



South Sudan Action Network  
on Small Arms

# Human Security Survey 2017 Annual Summary Report Jubek State, South Sudan

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- There exists a gap between local community security needs and the capacities for protection that security actors – local or international, like UNMISS – provide;
- PAX, SSANSA and AMA address this gap by surveying local security perceptions and feeding back this information into protection dialogues involving citizens as well as security actors;
- This report summarises the Human Security Survey findings for Jubek State and the main conclusions from local community security dialogues in 2017.

## Introduction and methodology

The Human Security Survey (HSS) is a unique survey methodology developed by PAX, that includes a series of complementary activities, including population-based research, community engagement, and advocacy. The objectives of the HSS are: 1) to increase knowledge and understanding of local human security dynamics and trends; 2) to enhance the 'claim-making capacity' of civilians to hold security providers and decision-makers accountable; and 3) to inform evidence-based advocacy that enables international stakeholders to design and implement protection activities that reflect local realities. PAX currently implements the HSS in South Sudan in close collaboration with its long-standing local partners South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) and Assistance Mission to Africa (AMA).


The survey in Jubek State took place over three weeks in July 2017. Ten locally recruited and trained enumerators conducted **525** interviews on civilians'

experiences, perceptions and expectations regarding the local security situation. Interviews were conducted across five payams in Juba, Rejaf county and Mangalla county (i.e. Lologo, Khor William, Kator, Jebel Lemun, and Kadoro), where geographical accessibility and security of enumerators were considered as important selection criteria. Within these payams, households and individual respondents were selected using an approximately random procedure to allow for some generalizability<sup>1</sup>.

In December 2017, PAX and SSANSA staff returned to Juba for a community security dialogue with around 40 participants, including chiefs from Mangalla and Rejaf, local government officials, police and prison service staff, wildlife rangers, women and youth representatives, a farmers' union representative, a representative from UNMISS, and a number of the local enumerators that had been collecting the data in Jubek state. During this three-day dialogue the

main survey findings and its practical implications were presented, discussed, and validated; participants jointly worked out an action plan for addressing security priorities locally; and a local Community Security Committee consisting of members with diverse backgrounds was established for monitoring the local security situation, and organizing activities that address the identified main security priorities. This way, initiatives to work on locally identified security issues originate from the community, genuinely representing community-based bottom-up endeavors.


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
## Main findings

### Security context

Respondents have been asked to assess the change in their personal security situation since the last year. The figure is quite dispersed: slightly less than half of respondents (48%) indicate an improved security situation, 32% indicate the situation worsened, and for 17% of respondents the situation has not changed<sup>5</sup>. When disaggregating respondents into three groups based on geographical location (i.e. Juba, Rejaf county, and Mangalla county<sup>6</sup>), we do see differences in the changed personal security situation between respondents from different areas. Significantly more respondents from Mangalla county indicate positive developments in the security situation than respondents from Juba: respectively 57% vs 36% indicate an *improved* security situation, and respectively 25% vs 40% indicate a *worsened* personal security situation<sup>7</sup>.



The main reasons for an *increased* personal security situation mentioned by respondents are “there was less violence in the payam” (75%), “we feel better protected by the security services” (34%), “we feel more relaxed and have less stress” (19%), “we can move freely in our village day and night” (18%), and “there were fewer weapons in our payam” (16%). Most frequently mentioned reasons for a *worsened* personal security situation are “there is more criminality” (90%), “increased cost of living or more poverty” (49%), “loss of job or fewer livelihood opportunities” (40%), “there are more weapons in our payam” (40%), and “we feel less protected or have less trust in the security forces” (30%).



### Demographics of the survey sample

Of the 525 respondents, 48% is male and 52% is female. Thus, the gender division of respondents is quite balanced across the sample. The average age of respondents is 35 years old. Given the fact that one of the respondent selection eligibility criteria is a minimum age of 16 years old, the average age in the survey sample is necessarily much higher than the median age in South Sudan of 17.3<sup>2</sup>. In terms of ethnicity, 23% of respondents is Dinka, 21% Bari, and the other 56% of respondents belong to one of the several ethnic minority groups<sup>3</sup>, thereby reflecting the ethnic variety of Jubeck’s population.

The majority of respondents (70%) indicate having lived primarily in this payam since South Sudan achieved independence in 2011. From the 30% who did move their residence since independence, 57% have moved from a state other than Jubeck<sup>4</sup>. As main reasons for migration respondents most often mention insecurity (42%), economic opportunities (31%), and living closer to family (20%).


In terms of livelihood strategy, 24% of respondents indicate working around the house. The other most frequently mentioned sources of livelihood are working in a small business, shop, restaurant, or as a trader (14%), farming (11%), working in the civil service (11%), and being a student (10%). In total 17% of respondents

Irrespective of whether perceived insecurity levels improved or got worse over the last year, respondents have been asked whether they have developed strategies for coping with general levels of insecurity. Around **89%** of respondents mention changes made by them or members of their household for improved personal security. The most frequently mentioned changes are “increased reliance on local police and/or military” (**67%**), “not leaving the house after dark” (**23%**), “joining armed local security units” (**16%**), and “participating in peace building initiatives” (**12%**). On average only **7%** of respondents mention relying on “acquiring weapons”.

## Incident reporting

Respondents were given a list of sixteen types of security incidents<sup>8</sup> and asked whether they themselves or someone from their household has experienced any of these incidents during the last year. From all respondents, **65%** mention *at least one* of the incidents from the list. Again regional variation exists: the victimization rate in Rejaf county is highest (**75%**), followed by Mangalla county (**49%**). Thus, in Juba the percentage of respondents reporting at least one security incident is smallest (**40%**). Nevertheless, recall that Juba was the area in which respondents were most negative about the *change* in security situation (see previous section)<sup>9</sup>.


The most frequently reported security incidents were *robbery* (**59%**), *assault with a weapon* (**24%**), *murder or attempted murder* (**19%**), *rape or sexual assault* (**15%**), *beating* (**11%**), and *extortion* (**10%**). All other incidents were mentioned by a maximum of **5%** of respondents. According to the residential area of respondents, the security incidents of *robbery*, *assault with a weapon*, and *beating* were especially prevalent in Rejaf county. *Rape or sexual assault* and *extortion*, on the contrary, were most prevalent in Mangalla county<sup>10</sup>. In the community security dialogue held in December 2017, participants debated how the high rate is related to poverty and hunger, unpaid salaries and lack of work, as well as too many small arms in the community and a general lack of



law enforcement. Furthermore, in terms of *rape* the point was raised that often rape happens in connection with robberies. It was also discussed to what extent rape incidents were related to drug use (“*Hungry people do not rape. The people who rape are under influence of drugs*”), impunity and systematically organized terror against certain communities<sup>11</sup>.

When asking respondents whether these incidents<sup>12</sup> have become more or less frequent in the community during the last year, for all security incidents the largest share of respondents point to an increasing frequency (compared to decreasing or unchanged). To be more specific: especially for the cases of *rape* or *sexual assault* and *extortion* more than **two-thirds** of respondents who reported these cases point to a higher frequency of these incidents lately than before.

Across all type of incidents, respondents most often point to *criminals* as the perpetrator of the incident (**88%**)<sup>13</sup>. The second most often reported perpetrator is *people from another community* (**39%**). In terms of location the most frequently mentioned location across all incidents was “around my house” (**66%**), and “in my house” (**64%**). Also “on the road while traveling” and “in the street/in the payam” were mentioned a considerable amount of times (**37%** and **32%** respectively).




In just above **half** of the cases, respondents mention having contacted someone outside the household to help them resolve the case. If respondents *did* contact someone (N= 371), the most frequently mentioned actor is the police (**89%**). This is followed by the SPLA (**36%**) and the local elders (**23%**)<sup>14</sup>. In just about **55%** of all of these cases the response was said to have been effective. As reasons why the response was effective respondents point to “*the perpetrator was caught and punished*” (**81%**), “*compensation for losses was offered*” (**46%**), and “*I feel safer now generally*” (**30%**). Examples of compensation offered mentioned by participants from the community security dialogue are money, cattle, and in some communities, women. Furthermore, reasons for the response *not* being effective are “*the*

perpetrator was not found” (81%), “the perpetrator was found, but not punished” (59%), and “no compensation for losses was offered” (53%). However, these latter findings are somewhat contradictory, as some people mentioned both the first and the second reason why the resolution was unsatisfactory (i.e. ‘the perpetrator was not found’, and ‘the perpetrator was found but not punished’)<sup>15</sup>.

## Vulnerability


Respondents have been presented a list of groups of people, and asked which of these groups they perceive as most vulnerable to violence. A clear gender picture arises: women are the most frequently mentioned group (60%), followed by young girls below the marriageable age (54%). Perceived types of incidents which these people might be facing are similar to the most frequently reported incidents: robbery (79%), rape or sexual assault (39%), assault with a weapon (34%), and murder or attempted murder (33%).



Reasons why these groups of people are perceived as particularly vulnerable are “these people cannot physically protect themselves” (58%), “these people are specifically targeted by perpetrators” (46%), and “these people do not have anyone to protect them” (46%). In the community security dialogue it was asked who are not able to physically protect themselves. Participants answered: “Women in general, as they don’t have guns. However, even if they do have guns they still would not be able to protect themselves”. People specifically targeted are “young girls, women, people with a certain political affiliation, and specific ethnic groups”<sup>16</sup>. When posing respondents a statement about whether an early marriage can be a good protection strategy for a young girl, 20% of respondents agrees; 72% does not agree. A woman representative said during the community security dialogue that “it is better to marry off girls when they are older, because they know more by then and can defend themselves”<sup>17</sup>.

## Security actors


Throughout the surveyed area, the majority of respondents (79%) indicated the police having a regular presence in the payam<sup>18</sup>. In Mangalla county significant less respondents recognized the presence of the police (44% vs 92% in Juba and 86% in Rejaf county). Over the whole sample slightly less than half of respondents confirm the presence of the SPLA (45%), or a traditional chief and/or traditional court (42%). In Juba less respondents confirm the presence of the SPLA than in Rejaf county (32% vs 48% respectively). On the contrary, in Juba the presence of the traditional chief and/or traditional court is recognized by more respondents than in both Rejaf and Mangalla county (71% vs 40% and 25% respectively). When asking respondents which three actors from this list have the best technical capacity to impact the local security situation in their payam, the same security actors are listed as abovementioned (police 73%; SPLA 35%; traditional chief and/or traditional court 32%).



The list of security actors was presented again, and respondents had to indicate which of these actors have a positive impact, negative impact, and/or neutral impact<sup>19</sup>. Again the police, SPLA, and traditional chief and/or traditional court are the most frequently mentioned actors. Out of respondents who indicated the presence of these actors, the influence of these actors was sometimes perceived ambivalently to be both positive, neutral and negative. On average 90% of respondents indicate the police having a positive impact, while 60% of respondents indicates a negative impact. For the SPLA these numbers are 66% and 47% respectively. Lastly, with regards to traditional chiefs/courts 40% of respondents indicates a positive impact, and 32% a negative. Thus, although for all security actors some respondents indicate both a positive and negative impact, in all cases the positive impact is the largest share. Furthermore, recall that it was these three actors which were ranked top in being contacted by respondents who experienced security threats for



help with resolving these. However, respondents who perceive themselves as a possible victim of violence in the future (N= 114) also point to the *police* (35%) and *SPLA* (29%) as likely perpetrator. Participants from the community security dialogue did not have a general explanation for this finding. However, it was claimed that new police recruits often were insufficiently trained, “they just get a uniform and a gun which is dangerous and they are not capable of helping to resolve issues”<sup>20</sup>. Other participants suggested that criminals or other perpetrators might pretend they are members of the police force by using their uniforms, making it easy to disguise as a police officer and thereby tainting their reputation.



Several statements were presented to respondents in the survey. On average the majority (75%) agrees that “the police takes reports from community seriously and are helpful in resolving them”. However, participants from the community security dialogue did not generally agree with this statement. It was argued that “The police does not intervene if the perpetrators are from the military, because the military staff are more senior than the police”, and that “The police is not well equipped; they often lack vehicles, as well as simple things as pen and paper”<sup>21</sup>. A police officer present in the community security dialogue even claimed that for the whole of Mangalla county there were only 10 policemen, who had to share six weapons among themselves<sup>22</sup>.


Although only 1% of respondents report the regular presence of UNMISS in their payam, 28% agrees that “UNMISS is actively working to protect or support people in this payam”; 52% disagrees. A comment made on the community security dialogue was that “UNMISS is doing nothing; they should provide the police with vehicles”<sup>23</sup>. An UNMISS representative present at the dialogue reacted that “It is the responsibility of the host government to protect the civilians. UNMISS comes in only when the government fails to protect civilians. The local population often doesn’t understand the mandate UNMISS has”<sup>24</sup>.

Respondents are divided between the statements whether security forces should be recruited from within the community, or consist of outsiders (44% vs 45% respectively). At the community dialogue it was argued that “Villages should protect themselves as we don’t have a unified national army or police that functions well and is present. However, we should aspire to get such a well-functioning army”<sup>25</sup>. Although many villages rely for their protection on local armed youth, some considered them not to be a reliable security actor: “local armed youth are not unifying, they are contributing to conflict between communities. A local youth group called Cobra started well as a defense force, but they now fight other communities”<sup>26</sup>. In order to recruit local youth as police officers, the armed youth would then have to be properly trained and coordinated by the local chiefs.

Rather than a strict separation between traditional or informal justice providers (local chiefs, elders) and formal state court employees like judges or lawyers, many participants to the community security dialogue proposed a more fluid system in which cases can be transferred upwards or downwards through the legal chain: “The reason that most people agree with the local elders or chief option is that it is more simple (accessible) in civilian cases and faster than the state court system. Therefore it should start with the elders, but they are not able to enforce the law alone. If they fail, cases should be taken up to the state courts”<sup>27</sup>.

### Suggestions to address local insecurity

The most frequently mentioned conflict factors according to respondents are socio-economic in nature. The majority of respondents (86%) indicate “poverty, hunger, and rising prices” as the most likely factor causing conflict in Jubek state. This is followed by “access to weapons” (51%), “poor governance at the national level” (49%), “control or fight over resources and corruption” (49%), “poor governance at the local level” (34%), and “lack of livelihood/job



*opportunities” (31%). During the community security dialogue, the lack of employment opportunities for young people was directly linked to them being recruited by army, police or other armed groups: “the lack of jobs result in crime, in joint rebellion by the youth. It is very hard to get a job if you don’t have an uncle working with the government or an organization. The only place where you can simply get a job is in the army or police.”*

### CONFLICT BETWEEN FARMERS AND PASTORALISTS

On average **19%** of respondents indicated “*conflict between cattle keepers and farmers*” as the main factor likely causing conflict. In July 2018 the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of UNMISS<sup>29</sup> together with PAX organized a farmer-pastoralist forum in Mangalla county, which was attended by a total of 80 participants. The objectives of the meeting were to promote cordial relationships between farmers and pastoralists; to promote peaceful co-existence between farmers and pastoralists; and to develop action points for peaceful co-existence.


During the forum it was discussed that the core cause negatively affecting peaceful co-existence between farmers and cattle keepers was the one of cattle destroying farmland. Cattle keepers explained that it is mainly because of insecurity that they bring their cattle close to farmland: “*If you go far away into the deep bush with your cattle, raiders will take away your cattle and might even kill you*”. However, pastoralists expressed their desire for peace and they proposed a geographical demarcation of land to end frequent clashes.

Farmers and pastoralists together identified ways to enhance peaceful co-existence through activities and economic development. The actions identified include joint farming and sharing of proceeds between cattle keepers and farmers, establishment of a common market to promote a sense of economic relevance, defining of migration and grazing routes, dissemination of skills gained through the forum to the cattle camps and farming communities, punitive measures against cattle destruction of farmlands, social cohesion through a restaurant for enhanced interaction, and formation of a joint committee of farmers and pastoralists. This latter committee exists of three farmers and three pastoralists, and aims to oversee the implementation of the community resolutions.

Although access to weapons is perceived as one of the main factors likely causing conflict, only **20%** of respondents agrees that “*it is easy to buy new weapons in our payam*”; **72%** disagrees. Nevertheless, **86%** of respondents agrees that “*disarmament of our weapons in the payam would reduce violence and*

*crime*”. However, in the community security dialogue it was argued that “*Disarmament is not possible as long as there is civil war and tribalism. Disarmament can only happen after peace has come*”<sup>28</sup>. During the community security dialogue the general feeling among participants was that the national power struggle and the national government were creating more insecurity in the country than local security issues do.

### WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE MOST VIABLE SOLUTIONS FOR LASTING PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN? (N= 525)



Respondents have also been asked to share their ideas about viable solutions for lasting peace in the country. The most frequently mentioned solution as “*implementation of the national peace agreement (ARCSS)*” (**77%**), closely followed by “*improved governance at the national level*” (**74%**). Half of respondents indicated “*improved community relations, e.g. through reconciliation, dialogue, and mutual respect*”. Furthermore, “*improved governance at the local level (state, county, payam)*”, and “*economic development, including more jobs and improved food security*” were mentioned by slightly less than half of respondents (**46%** and **45%** respectively). When presenting several statements to respondents related to means of improving security, 63% of respondents agree that “*prohibition of alcohol will have a positive impact on the security in my community*”.

With regards to the future, respondents are quite

### DATA PRESENTATION DURING COMMUNITY SECURITY DIALOGUE, JUBA DECEMBER 2017



positive about what they expect to happen with the security in their county. From all respondents who shared an expectation (N= 235), **75%** expect it will improve either a little or a lot. Only **13%** of respondents expect it will worsen.

During the community security dialogue, participants jointly identified five main security priorities in need of addressing: (1) preventing land disputes and dealing peacefully with land grabbing, (2) improving food security, (3) discouraging and preventing child abduction, (4) preventing rape and sexual assault, and (5) preventing cattle from eating crops from the fields. This shared understanding of threats and priorities helps to focus local peacebuilding efforts in the upcoming year, and follow-up activities and dialogue meetings initiated by the voluntary Community Security Committee, supported by the local authorities and communities.

PAX, SSANSA and AMA are committed to conduct further annual rounds of survey collection and dialogue, to generate additional insights into local security dynamics, to see how identified trends in local security develop over time, and to support the local follow-up activities, with the aim of achieving sustainable results in improving the local security situation.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See also the HSS South Sudan methodology summary published on our website at <https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180206HSS-SS-Methodology-one-pager.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> According to the CIA World Fact Book (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html>).

<sup>3</sup> Ethnic groups present in the sample are Acholi, Azande, Baggara, Balanda, Bari, Didinga, Dinka, Luo, Madi, Moru, Murle, Nuer, Otuho, Shilluk, Tennes, Toposa, Lolubo, Lotuko, Feri/Peri, and Kakwa. For each of these ethnic groups (apart from Bari and Dinka) in between 0% and 6% of respondents identifies him/herself with the ethnic group.

<sup>4</sup> The most frequently mentioned states where respondents indicate having lived before were Eastern Equatoria (32%), Jonglei (26%), and Central Equatoria (11%). The area on which Jubek State is currently located was, before the establishment of the 28-state system in 2015, also part of Central Equatoria State.

<sup>5</sup> No significant differences are found between male and female respondents in terms of the perceived change in personal security situation.

<sup>6</sup> Juba includes respondents from Kator, Rejaf county includes respondents from Logo and Khor William, and Mangalla county includes respondents from Kadoro and Jebel Lemun. In terms of distribution 16% of respondents reside in Juba, 19% in Mangalla county, and 65% in Rejaf.

<sup>7</sup> Please keep in mind that these are *relative* numbers and not necessarily *absolute*.

<sup>8</sup> The incidents from the list include: murder or attempted murder, assault with a weapon, robbery, rape or sexual assault, extortion, explosives, human trafficking/slavery/forced labor, abduction/forced disappearance, cattle raiding, forced marriage, being forced to flee, beating, torture, imprisonment, intimidation/

harassment, and forced conscription into security forces (formal or informal).

<sup>9</sup> At first sight it is interesting that respondents in Juba (compared to Rejaf county and Mangalla county) are most negative about the developments in the personal security situation, while the victimization rate in Juba is lowest. However, differences exist between relative and absolute levels of insecurity.

<sup>10</sup> *Robbery* is reported by 73% of respondents in Rejaf county, compared to 35% in Mangalla county and 34% in Juba. *Assault with a weapon* is reported by 32% of respondents in Rejaf county, compared to 13% in Mangalla county and 8% in Juba. *Beating* is reported by 15% of respondents in Rejaf county, compared to 5% in both Mangalla county and Juba. *Rape or sexual assault* is reported by 20% of respondents in Mangalla county, compared to 17% in Rejaf county and 1% in Juba. *Extortion* is reported by 19% of respondents in Mangalla county, compared to 9% in Rejaf and 6% in Juba. No significant differences are found between either of the three areas for the percentage of respondents experiencing *murder or attempted murder*.

<sup>11</sup> Participants from community security dialogue, December 2017.

<sup>12</sup> Please note that for the remainder of this section we focus only on the six most frequently reported incidents: robbery, assault with a weapon, murder or attempted murder, rape or sexual assault, beating, and extortion.

<sup>13</sup> Numbers in the remainder of this section, when not otherwise indicated, are weighted averages across the six most frequently reported incidents (N= 725).

<sup>14</sup> This order of security actors is in line with the findings of four scenario questions where respondents have been asked whom they would contact if someone from within their household would be murdered, raped, robbed, or would see unidentified armed men around the village.

<sup>15</sup> One participant to the community security dialogue said, somewhat disappointed: *“Earlier [during the war], in the military there were strict regulations when somebody raped a woman – they were shot. But now, because of human rights, we cannot do that anymore.”*

<sup>16</sup> Participants from community security dialogue, December 2017.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Respondents could tick all security actors from a list of 16 actors which they perceived as having a regular presence. The list of actors includes: police, family, wildlife rangers, statutory court and/or state court, neighborhood watch and/or armed youth, county commissioner, UNMISS, state governor, rebel group and/or local armed group, SPLA, local civilian organizations, fire brigade, friends, traditional chief and/or traditional court, bean police, and church and/or religious institution.

<sup>19</sup> Please note that these were three separate questions. Respondents could, thus, assign e.g. both a positive and negative impact to the same actor.

<sup>20</sup> Participants from community security dialogue, December 2017.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> UNMISS representative at community security dialogue, December 2017.

<sup>25</sup> Participants from the community security dialogue, December 2017.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Information in this box is based on notes from both PAX and CAD.

**Peace. Are you in?**

**PAX**