



South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms

Human Security Survey 2018 Annual Summary Report for Jonglei State, South Sudan

By Anton Quist


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- A gap exists between local community security needs and the capacities for protection that security actors – local or international, like UNMISS – provide
- PAX and SSANSA address this gap by surveying local security perceptions and feeding back this information into protection dialogues involving citizens as well as security actors
- This report summarises the Human Security Survey findings for Jonglei State and the main conclusions from the local community security dialogue in November 2018

Introduction

The Human Security Survey (HSS) is a unique survey methodology developed by PAX, that includes a series of complementary activities, including population-based research, community engagement, and advocacy. The objectives of the HSS are: 1) to increase knowledge and understanding of local human security experiences, perceptions, trends and priorities; 2) to enhance the ‘claim-making capacity’ of civilians to hold security providers and power brokers to account; and 3) to guide and inform a wide variety of stakeholders who have an ability to impact protection issues through evidence-based advocacy at local and international levels. PAX currently implements the HSS in South Sudan and Iraq.

The underlying rationale for the HSS is that by strengthening the voice and agency of civilians on protection strategies and security policies, the resulting protection practice will be more reflective of, and responsive to, local needs and priorities. In order to achieve this, the HSS seeks to create or leverage opportunities for civilians to participate in security dialogues at the community level, where practical decisions by military, local government, police, traditional leaders,



and non-state armed actors deeply affect civilians’ day-to-day lives.

The HSS also provides a means of connecting local perspectives with national and international policymakers,

diplomats and security actors such as the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by providing valuable, first-hand information about the experiences and perspectives of conflict-affected communities. The survey itself is therefore best seen as a means to an end, with the ultimate aim being to facilitate more effective protection of civilians' strategies in South Sudan.

Methodology

The Human Security Survey started in 2016 with developing a research methodology and questionnaire, an enumerator training curriculum, and building a local network across four different states throughout South Sudan¹. We work in close collaboration with our long-standing local partners, the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) and the Assistance Mission to Africa (AMA), throughout all the project phases².

The HSS was first implemented in Jonglei with an enumerator training and subsequent data collection in November 2016 across Bor South, Twic East and Duk counties. After analysing the results, these were presented to community representatives during a three-day community feedback and dialogue meeting in Bor in March 2017. Furthermore, a Community Security Committee (COMSECOM) was established with participants to the dialogue who dedicated themselves to addressing the main security priorities put forward by the communities during the dialogue.

After reviewing the survey questionnaire and main methodology at the start of 2018, another enumerator training was organized where 10 locally recruited participants were trained for four days in Bor town in February 2018. The participants received training on, among others, interview and listening skills, random sampling procedures, how to respond to ethical and logistical field challenges, security and communication protocols, and how to use mobile phones for data collection, including basic digital security practices. They also received a general introduction to the specific Human Security Survey questionnaire. After the training, the 10 enumerators were deployed into the field during March 2018, where 560 surveys were collected across 11 *payams*³, located in the same counties that were covered in the survey of November 2016⁴.

Locally trained enumerators provide the best possible access to these logistically challenging areas, given that they

speak the local language⁵ and understand the local context and customs. The surveyed payams were selected in cooperation with SSANSA and the local enumerators during the training. Geographical accessibility and security of enumerators were important considerations in the selection of payams. Within the area clusters however, households and individual respondents were selected using an approximately random procedure to allow for some generalizability⁶.

In November 2018, PAX and SSANSA staff returned to Bor town to present the main survey findings to approximately 40 representatives of local government (state and county level), police, local (armed) youth, chiefs, women's groups, and the Civil Affairs Department of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).


On the first day, participants discussed and validated the survey data, and explanations behind the numbers were sought. The same stakeholders participated in a subsequent two day community security dialogue called "*Security is Everyone's Business*". Practical implications of the survey data were discussed, such as the frequency of various reported security incidents, its root causes and the capacities and track record of various security actors to address them. Comparisons were made with discussions during the last year about local security developments to see if last years' priorities were sufficiently addressed or are still relevant, and the COMSECOM presented its track record over the last year. Subgroups of participants were formed to prioritize the most important local security issues, representing the various perspectives of authorities, security actors and different civil society groups present during the dialogue. Participants jointly worked out an action plan to address these priorities jointly over the next year.

PARTICIPANTS OF THE COMMUNITY SECURITY DIALOGUE IN BOR DISCUSSING THE MOST IMPORTANT LOCAL SECURITY ISSUES




Demographics of the survey sample

96% of respondents indicated that the ethnic or group identity they belonged to was Dinka. The remaining respondents belonged to the Nuer (3%), Acholi, Feri/Peri and



Shilluk (all less than 0,5%). Almost half of respondents was between 16-30 years of age, 30% between ages 31-45 and only 3% was above 65 years of age⁷. Two-thirds of respondents were female, only one-third was male, most likely because surveys were primarily conducted during the morning and afternoon hours. At those times, many men are out herding cattle, working the fields, or engaging in other livelihood activities. Female family members are more likely to be found in and around the house to look after children and do domestic chores (21%), or work on the land and/or collect firewood (29%). Dialogue participants also claimed that because of the war, many men had died, thereby increasing the amount of households headed by widowed women.

Little over half of respondents (52%) indicated that they did not have a job or source of livelihood at the time of the interview, 48% did have a job or source of livelihood. Those respondents who did not have a job or source of livelihood described their situation as being housewife and doing domestic work in the household (29%), relying on aid from the UN, NGOs or others (28%), unemployed (26%) or student (14%). The respondents who did have a job or livelihood were in majority farmers or land labourers (53%)⁸, working in small businesses (14%), cattle keepers (8%)⁹, doing domestic work outside the household (6%) or were civil servant/government employee (5%). 60% of all respondents indicated that they have lived in their current payams since 2013. Among the 40% of respondents that did move their residence during the last five years, one in five (21%) had to relocate themselves twice and 7% more than twice. Of all respondents who had to move payams in the last five years, 94% claimed they had to do so because of insecurity (see below)¹⁰.



Main findings

Perceptions of the general security situation

Respondents' assessment of developments in their personal security situation during the last year showed a diverse picture. 31% of respondents thought the security situation had become worse over the last year, while 28% thought the situation had improved and 40% were of the opinion the security situation had not changed during the last year, which was quite a dramatic considerable from the results in 2016-17 (see figure on the right)¹¹. However, just like in 2016-17, there was considerable regional variation to enumerators' local security assessment depending on the county: in former Twic East county 59% of respondents

thought the security situation had become worse and only 11% thought it improved, in former Duk county 55% of respondents indicated that the security situation had not changed (and another 30% indicated it got worse), while in former Bor South county 55% of respondents thought security had improved and only 11% thought it got worse.



During the community dialogue, two-thirds of participants similarly indicated that the security situation had improved over the last year, with one-third claiming it did not. Main reasons why the situation would have improved were mainly the government's engagement to achieve peace agreements, "Murle¹² leaders becoming more proponents for peace in urging their people to stop cattle raiding", and the safer roads leading from Bor to Juba and Pibor. Also UNMISS staff that was present confirmed that the casualty numbers dropped compared to a year ago, although the root causes to the violence still remained¹³.

Respondents who felt the security situation had improved (N= 158), pointed to "less violence in our payam" (62%), followed by "There is less crime" (49%), "Friends or family have been able to return home after being displaced" (13%) and "There are fewer weapons" (10%)¹⁴. Of the people who thought the security situation had become worse, more than two-thirds (69%) claimed this was due to increased crime rates, while 32% thought "There was more violence" in general¹⁵.

Irrespective of whether perceived insecurity levels improved or got worse over the last year, local communities generally have to develop strategies to cope with existing levels of insecurity. More than a third of respondents (34%) indicated that they sought assistance from formal or informal security forces, such as the army, police or armed youth, 23% joined formal or informal security forces, 19% acquired or used weapons, 13% travelled less frequently outside of the home, 13% avoided going to specific places or avoided going out after dark, 10% fortified their household and 12% indicated they had not used any of the given protection strategies.


Incident reporting

Respondents were asked whether they themselves or their household members experienced any given security incidents during the last year. In the three counties of Jonglei State, almost half of respondents (45%) indicated that they or their household members experienced one or more of these listed security incidents during the last year. This is significantly lower than the 80% of respondents reporting

that they were a victim of one or more types of incidents during the survey of 2017. Within Jonglei State there is quite some regional variation in the shown victimization rates: more than two-thirds (69%) of respondents in Duk county indicated that they were victims of at least one type of incident, while Bor South (35%) and Twic East (27%) counties saw much lower victimization rates.


Generally, women indicated higher victimization rates than men, respondents without a job or of lower socio-economic status indicated higher victimization rates than the higher or employed socio-economic strata, ethnic minorities experienced higher victimization rates than Dinka, and respondents who have moved residence during the last five years also indicated higher victimization rates than respondents who have not. When asking about gender and age of the victims of the reported incident, it was mainly adult men (above 18 years old) who were victimized in 81% of reported cases of 'murder and killing' and 96% of cattle raiding cases, while 94% of forced marriage cases involved women and girls.

The three most reported types of incidents by respondents throughout Jonglei were the same as in 2017, but in a different sequence: cattle raiding (by 22% of respondents), killing or murder (20%) and abduction or kidnapping (10%). Other but less frequently reported incidents are forced marriage (9%), assault with a weapon or attempted murder (8%), unlawful imprisonment or detention (4%), robbery or seizure of property (4%), bombing or explosives (3%), forced recruitment into security forces (2%), beating, physical abuse or torture (1%) and rape or sexual assault (1%).



In 2017, more than half (52%) of enumerators in Jonglei generally reported a case of killing or murder, while this number dropped to one-fifth of enumerators in 2018 (see figure on the left). Furthermore, all types of incidents scored significantly lower victimization rates compared to 2017, with only cattle raiding showing a relative stable occurrence. The general trend of lower reporting rates of security incidents is also visible across the different counties. Although in general reported victimization rates are still higher in Duk county compared to the two other counties, as in 2017, the reporting rates show a drop for the main reported security incidents across all three counties, with an exception to cattle raiding in Duk and Bor South counties in 2018 (see figure on the top right).


Generally, the lower reported rates of victimization across



the counties dropped more profoundly than the general security perceptions in the same counties, although the general perceptions did see an improvement with one year earlier.

Respondents indicated that half (49%) of all reported incidents happened in their payam, with an additional 37% claiming the incident happened inside their home (such as 79% of all murder cases), stressing that likely risky areas are located in people's daily living environment. Respondents who reported one or more security incidents happening to themselves or a household member, generally perceived that criminals (25%), Murle (25%), other armed groups (13%), members of another community (8%), someone from my own family (7%) or 'another actor' (20%) were the most likely perpetrators of these incidents¹⁶. Additional complicating factor with these perpetrator categories was that they seemed to overlap according to many participants to the community dialogue: when they were asked who the mentioned 'other armed groups' and 'other communities' would most likely be, participants answered that they were Murle.

More than half of respondents who were victimized (57%) indicated that they contacted someone outside their household to help them resolve the incident they experienced¹⁷. The most contacted actor generally were the police (74%), local armed youth (41%), local leaders (15%) and the national army (7%)¹⁸. The police was contacted in 87% of all reported murder cases, in 73% of reported cattle raiding cases and in 65% of reported abduction or kidnapping cases. The other main assisting actor, local armed youth, was contacted in half of murder cases, 51% of cattle raiding cases and also 65% of abduction of kidnapping cases¹⁹. The regional distribution of contacted actors shows that the



rates of police assistance that was called in was reported to be significantly higher in Duk and Twic East counties compared to Bor South, the rates of contacted local armed youth are comparable (see figure on the bottom left).

Two-thirds of respondents who have called in outside assistance indicated that they were not satisfied with the resolution of the incident by the security actor they contacted. 85% of respondents who weren't satisfied blamed this on the perpetrator not being caught, 18% said there was no compensation offered for their losses and 10% said that they did not get their stolen goods back²⁰. The respondents who were satisfied with the resolution of the incident indicated this was the case because *"the perpetrator was caught and punished"* (49%), that their *"stolen goods, abducted people or cattle were returned"* (37%), *"revenge was taken against the perpetrator"* (26%) or *"compensation for their losses was offered"* (21%)²¹.

Regarding the vulnerability of groups in society, two-thirds of respondents claimed that both men and women are equally likely to become a victim of violence in Jonglei, while 12% claimed men and boys are more vulnerable to violence, and 11% said that women or girls are more vulnerable. In a similar fashion, 70% of respondents agreed to the statement that *"all people in this community are equally likely to be exposed to violence"*, a sentiment that was similarly echoed during the community dialogue in Bor.


However, although men and women might be considered equally vulnerable to violence, the reasons for their perceived vulnerability vary according to respondents. Men or boys were considered vulnerable by 60% of respondents because *"they are likely to be seen as a threat"*, for instance as a potential criminal or combatant. A quarter (26%) thought that men and boys were vulnerable because *"they cannot physically protect themselves"*, 23% thought that *"they do not have anyone to protect them"* and another 23% said that *"they are targeted as a matter of revenge or to restore honour"*, a higher number than among women and girls (7%)²². Three-quarters of respondents (77%) think that women and girls' vulnerability stems from the notion that *"they cannot physically protect themselves"*, followed by 28% that were of the opinion that *"they do not have anyone to protect them"* and 18% claiming that *"their rights are often ignored"*.

When groups in society beyond the gender dichotomy are considered in their vulnerability to violence, responses primarily highlighted age categories, such as elderly people (28%), small children (27%), young men and boys (16%) and young unmarried women or girls (14%), while 39% said 'I don't know'²³. Therefore it seems that age was considered a more relevant factor determining one's vulnerability than gender. When asked what potential perpetrators the respondents themselves feared towards the future, they mentioned criminals (66%), Murle (30%), other armed groups (19%) and SPLA-IO (12%).

Security actors

We asked enumerators what (security) actors were present and accessible in their respective payams throughout

Jonglei. The actors that scored the highest for having a consistent presence were religious leaders (100%), local leaders (98%), government officials (96%), local armed youth (92%), NGOs (90%), the police (89%), lawyers (73%) and paramilitary forces (53%). On the other hand, (security) actors that were mainly considered not or less present or accessible were SPLA-IO²⁴ (76% of respondents claiming it was *not* consistently present in their payam), UNMISS (71%), other armed group (60%), the national army (SPLA²⁷; 58%) and paramilitary forces (43%). Regionally there are some differences in especially national army and UNMISS presence: respondents in Bor South reported in 64% that there was national army presence in their payam, with only 6% of Twic East respondents claiming the same. Equally, UNMISS was present according to 65% of Bor South respondents²⁸, while only 3% of Twic East and 1% of Duk respondents claimed there was regular UNMISS presence in their payam²⁹. The police however, was fairly present from 84% of Bor South claiming presence in their payam, to even 97% of Duk county respondents.



Overall, respondents overwhelmingly reported that the security actors most locally present and accessible, were also the actors considered to be most positive in their effect on the local security situation (see the figure below). Respondents were asked to rate only the five most prominent security actors on the South Sudanese national platform (police, national army, SPLA-IO, local armed youth and UNMISS) on their performance in providing security³⁰. Of these five actors, local armed youth scored best (89% scored them as "good/very good"), followed by the police (87% scored them "good/very good") and the national army (78% scored them "good/very good"). UNMISS saw a varied score: 40% "good/very good", 31% "just ok", and 22% "not good/very bad". Too few respondents mention the presence of SPLA-IO to say anything meaningful about the SPLA-IO's performance.

Here there also were regional variations: performance rates were fairly positive for the police (ranging from 76% of Twic East respondents to 95% in Duk), the armed youth (from 83% in Bor South and Twic East to even 99% in Duk); the approval rate for the national army was somewhat ambiguous (43% in Twic East to 81% in Bor South). 96% of respondents who mention the presence of UNMISS lives in Bor South; 41% rates them as "good/very good". Generally, the performance rates in 2018 for the police, the local

CHILD ABDUCTIONS IN JONGLEI

70% of all reported abductions in the 2018 survey involved boys below 18 years of age, and in 58% of reported abductions girls below 18 years of age were the victim. In Jonglei, child abductions are not uncommon, often being committed alongside huge cattle raids and are mostly blamed on the neighbouring Murle ethnic group from Boma State. They are thought to enlarge their kinship groups by abducting children (and sometimes women). In 2016 alone it was reported that 46 children were abducted in Jonglei state³¹.


Although communities, government authorities, (I) NGOs and UNMISS are trying to address the issue of child abductions, the practice still continues to this day. Recent attempts to broker a communal peace agreement between Boma Murle and Jonglei Bor Din-ka has not yet resulted in a stop to cattle raiding and child abductions yet, but some participants to the community dialogue were hopeful, saying that more Murle leaders are becoming supportive of peace and tell their communities to cease raiding cattle and abducting children. There have also been a growing number of cases in which abducted children have been returned to their communities thanks to involvement by Boma authorities. The participants to the dialogue suggested solutions to child abductions, among which were mentioned (joint) police border patrols, increased law enforcement and punishment of child abductions by (traditional) courts, and making the issue part of community reconciliation efforts through dialogue and peace agreements, including the identification and return of abducted children to their communities³².

armed youth and the national army were much higher in all three counties compared to 2017 data.

There is a correlation between presence and positive performance rating for security actors. This holds as well for general rating of 'effect' (see figure on the top right): for all actors which on average have a +20% "mostly negative" effect rating, this negative rating vanishes when we ask the question to only those respondents which mention the corresponding actor being present³³.

When asked how these security actors could improve their performance, almost half of respondents (49%) said "we need more presence of this actor" (the police scored 77% on this point, the national army 70%, local armed youth 55% and UNMISS 31%). Other frequently mentioned ways to improve performance were: "we need this actor to be better armed or equipped" mentioned by 24% of all respondents (local armed youth scored 56%, police 41% and the national army 21%), and "we need this actor to be more responsive towards the civilians" mentioned by 20% of respondents (UNMISS scored 31%, the police and national

IN GENERAL, HOW DO YOU RATE THE EFFECT ON YOUR PERSONAL SECURITY SITUATION OF THE FOLLOWING ACTORS? (N= 560)



army 24%³⁴)³⁵.

88% of respondents agreed with the statement that "the police takes reports from community members seriously and are helpful in resolving them"³⁶ and 77% of respondents agreed that "men and women in this community get equal assistance when reporting a security incident to the police". However, the support for more women officers serving in the police ("there should be more women serving in the police to help with security issues facing women") was not universally supported by respondents: 42% agreed, while 50% did not, although the rate among female respondents was slightly higher than with men. In addition, most respondents indicated that they would go to the police in the hypothetical case they would be confronted with murder, rape, or when seeing unidentified armed men around their village (police scoring 92%, 93% and 88% in these hypothetical cases respectively). The police scores much higher than local leaders such as tribal elders or chiefs (scoring 24%-20%-13% resp.) and local armed youth (scoring 12%-8%-36% resp.).

Apart from the generally high approval rates of the police, it is notable that respondents also have a strong identification and appreciation for more informal local armed youth, for instance by agreeing to the statement "In my payam we trust local armed youth for our security more than any outsiders" (84%)³⁷. However, support for the statement "It is best for security in our payam when security forces are from our own community, because they know us" was undecided with 49% agreeing with the statement, while 47% did not, thereby agreeing to the opposing statement "It is best for the security in our payam that security forces are from outside the payam, because they do not take sides". Likewise, 59% of respondents agreed with "my community needs more police presence to provide security", while 41% supported the statement that "my community should rely on local armed youth to provide protection and security". Therefore, it does not seem there is a very clear distinction in Jonglei community members' perceptions and preferences regarding formal security provision on the one hand (by police) and informal 'self-protection' strategies (local armed youth) on the other³⁸. One of the participants to the dialogue suggested that people's reliance on armed youth could be only a temporary situation: "We only need them

now, because there is a lack of formal protection actors”.


Suggestions to address local insecurity

Two-thirds of respondents (66%) indicated that “lack of livelihood opportunities” is the most likely factor to cause conflict in Jonglei, followed at some distance by “poor governance at the national (Juba) level” (39%), “competition over resources” (23%), “easy access to weapons” (16%), “the national political power struggle”³⁹ (16%), “tribalism or discrimination between ethnic groups” (12%) and “poor governance at the local level” (6%)⁴⁰.

When community members discuss local security issues, they often mention the easy access to and distribution of guns towards and within communities, to the extent that community members sometimes outgun formal security providers, thereby decreasing their ability to provide protection. Likewise, two-thirds of respondents (65%) indicated they thought civilian disarmament was needed to increase the security of their payam, while one-third said that people need guns to provide their own security. However, two-thirds (66%) of all respondents disagreed with the statement that “It is easy to buy new weapons in our payam” and recall that only 16% of respondents mentioned easy access to weapons as conflict trigger, countering the idea that proliferation of arms in their communities is particularly widespread.

The main reason given for this seeming contradiction was the way disarmament campaigns have been carried out previously: “previous disarmament campaigns backfired, because they exposed populations and made them vulnerable for attacks. When other communities around us still have arms, we also need arms to protect ourselves”⁴¹. Therefore civilian disarmament campaigns should be designed do disarm local communities comprehensively and take away the underlying causes why community members think they need to arm themselves in the first place.

However, disarmament was mentioned only by 18% of respondents as most viable solution for lasting peace. Alternatively, respondents pointed primarily to the need for “economic development” (63%) in the ountry and “improved governance at the national level”⁴⁰ (39%, see figure below)⁴¹. In 2017, the “implementation of the national peace agreement” and “improved community relations” were considered the biggest priorities.



Apart from the proliferation of guns, respondents also gave

their opinions on other potential social and cultural factors underlying local insecurity. More than half (57%) said that “tribalism had a big impact on the local situation”, with 37% saying that there was no impact. 60% of all respondents perceived that “a ban on alcohol would have a positive effect on security”, while 30% thought it did not. For girls across South Sudan, the practice of early and even forced marriage is quite common. However, 87% of respondents agreed that “early marriages do not provide girls with more protection from violence”. Regarding the recurrent issue of cattle raiding, there are cultural reasons attached to the frequency of raiding, such as the need for dowries consisting of cows for marriage, and traditional appreciation for a ‘warrior mentality’ among young men. However, according to 83% of respondents “a young man who raids lots of cattle from a neighbouring community should not be respected”.

Respondents in Jonglei were generally reserved regarding predictions or expectations for the future: 51% of respondents (42% in Duk, 59% in Twic East) generally did not know what to expect on how the local security situation would develop over the next year, and 20% expected the situation to remain the same (30% in Duk). Positive outlooks however, outweighed the negative expectations, with 13% expecting the security situation to improve and 9% to improve a lot (17% and 13% in Bor South respectively). Only 3% thought it would become worse, and another 3% expected much worse.



Participants attending the community dialogue in Bor jointly identified five main security priorities in need of addressing: 1) land disputes, 2) cattle raiding and child abduction, 3) intercommunal conflict, 4) forced marriage and 5) Lack of proper communication between security actors and communities. The common understanding of threats and priorities helps to focus local peacebuilding efforts in the upcoming year, as well as the follow-up activities initiated by the COMSECOM, that are supported by the local authorities and communities.

PAX and SSANSA are committed to conduct another annual round of survey collection and dialogue in 2019, to generate additional insights into local security dynamics, to see how identified trends in local security develop over time,

and to support the local follow-up activities, with the aim of achieving sustainable results in improving the local security situation for communities across Jonglei.

NOTES

- 1 The HSS is implemented in the states of Jonglei, Eastern Lakes, Southern Liech and Jubek.
- 2 Our other main local partner, the Assistance Mission to Africa (AMA), has a permanent field presence in Eastern Lakes and Southern Liech states, and constitutes an important implementing partner in these two states.
- 3 Lower governmental administrative area, mostly consisting of a town or a number of adjacent villages or hamlets. The payam often serves as a basic point of logistical orientation for many (rural) South Sudanese.
- 4 While Jonglei State (already a smaller state in the 28- and later 32-state system than the state with the same name in the ten state-system pre-2015) has witnessed extensive bureaucratic fragmentation into numerous new counties and payams since 2015, we decided to keep referring to the previously used county names Bor South, Twic East and Duk in the 2016-17 survey, as these county names and its mutual borders were widely known by enumerators and respondents alike.
- 5 Enumerators are responsible for conducting surveys in the local language while the questionnaire is in English, thereby doing forward-backward translation on the spot and submitting English answers on the phone.
- 6 See also the HSS South Sudan methodology summary published on our website at <https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180206HSS-SS-Methodology-one-pager.pdf>.
- 7 The median age in South Sudan is 17.3 years according to the CIA World Fact Book (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html>). By excluding respondents below 16 years of age, the average age in our sample is necessarily much higher.
- 8 Of all farmers, 75% is female.
- 9 17% of male respondents indicated that they were cattle keeper, but they are still underrepresented according to dialogue participants.
- 10 Respondents could pick more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- 11 In another question, 45% of respondents agreed to the statement "I generally feel safe from violence or crime in my community", while 50% disagreed (thereby indicating that they didn't feel safe). However, in 2017 only 33% agreed to the same statement and 64% disagreed, so also here a relative improvement in security perceptions is visible.
- 12 The Murle are the main rival ethnic group from neighbouring Boma State.
- 13 Participants' contributions during the community dialogue in Bor, November 2018.
- 14 Respondents could pick more than one response option with this question, so the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- 15 Idem.
- 16 Idem.
- 17 Of the remaining respondents who did not seek external assistance, 60% said they did not do so because they "did not believe anyone could help me resolve the issue".
- 18 57% of respondents thought that the Police was generally the best suited actor to respond to the incident they experienced, while 37% thought local armed youth were the best suited actor, followed by the national army (15%) and local leaders (12%).
- 19 For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- 20 Idem.
- 21 Idem.
- 22 Participants to the dialogue claimed that revenge killing was a more prevalent phenomenon in neighboring Eastern Lakes compared to Jonglei State.
- 23 For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- 24 The SPLA-IO, or Sudan People's Liberation Army – In Opposition, is the main political and armed oppositional group to the central government of South Sudan in Juba.

- 25 The SPLA or Sudan People's Liberation Army was the name of the main revolutionary armed group that fought to liberate South Sudan from the unitary Sudanese regime based in Khartoum from the 1950s up to 2005. After independence of South Sudan, the name SPLA was still used to designate the national army of the new nation. At the time of the survey, the national army was still commonly referred to as SPLA, but since the end of 2018, the national army is officially termed SSDF or South Sudan Defense Forces.
- 26 UNMISS has an operational base located near the airport in Bor, the state capital of Jonglei.
- 27 An UNMISS representative who was present countered that we had mainly surveyed in payams where UNMISS was not present or operational.
- 28 We report the views of only those respondents who mention the corresponding actor being present.
- 29 This is the case for all actors except the SPLA-IO. For the SPLA-IO the negative rating increases to 43%, while for all other actors the negative rating decreases to between 6-14%.
- 30 A community representative during the dialogue in Bor said that the national army, unlike the police, is not considered to be accessible to the community: "The police deals with civilians, but the army deals with the military, they are just busy with fighting".
- 31 "46 children abducted in Jonglei state last year: report", Sudan Tribune of 07-02-2017, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61590>.
- 32 Furthermore, in order to reduce the number of cattle raids and child abductions, 55% of respondents indicated that the authorities in their payam do not have a clear system to track and retrieve cattle that is lost or stolen, 38% said their payam had a mechanism to track and return cattle to their rightful owners.
- 33 For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- 34 Up from 74% agreement rates in 2017.
- 35 This rate was an increase from a score of 75% in 2017.
- 36 When it comes to access to justice, 87% respondents indicated that dispute resolution between communities is best handled by local elders or chiefs (informal justice providers), whereas 13% preferred recourse to the formal state court system.
- 37 Take note of the fact that the survey data were collected in March 2018, so well before the signing of the last Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018. Community perceptions might therefore have shifted now, which we hope to collect in the upcoming 2019 survey.
- 38 For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.
- 39 Quotes from community security dialogue in Bor, November 2018.
- 40 A third of respondents (34%) agreed to the statement "The national government in Juba is taking clear steps to reduce violence in our community", while 47% disagreed with the statement.
- 41 For this question, respondents were allowed multiple answers. As a result, the sum of the responses exceeds 100%.

Peace. Are you in?

PAX