argued that: *"This peace agreement (i.e. R-ARCSS) is not as the one of before. During the previous peace agreement the government was still launching attacks. Now the government and the SPLA-IO are more peaceful together."* Participants are also very positive about the local peace agreement. Generally speaking, they expect the security situation to improve even further, although they also recognize that sometimes border communities are still spoiling the agreement. Furthermore, at the timing of the dialogue (March 2019), again some Mayom youth, motivated by a local spear master, decided to commit a cattle raid in neighbouring Mayendit county. At the same time, the main impact of improved relations with the Dinka of Yirol (Eastern Lakes), i.e. freedom of movement between the two areas, was also not yet in place as apparently

a third group (Pakam youth from Western Lakes) were currently residing in the border area with Eastern Lakes, creating insecurity for both neighboring communities: *"How to manage the border, we respect the agreement that was signed, we hope the road to Yirol will be opened soon. But how can we manage the border? The Pakam have run between Payinjiar and Yirol and were received as guests, but they commit atrocities as Yirol was disarmed and the Pakam were not. Pakam have even captured Pagarau for 2 days, killing many youth."* These incidents highlight the importance of continuously committing oneself and the community to peace and monitoring this peace process.

PAX, SSANSA and AMA are committed to conduct further annual rounds of survey collection and dialogue, to generate additional insights into local security dynamics, to see how identified trends in local security develop over time, and to support the local follow-up activities – with the aim of achieving sustainable results in improving the local security situation.

ACTION PLAN ON LOCAL SECURITY PRIORITIES

In the three-day community security dialogue, participants jointly identified five main security priorities in need of addressing: (1) cattle raiding; (2) revenge killing; (3) water shortage; (4) rape and early/forced marriage; and (5) guns in the hands of civilians. Also an action plan for addressing these priorities, following the SMART-principles (i.e. Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Timely), was developed. A few examples of proposed actions are:

• Awareness raising among youth in cattle camps about the risks of cattle raiding, and about the peace agreement that was signed with Eastern and Western Lakes;

• Talking with parents about the consequences of forced marriage, and about the benefits of education for both boys and girls;

• Awareness raising about cycles of revenge and the importance of reporting security incidents to relevant local authorities;

• Awareness raising among youth about the importance of disarmament;

• Working together with local authorities to restrict the movement of armed youth.

In the coming months, the Community Security Committees (COMSECCOM) in both greater Ganyliel and Nyal will be working on the community shaped action plan. Both COMSECCOMs consist of a diverse set of members that are authorized to work on behalf of the community on improving local security.

COMMUNITY MEMBERS JOINTLY DISCUSSING THE MAIN SECURITY PRIORITIES IN NEED OF ADDRESSING, GANYLIEL MARCH 2019

Conclusions and Recommendations

The insights gathered from the Human Security Survey data and community security dialogue initiated some key conclusions and recommendations:

- Security levels have improved in Payinjiar in 2018 compared to 2017. Communities explain this improvement by the local peace process with the Dinka communities of (Eastern) Lakes. Nevertheless, the situation remains very unstable and therefore unpredictable for the time being;

- Cattle raiding and killing/murder were the most frequently reported security incidents across Payinjiar in 2018, followed by forced marriage and forced recruitment into security forces. Especially reports of cattle raiding have risen significantly in 2018 compared to 2017;

- Local authorities and security actors should actively encourage community members to report any incidents to the relevant authorities. Only when incidents are reported to local authorities and serious action is undertaken by these authorities, the risk of community members taking the law into their own hands and/or revenge cycles of violence can be reduced;

- Community members deem (young) men and boys most vulnerable in society, as they often are occupied as cattle keeper and therefore run the risk of becoming victims of common cattle raids. However, cattle raids often lead to revenge towards broader communities as well, so the risk of cattle raids is not limited to young men and boys only;

- Although the role of the police is generally appreciated within the communities (as well as most other local security actors), they should be present more numerously in the area as well as receive training on human rights and the application of law;

- Payinjiar communities expect that a more sustainable peace can be reached in South Sudan if national governance is improved. Implementation of the national peace agreement (i.e. R-ARCSS) as well as economic development are important priorities on the national level.

PARTICIPANTS OF THE COMMUNITY SECURITY DIALOGUE, GANYLIEL MARCH 2019

NOTES

1. This was the second round of data collection in Payinjiar county. A first round of survey data was collected in April-May 2017.

2. A sample size of 354, combined with a population size of 50.723 (Unicef, 2016) and a confidence level of 95%, gives us a margin of error of approximately 5.2. Population estimate retrieved from: Unicef (2016). South Sudan: Payinjiar County Social Map. https://www.unicef.org/southsudan/Payinjiar_social_map_V3.pdf.

3. See also the HSS South Sudan methodology summary published on our website at https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180206HSS-SS-Methodology-one-pager.pdf.

4. This was the second community security dialogue. A first dialogue was organized in October 2017, following the first round of data collection in April-May 2017.

5. Unicef (2016) estimates 31.2% of Payinjiar population being internally displaced.

6. Unicef (2016) estimates that 4.3% of Payinjiar population lives in cattle camps.

7. We asked whether it is mainly the local or national peace process that has contributed to a better security situation in Payinjiar county. Participants jointly agreed the local peace process was most important in terms of actual impact on daily life. However, the survey results were collected in May 2017, before the local Dinka-Nuer peace agreement, as well as the national government-IO peace agreement, were signed and implemented.

8. Respondents could choose multiple answers.

9. Ibid.

10. Note that in 2017 still 60% agreed.

11. Participants stressed that weapons cannot be bought in the market, but that they are sold from person to person. They argued it is easy to buy weapons as access is not restricted. The only condition is that you should have cows for barter. Also the issue was raised that the SPLA (the national army) has previously armed Payinjiar youth.

12. No differences for agreeing/disagreeing with this statement exist for gender, age, ethnicity, and residential status. However, respondents with a job outside of the household more often than those without are in favor of disarmament (74% vs 57%).

13. Reliance here means seeking assistance from formal security forces, and/or joining formal security forces, and/or providing money/food/services to security forces.

14. The average number of reported incidents is 3.14 (NB: mean excludes zero – i.e. those respondents who did not report any incident at all).

15. In 2017 the most frequently mentioned perpetrator was the SPLA (29%). However, according to dialogue participants by then SPLA presence also was higher than in 2018. Participants explained that now the SPLA has left the area. (However, survey data does not necessarily back

-up this statement: SPLA presence was 13% vs 10% in 2017 and 2018 respectively.)

16. Satisfaction rates are quite stable across different types of contacted actors: 64% in case the police was contacted, 64% in case local armed youth was contacted, 70% in case the local leader was contacted, and 67% in case the commissioner was contacted.

17. This is also the name of the three-day community security dialogue.

18. In 2017 this was still 45%.

19. 27% of respondents used the answer category 'I don't know'.

20. Respondents not having a job outside of the household more often than those who do, report themselves as likely to become a victim of violence (76% vs 50%). Also domestic workers (of which 89% is female) more often than non-domestic workers report themselves likely to become a victim of violence (83% vs 53%). However, gender in general does not significantly influence the perceived likelihood of being exposed to violence.

21. Respondents could pick multiple answers. Furthermore, women more often than men mention formal security actors (i.e. police, SPLA, SPLA-IO, UNMISS, or paramilitary forces) as likely perpetrator (55% vs 35%). Similarly, respondents who have experienced security threats more often than those who have not, expect formal security actors being the most likely perpetrator (53% vs 31%).

22. Respondents could pick multiple answers.

23. Ibid.

24. These actors are mentioned by at least 72% of respondents as being present in their payam.

25. Margin of error ranges from 3.11 to 3.67.

26. Respondents could pick multiple answers.

27. The police, SPLA, SPLA-IO, UNMISS, paramilitary forces, lawyers or official courts, commissioners or payam administrators or other government officials, and NGOs are categorized as formal. Family or friends, local armed youth, other armed groups, local leaders or chiefs, and religious leaders are categorized as informal.

28. In the scenario of seeing unidentified armed men, men more often than women would contact only formal security actors (43% vs 27%), while women more often than men would contact both formal and informal actors (61% vs 50%). Also in the third scenario respondents having primarily lived in this area during the last 5 years, more often than those who have not, mention contacting only formal actors (34% vs 24%), while the latter group would more often contact only informal actors (22% vs 8%). In all other cases, no significant differences are found between respondents of different age, gender, job status, and having/not having experienced threats.

29. Respondents who have reported at least one security incident don't differ from those who have not, in having a negative vs neutral-positive future security outlook.

30. Respondents could pick multiple answers.