


# Protection Of Civilians

PROTECTION SERIES: 7/2023

## Reflections on Protection of Civilians in UN Special Political Missions



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## **Colophon**

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Cover photo: UNAMA releases its 2015 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict at a press conference in Kabul, 14 February 2016 (UN Photo / Fardin Waezi).

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# Table of contents

<b>List of acronyms</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1. Executive summary</b>	<b>5</b>
1.1 Recommendations	7
<b>2. Introduction</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>3. Protection of civilians and the protection system</b>	<b>9</b>
3.1 Defining PoC	9
3.2 PoC and the protection framework	11
<b>4. SPMs: mandates, structures, and operations</b>	<b>15</b>
4.1 Mandates	15
4.2 Structures	17
4.3 Operations	19
<b>5. Conclusion</b>	<b>22</b>

# List of acronyms

CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
GEE Yemen	Group of Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen
HRC	Human Rights Council
HRDDP	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSESGY	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen
PoC	Protection of Civilians
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SPM	Special Political Mission
SRSR	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SRSR-CAAC	Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict
SRSR-SVC	Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
SWPA	Senior Women's Protection Advisor
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNAMID	United Nations - African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNITAMS	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

# 1. Executive summary

One of the core roles of United Nations (UN) Missions is protection. Whether that protection is mandated or de facto, all UN Missions have some role to play in protecting the populations they serve. This includes protection across the spectrum of mandates and available tools – from presence to armed response. The UN Security Council is increasingly relying on Special Political Missions (SPMs) to support peace and conflict prevention. PAX has conducted interviews with protection professionals in a variety of UN Missions, headquarters – including with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), Department of Peace Operations (DPO), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – and elsewhere to better assess current capacities for the Protection of Civilians (PoC) specifically in SPMs, and to determine how and if these capacities might be improved upon, including through provision of context-specific protection-enabling mandates and resourcing.

In recent years, the Security Council has shifted toward the deployment of predominantly civilian missions, including SPMs, in conflict and post-conflict settings following decades of precedent in mandating peacekeeping operations (PKOs) involving uniformed personnel under the aegis of the UN. SPMs, managed by the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), have been configured with different structures ranging from smaller regional offices and Personal or Special Envoys of the Secretary-General<sup>1</sup> with limited staff to large country-specific field missions, such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The general expectation from the majority of interviewees consulted for this research is that these missions will continue to grow numerically and in terms of tasks assigned to them, thereby representing a critical component of future UN deployments to the field.

Throughout PAX's research, one thing all consulted on this paper stressed was the need for more flexibility in the mandates of SPMs regarding protection of civilians.<sup>2</sup> However, PAX and those consulted continue to weigh the value of specific versus broad PoC language in SPM mandates. Specific references to PoC roles should empower the UN in carrying out its mandates, programs, and operations in a more effective manner. However, some interviewees have expressed a preference for broader mandates to enable mission components to quickly adapt to ever-changing situations on the ground. Perhaps this is a matter best left to the specifics of the conflict as both views have merit, but PAX's research has indicated that, under current conditions within the UN system, a broader mandate that includes a reference to protection allows for flexibility and provides the mission with an opportunity to surge to meet demands when needed and scale back when needs are met.

<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of this paper, other entities considered as SPMs but not under the management of DPPA, such as the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Panels of Experts, or sanction and monitoring teams, have not been analyzed.

<sup>2</sup> For example, and as will be discussed later, UNAMA's mandate included: "To monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection"; while UNAMI's mandate said: "Promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform".

SPMs have been configured and deployed to respond to the specific challenges and opportunities of the country of concern and to adapt to several variables, including: the level of support by the host nation; the geopolitical context; the readiness of the Security Council to take action; the availability of funding; the pre-existence of UN presences; and the objectives set by the Secretary-General. This has necessarily resulted in a plethora of diverse mandates, structures, and operations. According to interviewees and literature on the topic, while it is challenging to create unifying policies for these mechanisms, their diversity and operational flexibility is a major strength.

Recently, recognition of the critical value that SPMs can provide to the protection of civilians in conflict-affected states has grown. However, SPMs' abilities to support PoC in armed conflict can be frustratingly limited without the support, legitimacy, and resourcing provided by explicit reference to PoC and/or protection-linked responsibilities within mandates. Such language does not have to be overly prescriptive: it can include broad mandate language which allows for flexibility in the face of quickly changing contexts and needs of the mission, as was utilized in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), or explicit protection language, as was previously included in UNAMA's mandate. Further inclusion of complementary human rights, peacebuilding, and other mandates that can support PoC objectives are critical to supporting a holistic response to protection concerns. Complementary unarmed approaches to PoC have an indisputable role to play in the promotion of PoC, and should be prioritized.

Additionally, as the use of SPMs continues to expand in new and different contexts with varying mandated responsibilities, it is critical that the UN, particularly the UN Security Council, pursues clarity on their objectives and methodologies in relation to PoC, especially in relation to PoC mandates and the broader UN PoC agenda. To this end, SPMs need to consider the varying conceptualizations of PoC, ensure sound coordination among their political, human rights and humanitarian entities, and plan and implement operations that respect the principle of Do No Harm, while enhancing the protection of civilians.

This paper provides an analysis of different approaches to PoC and challenges that SPMs have experienced in the implementation of their mandates. It presents a proposal for a coherent and coordinated approach to PoC within SPMs. It argues that SPMs should establish regular reporting mechanisms with the political, human rights, and humanitarian components (where present) collaboratively working toward evidence-based analysis to inform the UN leadership on challenges and opportunities to influence engagements and advocacy. Building on existing UN policies and mechanisms, it makes a proposal for a coherent structure to achieve the objective of enhanced protection of civilians, without the intention of adding another layer of coordination and reporting to an often already saturated environment.

The paper analyzes some key aspects of four SPMs – those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Sudan – and discusses the issues of the explicit inclusion of PoC into mandates, how the different structures of SPMs can influence the mandate, and reviews some of the PoC practices and gaps constituting the daily work of these missions. However, we recognize this is a diverse set of SPMs and it may not be practical nor desirable to have a “one-size-fits-all” policy regarding protection mandates, which is reflected in our topline recommendation. This paper concludes that, after giving due consideration to the situation on the ground, the explicit inclusion of PoC language in mandates can be beneficial to provide the necessary political legitimacy to SPMs to carry out the tasks vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict. It also finds that the decision of including specific references to PoC should consider several key aspects such as the size and structure of the SPM, the available human and financial

resources, and the security conditions on the ground for UN personnel and civilians interacting with them. Finally, it is imperative SPMs are staffed with PoC coordination officers so they can effectively carry out their critical protection role. These PoC coordination officers should ensure all components with a role to play in PoC-related issues are coordinated and speak with one voice when raising specific PoC-related issues.

## 1.1 Recommendations

With the intention of providing a continued support to the discussion on enhanced protection of civilians, and while recalling and expressing full support to the recommendations made by Dirk Druet in his International Peace Institute [report on SPMs](#), this paper also recommends that:

- (a) SPMs should have a specific reference to PoC in mandates where applicable, and those mandates should be broad enough to enable missions to adapt to changing dynamics.<sup>3</sup>
- (b) SPMs must be properly resourced with PoC-trained staff, as well as PoC tools and mechanisms to carry out their mandates and/or to support national institutions in maintaining PoC responsibilities in full compliance with international law. Such staff may be members of the human rights unit, protection advisors, or, regardless of their specific title or affiliation, may take some other form as determined by the SPM leadership.
- (c) SPMs and all UN Missions, should consider the full spectrum of civilian harm, including reverberating effects, in all conflict and risk monitoring and analysis, as well as those actions taken to prevent, mitigate, and/or respond to civilian harm.
- (d) DPPA should carry out an in-depth study on its protection activities, including specific PoC-related activities, in SPMs to obtain a clear understanding of best practices and develop effective measures to address gaps and challenges, including those deriving from transitional settings.
- (e) SPMs should further enhance efforts to leverage technology for PoC; ensuring regular access to satellite images for its staff, train personnel on innovative techniques for information gathering on PoC, create and disseminate a uniform user-friendly PoC-specific database for civilian harm tracking and mitigation efforts, and make use of technical expertise, such as military advisors, to further improve the quality of PoC reporting as a tool to advance political solutions.
- (f) SPMs and other UN entities must prioritize full implementation, in accordance with the specific conditions on the ground, of existing relevant protection-related policies and good practices – such as those embodied in the Secretary-General's Our Common Agenda and his 2020 Call to Action for Human Rights, including the forthcoming Agenda for Protection, as well as the UN's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on Support to Non-UN Security Forces (HRDDP) – to promote an effective and coherent whole-of-system approach to all aspects of protection.

<sup>3</sup> See the UNAMA and UNAMI mandates for best practices.

# 2. Introduction

With this research paper on SPMs and PoC, PAX intends to build on the policy and operational recommendations discussed at an event hosted by DPPA, OHCHR, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), entitled “Contributions of Special Political Missions to the Protection of Civilians,” during Protection of Civilians Week 2021, with a view of supporting decision making for an enhanced protection for civilians.

Due to the large number of [UN Missions](#) with presences in four continents, including 40 SPMs, each with different mandates, structures, and operations, this paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the situations and roles of all SPMs. Rather, it analyzes experiences, lessons learned, challenges, and opportunities shared from four missions, namely [UNAMA](#), [UNAMI](#), the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen ([OESGY](#)), and the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan ([UNITAMS](#)), in order to identify gaps and strengths and develop effective advocacy strategies. The choice of these Missions responds to the necessity to consider different mandates and structures of SPMs, including assessing transitional settings, as well as to provide a wide geographical coverage, while recognizing that our selection may not be representative for all currently existing types of SPMs.

The findings and recommendations in this report are also based on a desk review of PAX’s [publications](#) and policy documents, particularly the book “[On Civilian Harm](#)”, existing literature on the topic,<sup>4</sup> UN Security Council Resolutions, and public policy documents, as well as 12 interviews of members of the UN Secretariat at headquarters and field level, consultations with DPO, DPPA, and OHCHR, and thematic and geographical experts from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In full respect of confidentiality principles, interviewees are identified and quoted exclusively after receiving expressed authorization. Attention was also paid to the incorporation of gender-specific considerations to assess how SPMs and other UN entities can adequately respond to the specific protection needs of men, women, boys, and girls in situations of conflict or armed violence.

From a normative perspective, the research is guided by the UN Charter and the obligations deriving from International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Recalling common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, this paper adopts a working definition of PoC that focuses on protection of civilians, protected objects, and personnel, from direct harm in situations of conflict or other forms of violence. However, it appreciates and discusses various approaches to PoC and protection in general, presenting a proposal for coherent policies and practices for SPMs operating in diverse environments and conditions while maintaining the protection of the right to life as the core objective of all protection frameworks within the Missions.

<sup>4</sup> An essential reading on the topic of SPMs and PoC is the International Peace Institute report, “United Nations Special Political Missions and Protection: A Principled Approach for Research and Policymaking”, July 2021.



# 3. Protection of civilians and the protection system

## 3.1 Defining PoC

One of the first findings of the research is the existence within SPMs and the UN system of a variety of approaches and understandings of PoC, both conceptually and semantically. In referring to PoC, interviewees and literature cover a wide range of concepts and actions, from operations able to rely on, if required, the ability to deploy the use of force to complement unarmed approaches to settings relying purely on unarmed approaches conducted by both uniformed and civilian personnel.<sup>5</sup> The latter often encompasses numerous activities which are relevant to various UN mandates and are all PoC-related. These include: the promotion and protection of human rights; documentation and recording of civilian casualties; and facilitation of the provision of humanitarian assistance, transitional justice, remedies for victims; and the efforts aimed at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 16. Therefore, any successful PoC advocacy at the Security Council to influence mandates and operations of SPMs must clarify terminology and its content. This is even more compelling in consideration of the obstacles posed by the current global political environment where multilateralism and consensus-based decision making are increasingly challenging to achieve.

While it is unanimously accepted that advocacy should aim at the highest standards of protection for civilians, a strategic approach to the development of SPMs' mandates and implementation of operations is critical. In its 2020 [position paper](#), PAX offered a broadened definition of civilian harm, which informs its priorities to promote a more holistic approach to PoC. This definition builds on the traditional foundations of this discipline, expanding it to encompass not only direct effects, but also reverberating civilian harm effects. Specifically, PAX defines civilian harm as:

*Negative effects on civilian personal or community well-being caused by use of force in hostilities. Effects can occur directly (death, physical or mental trauma, property damage) or indirectly through the destruction of critical infrastructure, disruption of access to basic needs and services, or the loss of livelihood.*

This definition extends the level of protection beyond direct harm in the course of hostilities to a concept of harm that affects individuals and communities in the mid- and long-term. Such an approach is essential to monitor and assess the full extent of the impact on the civilian

<sup>5</sup> The concept of [unarmed approaches to PoC](#) refers to a non-exhaustive list of protection activities carried out by uniformed and civilian personnel without threat or use of force; for example, protection through presence.

population of the use of force and violations of international law, especially in terms of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity. Moreover, if looked at through a UN lens, this definition could establish important synergies with mandates and operations of the UN system at large and therefore it can inform the development of SPM mandates, providing grounds for political, human rights, and humanitarian entities to act in a coherent and coordinated manner.

Conversely, the definition of PoC by UN DPO remains anchored to physical violence, and it allows for all necessary means, including deadly force. The [2019 policy](#) “The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping” defines PoC as:

*[W]ithout prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state, integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed mission components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians within the mission’s capabilities and areas of deployment through the use of all necessary means, up to and including deadly force.*

The DPO policy also identifies three tiers of PoC action, namely (i) protection through dialogue and engagement, (ii) provision of physical protection, and (iii) the establishment of a protective environment. Types of activities include engagement with communities, mediation, monitoring and reporting under tier (i) and security sector reform, capacity building, and strengthening the rule of law under tier (iii). Moreover, tier (ii) also encompasses not only the use of force - which would not be an option in SPM settings - but also other activities that can be carried out by all mission components to physically protect civilians, whether through protective presence, interposition, the threat of use of force, or facilitating safe passage or refuge.

Though the DPO policy does not apply to SPMs, it does provide relevant guidance on PoC approaches that are arguably also applicable in SPMs. SPMs, however, lack traditional uniformed components – if not in advisory roles – a reality which means that while they may still engage in and provide protection depending on the situation, they cannot fully fulfill all aspects of tier (ii), particularly the use of force. This indicates the necessity for the UN to consider the development of a nuanced PoC framework to promote clarity on what SPMs can realistically achieve in the field and contribute to sustainable peace and development. The transition from the United Nations - African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to UNITAMS, as well as the recent changes in UNAMA’s mandate following the evolving context after the withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan can offer important insights on existing opportunities, challenges, and gaps for enhanced protection capacities and would deserve in-depth research and analysis.

The PoC definition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in its [2016 Policy](#) for the Protection of Civilians, may also provide some comparative insight. In this Policy, NATO indicates that:

*The protection of civilians (persons, objects and services) includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimise and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations on the civilian population. When applicable, it also includes efforts to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors.*

One of the most interesting aspects of this definition, when read in relation to SPMs, is the focus on civilian harm that NATO may cause during its operations. While within the UN system there is a level of attention to the impact of the operations, it should be ensured that during the planning phase for SPMs, mandates and operations fully reflect and respect principles such as “Do No Harm” and make meaningful use of existing tools like the [Human Rights Due Diligence Policy \(HRDDP\)](#).<sup>6</sup> While SPMs can use these policy frameworks and approaches to creatively implement PoC, other organizations and support providers should also be encouraged to actively apply “Do No Harm” or conflict-sensitive approaches to avoid providing support to military and civilian actors who may be responsible for violations of international law and causing harm to civilians.

### 3.2 PoC and the protection framework

SPMs and unarmed approaches to PoC play a critical role in the promotion of PoC, and it is essential that the international community equip SPMs with tools and mechanisms to satisfactorily carry out their mandates. This is intimately interconnected with the second finding of the research: the relationship between PoC and the protection system. Much has been written on the complexity of the topic and there are multiple policy tools available. Key policy documents have recently been released, such as the Secretary-General’s [Our Common Agenda](#) and his [Call to Action for Human Rights](#), and more are to be published, including the long-awaited Agenda for Protection for the UN system. Therefore, this paper does not presume to solve the issue but rather it intends to offer a conceptual perspective to PoC and protection for further analysis and actions.

Any protection activity, be it from the perspective of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, OCHA, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG-CAAC) and on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC) or, of course, the UN human rights component/OHCHR, has as underpinning principle the respect of the right to life and physical integrity. As articulated in [Our Common Agenda](#), “[h]uman rights are vital problem-solving tools that safeguard lives and livelihoods and can prevent grievances from arising”.

While the diversity in compositions and structures of SPMs is widely considered as a strength to address the unique specific challenges of situations on the ground, it also makes the development of effective “one-size-fits-all” policies (and/or mandate language) extremely challenging. However, protection mandates in SPMs and in UN presences in any given country proactively address a wide range of cross-cutting issues – such as the promotion and protection of human rights; assisting in security sector reform and promotion of the rule of law; supporting humanitarian action and response; among others – allowing for a conceptualization of the approach.

Recalling the principles of the [Human Rights up Front](#) initiative and in support of the Secretary-General’s call for a renewed social contract anchored in human rights in [Our Common Agenda](#), this proposal for a protection framework entails a primary role for PoC as a necessary component

<sup>6</sup> The HRDDP, which is mandatory for the entire UN system, requires that the UN carry out risk assessments before engaging in support and develops mitigation measures to avoid the verification of risks. Best practices on the implementation of the HRDDP can be found in the experience of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia ([UNSOM](#)). Of interest and to ensure respect of the Do No Harm principle and to avoid reputational damages, the UN in Myanmar initiated a due diligence process covering both military and civilian institutions due to the widespread control of the army over civilian life. Read [here](#) for some more information on the process, specifically in para 57.

of SPMs' conflict analysis and conflict resolution activities, identification of patterns affecting civilians, and a key aspect for decision making on programming, engagement, and advocacy.

A coordinated and comprehensive approach to PoC within and across UN Missions and the system as a whole is key to making maximum use of the interdependency and interconnectedness of protection issues and overcoming challenges posed by explicit, but mutually reinforcing individual mandates. Therefore, SPMs, and other UN entities on the ground, must commit to overcoming the differences that have often hampered the successful implementation of UN operations on the ground, including a sense of individual or sectional ownership of thematic portfolios on the basis of the entity's mandate, and turn them into an instrument that can lead to positive behavioral changes. To this end, the recently launched DPPA/DPO [Peace and Security Data Hub](#) represents an innovative and practical tool expected to significantly support the work of the UN in the field and at headquarters level.<sup>7</sup> The scope of this tool is mostly threefold: it aims at improving analytical situational overviews for operations and programs, supporting informed decision making, and not least ensuring transparency and accountability. If consistently used among mission components or United Nation Country Teams (UNCTs), this tool has the potential of overcoming challenges regularly faced in the field in relation to information sharing and coordination, including on PoC.

Many different protection actors contribute to regular, verified, data-driven reporting on developments within Mission contexts and delivery of their mandates, such as early warning and reporting on civilian harm. While compositions and methodologies may vary depending on the specific situation, human rights components or OHCHR presences should maintain a leading role as it is widely recognized that human rights components in missions or OHCHR stand-alone offices have a leading role in promoting and protecting the human rights to life and physical integrity, hence in PoC. Their expertise, including in collecting and analyzing are well known and key in establishing a protective environment. However, communication and information sharing across and within Missions should be improved and promoted wherever possible to breakdown any remaining silos and foster cooperation across all protection-related prevention, mitigation, and response measures.


As stressed by Under-Secretary-General [DiCarlo](#), political solutions are the primary instrument for the UN to prevent and solve conflicts. The work done by human rights components directly contributes to achieving overall political mission objectives and mandate implementation of the Mission as a whole, including to the fundamental objective of protecting civilians that underlies all UN peace efforts whether in PKOs or SPMs. In fact, broader efforts to strengthen human rights – encompassing the wide range of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights – are critical to establishing a protective environment and prevent the relapse of violence. Therefore, political senior leadership should incorporate the human rights components' role (where present) under this framework into the holistic understanding of missions' operations as well as headquarter directives and policy decisions into the analysis.

While there is consensus among interviewees that attempting to conceive a system applicable in all situations where SPMs are or may be deployed is ineffective, this paper argues that there is merit in the development of a coordinated protection framework for analysis of SPMs' mandates

<sup>7</sup> The Peace and Security Data Hub is part of a comprehensive UN approach to new technologies and data which also incorporates the 2018 [Secretary-General's Strategy on New Technologies](#), the 2020 [Secretary-General's Data Strategy](#), and the 2021 [UN Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping](#). Available literature on the impact of these strategies on the PoC and overall work of the UN as a system is extremely limited. Specific researches on these topics are warranted.

and recurring issues facing UN Missions. The table below demonstrates relationships among PoC, UN stakeholders, and protection thematic issues and how, as explained above, protection issues are interconnected and require a holistic analysis to satisfactorily carry out PoC work. It should be noted that while this table attributes primary responsibility to certain entities (e.g., SRSG for advocacy), it does not intend to indicate that such responsibilities are exclusive.

**TABLE 1: POC IN SPMS**



# 4. PoC and SPMs: mandates, structures, and operations

## 4.1 Mandates

A confirmation of the validity of both approaches – the explicit inclusion of PoC-related language in Mission mandates or the use of broader, more flexible language – derives from the analysis of the mandates of UNAMA and UNAMI, generally regarded as best practices on PoC within the UN system. UNAMA’s [mandate](#) read, “To monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection”.<sup>8</sup> This specific provision allowed the human rights component to operate as a recognized stakeholder from all parties, including international forces and non-State armed groups, and produce regular and accurate [PoC reports](#), including on torture and sexual violence, since 2007. As has been widely documented, it is through these reports, advocacy, and continuous engagement with all parties to the conflict, that UNAMA has been effective in promoting some behavioral changes among conflict parties that have ultimately contributed to saving the lives of Afghan civilians.

UNAMI’s broad mandate to “Promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform”, has provided the mission with the flexibility to prioritize and better focus its efforts, actions, engagements, advocacy, and resources to advance and promote protection issues. Since 2005, the UNAMI human rights component has published a wide range of [reports](#) on the human rights situation in Iraq. These reports have been an invaluable tool in documenting a broad range of violations, including those committed during ISIS’ control of territories in the north. Moreover, in recent years UNAMI has continued its work on numerous topics related to PoC, such as administration of justice, including on cases of terrorism, past enforced disappearances, mass graves, and accountability for the use of violence during demonstrations. The work of UNAMI’s human rights component, including monitoring and reporting, is contributing to creating conditions conducive to mitigating all forms of violence. This human rights-based preventative approach, which is based on continuous partnership with the Government of Iraq to strengthen its compliance with international legal obligations and promote systemic changes, is also facilitated by the flexibility provided in the language used in the mandate. Another exemplary practice is

8 Following the 2021 crisis, at the mandate’s renewal in September, the Security Council adopted Resolution [596 \(2021\)](#) extending the mission for six months without any specific reference to PoC. For the work previously done by UNAMA references are to Security Council Resolution 2543(2020) and preceding resolutions.

the embedding of a Senior Women's Protection Advisor (SWPA) within UNAMI's human rights component. The SWPA is tasked with monitoring and verifying acts of sexual violence, analyzing trends, and advising the mission's senior leadership on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) prevention and response as well as ensuring CRSV considerations are fully integrated into mission planning, analysis, and operational activities.

The transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS also presents an interesting case to assess the role of mandates.<sup>9</sup> UNAMID used to be a large peacekeeping presence with over 4,000 uniformed personnel and a clear mandate to "Protect civilians" in Darfur. In 2017, UNAMID endorsed a "[Refined Protection of Civilians Strategy](#)" with the objective to provide theoretical and operational guidance on its four main tasks: enhanced physical protection of conflict-affected populations; early warning and early response; creation of a protective environment; and increased capacity to respond to protection needs on the ground. However, following the decision to close down the mission, these solid policy and operational frameworks in place were not transferred to UNITAMS.

UNITAMS' [mandate](#) focuses more on the provision of technical assistance to the Government of Sudan to support political transition, peacebuilding, and economic and development assistance, to give continuity to the work of UNAMID. Specifically, UNITAMS' mandate refers to "Assisting peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas".<sup>10</sup> According to some interviewees intimate with Security Council decision making, the intention of the Security Council was to indicate the shift in UN activities from UN-provided physical protection to an exclusively assistance role supporting the Government in its primary responsibility to protect civilians, including through supporting the development of a work plan for the implementation of the Transitional Government's National Mechanism for Protection of Civilians. However, this transition from a PKO to an SPM resulted in significant challenges in the implementation of operations on the ground. Fundamental differences in mandate, resourcing, and Mission configuration contributed to a major decline in protection capacities comparatively between the Missions, among other factors. For example, the transition of UN presence and capacities was not adequately communicated among civilian populations in Sudan. Interviewees consistently indicated that civilians in Darfur failed to understand the fact that the UN mandate had fundamentally changed, if any explanation was ever provided to them, and only perceived a decrease in protection and prevention efforts. This, coupled with the substantial reduction of UN staff in the field, caused reputational problems and trust issues that could further hamper the full delivery of the current mandate.

From a perspective of having several coexisting different country-specific mandates, the case of Yemen is peculiar albeit not unique.<sup>11</sup> UN entities currently or formerly holding a mandate to work on Yemen include two SPMs, the OSESGY and the UN Mission to support the Hedaydah Agreement (UNMHA), a UNCT with 20 Agencies, Funds, and Programs, including OHCHR, and the Human Rights Council's (HRC) Group of Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen (GEE Yemen).<sup>12</sup>

9 It should be noted that the transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS was not a usual transition as a peacekeeping operation deployed to only one region of the country was followed by the deployment of an SPM with a mandate covering the whole country (and with concurrent mandates for a period of six months).

10 UNITAMS clearly has a PoC mandate although the language used in the resolution refers to "civilian protection" rather than "protection of civilians". This new use of terminology, however, adds confusion rather than provides clarity and should not be replicated in future mandates.

11 Similar to Yemen, Myanmar also has numerous concurrent mandates, including a Special Envoy acting as SPM.

12 Regrettably, on 7 October 2021, the Human Rights Council voted against the extension of the mandate of the GEE Yemen further hampering UN actions on PoC in an already extremely dire situation.

Additionally, reporting mechanisms relevant to PoC, such as the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms (MRM) on violations listed in Resolution 1612 (2005), are in place.

The [mandate](#) of the OSESGY is indicative of the primacy of political engagement to UN conflict prevention and resolution activities and no reference to PoC is made in the mandate. UNMHA's [mandate](#) reflects the specific thematic and geographical scope of this entity and it includes some PoC elements, including “to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces, and mine action operations”. On the contrary, the HRC-issued [mandate](#) to the GEE Yemen used to be quite broad and it requested “To monitor and report on the situation of human rights, to carry out a comprehensive examination of all alleged IHRL violations and abuses and other appropriate and applicable fields of international law committed by all parties to the conflict”.

Despite this, civilians have continued to be exposed to all possible forms of harm from the conflict for over seven years. The case of Yemen demonstrates the gaps within the UN system's approach to promoting the protection of civilians, including in situations where SPMs are present, as the overall system still lacks a structured, coherent, and coordinated approach to PoC. While the [2020 UNCT report](#) on Yemen highlights some of the actions taken by the UN on the ground, including OHCHR exchanging data on civilian casualties and human rights violations and abuses, the absence of a whole-of-system PoC-mandated focus hampers more substantive efforts aimed at protecting civilians.

## 4.2 Structures

Most interviewees emphasized that SPMs' mandates must be implementable in accordance with their size and structure on the ground. It is generally accepted that it would be a mistake, if not even harmful, to request an SPM to take over duties and responsibilities for which they are not equipped. This would inevitably result in a systemic failure that may even bear responsibility in the case of occurrence of grave crimes. This does not include entities that are in general more limited in size, such as Special Envoys offices and regional offices to whom it is not advisable to attribute core PoC responsibilities, but even among larger Missions important differences in resourcing and capacity must be considered.

For example, in the transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS, in addition to the configuration of the mandate (from a uniformed peacekeeping operation deployed under Chapter VII to a civilian SPM deployed under Chapter VI)<sup>13</sup>, the transition brought along two main differences: geographical coverage, as UNAMID focused on Darfur exclusively while UNITAMS covers the entire Sudan, and resources as in budget and staff. Reportedly, the size of UNAMID's human rights component (275 staff) was larger than the whole of UNITAMS (269). Under these new circumstances, it would be a gross miscalculation to believe that UNITAMS could deliver in a comparable capacity to UNAMID. As eloquently expressed by a UN Senior official “to do more with less is to do less”.

The success of a mission transition like the one in Sudan depends on all stakeholders, from UN Member States to the victims of the conflict, being aware of policy and operational changes. Analyzing the findings of previous mission transitions – notwithstanding differing contexts and mandate requirements – Agathe Sarfati [argued](#) that there are three necessary conditions for a successful transition: a shared vision of peace among national actors and the UN system; clarity

<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that this section is examining the comparative capacities based on the structure of UNITAMS and not further expounding upon questions of mandate.



from the UN about the substantive differences between the various stages of its presence and the implications for political engagement and peacebuilding efforts; and making arrangements to ensure continuous political engagement and provide conflict-sensitive analysis to support the work of the UN. The initial findings of this research indicate that none of these elements were sufficiently implemented on the ground, including the latter two conditions, which the UN should have had agency to implement throughout the transition.

Interviewees familiar with the transition and the current operations of UNITAMS emphasized that in a short timeframe the PoC work of the UN in Sudan moved from the provision of physical and legal protection, effective coordination with the military and police, and post-incident field deployments, to the current assistance to the Government for the implementation of the national plan and liaison with the UNCT to streamline PoC within the protection framework. However, the limited financial resources available have hampered the possibility to even fulfill this role, with a number of requests for assistance, such as IHL training, exceeding the ability to respond.

It is worth noting for context that the creation of UNITAMS' "Office of Support to Civilian Protection,"<sup>14</sup> was preceded by the OHCHR country office, which was created before UNITAMS came into existence. As a result, the human rights presence in Sudan has two mandates. It was reported that the Head of the OHCHR office is also the Deputy of the Head of the human rights component. As this process is ongoing, it is not possible to assess the level of efficacy of this decision yet. UNITAMS and OHCHR should continue work on developing and implementing a realistic and implementable PoC framework to continue protecting civilians despite the limited resources, integrate their work with the other mission components and the UNCT, and support the Government in meeting its obligations. It is believed that the proposal made in the first part of this paper could represent a possible solution.

The cooperation between SPMs and OHCHR brings up another important point often raised in relation to the structure of PoC work, namely the issue of a dual reporting line. UNAMA and UNAMI have published for several years PoC and other thematic reports under the auspices of both the SPM and OHCHR. We found that interviewees and [literature](#) are unanimous in highlighting the positive impact of this arrangement rather than the challenges. This dualism appears to be mutually beneficial. The SPMs gain in reputation and political capital due to the high quality of the reports, their impartiality, and the ability to raise awareness on the harm civilians suffer to promote behavioral changes and advocate for remedial actions. On the other side, OHCHR can provide its methodological and technical expertise to advance the promotion and protection of human rights. This fruitful cooperation has an impact on other aspects of the work of SPMs as OHCHR has the opportunity to present on its own sensitive and politically relevant issues framed under a human rights perspective. This relieves the SRSG of some risks that may compromise the operations of the mission at large.

Finally, in terms of structures and decisions on the provision and extent of SPMs' PoC mandates, it is necessary to take into consideration the willingness of the Government to support it, the presence on the field, and the security situation on the ground. National support is a necessary condition for SPMs to operate. In the absence of it, it would be extremely challenging for any SPM to deliver its mandate. Therefore, dialogue, negotiations, and political engagement with the host country are critical to delineate an effective course of action.

<sup>14</sup> This office serves to support the Government of Sudan in preventing conflicts and violence and protecting populations at risk of violence, promoting human rights, and strengthening accountable rule of law and security institutions, including to uphold accountability.

Of similar importance is the presence of an SPM in all parts of the country. For example, one of the key elements of the PoC achievements of UNAMA was in fact its extensive physical presence in Afghanistan. UNAMA used to have offices in all provinces and in most districts and, with just a few exceptions and some planning, UNAMA personnel were able to travel to those districts where it had no offices. This positively contributed to several decisive factors for the PoC work of UNAMA. First and foremost, it facilitated the establishment of trusted relationships with international and national armed forces, public officials, and local networks who became sources of information and critical components of referrals in order to access primary sources. UNAMA also became a point of contact for civilians who suffered harm to directly report their testimonies and request an end to the violence. Moreover, with its capillary presence, UNAMA conducted advocacy activities and awareness-raising activities, such as the public presentation of PoC reports at the local level. This demonstrated to Afghans how they contributed to the product and the importance of a systematic dialogue to contribute to the protection of civilians. In March 2022 a new mandate was approved for UNAMA, which - coupled with a changed situation on the ground - has resulted in a reconfiguration of some of its PoC work.

Security of UN national and international personnel and of civilians interacting with SPMs is another key concern to take into consideration. During conflicts in Iraq, from 2003 and onwards, including during the ISIS incursion, the PoC work of UNAMI was extremely challenging. With the Mission headquartered in the Green Zone in Baghdad and despite some presence in the field,<sup>15</sup> security and protection concerns were predominant considerations in outreach activities. The full reporting of the brutality and impact of the conflicts on civilians was hampered to an extent during the height of ISIS' incursion when it controlled one third of Iraqi territory. Similarly, in Yemen interviewees reported acute security concerns posing significant obstacles to communication and information gathering and -sharing. A former NGO member reported the widespread feeling among Yemeni civil society that international organizations relied on them to receive sensitive information, such as detainees' lists, which exposed civilians to serious risks.

To conclude, during the planning and decision-making phases for the mandate of an SPM and in pursuance of a whole-of-system approach to PoC, the UN should carefully consider the extent of territorial coverage of the SPM, the requirements for human and financial resources to carry out PoC tasks, and the overall security conditions to enable operations on the ground. Moreover, for situations of transitions from peacekeeping to an SPM, Damian Lilly [argues](#) that attention should also be paid to the development of exit strategies revising protection priorities and approaches, to establishing a clear definition of the target end state for PoC, and to enhancing national ownership and leadership.

### 4.3 Operations

In the implementation of their mandates, SPMs have to develop a number of tools and techniques to ensure that their PoC work results in verified, credible, accurate, and impartial products avoiding any harm to victims, witnesses, and interlocutors. A key aspect of this is the methodology employed for casualty recording. While most SPMs analyzed in this paper carry out their monitoring, documenting, and recording on the basis of commonly accepted methodologies, including the 2019 OHCHR [Guidance on Casualty Recording](#), it appears that each mission adapts to the specificities of the

<sup>15</sup> UNAMI has offices in Baghdad, Erbil, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Basra.

situation on the ground. In regard to UNAMA, which is generally considered as the most coherent experience within the UN system on casualty recording, interviewees indicated that a critical aspect of the operations was the investment made in an effective and user-friendly PoC-specific database, which significantly contributed to structuring the information collection process and facilitated data storage and analysis. The creation of this tool was also indicative of the firm position of the management to prioritize PoC as the key thematic area of focus. Another strategic decision was to incorporate military experts who provided expert contributions to the analysis and facilitated dialogue with armed forces.

Some other SPMs use recording systems either provided by the Mission or in use at OHCHR, neither of which were specifically designed for PoC. However, around 2013, UNAMI developed its own PoC database that helped to strengthen coherence in the overall approach to PoC. It then later transitioned to an OHCHR-provided database which, considering the improvement of the security situation on the ground and therefore the ability of UNAMI personnel to travel across governorates, was critical to help conduct investigations and monitoring on demonstrations and responses by security forces and other actors, as well as the work on detention. The possibility to deploy to the field and establish networks of contacts to identify and reach out to primary sources has been key to advancing UNAMI's PoC work, particularly when the conflict was most violent. UNAMI redirected its efforts and resources to a broader concept of PoC and reported on issues of administration of justice, including torture and conditions of detention, enforced disappearances, and fundamental freedoms and rights such as the rights to assembly and expression. Moreover, the UNAMI human rights component has worked toward strengthening cooperation and multilateralism within the mission to ensure that information gathered by all the different entities positively contributes to the protection framework of the whole mission, including on child protection and CRSV issues.

In Sudan, due to the transition to UNITAMS and the current limitations in terms of size of the team in line with the mandate given to the new mission, the PoC role shifted from direct engagement to a support role toward the Government in the implementation of the National Mechanism for Protection of Civilians. Specifically, UNITAMS is providing technical assistance to the Government to develop sound action plans with measurable indicators to assist the authorities in meeting their obligations in relation to protection of civilians. In parallel, UNITAMS is advancing capacity-building activities with civil society that were initiated under UNAMID. However, as already indicated above, the limited budget and human resources are preventing an even larger outreach on PoC. While shifting responsibilities and monitoring roles to national stakeholders is a positive outcome in terms of strengthening local capacities to promote long-term sustainability of the efforts, interviewees shared the belief that political motives of the transition were predominant over considerations of timing for the shift in responsibility and assessments of actual capacities to adequately carry out the tasks.

The precarious security situation in Yemen and serious safety concerns for the staff represent a major obstacle for the UN in Yemen to carry out comprehensive PoC work. Even the GEE Yemen, while recognizing that serious violations of international law may have recently occurred, [reported](#) significant political and technical obstacles in the implementation of their mandate, which was further compounded by the COVID-19 situation. With SPMs in Yemen lacking a PoC mandate, operations are reported in a disjointed manner. For example, it was found that there is a functioning Country Task Force on MRM documenting violations according to Security Council Resolution 1612 and that OHCHR proactively shares information on civilian casualties with other protection actors. However, details on how these activities are carried out and how synergies are established with

existing SPMs to promote behavioral changes and protect civilians were not shared during the interviews. It appears that the humanitarian and political dimensions of the conflict prevail over the human rights dimension, relegating PoC as a secondary component of UN protection-related work in Yemen rather than the central element as argued in the first part of this paper.

According to interviewees, a common feature among the experiences of SPMs in the field is the absence of a systematic approach to new technologies to inform PoC operations. Human Rights components mostly carry out PoC tasks with the traditional methodologies that have proven successful for UNAMA and elsewhere. However, little evidence has been found that SPMs in the field have implemented or utilized strategies or capacities to document violations and incidents through innovative techniques such as those pioneered by [Bellingcat](#), [Airwars](#), and others. For example, according to interviewees, SPMs appear to have access to satellite images through the United Nations Satellite Centre upon specific request but not at the field level to facilitate geolocation, corroborate testimonies, and identify perpetrators. Since SPMs often face access challenges to countries or parts of them, developing knowledge and expertise on open sources and satellite imagery analysis may prove extremely beneficial to PoC and, ultimately, to SPMs' decision making. Relevant budget allocations should be considered in the planning phase to purchase or avail itself of services that could significantly contribute to the in-country or remote substantive work of SPMs.

Finally, SPMs need properly resourced and trained PoC staff. The success of both the UNAMA and UNAMI examples was partly due to the highly trained cadre of human rights officers with specific PoC backgrounds and training. Future SPMs need not rely on human rights officers, but it is imperative that SPMs include staff with either a PoC background or that have been trained with a PoC mandate in mind. For example, in the 2010-11 timeframe UNAMA began hiring numerous international staff with specific PoC expertise, including experts on civilian harm, sexual and gender-based violence, torture, and IHL. They were posted across the regional offices conducting PoC-specific training with national staff, implemented a new PoC-specific database, and conducted outreach to all parties to the conflict on PoC issues, including the Taliban. The PoC unit at UNAMA has become an example of best practices often cited within the UN and PoC community and, while unique to the conflict, provides numerous lessons that can be applied to future SPMs.

# 5. Conclusion

*For our concrete recommendations, see Chapter 1.1.*

This research demonstrated that the discussion around PoC and the need for enhanced protection of civilians through the work of SPMs needs to be further explored and coherent decisions must be made to translate the objective of protecting civilians into effective policies and concrete operations. The UN should take efforts to harmonize views on PoC across the UN system and prioritize implementation rather than conceptualization. In principle, SPMs and other UN entities' engagements, programs, and advocacy should pursue a broad understanding of PoC, placing at the core of their planning and operations phases the definition of civilian harm offered by PAX.

This paper proposes the UN should develop a UN-system-wide protection framework in order to address gaps in protection arising from disparate individual mandates of different UN entities, while also optimizing use of the flexibility and expertise that the system of different entities provides. The UN should develop a theoretical system whereby PoC is prioritized as playing an inherent central role in guiding a coordinated UN approach in any given SPM. Coordination and collaboration among UN entities and within Missions should be fostered to improve reporting and information gathering and -sharing to contribute to building coherent and comprehensive analysis and inform decision making at both Mission and headquarters levels. As indicated in Table 1 above, other protection issues would provide substantial contributions to ensure the analysis encompasses all the necessary elements to assess the broader concept of civilian harm.

The concrete implementation of such a framework rests on several factors. First is the formation of SPM mandates, including the benefits of explicit inclusion of PoC language, as well as the benefits of broader mandates, allowing for flexibility in implementing the UN's PoC agenda. Many interviewees called for the explicit inclusion of PoC language into relevant SPMs' mandates, which has the benefit of providing SPMs with strong legitimacy in their engagements with interlocutors and, consequently, a higher probability of leading to behavioral changes. Many interviewees also prioritized the need for a broader look at the SPM PoC agenda, noting that even when there is no explicit PoC language in a mandate, it does not mean there is not a PoC role to play, and, in fact, the core role of the UN is inherently all about protection, including the promotion of human rights. Broader mandates also allow SPMs to adapt to changes on the ground in a timely manner, gaining in effectiveness and ability to identify emerging protection concerns, as can be seen in the case of UNAMI, for example.

Second is the type and structure of the SPM that is deployed to the field. With numerous options at the disposal of the Security Council, PoC mandates and tasks should be given exclusively when the size and resourcing of the Mission, as well as the geographical coverage it has in the country allows for it. Burdening an SPM with a mandate requiring operations that cannot be practically carried out would negatively impact on the ability of the SPM to prevent harm and promote positive changes. Moreover, it would expose the UN to reputational risks that may in turn jeopardize political efforts at advancing peacebuilding.

Finally, security considerations for UN staff – national and international – as well as for all interlocutors and partners, should guide all considerations around SPMs and PoC. Emphasis must be placed on the full respect of the principle of “Do No Harm” as a protection imperative and a necessity for UN operations in any context. In this view, the UN should prioritize improving and ensuring full implementation of the HRDDP across the system as a pressing necessity.

**ANNEX I: OVERVIEW OF MISSION MANDATES AND STRUCTURES ANALYZED IN THE PAPER**


MISSION	MANDATE	YEAR	RESOLUTION	STRUCTURE
<b>UNAMID</b> (Peacekeeping)	<p>Protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan;</p> <p>Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel;</p> <p>Mediate between the Government of Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur;</p> <p>Support the mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes.</p>	2014	2148	4,005 military personnel, 480 police advisers, 1631 formed police unit officers, 483 international civilian staff, 64 UN volunteers, 945 national civilian staff.
<b>UNITAMS</b>	<p>Assisting the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace;</p> <p>Supporting peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements;</p> <p>Assisting peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile states);</p> <p>Supporting the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance by ensuring an integrated approach with UN agencies, funds and programs and through collaboration with international financial institutions.</p>	2021	2579	141 international staff, 117 national staff, 11 UN volunteers.
<b>UNAMA</b> (Original)	<p>Provision of good offices;</p> <p>Support for the organization of future elections;</p> <p>Strengthening capacity in the protection and promotion of human rights including the protection of children affected by armed conflict and prevention of child recruitment;</p> <p>Support for gender equality and women's and girls' empowerment;</p> <p>Coordination and facilitation of humanitarian assistance;</p> <p>Support for Afghanistan's development and governance priorities, including the rule of law, transitional justice, budget execution, and the fight against corruption.</p>	2002	1401	296 international staff, 799 national staff, 68 UN volunteers.

<p><b>UNAMA</b> (until revision of mandate in March 2022)</p>	<p>To monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection;</p> <p>To monitor places of detention, and the treatment of those deprived of their liberty;</p> <p>To promote accountability, and advise on the establishment and implementation of judicial and non-judicial processes to address the legacy of large-scale human rights violations and abuses as well as international crimes.</p>	<p>2020</p>	<p>2543</p>	
<p><b>UNAMI</b> (Original)</p>	<p>Provision of advice, support and assistance to the Government and the people of Iraq on advancing inclusive political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation;</p> <p>Assistance to the electoral process;</p> <p>Facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation between Iraq and its neighbours;</p> <p>Promoting accountability and the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform;</p> <p>Promoting gender equality;</p> <p>Promoting coordination and facilitating, in coordination with the Government of Iraq delivery in the humanitarian and development areas.</p>	<p>2003</p>	<p>1500 then revised under 1770 (2007)</p>	<p>303 international staff, 502 national staff, 2 UN volunteers.</p>
<p><b>UNAMI</b> (Latest)</p>	<p>Promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq, in order to strengthen the rule of law and improve governance in Iraq, in addition to supporting the work of the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD) established in resolution 2379 (2017).</p>	<p>2021</p>	<p>2576</p>	



<p><b>OSESGY</b></p>	<p><i>NOTE: Unlike the other SPMs in this table, the OSESGY does not have a mandate from the UNSC, rather a description of the intended function from the UNSG operating under the mandate of his good offices, like most Special Envoys.</i></p> <p>Enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people, including women, for peaceful change and meaningful political, economic and social reform, as set out in the 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference of 2013-2014;</p> <p>Work closely with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Security Council and other international partners to ensure strong and consistent international backing for peace and stability in Yemen.</p>	<p>2011</p> <p>2012</p>	<p>2014</p> <p>2051</p>	<p>61 international staff, 34 national staff.</p>
<p><b>UNMHA</b></p>	<p>To lead, and support the functioning of the Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC), assisted by a secretariat staffed by United Nations personnel, to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces, and mine action operations;</p> <p>To monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire in Hudaydah governorate and the mutual redeployment of forces from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ras Isa;</p> <p>To work with the parties so that the security of the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ras Isa is assured by local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law;</p> <p>To facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties to fully implement the Hudaydah Agreement.</p>	<p>2019</p>	<p>2452</p>	<p>36 international staff, 69 nationals.</p>


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
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
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
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